The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program was created by legislation passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by the president in 1996. The Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) created the TANF program out of the preexisting Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which itself was created by Congress in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act. The PRWORA legislation represented the most fundamental restructuring of the AFDC program since its inception. The most important restructured elements are (a) the devolution of major program design elements, and financing through block grants, to the individual states; (b) the imposition of strict work requirements in order to qualify for federal aid; and (c) lifetime limits on the number of years of benefit receipt which could be paid out of federal funds.

This paper reviews the rules and structure of the TANF program and compares them with the historical AFDC program. In addition, it reviews the caseloads, costs, and participation rates of the TANF and AFDC programs. Finally, it reviews the research that has been conducted on both programs. Given the relative youth of the former, relatively little scholarly research has been conducted on it to date. Consequently, the bulk of the research will be reviewed for the AFDC program. Some discussion will also be provided of the extent to which the results of the AFDC research can be expected to apply to the TANF program.

Robert A. Moffitt is professor of economics at Johns Hopkins University and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

The author would like to thank Daniel Gubits for research assistance.
The first section reviews the rules and history of the programs. The second section reviews the trends in caseloads and expenditures and other program characteristics, followed by a section on the research results. Section 5.4 reviews research on the TANF program. A final section discusses reforms of the financial incentives in the program.

5.1 History, Rules, and Goals

5.1.1 History and Rules of the AFDC Program

Table 5.1 shows the major pieces of legislation creating and altering the AFDC program over its history, 1935–96. The program was created by the Social Security Act of 1935 along with the Old-Age Social Security and Unemployment Insurance programs. The AFDC program provided cash financial support to families with “dependent” children, who are defined as those who were deprived of the support or care of one natural (i.e., biological) parent by reason of death, disability, or absence from the home, and were under the care of the other parent or another relative. Although the language of the legislation was gender-neutral, in practice the vast majority of families of this type consisted of a mother and her children, or what are today called single-mother families. Although the presence of the father was possible if he was the single parent or if he was disabled, the

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1. A short, but more detailed, history of the major developments in the AFDC program can be found in Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986, chap. 4). That discussion also includes an account of the history of income support programs prior to AFDC.
overwhelming majority of participating families were initially, and have
continued to be, those in which the father is not present. In 1935 the pri-
mary reason for the absence of the father was death, but this was to change
in later years as that absence was more a result of divorce or out-of-
wedlock childbearing. Eligibility also required that families have income
and assets below specified levels.

The AFDC program was created as a shared federal and state respon-
sibility. The states had a large role in the program, for they were responsible
for not only creating and administering their own AFDC programs but
also setting the level of basic benefits. States subsequently picked very
different benefit levels, with benefits ranging sixfold from the most gener-
ous to the least generous. The federal role was both financial and regulat-
ary. Financially, the federal government was responsible for providing
open-ended matching grants to the states, with declining match rates at
higher state benefit levels. On the regulatory side, the federal government
put many restrictions on the definition of eligibility and allowable re-
sources but also on the benefit formula. In terms of eligibility, for example,
the federal government defined what family structures were eligible and
put restrictions on who could and could not be counted as part of the as-
sistance unit, and also on what income and assets could be counted for el-
igibility determination. Regarding the benefit formula, the federal govern-
ment put restrictions on allowable deductions for earned income and also
for child care and work-related expenses, effectively constraining the state’s
ability to set the benefit reduction rate in the program. Thus the states
ended up being primarily responsible for the level of benefits, or what econ-
omists call the “guarantee,” while the federal government effectively set the
benefit reduction rate, which economists sometimes call simply the “tax
rate.” The nominal benefit reduction rate in the program in 1935 was 100
percent, for benefits were determined by a straightforward subtraction of
income from “needs” (i.e., the guarantee), and there were few deductions
for income allowed.2

The definition of a dependent child as resulting from the absence or dis-
ability of a parent implicitly allowed families to be eligible where the
mother (or father) had remarried or was cohabiting with a partner who

