1 Overview

More than one billion people live in extreme poverty, which is defined by the World Bank as subsisting on less than one dollar a day. In 2001, fully half of the developing world lived on less than two dollars a day. Yet poverty rates are much lower today than twenty years ago. In the last two decades, the percentage of the developing world living in extreme poverty has been cut in half. While poverty rates were falling, developing countries became increasingly integrated into the world trading system. Poor countries have slashed protective tariffs and increased their participation in world trade. If we use the share of exports in gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of globalization, then developing countries are now more globalized than high-income countries.

Does globalization reduce poverty? Will ongoing efforts to eliminate protection and increase world trade improve the lives of the world’s poor? There is surprisingly little evidence on this question. The comprehensive

Ann Harrison is a professor of agricultural and resource economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. I would like to thank Pranab Bardhan, Ethan Ligon, Margaret McMillan, Branko Milanovic, Guido Porto, Emma Aisbett, Don Davis, Alix Zwane, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.

1. The poverty estimates in this paragraph are taken from the World Bank’s official poverty web site, at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp. The $1-a-day poverty line is actually $1.08 in 1993 purchasing power parity dollars.
3. Although there have been a number of recent studies on globalization and inequality, these volumes focus primarily on distributional consequences of globalization, rather than poverty. There are exceptions, of course; see, for example, Bhagwati (2004). Bardhan’s publications on this topic include his Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, published as Social Justice in a Global Economy (Bardhan 2000), as well as Bardhan (2003, 2004). See also Hertel and Winters (2005), forthcoming.
studies by Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), and Ravallion (2004a) all acknowledge that they can review only the indirect evidence regarding the linkages between globalization and poverty. There have been almost no studies that test for the direct linkages between the two.4

Yet one of the biggest concerns of globalization's critics is its impact on the poor. This introduction and the following chapters provide an economist’s perspective on how globalization affects poverty in developing countries.5 By bringing together experts on both international trade and poverty, we hope to bridge the intellectual divide that separates the individuals who study each of these phenomena. The fifteen studies and accompanying discussions that are part of this project ask the following questions: How has global economic integration affected the poor in developing countries? Do trade reforms that cut import protection improve the lives of the poor? Has increasing financial integration led to more or less poverty? How have the poor fared during currency crises? Do agricultural support programs in rich countries hurt the poor in developing countries? Or do such programs in fact provide assistance by reducing the cost of food imports? Finally, does food aid hurt the poor by lowering the price of the goods they sell on local markets?

Although the concept of globalization is quite broad, we focus on two aspects: (1) international trade in goods and (2) international movements of capital—including foreign investment, portfolio flows, and aid. Consequently, most of the chapters measure the impact of increased exposure to trade and international capital flows on poverty. We do not address other aspects of globalization, such as information flows, migration, or trade in services. A number of chapters also address the linkages between our preferred measures of globalization and inequality.

Why is it important to also think about globalization's impact on inequality in a volume devoted to poverty? Most economists expect openness to trade to be associated with higher growth, and growth is good for the poor. Consequently, we would expect that increasing trade should lead to less poverty. Yet if openness to trade is associated with increasing inequality.

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4. Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004) write in their insightful and comprehensive survey that “there are no direct studies of the poverty effects of trade and trade liberalization.” Goldberg and Pavcnik’s (2004) excellent review points out that “while the literature on trade and inequality is voluminous, there is virtually no work to date on the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty.” The few studies that do examine the links between globalization and poverty typically use computable general equilibrium models to disentangle the linkages between trade reform and poverty. While such research provides an important contribution to our understanding of the channels through which globalization could affect poverty, it is extremely important to be able to look at actual ex post evidence of the impact of trade and investment reforms on the poor. See the studies cited in Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004), Ravallion (2004a), Chen and Ravallion (2000), and Hertel and Winters (2005).

5. More information can be found online at http://www.nber.org/books.html.
ity, then the growth gains from trade could be wiped out for those at the bottom of the income distribution. In other words, if the gains from trade are highly unequal, then the poor may not share the benefits. Many of the studies in this volume suggest that globalization has been associated with rising inequality, and that the poor do not always share in the gains from trade.

The new research presented in this volume takes two different approaches: cross-country studies and individual country studies. The cross-country studies use aggregate data to examine the impact of globalization on the number of poor, aggregate growth rates, and inequality. The country case studies typically use microdata for a single country to examine the impact of globalization on the incomes of the poor. Cross-country studies are appealing because they allow authors to generalize beyond one specific case study. Yet many countries have information on aggregate poverty for only two or three points in time, which means that statistical tests using cross-country data may not yield conclusive results. Consequently, most of the studies in this volume rely on the use of microdata. These data sets typically span a number of years, including periods before, during, and after a trade reform.

What are the lessons that emerge from the various chapters? Although the issues are complex, some broad themes emerge.

The poor in countries with an abundance of unskilled labor do not always gain from trade reform. Many economists have used the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) framework in international trade to argue that trade liberalization should raise the incomes of the unskilled in labor-abundant countries. Most researchers who use this framework to argue that globalization is good for the world’s poor make a number of heroic assumptions. These assumptions—such as the necessity that all countries produce all goods—are challenged in this volume. In addition, the country studies show that labor is not nearly as mobile as the HO trade model assumes; for comparative advantage to increase the incomes of the unskilled, they need to be able to move out of contracting sectors and into expanding ones. Another reason why the poor may not gain from trade reforms is that developing countries have historically protected sectors that use unskilled labor, such as textiles and apparel. This pattern of protection, while at odds with simple interpretations of HO models, makes sense if standard assumptions (such as factor price equalization) are relaxed. Trade reforms may result in less protection for unskilled workers, who are most likely to be poor. Finally, penetrating global markets even in sectors that traditionally use unskilled labor requires more skills than the poor in developing countries typically possess.

The poor are more likely to share in the gains from globalization when there are complementary policies in place. The studies on India and Colombia suggest that globalization is more likely to benefit the poor if trade reforms
are implemented in conjunction with reducing impediments to labor mobility. In Zambia, poor farmers are only expected to benefit from greater access to export markets if they also have access to credit, technical know-how, and other complementary inputs. The studies also point to the importance of social safety nets. In Mexico, if poor corn farmers had not received income support from the government, their real incomes would have been halved during the 1990s. In Ethiopia, if food aid had not been well targeted, globalization would have had little impact on the poor. The fact that other policies are needed to ensure that the benefits of trade are shared across the population suggests that relying on trade reforms alone to reduce poverty is likely to be disappointing.

*Export growth and incoming foreign investment have reduced poverty.* Poverty has fallen in regions where exports or foreign investment is growing. In Mexico, the poor in the most globalized regions have weathered macroeconomic crises better than their more isolated neighbors. In India, opening up to foreign investment has been associated with a decline in poverty. The study on Zambia suggests that poor consumers gain from falling prices for the goods they buy, while poor producers in exporting sectors benefit from trade reform through higher prices for their goods. In Colombia, increasing export activity has been associated with an increase in compliance with labor legislation and a fall in poverty. In Poland, unskilled workers—who are the most likely to be poor—have gained from Poland’s accession to the European Union.

