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Since the recent deregulation of the airlines, a chorus of politicians and consumers has been calling for the deregulation of other industries—especially those in the troubled transportation sector. By making use of a general-equilibrium model, the authors of this study have evaluated the consequences of deregulation in the rail and trucking industries and, in particular, have quantified the efficiency and distributional effects of such a change.

The book uses new and powerful econometric and analytical tools in its general-equilibrium analysis, with explicit attention to the tradeoffs between the efficiency and distributional aspects of deregulation policies and the relationship between freight rates and regional incomes. The analysis recognizes the interdependence among the various rail and trucking modes and thus encompasses the full general-equilibrium effects of deregulation. In addition, by differentiating between short-run and long-run equilibrium, it takes changes in railroad infrastructure into account, balancing the huge costs of infrastructure maintenance against the savings of abandoning low-density routes. The book also tests a number of general hypotheses about the structure of cost and demand in the transport industries.

The SEC and the Public Interest
by Susan M. Phillips and J. Richard Zecher

"The SEC and the Public Interest presents an irreverent but thoughtful challenge to most of the assumptions on which the SEC has been operating since 1934. President Reagan would be well advised to hand his new SEC Chairman this book with an admonition to either accept its teachings or to prove it wrong."—Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, 1975-1977, Securities and Exchange Commission

"If the SEC were a firm with traded stock, the disclosure of the information in this book would make its stock fall sharply."—Fischer Black, Professor, Sloan School of Management, MIT

The Economics and Politics of Oil Price Regulation
Federal Policy in the Post-Embargo Era
by Joseph P. Kalt

The broad theme of this book is that, within the domestic public policy arena, the energy crisis is primarily a battle over the appropriate distribution of income within society rather than the manifestation of some massive failure of markets and institutions to allocate the nation's energy resources efficiently. It explains the political and economic factors that have shaped post-embargo oil policy, assesses the impact of regulation on the prices we pay for refined petroleum products, and estimates how that price impact has translated into gains and losses in efficiency of allocation and into income transfers.