2. Additional complexities were present because the states actually had the right to manip-
ulate the benefit formula in ways that altered even the tax rate. For example, states could im-
pose maximums on the benefit paid to a family, which creates a range of a zero tax rate; they
could reduce the difference between the guarantee and net income (defined as income less de-
ductions) by a defined fraction (called the “ratable reduction”), which effectively reduces the
tax rate by that fraction; and they could impose gross income ceilings for eligibility, which cre-
ate a notch in the budget constraint. They also had discretion in setting allowable deductions,
which alters the effective tax rate as well. See U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways and Means
(1996), Keane and Moffitt (1998, appendix), and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001, appendix 1)
for more details on the formula in different states. States are allowed even more discretion
over the benefit formula under the new TANF program (see subsequent discussion).
was not a parent of the child. Further, stepparents and cohabitators were excluded from the definition of the assistance unit for purposes of eligibility and benefit determination, so their income was not automatically counted against benefits. In principle the income they provided to the eligible children should be counted as income to the assistance unit, but rigorously measuring intrahousehold income flows is difficult, so the enforcement of this principle was minimal. However, in 1935 the rate of remarriage was fairly low and the rate of cohabitation was even lower, so these issues did not attract discussion; they did so only later when these types of families grew in the general population and in the AFDC recipient population.

A significant expansion of the program took place in 1961 when Congress created the AFDC-UP (for “unemployed parent”) program to include families in which both natural parents were present but where the primary earner was unemployed, with unemployment defined as the inability to find work in excess of 100 hours per month. The income and asset eligibility conditions and benefit formulas were identical to those in the basic AFDC program. The AFDC-UP program was made optional to the states, with financing at the same rate as in basic AFDC, and twenty-five states had created and operated such programs by the end of the decade.

The next major change in the program occurred in 1967 when Congress, concerned with work incentives in the program, lowered the nominal tax rate on earnings from 100 percent to 67 percent (by two-thirds, to be exact). States were required to deduct $30 and one-third of remaining monthly earnings from total monthly income before calculating the benefit (hence the “thirty-and-one-third” rule). The Social Security Amendments in 1967 also created a program called the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, which required women whose youngest child was older than six and who did not fall into a number of exempt categories (disabled, in school, etc.) to register for some type of work or education activity, usually some type of job placement program. The WIN program was never effective, for, while the majority of nonexempt recipients were registered, states did not provide the funds or exert the effort to set up the necessary activities to engage more than a small number of registrants. Although there were almost no evaluation studies of WIN conducted (see below), there was nevertheless a widespread perception that the job placement operations in place were also quite ineffective.3

A number of Supreme Court decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s were also important in modifying key features of the program. One outlawed what were called state “man-in-the-house” rules, rules which made ineligible for benefits mothers who were living, even on a temporary basis, with men who were not the natural fathers of the children. The court

3. See Lalonde (chap. 8 in this volume) for a more detailed discussion of the WIN program and its evolution.
judged these laws to violate the original Social Security Act provision stipulating that eligibility was based solely on the absence of the natural father. A second, related decision prohibited states from counting the income of any such cohabiting men against the AFDC benefit without specific evidence that the men were providing income support to the woman and children; some states had been automatically including the male’s income when calculating benefits. A third decision outlawed so-called residency requirements that some states had adopted, which required families who had moved into a state to live there for a few years before eligibility could be established. The court judged these laws to violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and to impose an unlawful restriction on freedom of residential location.

The growth of the Food Stamp and Medicaid programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s also affected the AFDC program. Eligibility for the Food Stamp Program, although open to all individuals regardless of family type, was made automatic for AFDC recipients. Thus a close tie between the programs was established, and participation in the AFDC program constituted a guaranteed entry to the Food Stamp Program. Families in the AFDC program were also made categorically eligible for the Medicaid program, significantly raising the generosity of program benefits. Unlike the case of food stamps, however, non-AFDC recipients faced more difficult eligibility hurdles for Medicaid and were often ineligible until the 1980s (see the chapter on Medicaid in this volume). A third program of some importance that grew more in the 1980s is the Earned Income Tax Credit, whose amounts were required by Congress to be excluded from AFDC recipient income for the purpose of benefit calculation in order to encourage work.4

Throughout the 1970s a number of welfare reform proposals were considered by the federal executive branch but were either never proposed to Congress or were proposed and not passed. The Nixon administration proposed, with its Family Assistance Program, replacing AFDC with a program more resembling a negative income tax—with a low marginal tax rate—and which would have federalized the program and hence removed it from the control of the states, a reform much discussed in the 1970s in an attempt to eliminate the large cross-state variation in benefits. The legislation did not pass Congress. The Ford administration considered a welfare reform proposal with a number of features but, most notably, a considerable strengthening in the work requirements of the program. The program was never submitted to Congress. The Carter administration submitted to Congress a major welfare reform proposal which, like the Family Assis-