*Financial crises are costly to the poor.* In Indonesia, poverty rates increased by at least 50 percent after the currency crisis in 1997. While recovery in Indonesia has been rapid, the Mexican economy has yet to fully recover from its 1995 peso crisis. Poverty rates in Mexico in the year 2000 were higher than they had been ten years earlier. Cross-country evidence also suggests that financial globalization leads to higher consumption and output volatility in low-income countries. One implication is that low-income countries are more likely to benefit from financial integration if they also create reliable institutions and pursue macroeconomic stabilization policies (including the use of flexible exchange rate regimes). However, foreign investment flows have very different effects from other types of capital flows. While unrestricted capital flows are associated with a higher likelihood of poverty, foreign direct investment inflows are associated with a reduction in poverty. The poverty-reducing effects of foreign direct investment are clearly documented in the chapters on India and Mexico.

*Globalization produces both winners and losers among the poor.* It should not be surprising that the results defy easy generalization. Even within a single region, two sets of farmers may be affected in opposite ways. In Mexico, while some small and most medium corn farmers saw their incomes fall by half in the 1990s, large corn farmers gained. Across different countries, poor wage earners in exporting sectors or in sectors with incoming foreign
investment gained from trade and investment reforms; conversely, poverty rates increased in previously protected sectors that were exposed to import competition. Within the same country or even the same region, a trade reform may lead to income losses for rural agricultural producers and income gains for rural or urban consumers of those same goods.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some issues associated with measuring both poverty and globalization. Section 3 discusses theoretical links between trade and poverty outcomes. Section 4 summarizes the results from the cross-country studies, while section 5 describes the results of the country case studies. The studies that address the impact of capital flows on the poor are summarized in section 6. Although the focus of this volume is on the relationship between poverty and different measures of globalization, a number of authors also address other possible outcomes associated with globalization; these are described in section 7 of this chapter. Since the evidence suggests that globalization creates winners as well as losers among the poor, this chapter moves in section 8 to a discussion of why globalization’s critics seem all too aware of the costs of globalization and generally fail to see the benefits. A number of research questions remain unanswered; these are also discussed in section 8. Section 9 concludes.

2 Measuring Globalization and Poverty

There is an enormous literature devoted to trade and poverty measurement. For openness to trade, the authors in this volume use both trade volumes and measures of trade policy. Most contributors favor the use of direct policy measures, such as tariffs or quotas, over trade volumes. Trade volumes are typically measured as shares, such as exports plus imports divided by GDP. Although widely available, trade shares are not ideal because they are determined by trade policies, geography, country size, and macroeconomic policies. Globalization of financial flows is measured either by creating indexes of policy or by using measures of actual flows. Capital controls, which are collected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are examples of policy measures; again, actual capital flows are less desirable measures of policy than capital controls since flows are outcomes of many factors.

One important observation that emerges from the various chapters is that different measures of globalization are associated with different poverty outcomes. How globalization is measured determines whether globalization is good for the poor. Measures of export activity and foreign investment are generally associated with poverty reduction, while removal of protection (an ex ante measure of globalization) or import shares (an ex post measure) are frequently associated with rising poverty. These different effects are consistent with short-run models of international trade (such as
the specific-sector model) where factors of production cannot easily move from contracting or import-competing sectors to expanding or export-oriented ones.

Poverty is typically measured by choosing a poverty line, which reflects the minimum income or consumption necessary to meet basic needs. For low-income countries, the World Bank has calculated poverty lines at $1 and $2 a day.⁶ Although these minimum requirements vary across countries and over time, the $1- and $2-a-day measures allow policymakers to compare poverty across countries using the same reference point. The head count measure of poverty identifies the percentage of the population living in households with consumption or income per person below the poverty line. The head count is reported either as a percentage (the incidence of poverty) or as the number of individuals who are poor. Another popular measure is the poverty gap, which measures the mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line.

One area of disagreement in poverty measurement is whether poverty should be measured as the percentage of individuals who are poor (the incidence) or the absolute number of people who are poor. While the incidence of poverty has been falling over the last twenty years, the change in the absolute numbers of poor individuals depends on the poverty line chosen. The number of individuals living on less than one dollar a day declined in the 1980s and 1990s, while the number of individuals living on between one and two dollars a day did not.⁷ Critics of globalization frequently use the absolute number of people who are poor as their preferred measure, while globalization’s supporters (see the comment by Xavier Sala-i-Martin for chap. 1 in this volume) prefer to use the incidence of poverty. Chapter 1, by Emma Aisbett, shows that this diversity of opinion is one of the reasons that there is so much disagreement about whether world poverty has been falling during the period of globalization.

It is important to emphasize that the poverty line itself is not fixed over time. Eswar S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan Kose conclude chapter 11 with the following observation:

One has to acknowledge that poverty is fundamentally a relative measure, which will probably gain an entirely different meaning as the world economy becomes more integrated. . . . For example, if global growth continues at a rapid pace during the next century, it is possible that by the end of the century emerging-market economies, including China and India, could attain income levels exceeding those of Americans today. This implies that Malthusian notions of poverty are likely to become a

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⁶ Ann Harrison

⁷ One possible explanation is that the poor in the world are becoming better off, moving from incomes of less than $1 to less than $2 per day. Yet this possibility has not been adequately explored, in large part because this necessitates being able to follow the same poor household or individual over time.
distant memory in most parts of the world as global income inexorably expands over the next century, and issues of inequality, rather than subsistence, will increasingly take center stage in the poverty debate.

The country case studies show that acceptable poverty lines vary across countries and through time. As discussed by Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik in chapter 6, the $1-a-day line is indicative of poverty lines used in very poor countries, but not in middle-income countries such as Colombia. The official poverty line in Colombia is closer to three (purchasing power parity) dollars a day. In the United States, the poverty line in 2004 was closer to thirty dollars a day. As acceptable definitions of poverty shift over time, research on inequality and the overall distribution of income becomes increasingly important. This is one reason why Gordon H. Hanson, Ethan Ligon, and Duncan Thomas and Elizabeth Frankenberg, in their chapters, report the impact of globalization on the entire distribution of income, using nonparametric techniques.

3 Theoretical Linkages between Globalization and Poverty

One of the most famous theorems in international trade is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which in its simplest form suggests that the abundant factor should see an increase in its real income when a country opens up to trade. If the abundant factor in developing countries is unskilled labor, then this framework suggests that the poor (unskilled) in developing countries have the most to gain from trade. Anne Krueger (1983) and Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan (2002) have all used this insight to argue that trade reforms in developing countries should be pro-poor, since these countries are most likely to have a comparative advantage in producing goods made with unskilled labor. From this perspective, expanding trade opportunities should cut poverty and reduce inequality within poor countries.

In chapter 2, which examines the theoretical linkages between trade and poverty, Donald R. Davis and Prachi Mishra argue that “Stolper-Samuelson is dead.” They write eloquently that applying trade theory to suggest that liberalization will raise the wages of the unskilled in unskilled-abundant countries is “worse than wrong—it is dangerous.” Davis and Mishra show that such arguments are based on a very narrow interpretation of the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem. In particular, SS holds only if all countries produce all goods, if the goods imported from abroad and produced domestically are close substitutes, or if comparative advantage can be fixed vis-à-vis all trading partners. As an illustration, a poor country in a world with many factors and many goods may no longer have a comparative advantage in producing unskilled-intensive goods. This idea is easy to understand in the context of three countries—for example, the
United States, Mexico, and China. Although Mexico might have a comparative advantage in producing low-skill goods in trade with the United States, its comparative advantage switches vis-à-vis trade with China.

