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Authors and Discussants

Authors

Elizabeth E. Bailey
Civil Aeronautics Board
Kenneth C. Baseman
Department of Justice
Melvyn Fuss
University of Toronto
John E. Jackson
University of Michigan
Paul L. Joskow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Robert A. Leone
Harvard Business School
Richard C. Levin
Yale University
Patricia Munch
Rand Corporation
Roger C. Noll
California Institute of Technology
Sam Peltzman
University of Chicago
Dennis Smallwood
University of California, San Diego
Leonard Waverman
University of Toronto
Robert D. Willig
Princeton University

Discussants

William J. Baumol
Princeton University and
New York University
Ronald Braeutigam
Northwestern University
Alfred E. Kahn
Cornell University
Alvin K. Klevorick
Yale University
Allan V. Kneese
University of New Mexico
Howard Kunreuther
University of Pennsylvania
Michael P. Lynch
Federal Trade Commission
Bridger M. Mitchell
International Institute of Management
and Rand Corporation
Almarin Phillips
University of Pennsylvania
John C. Panzar
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.
Richard Schmalensee
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
George J. Stigler
University of Chicago
Richard Zeckhauser
Harvard University

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