4. Food stamp benefits were also excluded from the AFDC benefit calculation, as were housing subsidies in most states. Supplemental Security Income benefits were excluded, but SSI recipients were not allowed to be covered by AFDC anyway (i.e., they were excluded from the AFDC assistance unit).
tance Program, would have federalized the program but which introduced, for the first time, significant added work requirements. The legislation was not passed by Congress.

The next major piece of legislation passed by Congress was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, which had several important features. The tax rate on earnings in the program was increased to 100 percent, up from the 67 percent provided for in the 1967 amendments, on the argument that this would concentrate benefits on the lowest income families and hence those most in need.\(^5\) In addition, for the first time Congress required states to count a portion of stepparent income against the grant regardless of the amount of financial support that the stepparent might be determined, by some calculation, to have provided to the mother and her children. Congress also put an upper limit on the gross income that a family could have to be eligible, thus eliminating the possibility that high levels of deductions could allow such families onto the rolls. A fourth important feature of the legislation, little noticed at the time but which became important later, was a provision encouraging states to experiment with new AFDC work provisions that were at variance with federal law and federal regulations, and to seek waivers to test alternative provisions that they might be interested in. The “WIN demonstrations” of the 1980s, as they were called because they were modifications of WIN, allowed states to experiment with community work programs, work supplementation programs, heightened job search, and other programs to strengthen the emphasis on work and improve upon their WIN programs.

Subsequent to 1981 and throughout the early and mid-1980s, states began taking advantage of the waiver provisions in the 1981 Act and, eventually, virtually all states conducted WIN demonstrations. These demonstrations typically tested low-cost programs that required some type of job search activity, although some also required recipients to simply work—usually in some community service job like cleaning up a public park—in exchange for their benefits (“workfare”). A few states were more ambitious and tested more expansive employment programs that attempted to provide more basic skills training or substantive work experience. Many of the demonstrations also narrowed the list of conditions allowing a recipient to be exempt from participating in these programs. The 1980s thus witnessed the beginning of significant AFDC reform activity initiated at the state and local levels, a new trend in light of the history of reform activity, which had theretofore occurred primarily at the federal level.

The state activity on increased work requirements led to increased congressional interest in work and culminated in the passage of the 1988 Fam-

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5. The recipient was allowed to work for four months with the thirty-and-one-third reduction rule, but further earnings were taxed at the 100 percent rate. Later, the flat $30 exemption amount was allowed for twelve months.
ily Support Act, whose most important feature was the creation of the Job Opportunities (JOBS) program. The JOBS program replaced WIN and was to require much larger numbers of welfare recipients to engage in work-related activities, both by reducing the number of exempt recipients and by mandating that states engage a minimum fraction of eligible recipients in some type of acceptable activity (called “participation” requirements). In addition, and equally important, the legislation strongly encouraged, and partly required, states to conduct not only low-cost job search programs that had been dominant in the WIN demonstrations but also some human capital, education, and training programs that would increase job skills of AFDC recipients, a major change in orientation.6

However, over the years subsequent to 1988, states failed to implement JOBS programs to any significant degree. They failed to draw down all the federal matching funds made available to them to subsidize the programs, and they did not put in place the necessary programs to enroll eligibles on a wide scale. As a result, many states never achieved the participation requirements in the act. The most common explanation for this failure was the onset of a recession in the late 1980s, which put pressure on state budgets and made it difficult to allocate funds to JOBS, but the administrative difficulty in creating JOBS programs was gradually realized to have been underestimated, and this also played a role. It was also gradually realized that full implementation of the JOBS program would require a significant increase of expenditures and hence was unlikely in the short run to generate cost savings.7

In an attempt to provide more financial work incentives, the Family Support Act also required states to offer transitional child care and Medicaid benefits, benefits provided to families who had left the welfare rolls because of employment or increased earnings, for up to twelve months following exit. States were allowed to require copayments for child care and were required to charge premiums for the second six months of Medicaid benefits. In practice, these provisions were little used by exiting welfare mothers, for reasons that have never been fully studied. Some experts speculated that the paperwork burden of continuing to establish eligibility combined with the relatively short time frame of extended benefits (twelve months), together with the copayment and premium provisions, discouraged take-up.