Trade reform also affects the poor by changing the prices they face as consumers and producers. Davis and Mishra develop a simple model to show that if imports and domestic goods (produced by the poor) are non-competing, then the first-order effect of a trade reform would be to raise real incomes of the poor. Clearly, the poor gain from tariff reductions on goods that they buy. If globalization raises the prices of goods produced by the poor—such as agricultural products marketed by farmers—then poverty is also likely to decline.

Many of the authors in this volume do not use the HO model as their framework but adopt a specific-sector framework. In the specific-sector framework, workers or machines may be attached to a specific sector or industry and unable to relocate easily. Consequently, any reduction in protection to sector X will lead to a fall in the incomes of workers who previously produced goods for that sector and are unable to relocate elsewhere. The mechanism is the following: a fall in protection is assumed to put downward pressure on the price of the previously protected good, which in turn shifts labor demand downward. It is important to remember, however, that the reverse is also true: any increase in export activity in sector Y would then be beneficial to workers attached to that sector. The specific-sector model suggests that workers may gain from globalization depending on which sectors (import-competing or exporting) they are attached to; this is very different from the HO framework, which suggests that winners and losers from globalization can be identified by their skill levels, regardless of where they work. If the HO assumption of perfect labor mobility across sectors is violated, then the specific-sector model may be the more appropriate framework, at least in the short run.

In chapter 3, William Easterly also explores the theoretical linkages between globalization and poverty, but in the context of a neoclassical growth model. Easterly shows that globalization could affect the incomes of the poor in two opposite ways. If productivity levels are similar but endowments are different, globalization should raise the incomes of the poor. Globalization, by relaxing constraints on the movement of goods and factors, will allow factor returns to equalize across countries. This is the factor endowment view. If poor countries are more endowed with (unskilled) labor, then relaxing constraints on global trade or factor flows will lead capital to flow to poor countries, and per capita incomes there should rise. A second possibility is the productivity view. Differences in per capita incomes may stem from exogenous productivity differences across countries rather than differences in endowments. This second possibility implies that globalization either will have no impact on poverty or could exacerbate poverty, as capital is drawn away from low-productivity toward high-productivity regions.
Aart Kraay (in the chap. 3 comment), Sala-i-Martin, and Prasad and his coauthors emphasize that globalization could raise the incomes of the poor through a third channel: by increasing long-run growth. To reconcile their perspective with Easterly’s framework, this means that increases in trade or capital flows could increase incomes of the poor by raising productivity or through the accumulation of capital. Imports of new goods embody new technology, which in turn raises productivity, while incoming foreign investment provides the possibility for technology transfer. If the income effects are fairly uniform, then the increase in aggregate income resulting from globalization-induced productivity gains should improve the incomes of the poor.

4 Cross-Country Evidence

The cross-country studies present evidence on the relationship between poverty, inequality, and globalization. Easterly finds that increasing trade integration is associated with falling inequality within developed countries and greater inequality within developing countries. His results are consistent with the evidence presented in chapter 4 by Branko Milanovic and Lyn Squire, who construct their own measures of both interindustry and interoccupation wage inequality using detailed information on wages across occupations and industries. Milanovic and Squire find that globalization, measured using average tariffs, leads to rising inequality in poor countries and falling inequality in rich countries.

Both Easterly’s and Milanovic and Squire’s chapters find that increasing openness to trade is associated with rising inequality in poor countries. Easterly argues that the evidence is consistent with his productivity view, whereby exogenous differences in productivity lead capital to flow from poor to rich countries and exacerbate inequality in poor countries. Milanovic and Squire emphasize the lack of labor mobility and the weak power of unions to explain why increasing openness to trade is associated with rising inequality in poor countries.

In his comment on Easterly’s chapter, Kraay reviews the evidence on (1) the linkages between trade and growth, and (2) the relationship between growth and poverty. Although some previous studies on the relationship between trade and growth have been discredited (see Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000 and Harrison and Hanson 1999), Kraay cites several new studies that find that increasing openness to trade is associated with higher growth. Kraay also points to his own work showing that growth is good for the poor, and concludes that since trade enhances growth, which in turn reduces poverty, then globalization is good for the poor.

In chapter 5, Margaret McMillan, Alix Peterson Zwane, and Nava Ashraf use cross-country data to measure the impact of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) support policies for
agriculture on poverty. The vast majority of least developed countries have historically been net importers of food, particularly cereals, which are among the crops most subsidized by the OECD. As net food importers, poor countries may gain from rich-country subsidies (see also Panagariya 2002, 2004; Valdes and McCalla 1999). Even within food-exporting countries, the poorest members of society may be net purchasers of food. However, McMillan and coauthors find no support in the cross-country analysis for the claim that OECD policies worsen poverty in developing countries.

None of these studies directly examine the aggregate relationship between different poverty measures and globalization. Previous research on this topic, including Dollar and Kraay (2001, 2002), combines measures of income distribution derived from household surveys with aggregate national income data to measure the income of the poor. Deaton (2001, 2003) suggests that using aggregate national income data to interpret cross-country correlations between aggregate growth and poverty reduction is likely to be misleading. This is because the observed correlation could be attributable to measurement error as well as biases in national income statistics, which generally suggest a much higher rate of poverty reduction relative to trends in aggregate poverty implied by household surveys.

One solution to this problem is to use measures of poverty based exclusively on household surveys. Yet the limited time series for poverty data from these surveys makes it almost impossible to conclude anything on the aggregate relationship between openness and poverty. I show this in tables 1 and 2, which report regression results on the linkages between openness, GDP growth, and different measures of poverty. I begin by revisiting the evidence on the linkages between trade and growth; these results are presented in table 1. Openness to trade is measured in two different ways, as either (1) the ratio of trade \((X + M)\) to GDP or (2) average tariffs, defined as tariff revenues divided by imports. The results suggest that an increase in openness—using these two measures—is associated with an increase in aggregate income.\(^8\)

The problems of small sample size are illustrated in columns (5) and (10) of table 1. I redo the basic specifications but restrict the sample to the observations for the country-years where poverty rates could be calculated based on household surveys. In the restricted sample the link between

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8. To address concerns regarding endogeneity, openness is measured using either its three-year lag or the contemporaneous value instrumented using lagged values. These results are robust to the inclusion of other controls, such as country fixed effects or policy variables likely to be correlated with trade policies. Other extensions, using growth of GDP per capita as the dependent variable instead of income per capita, yield similar results. Although some specifications—notably those that include country fixed effects and instrument for openness using lagged values—are not always significant at the 5 percent level, the evidence is generally consistent with a positive relationship between openness and income or growth. The evidence is also consistent with recent work by Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004), who apply more innovative ways to address the endogeneity of openness and continue to find a positive relationship between openness (measured using trade shares) and growth.
Table 1
Income per capita and trade policy for a panel of developing countries (dependent variable: ln income per capita, in PPP $1993$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS no controls (1)</th>
<th>OLS no controls (2)</th>
<th>OLS includes controls (3)</th>
<th>OLS includes controls (4)</th>
<th>OLS includes controls (5)</th>
<th>IV no controls (6)</th>
<th>IV no controls (7)</th>
<th>IV includes controls (8)</th>
<th>IV includes controls (9)</th>
<th>IV includes controls (10)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Income per capita and trade shares</td>
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<tr>
<td>Three-year lag trade share</td>
<td>0.907 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.514 (0.037)</td>
<td>0.214 (0.038)</td>
<td>0.203 (0.035)</td>
<td>0.081 (0.074)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade share</td>
<td>0.978 (0.037)</td>
<td>0.857 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.426 (0.067)</td>
<td>0.402 (0.064)</td>
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<td>2,657</td>
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<td>B. Income per capita and average import tariffs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Three-year lag average import tariff</td>
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<td>−0.721 (0.142)</td>
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<td>−0.137 (0.119)</td>
<td>−0.250 (0.281)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average import tariff</td>
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<td>−4.830 (0.441)</td>
<td>−0.635 (0.328)</td>
<td>−0.338 (0.379)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aisbett, Harrison, and Zwane (2005).
Notes: OLS = ordinary least squares. IV = instrumental variables. Restricted sample is country-year observations for which poverty (head count) data are available. All regressions exclude OECD high-income countries. Columns (3) and (8) include controls for inflation, government expenditure in GDP, currency crises, investment in GDP, and the fraction of the population that is literate. Columns (4), (5), (9), and (10) include controls for inflation, government expenditure, and currency crises. Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. In instrumental variables regressions, trade share is instrumented using three-year lagged value, and import tariff is instrumented using three-year lagged value.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Head count poverty and trade policy for a panel of developing countries (dependent variable: ln fraction of households living on less than $1 per day, in PPP $1993)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>OLS no controls</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>A. Head count poverty ($1 per day) and import tariffs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Three-year lag trade share</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.385)</td>
<td>(0.502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade share</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–2.164</td>
<td>–1.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.760)</td>
<td>(0.524)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three-year lag log income per capita</td>
<td>–2.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.252)</td>
<td>(1.646)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country fixed effects</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time fixed effects</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Head count poverty ($1 per day) and average import tariffs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three-year lag average import tariff</td>
<td>7.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.229)</td>
<td>(1.618)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average import tariff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–1.038</td>
<td>6.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.266)</td>
<td>(1.801)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three-year lag log real income per capita</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(1.666)</td>
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<td>Time fixed effects</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aisbett, Harrison, and Zwane (2005).

Notes: OLS = ordinary least squares. IV = instrumental variables. Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions exclude OECD high-income countries. Columns (3), (6), (8), and (10) include controls for inflation, government expenditure in GDP, currency crises, investment in GDP, and the fraction of the population that is literate. Columns (2), (5), (7), and (9) include controls for inflation, government expenditure, and currency crises. In instrumental variables regressions, trade share is instrumented using three-year lagged value, and import tariff is instrumented using three-year lagged value.
openness to trade and GDP per capita weakens significantly. The weakness of the association between openness and growth in this small sample suggests that efforts to find any direct relationship between openness and poverty reduction using cross-country data sets are likely to be plagued by limited data availability.

The association between measures of openness, GDP growth, and poverty is presented in table 2. Measures of poverty are derived from household sample surveys made available by the World Bank. While the results are robust to the poverty measure chosen, in table 2 we define poverty as the percentage of households living on less than $1 a day in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. The evidence in table 2, confirming evidence presented by Besley and Burgess (2003) as well as other researchers, suggests that growth is indeed good for the poor. We use several different measures of income: contemporaneous income, income lagged three periods, and contemporaneous income instrumented using annual average levels of precipitation and temperature. Across all specifications, aggregate income or aggregate income growth (not shown here) is associated with a reduction in the percentage of the population that is poor.9

Although the results presented in tables 1 and 2 suggest a strong link from trade integration to aggregate income, and from income growth to poverty reduction, the evidence on direct linkages between trade shares or tariffs and poverty outcomes is quite weak. While the first three columns of table 2 suggest that openness to trade (measured using either trade shares or tariffs) is associated with less poverty, this result disappears when we introduce country fixed effects. I show this graphically in figures 1 and 2. In figure 1, there is a positive relationship between globalization and poverty reduction, but this association disappears in figure 2 with the addition of country effects.10

To summarize, there is no evidence in the aggregate data that trade reforms are good or bad for the poor.11 Yet even if we could identify a robust

9. The coefficients on real GDP per capita reported in tables 3 and 4 are much larger than those reported by Besley and Burgess (2003). The poverty-reducing effects of growth are larger here because any one of the following changes alone leads to big changes in the coefficient on GDP per capita: the inclusion of time effects, a larger sample with more years of data and more countries, the inclusion of other policy determinants of poverty, or a PPP real GDP per capita measure. The fact that any of these modifications leads to such large changes in the coefficient on GDP per capita suggests that—despite a strong poverty-reducing effect of growth—the exact magnitude of the effect cannot be precisely estimated.

10. Similar results were found when using different poverty measures—such as the percentage of the poor living on less than PPP$2 per day, or the incomes of the poorest quintile or decile.

11. In a comparable exercise using country-level poverty head counts and trade shares, Ravallion (2004b) reaches a similar conclusion; he argues that there is no robust relationship between poverty and globalization in the aggregate data. Possibly the only exception to these general conclusions is Agénor (2004), who finds that there is a nonlinear relationship between measures of poverty and globalization. Agénor finds that at low levels, globalization appears to hurt the poor, but beyond a certain threshold, it seems to reduce poverty. For earlier related studies, see Dollar (2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2001, 2002).
Fig. 1 Correlation between fraction of households living on $1 per day and average import tariff

Fig. 2 Correlation between fraction of households living on $1 per day and average import tariff controlling for country fixed effects
relationship between trade reform and poverty reduction in the aggregate data, cross-country work remains problematic for several reasons. First, it is difficult to find appropriate instruments for trade policy at the country level, or to adequately control for other changes that are occurring at the same time. Second, even if cross-country studies point to a positive relationship between globalization and overall growth, such growth may lead to unequal gains across different levels of income. If the growth effects on average are small and there are large distributional consequences, trade-induced growth could be accompanied by a decline in incomes of the poor. The cross-country evidence presented by Easterly and by Milanovic and Squire is consistent with this view: their chapters suggest that globalization has been accompanied by increasing inequality in poor countries. Finally, even if the cross-country evidence presented in tables 1 and 2 overcomes this problem by directly testing for the relationship between poverty and trade reform, there may be significant underlying heterogeneity across different segments of the population (see also Ravallion 2004a). Aggregate poverty could move in one direction or remain unchanged while poverty increases in some parts of a country and declines in others.