Finally, the Family Support Act expanded AFDC-UP, mandating that all states offer the program. However, the law only required states to offer benefits to unemployed families for six months out of the year, and many states initially without UP programs elected to meet only this minimum requirement when creating their program subsequent to the act.


7. See the chapter by LaLonde in this volume for a more detailed discussion of JOBS.
Although the Family Support Act of 1988 was considered at the time to be landmark legislation that would lead to fundamental changes in the program, its failure to do so has left it as a fairly minor and transitional piece of legislation in the history of the AFDC program. Interest in further reforms of the system did not die down after the act but instead increased in intensity. For example, the goals of reform started shifting almost immediately from the human capital, education, and training emphasis embodied in the act to an emphasis on work per se, regardless of training content. Another notable shift subsequent to the act was a shift toward caseload reduction per se as a goal, which had not been a major focus of the act. In part this change may have been a result of the rising caseloads and expenditures in AFDC over the late 1980s and early 1990s (see below). Finally, an increased interest in family structure issues and nonmarital childbearing occurred in the period subsequent to the act.

This increased welfare reform activity took place, as it had in the 1980s, mainly at the state level. With encouragement from the Bush and Clinton administrations, states over the early 1990s increased their initiation of AFDC waiver programs testing alternative features of reform. An increased emphasis on work requirements, in particular to the exclusion of human capital and education programs as just noted, was present in almost all state efforts. Most states also began imposing sanctions (i.e., temporary or permanent withdrawal of benefits) on recipients for failure to comply with work and other requirements. Although such sanctions had been present in some form previously, they had never been as aggressively enforced. The increased emphasis on work requirements was often accompanied in the waiver programs as well by a reduction of marginal tax rates on earnings to provide financial incentives to work, for the federal rules still required 100 percent rates. Many other features also began to be introduced, including (a) the provision of time limits on benefits, stipulating that recipients could not receive benefits for more than a certain number of years (two to five, for example), at least within a given calendar period; (b) the imposition of family caps, which specified that AFDC recipients would not receive higher benefits if they had additional children while on AFDC; and (c) an attempt to reintroduce residency requirements by formulating two-tier programs under which immigrants were not denied benefits but rather were given lower benefits than initial residents for some specified period.

Another new feature of the state waiver programs in this period was an increased tendency to test programs that contained multiple reform features simultaneously, for example, simultaneously strengthening work requirements, enforcing sanctions, imposing time limits and family caps, and the like. Prior to this period, the waiver programs formulated by states had tested only one or two reform features at one time. These reform packages were intended to test new programs that differed in their entirety from the
AFDC program and were intended to have a cumulative impact greater than the sum of the impact of each reform individually. More generally, they represented a political desire for a major, wholesale change in the AFDC program rather than incremental change.⁸

A final new feature of the waiver programs over this period was an increased tendency to test the new programs on the entire state AFDC caseload, whereas prior to this period the waiver programs had been tested on the caseload in only one or two counties, cities, or local offices. These statewide waivers had the effect of essentially replacing the existing AFDC program with the reform program for the entire state, at least for the lifetime of the waiver, which was usually several years. As waivers of this type grew in number—forty states had requested and been granted waivers by 1995—the waivers gradually ceased to be small-scale experiments and began to envelope a major portion of the national caseload and hence to gradually eliminate the AFDC program de facto.⁹

5.1.2 TANF

Congress subsequently took action in 1996 by enacting PRWORA, which simultaneously reduced federal authority over the program but also mandated many (but not all) of the popular state-level waiver features with federal law. Table 5.2 summarizes the differences between AFDC and TANF. The PRWORA legislation converted the previous matching grant to a block grant and removed much of the federal regulatory authority over the design of the program. Thus states are free to set their benefit levels, as before, but also the tax rate, income limits, asset requirements, and even the form of assistance (cash or in-kind services). The last provision is important because it allows states to use TANF dollars to support child care, job search support, social services, and other types of expenditure; there are no requirements on how much or little must be spent on cash aid directly. In addition, no federal definition of who is to be included in the assistance unit is imposed; the AFDC-UP program is abolished, and states cover two-parent families at their own discretion. States are free to impose family caps. In addition, and importantly, the entitlement nature of the program is abolished and states are not required to serve all eligibles.