For all these reasons, most of the studies in this volume focus on changes in trade policy within a particular country. These studies typically use highly disaggregated data—at the level of the household or the enterprise—to identify the impact of trade policy. Since these studies exploit differences in globalization across sectors or regions within the same country, they are able to overcome the problem that trade reforms are usually introduced concurrently with other countrywide reforms such as exchange rate stabilization or privatization. Due to the availability of detailed household surveys documenting the existence of the poor, these surveys are also able to successfully address the problem of lack of comparable time series data. Finally, the authors of these studies are generally aware of the problem of the endogeneity of trade reform and are usually able to use the panel nature of these data sets to address this issue.12

5 Country Case Studies

This section reviews the ten country case studies for the volume. These country studies use household- or firm-level data to measure (1) the impact of globalization on employment and labor incomes of the poor and (2) the

12. Even preferred measures of globalization, such as tariffs or capital controls, are likely to be endogenously determined. The possible endogeneity of tariffs, as well as solutions to this problem, is explored in a number of the individual chapters. Since uniformity in tariffs is frequently a goal of trade reform, tariff reductions are often inversely linked to initial tariff levels. To achieve uniformity, policymakers must apply the largest tariff reductions to those sectors with the highest initial protection levels. Consequently, some chapter authors use initial levels of protection as an instrument for changes in tariffs.
impact of globalization on poverty through changes in the prices of goods produced and consumed by the poor.

The Impact of Globalization on Employment and Labor Incomes of the Poor

Country studies on Colombia, India, Mexico, and Poland examine the relationship between trade reform and labor market outcomes. In chapter 6 Goldberg and Pavcnik investigate the impact of a large reduction in average tariffs in Colombia between 1984 and 1998 on a variety of urban labor market outcomes: the probability of becoming unemployed, minimum wage compliance, informal-sector employment, and the incidence of poverty. Analyzing the relationship between globalization and these different labor market outcomes is useful since poverty is highly correlated with unemployment, informal-sector employment, and noncompliance with the minimum wage.

The Colombian experience suggests that individuals in sectors with increasing import competition are likely to become poorer, while those in sectors where exports are growing are less likely to be poor. Import competition increases the likelihood of unemployment and informality, and is associated with a higher incidence of poverty. Export growth is associated with the opposite: falling informal-sector employment, rising minimum wage compliance, and falling poverty. Goldberg and Pavcnik present evidence suggesting that workers cannot easily relocate away from contracting toward expanding sectors in the context of trade reforms, contradicting the assumption of perfect labor mobility in the HO framework. Consistent with other studies in the volume, this analysis of the Colombian trade reforms suggests the importance of complementary policies for minimizing the adverse effects of trade reform on the poor. When trade reform is accompanied by labor market reforms that make it easier for firms to hire or fire and ease relocation for workers, the adverse impact of tariff reductions on poverty disappears.

This is exactly the conclusion reached in chapter 7 by Petia Topalova, who estimates the impact of trade reform in India on poverty. In the 1990s, India embarked on a remarkable trade reform, reversing decades of protectionist policies that had led to average tariffs in excess of 90 percent. Using household data that span the period before and after the reform period, Topalova relates changes in tariffs to changes in the incidence of poverty. In particular, she uses the interaction between the share of a district’s population employed by an industry on the eve of the economic reforms and the reduction in trade barriers in that industry as a measure of a district’s exposure to foreign trade. Because industrial composition is predetermined and trade liberalization was unanticipated, she argues that it is appropriate to causally interpret the correlation between the changes in the levels of poverty and trade exposure.
Topalova’s chapter on India suggests that the rural poor gained less from the trade reforms than other income groups or the urban poor. A rural district experiencing the mean level of tariff reductions saw a 2 percent increase in poverty, accounting for a setback of about 15 percent of India’s progress in poverty reduction over the 1990s. In other words, the progress in poverty reduction experienced in rural India was lower in trade-affected areas, where (rural) poverty may have fallen by an average of 11 instead of 13 percentage points between 1987 and 1999. To identify the net contribution of globalization to poverty reduction in India would require identifying first the contribution of globalization to the overall poverty reduction across all of India during the 1990s, and then netting out the adverse impact on districts with increasing import competition. Topalova also discusses why the rural poor gained less than other groups from liberalization: restrictions on labor mobility in rural areas have impeded adjustment. She finds that the negative impact of trade policy on poverty is reduced or eliminated in regions with flexible labor laws.

While the studies on Colombia and India suggest that the gains from trade reforms were less likely to benefit the poor, the evidence for Mexico and Poland suggests the opposite. In chapter 10 Hanson explores the different outcomes for individuals born in states with high exposure to globalization versus individuals born in states with low exposure to globalization between 1990 and 2000. He finds that the income of individuals in high-exposure states increased relative to the income of individuals in low-exposure states. While labor incomes in the 1990s deteriorated in both regions, due in part to Mexico’s peso crisis in 1995, the deterioration was much less severe in states with high exposure to globalization.

While poverty was falling dramatically in India during this period, between 1990 and 2000 poverty in Mexico increased. In the states with low exposure to globalization, poverty increased from 32 to 40 percent; in the states with high exposure, poverty increased only slightly, from 21 to 22 percent. If we take the difference in the increase in poverty within each region over the 1990s, we find that poverty increased by 8 percent in low-exposure states and by only 1 percent in high-exposure states. The difference-in-difference estimator is the differential in these two changes—that is, 8 – 1 equals 7 percentage points—and is the basis for Hanson’s conclusions that the incidence of wage poverty in low-exposure states increased relative to poverty in high-exposure states by approximately 7 percent.

How can we reconcile the findings on Mexico and India? As pointed out by Hanson, the peso crisis in Mexico in 1995 is one major reason for the aggregate increase in poverty, in contrast to India, which experienced no ma-

13. These mean poverty rates are taken from the mean poverty rates for the rural areas in the national sample surveys for 1987 and 1999. See appendix tables in Topalova (chap. 7 in the volume). Mean poverty in the urban areas is reported separately. Topalova also reports trends in alternative measures of poverty, including the poverty gap and changes in consumption.
jor adverse macroeconomic shock during this period. In addition, Hanson defines high-globalization states to include those with a high proportion of maquiladoras—production activities designated for exports—and foreign direct investment. Topalova also finds, consistent with Hanson’s chapter, that poverty fell more in regions that exported more or received more foreign direct investment. Consequently, both studies suggest that export activity and foreign direct investment are correlated with beneficial outcomes for the poor.

In chapter 8, Chor-ching Goh and Beata S. Javorcik examine the relationship between tariff changes and wages of workers in Poland. Poland embarked on significant trade reforms during the 1990s, when the country moved from a closed to a very open economy, particularly vis-à-vis the European Union. Poland makes an excellent case study in part because changes in its tariffs can be treated as exogenous, as they were stipulated by the Association Agreement between the European community and Poland signed in 1991.

Goh and Javorcik demonstrate that labor mobility is fairly restricted in Poland, placing their analysis also in the context of a specific-sector framework. Their results suggest that workers in sectors that experienced the largest tariff declines experienced the highest increases in wages. They present evidence showing that tariff declines led to wage increases because firms were forced to increase productivity, and productivity increases resulted in higher wages. These micro-level results showing a positive relationship between tariff reductions and productivity increases are consistent with the more aggregate evidence on the positive relationship between openness to trade and aggregate growth. Their results are significantly different, however, from some of the other studies, since they find that workers in sectors with the biggest tariff reductions gained the most.

Impact of Globalization on Poverty via Prices of Production and Consumption Goods

In many developing countries, wages are not the primary source of income for the rural poor. In chapter 9, Jorge F. Balat and Guido G. Porto calculate that in Zambia wages accounted for only 6 percent of income for the rural poor in 1998. Consequently, globalization could affect poverty by affecting the prices of goods consumed by the poor (the consumption channel) and goods produced by the poor (the production channel).

In many cases, the urban poor are net consumers of agricultural products, and the rural poor are net producers of those same products; in this case, an increase in agricultural prices caused (for example) by a removal of export taxes could lead to an increase in urban poverty but a decline in rural poverty. These linkages are explored to various degrees in the studies on Ethiopia, Mexico, and Zambia. In chapter 5, McMillan, Zwane, and Ashraf explore the impact of liberalizing Mexico’s corn market on the in-
comes of the poor rural farmers. The evidence suggests that during the 1990s, imports of both white and yellow corn increased, and prices of Mexican corn fell. However, they also find that the majority of the poorest corn farmers are net consumers of corn and hence benefited from the drop in corn prices. The income from corn production among middle-income farmers who are mostly net sellers fell, both as a share of total income and in absolute terms. The decline in income from corn production among those farmers who are net sellers would have translated into an equivalent decline in real income if farmer incomes had not been supplemented with transfers through government programs such as PROCAMPO and PROGRESA.

In their study of Ethiopian rural grain producers in chapter 13, James Levinsohn and Margaret McMillan explore the impact of food aid on both consumption and production of the rural poor. This chapter addresses the concern that food aid further exacerbates poverty by depressing incomes of rural producers. While Levinsohn and McMillan confirm that a more optimal arrangement would be to buy food from local producers and distribute it to poor consumers, they also show that the net impact of food aid on the poor in Ethiopia has been positive. This is because the poor in Ethiopia are primarily net consumers, rather than net producers of food, and consequently food aid has alleviated poverty. As pointed out by Rohini Pande in her excellent discussion of this chapter, these results are contingent on food aid actually reaching the poor. Levinsohn and McMillan argue that this is often the case.

For Zambia, Balat and Porto calculate the impact of liberalizing the market for maize, which was heavily subsidized for both consumers and producers. They find that the resulting price increase led to consumption losses, which were offset by domestic market liberalization. They also measure the potential increase in income due to switching from production for home consumption to production and wage activities associated with production of cash crops. Balat and Porto estimate that rural Zambians would gain substantially from expanding into the production of cash crops, particularly in the production of cotton, tobacco, and maize. However, Balat and Porto also caution that such gains can only be achieved if other complementary policies are in place. These would include extension services, infrastructure, irrigation, access to credit and finance, and education and health services. Balat and Porto also point to the fact that Zambia needs to have access to international agricultural markets in order to realize potential gains.

6 Capital Flows and Poverty

Another avenue through which globalization could affect the welfare of the poor is through financial liberalization, which has increased the scope

14. This assumes that local purchase does not drive prices up for some poor people.
for capital to flow to developing countries. For this volume, Prasad and coauthors document in chapter 11 that both developed and developing countries have become increasingly open to capital flows, measured using either policy instruments such as capital controls or ex post capital flows.

In theory, openness to capital flows could alleviate poverty through several channels. If greater financial integration contributes to higher growth by expanding access to capital, expanding access to new technology, stimulating domestic financial-sector development, reducing the cost of capital, and alleviating domestic credit constraints, then such growth should reduce poverty. Access to international capital markets should also allow countries to smooth consumption shocks, reducing output or consumption volatility. Prasad and coauthors begin by examining the relationship between financial integration and growth. Reviewing over a dozen studies and examining the data themselves, they find that there is no clear relationship between the two. This suggests that the impact of financial integration on poverty—via possible growth effects—is likely to be small. They argue that since there are no clear linkages between financial integration and growth in the aggregate cross-country evidence, direct linkages between financial integration and poverty are also likely to be difficult to find.

They also explore another link: whether financial integration has smoothed or exacerbated output and consumption volatility. They point out that greater macroeconomic volatility probably increases both absolute and relative measures of poverty, particularly when there are financial crises. Since the poor are likely to be hurt in periods of consumption volatility, income smoothing made possible by global financial integration could be beneficial to the poor. However, the authors find that the opposite is true: financial globalization in developing countries is associated with higher consumption volatility. They posit the existence of a threshold effect: beyond a certain level of financial integration (50 percent of GDP), financial integration significantly reduces volatility. However, most developing countries are well below this threshold.

Prasad and coauthors point out that despite the lack of evidence of any association between financial globalization and growth, protectionism is not the answer. They suggest that if financial globalization is approached with the right set of complementary policies, then it is likely to be growth promoting and also less likely to lead to higher consumption volatility. These policies include the use of flexible exchange rates, macroeconomic stabilization policies, and the development of strong institutions. The authors’ definition of institutional development and good governance includes transparency in business and government transactions, control of corruption, rule of law, and financial supervisory capacity.

Much of the increases in consumption volatility identified by Prasad and coauthors for less financially integrated countries occurred in the context
of currency crises. How have the poor weathered these currency crises? The justification for addressing the links between currency crises and poverty outcomes in this study is simple: for many developing countries, financial globalization has been accompanied by more frequent currency crises, which in turn have implications for poverty. One study in the volume—chapter 12, by Duncan Thomas and Elizabeth Frankenberg—examines the impact of such a crisis on the poor. Using longitudinal household survey data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), Thomas and Frankenberg examine the immediate and medium-term effects of the East Asian crisis on multiple dimensions of well-being. In IFLS, the same households were interviewed a few months before the onset of the crisis, a year later, and again two years after that, which provides unique opportunities for measuring the magnitude and distribution of the effects of the crisis on the population.

Thomas and Frankenberg demonstrate that in the first year of the crisis, poverty rose by between 50 and 100 percent, real wages declined by around 40 percent, and household per capita consumption fell by around 15 percent. However, focusing exclusively on changes in real resources is complicated by the fact that measurement of prices in an environment of extremely volatile prices is not straightforward. Moreover, it misses important dimensions of response by households. These include changes in leisure (labor supply), changes in living arrangements (household size and thus per capita household resources), changes in assets, and changes in investments in human capital. These responses not only are quantitatively important but also highlight the resilience of families and households in the face of large unanticipated shocks as they draw on a wide array of mechanisms to respond to the changes in opportunities they face.

While the volatility of bank borrowing and portfolio flows may be costly to the poor, many of the authors in this volume emphasize the benefits from another type of inflow: foreign direct investment. Prasad and his coauthors emphasize that the composition of capital flows can have a significant impact on a country’s vulnerability to financial crises. They also document that foreign direct investment flows are significantly less volatile than other types of flows. The studies on Mexico, India, Poland, and Colombia all demonstrate that incoming foreign investment is associated with a significant reduction in poverty.

7 Measuring Other Effects of Globalization

While the primary focus of the studies in this volume is on poverty alleviation, several of the studies also examine other outcomes associated with globalization. Three of the country case studies test for the relationship between globalization and inequality, complementing the cross-country
studies by Easterly and by Milanovic and Squire. Past studies that use microdata sets have found that trade and capital flows are frequently associated with an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. The country case studies on India, Poland, China, and Colombia prepared for this volume, however, suggest that the evidence is mixed. Evidence presented by Topalova on India suggests that despite the increase in inequality in the 1990s, there is no relationship between trade reform and inequality, using the standard deviation of log consumption and the mean logarithmic deviation of consumption as measures of inequality. For Colombia, Goldberg and Pavcnik show that trade reform was associated with increasing inequality, in part because the most protected sectors prior to reform were sectors with a high share of unskilled workers. For Poland, Goh and Javorcik suggest the reverse: trade reforms increased the returns to unskilled workers relative to skilled workers, contributing to a decline in inequality.