At the same time, however, the law imposed new federal authority in a

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⁸ See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS; 1997) and Harvey, Camasso, and Jagannathan (2000) for a summary of the provisions of the state waiver programs in this period.

⁹ The federal government generally required states to conduct random-assignment evaluations of their reforms. When states moved to implementing reform programs on the full state caseload, they usually complied with this requirement by holding out a small group of control families to be administered the old AFDC program. A major problem with these experiments was that it was difficult to prevent the control families from perceiving, and being affected by, the overall programmatic change in the state that occurred around them. See subsequent discussion.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Eligibility</strong></td>
<td>Children deprived of support of one parent or children in low-income two-parent families (AFDC-UP)</td>
<td>Children in low-income families as designated by state; AFDC-UP abolished; minor mothers must live with parents; minor mothers must also attend school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrants</strong></td>
<td>Illegal aliens ineligible</td>
<td>Aliens ineligible for five years after entry and longer at state option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Form of aid</strong></td>
<td>Almost exclusively cash payment</td>
<td>States free to use funds for services and non-cash benefits</td>
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<td>At state option</td>
<td>Same</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Entitlement status</strong></td>
<td>Federal government required to pay matched share of all recipients</td>
<td>No individual entitlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income limits</strong></td>
<td>Family income cannot exceed gross income limits</td>
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<td><strong>Asset limits</strong></td>
<td>Federal limits</td>
<td>No provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment of earnings disregards</strong></td>
<td>After four months of work, only a lump sum $90 deduction plus child care expenses, and nothing after twelve months</td>
<td>No provision</td>
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<td><strong>Time limits</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Federal funds cannot be used for payments to adults for more than sixty months lifetime (20 percent of caseload exempt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOBS program</strong></td>
<td>States must offer a program that meets federal law</td>
<td>JOBS program abolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work requirements</strong></td>
<td>Parents without a child under three required to participate in JOBS</td>
<td>Exemptions from work requirements are narrowed and types of qualified activities are narrowed and prespecified (generally excludes education and classroom training) and must be twenty hours per week rising to thirty hours per week for single mothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work requirement participation requirements</strong></td>
<td>JOBS participation requirements</td>
<td>Participation for work requirements rise to 50 percent by fiscal year 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Child care</strong></td>
<td>Guaranteed for all JOBS participants</td>
<td>No guarantee, but states are given increased child care funds</td>
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<td><strong>Sanctions</strong></td>
<td>General provisions</td>
<td>Specific provisions mandating sanctions for failure to comply with work requirements, child support enforcement, schooling attendance, and other activities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Child support</strong></td>
<td>States required to allow first $50 of child support received by mother to not reduce benefit</td>
<td>No provision</td>
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*Source: Burke (1996).*
few specified areas. Federal funds are not to be used to pay adults for more than sixty months of TANF benefits over their lifetimes, although states are allowed an exemption from this requirement for 20 percent of their caseloads. Minors who have dependent children are required to stay in school and live with their parents in order to receive federal TANF dollars. Aliens are ineligible for five years after their entry into the United States and longer at state option. In addition, while the JOBS program is abolished, new work requirements are imposed that require that much greater fractions of the caseload be involved in them, and which exempt many fewer families (as many as 50 percent of single mother recipients and 90 percent of two-parent families must comply). Recipients involved in general education and training cannot be counted toward these participation requirements. The hours of work per week required are also greatly increased (up to thirty hours per week for single mothers and more for two-parent families).10

The most dramatic departures from the AFDC program are the time limit and work requirement provisions. Lifetime time limits are a new concept in U.S. transfer programs and are based on a quite different philosophy of the aims of public assistance than has been the case heretofore. States are allowed certain types of exemptions from the time limits and are also allowed to grant temporary extensions to individual families, so long as the total number does not exceed 20 percent of the caseload. The work requirements in the new legislation are much stronger than in previous law and change the orientation from education and training to work per se. The law also allows states to impose sanctions on recipients for failure to comply with the work requirements, sanctions that are much stronger than in past law and which have been enforced rigorously. The work emphasis of the law is further reinforced by an increase in the funds made available for child care.11 At the same time, any system of work requirements must specify some exemptions from them, and states are allowed to exempt families with specified types of difficulties.