A different approach to measuring the impact of globalization on incomes is taken by James Levinsohn in chapter 15. Levinsohn points out that one of the challenges to analyzing the impact of globalization is that increasing openness to trade and investment are typically accompanied by many other changes. In South Africa, the ratio of trade to GDP increased from 44 percent to 70 percent between 1991 and 2002, and there was a 200-fold increase in foreign investment. These changes were accompanied by many other developments, including the end of apartheid, the introduction of democracy, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. To separate the impact of globalization, he reasons, one approach would be to analyze whether the returns to speaking English increased. The evidence suggests that, controlling for other factors, the returns to speaking English did in fact increase, but only for whites. The fact that the returns to speaking English increased only for whites and not for other races suggests that the impact of globalization has been uneven in South Africa. This pattern of uneven gains is consistent with the other evidence presented in the cross-country studies and several of the individual case studies.

Another consequence of globalization, which is explored by Ligon in his study on China (chap. 14), is its possible impact on household welfare by affecting household risk. Prasad and his coauthors point out in chapter 11

15. As pointed out by Aisbett, Sala-i-Martin, and Milanovic and Squire in their respective chapters, debate continues on the nature and direction of trends in inequality. Within countries, inequality is generally rising. Across countries, inequality is stable or falling if we weight by country size, in large part because of the recent successes of China and India in reducing poverty. As Sala-i-Martin and others have emphasized, the correct measure of global social welfare is to use such country weights when the outcome of interest is the welfare of individuals. This is of course still a very rough proxy, since it disregards income inequality between individuals within countries. Thus, access to most countries’ income or expenditure surveys is needed for an accurate picture of individual-level welfare.

16. See chapter 10 for Hanson’s review of this literature, which covers microevidence on the relationship between different measures of globalization and inequality for Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and Hong Kong.
that the increase in consumption volatility possibly engendered by financial liberalization among the less developed countries could be harmful to the poor, but they do not explicitly model the impact of increasing risk on household welfare. In China, recent increases in urban income inequality are mirrored in increases in inequality in consumption expenditures. This connection between changes in the distribution of income and consumption expenditures could be entirely attributable to differences in preferences or could be caused by imperfections in the markets for credit and insurance, which ordinarily would serve to equate these intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. Ligon presumes that market imperfections drive changes in the distribution of expenditures, and he uses data on expenditures from repeated cross sections of urban households in China to estimate a Markov transition function for shares of expenditures over the period 1985–2001. He then uses this estimated function to compute the welfare losses attributable to risk over this period and to predict the future trajectory of inequality from 2001 through 2025. Ligon's contribution emphasizes that the amount of risk a household faces depends much more on its position in the consumption distribution than it does on aggregate shocks, whatever their source.  

8 Globalization’s Critics and Some Remaining Questions

Why does there continue to be so much criticism of globalization? This is the central question of Aisbett’s chapter (chap. 1). Aisbett argues that this continued criticism is due to several factors: the use of different methodologies in estimating poverty and inequality, the concerns of globalization’s critics about the short-term costs versus the longer-term gains from trade reform, their rejection of a perfectly competitive framework, and different interpretations regarding the evidence. Aisbett argues that people have a natural tendency to weight the information they receive according to their prior beliefs and values. Thus, evidence that is objectively “mixed” is quite likely to be interpreted by one type of person as very positive and by another as very negative. The mere fact that there are some los-

17. The contribution of globalization to the decline in poverty within China is clearly a topic that deserves further research. Ravallion (2004a) suggests somewhat provocatively that the significant reduction in poverty in China over the last twenty years is probably not related to its phenomenal increase as a global exporter. He uses as evidence aggregate time series data, in contrast to Shang-Jin Wei (chap. 14 comment), who has access to more disaggregate information. Nevertheless, Ravallion makes the important point that average tariffs and non-tariff barriers barely fell during the period of most rapid poverty reduction in China. It should be evident from this discussion that the choice of aggregation and the measure of globalization are likely to be key in resolving this debate. In addition, Wei in his comment in this volume and in other research employs measures of export activity or foreign investment to show that both are associated with desirable outcomes, while Ravallion looks at overall trade shares.
ers among the poor from globalization will lead people with negative priors to believe globalization is negative.

The second part of Aisbett’s answer is to examine what types of beliefs and values lead people to a more negative interpretation of the evidence on globalization and poverty. The values which she identifies include concern over inequality, independent of poverty. In particular, globalization’s critics feel differently about the polarization of the income distribution and inequality in the gains that different groups receive from globalization.

As first pointed out by Kanbur (2001), critics of globalization also tend to focus on shorter-term impacts, while globalization’s proponents are more concerned about the longer term. Critics of globalization also focus on the losses experienced by subgroups of the poor, even when poverty has declined on aggregate. Aisbett suggests a number of explanations for this value preference, including recent evidence from behavioral experiments.

Aisbett also argues that many people believe that the current form of globalization is based on processes that distill both political and market power upward and away from the poor. In particular, critics of globalization believe that corporate and commercial lobbies have disproportionate access to the international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and IMF, and that rich countries exploit their power within these international organizations. This belief about the processes through which globalization occurs is partly what predisposes them to interpret the available evidence negatively.

This volume seeks to address these misunderstandings and also presents comprehensive new evidence on the possible linkages between globalization and poverty amelioration. Nevertheless, a number of research questions remain unanswered, as described below.

1. **What is the relationship between globalization and poverty in the aggregate cross-country data?** Although there are many pitfalls associated with using cross-country data sets, it would nevertheless be useful to have more information on the association between globalization—measured using information on barriers to trade or capital flows—and measures of poverty. Evidence to date suggests that there is generally a positive association between openness and growth, and between growth and poverty reduction. We would have expected that there should consequently be a positive association between openness and poverty reduction; yet the evidence presented in this volume is quite fragile. The question remains: is the evidence fragile because the cross-country data on poverty are too poor to yield meaningful results, or because the costs of trade reforms have fallen disproportionately on the poor? In light of our knowledge that openness to trade is generally associated with growth, and that sectors hit by import competition in regions like India and Colombia have gained less from trade reforms, the possibility exists that the gains from trade in the aggre-
gate have not been big enough to offset some of the adverse distributional consequences for the poor.

2. *Who among the poor are the winners from globalization?* A number of the case studies point to winners among the poor from globalization. These include the poor wage earners in export-competing sectors and in sectors or regions that are recipients of foreign direct investment. Particularly in light of the vocal criticism leveled at globalization, these beneficiaries should be identified and emphasized in any future research agenda on the relationship between globalization and poverty. Of particular interest would be research that could further identify the impact of foreign investment inflows and export growth on poverty in India and China.

3. *How do we integrate the poorest of the poor into the world trading system?* The very poorest individuals are often untouched by globalization. This is evident among the poorest Mexican corn farmers who report that they never sell corn and among the poorest Ethiopian farmers who are net buyers of food. Africa as a continent has seen very little foreign investment and still exports primarily unprocessed agricultural products. More research is needed on how to better integrate the really poor into the global trading system. We need to identify the critical factors, whether these are credit, illness, lack of infrastructure, or land.

4. *Can we identify the dynamic effects of industrial-country trade and aid policies?* Several issues explored in this volume include the role of industrial-country policies in affecting the incidence of poverty in developing countries. Those studies suggest that, at least in the short run, OECD subsidies and food aid have probably helped the poor in other countries. However, further research is needed to identify whether there are longer-term, dynamic effects. For example, even if the poor in Ethiopia are currently net beneficiaries from food aid, there exists the possibility that over the long run food aid has discouraged poor farmers from planting or investing, transforming them from net producers into net consumers.

5. *Can we better identify the complementarities between measures of globalization and other policies?* Many of the country studies identify the importance of complementary policies in determining the benefits or costs of trade reforms for the poor. However, much more work is needed to identify which types of policies should accompany trade reforms. There has been little analysis to show, for example, that financial globalization would be beneficial to developing countries if it was accompanied by flexible exchange rate regimes or better institutions. Additional work is needed to identify whether trade reforms introduced in conjunction with labor market reforms are more likely to reduce poverty, and how to properly design social safety nets to accompany trade reforms. While Mexico has been successful in targeting some of the poorest who were hurt by reforms, these programs are expensive, and additional research could identify whether this approach is realistic for the very poorest countries.
Further research is needed to identify the source of the immobility of labor. While Topalova and Goldberg and Pavcnik show that some of these sources are artificial—stemming from labor market legislation that inhibits hiring and firing—Goh and Javorcik argue that much of the immobility of labor in Poland is due to societal factors that discourage workers from relocating. Further evidence identifying the relationship between gross labor inflows and outflows and trade reforms would be useful in this regard.

The fact that the gains or losses from trade reforms to the poor may hinge on the mobility (or immobility) of labor needs to be more explicitly addressed in existing models of international trade. Some models (e.g., HO) adopt assumptions of perfect factor mobility, while others (e.g., specific-sector) assume no factor mobility. Neither assumption is consistent with reality. In addition, many of globalization’s critics perceive the world through the lens of imperfect competition. Yet most trade economists assume perfect competition or zero excess profits, which is not consistent with reality in at least some sectors of developing economies.

9 Conclusion

Many countries have made tremendous strides in reducing not only the percentage of the population living in poverty but also the absolute number of individuals living on less than $1 a day. During the last twenty years, developing countries increased their trade shares and slashed their tariffs. If export shares are one measure of globalization, then developing countries are now more globalized than high-income countries. To what extent is increasing globalization responsible for the fall in the incidence of poverty?

The first theme that emerges across the chapters in this volume is that the relationship between globalization and poverty is complex; in many cases, the outcome depends not just on trade or financial globalization but on the interaction of globalization with the rest of the environment. Key complementary policies include investments in human capital and infrastructure, as well as macroeconomic stability and policies to promote credit and technical assistance to farmers. Financial globalization is more likely to promote growth and poverty reduction if it is accompanied or preceded by the development of good institutions and governance, as well as macroeconomic stability (including the use of flexible exchange rates). The role of complementary policies in ensuring that globalization yields benefits for the poor is emerging as a critical theme for multilateral institutions (see World Bank, forthcoming).

One related issue is that poor workers need to be able to move out of contracting sectors and into expanding ones. The country studies on India and Colombia suggest that trade reforms have been associated with an increase in poverty only in regions with inflexible labor laws. Consequently, any
conclusions that do not take into account the labor market institutions that could undermine labor mobility may be misleading. More research is needed to identify whether labor legislation protects only the rights of the small fraction of workers who typically account for the formal sector in developing economies, or whether such legislation softens short-term adjustment costs and helps the labor force share in the gains from globalization. The role of antisweatshop activists in promoting the right to organize, improving working conditions, and raising wages suggests that selective interventions may be successful (see Harrison and Scorse 2004).

Second, the evidence suggests that globalization leads to clearly identifiable winners. Across several different continents, export expansion has been accompanied by a reduction in poverty. The evidence also points to the beneficial effects of foreign direct investment. While the macroeconomic evidence suggests that foreign direct investment is a less volatile source of capital than other types of inflows, the microeconomic evidence for India, Mexico, Poland, and Colombia indicates that higher inflows of foreign investment are associated with a reduction in poverty.

Third, it is also possible to identify the losers from globalization among the poor. Poor workers in import-competing sectors—who cannot relocate, possibly due to the existence of inflexible labor laws—are likely to be hurt by globalization. Financial crises also affect the poor disproportionately, as indicated by the cross-country evidence and the erosion of real wages following currency crises in Indonesia and Mexico. In Mexico, some poor and most medium-income corn farmers have been negatively affected by increasing import competition.

Fourth, simple interpretations of general equilibrium trade models such as the HO framework are likely to be incorrect. Many economists predicted that developing countries with a comparative advantage in unskilled labor would benefit from globalization through increased demand for their unskilled-intensive goods, which in turn would reduce inequality and poverty. The theoretical and empirical contributions to this volume suggest that this interpretation of trade theory is too simple and frequently not consistent with reality. The cross-country studies document that globalization has been accompanied by increasing inequality within developing countries. One implication is that rising inequality induced by globalization offsets some of the gains in poverty reduction achieved via trade-induced growth.

The conclusions highlighted in these studies have several key implications for the globalization debate. First, impediments to exports from developing countries exacerbate poverty in those countries. Developing countries need access to developed-country markets. The evidence shows a clear link between export activity and poverty reduction in Colombia, Mexico, India, and Poland. This research suggests that efforts to dismantle barriers to developing-country exports through international agree-
ments are likely to lead to further poverty reduction. The evidence for India, Mexico, and Poland also points to a strong link between foreign investment inflows and poverty reduction.

Second, there are losers among the poor from trade reform. In particular, this volume identifies as losers the poor in import-competing sectors following the liberalization of trade. The heterogeneity in outcomes suggests that careful targeting is necessary to help the poor who are likely to be hurt by globalization. This includes the poor in countries hit by financial crises, as well as the smallest farmers who cannot compete with the more efficient larger farmers or with expanding import competition. Mexico’s transfer programs played a major role in preventing the smallest corn farmers from experiencing a large decline in income following reforms. In Indonesia, subsidized food was distributed to many communities. Scholarships and free public schooling introduced a year after the Indonesian crisis led to subsequent increases in school enrollments, particularly among the poorest. Extending such subsidies to health care visits and basic drugs might have arrested the decline in the use of health care that occurred after the 1997 crisis.

Finally, the evidence suggests that relying on trade or foreign investment alone is not enough. A critical role for complementary policies is highlighted in the country studies on Zambia, India, Colombia, Indonesia, and Poland. The poor need better education, access to infrastructure, access to credit for investing in technology improvements, and the ability to relocate out of contracting sectors into expanding ones in order to take advantage of trade reforms. Clearly, the concerns of globalization’s critics have been heard, but much remains to be done.

References


Global (Cross-Country) Analyses