Several other PRWORA provisions are worth noting for their importance. States are required to maintain expenditures from their own funds at a level at least 75 percent of that prior to PRWORA (the so-called

10. The law imposed specific penalties on the states for not complying with these mandated provisions. These penalties took the form of percentage reductions in the block grant allocation for each type of violation. The work participation requirements have been considerably ameliorated thus far by another provision of the law that reduces those requirements in proportion to the amount of caseload reduction a state experiences. Because caseloads have fallen dramatically, these participation requirements have been greatly reduced as well. However, this provision of the law also gives states an incentive to reduce the caseload because it lowers the level of mandated work requirements.

11. However, the guarantee of child care that existed under AFDC is abolished. That guarantee was widely seen by states as a constraint on their ability to increase employment among recipients.
“maintenance of effort” provisions). This maintains a semblance of a matching grant system in the short to medium run. A major point of discussion between the federal government and the states has been over whether these funds can only be spent on recipients eligible for TANF dollars or can be more generally spent and, if the latter, whether there are any categories of expenditure that funds cannot be spent on. Regulations issued in the spring of 1999 by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) interpret the law fairly broadly and allow the funds to be spent on a wide variety of sources, giving states considerable flexibility as a result. Another important financing provision was the creation of a contingency fund for the states to draw on in times of high unemployment. The strong performance of the U.S. economy since 1996 has made this contingency fund of little relevance thus far, but it could be important in the future if the economy turns down. Another provision in PRWORA provides for bonuses to the five states who most reduce their out-of-wedlock childbearing rates and their abortion rates.

Since the 1996 act, states have moved forward vigorously to design TANF programs that are very different from their AFDC programs prior to 1990, not only to comply with the provisions of the law but also to alter program features that go beyond the minimum required. A good example is the important case of time limits. Table 5.3 shows the limits adopted by the states in the first year after TANF. Only a slight majority of the states—twenty-seven—have adopted the simple PRWORA standard of a sixty-month lifetime time limit. The rest of the states have adopted some other type of plan and, in fact, most of these states have adopted time limits that

<table>
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<th>Time Limits</th>
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<td>27 states</td>
<td>60 months</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 states</td>
<td>Intermittent (e.g., 24 out of 60 months); lifetime of 60 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 states</td>
<td>Less than 60 months lifetime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona, Indiana</td>
<td>24 out of 60 months, lifetime of 60 for adults only; 60 months lifetime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>For applicants: 18 months but can be extended to 24 months if extension will lead to employment or 60 months if no job available and adults participate in community service. For recipients: 24 months but can be extended to 60 months if no job available and adults participate in community service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>No limit if family has earned income and works 20 hours per week; 24 months for families with no child under age 13 and no earnings; 60 months for all other families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Individualized; lifetime of 60 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>24 out of 60 months; no lifetime limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>No time limit; will use state funds after 60 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>12, 24 and 36 months lifetime for adults only; time period depends on employability of head of household</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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are stricter than those required by PRWORA, sometimes dramatically so. For example, eight states impose not only a lifetime limit but also a shorter limit over fixed calendar intervals (e.g., no more than twenty-four months of receipt in every sixty months of calendar time). Eight other states simply impose a shorter lifetime limit than sixty months; the shortest of these is Connecticut, at twenty-one months, a very stringent limit. However, Arizona illustrates a variation that many states have considered—a lifetime limit only for adults, so that children can continue to receive benefits beyond sixty months (paid for out of state funds). Six other states besides Arizona have adopted these “reduction” rather than “termination” policies, which constitute a relaxing of the time limits implicit in PRWORA (Gallagher et al. 1998, table 6). The other six states in the table have more complex provisions that introduce new criteria into the time limit imposed and hence open the door to individual-specific considerations related to need and job availability.

The states have also embraced work requirements and sanctions vigorously. The most notable movement has been toward a “work first” approach in which recipients and new applicants for benefits are moved as quickly as possible into work of any kind, with a deemphasis on education and training. States have imposed strong sanctions for failure to comply with these requirements, usually beginning with an initial partial sanction at first noncompliance and then graduating to a more severe, full sanction at subsequent noncompliance. Seven states have imposed a lifetime ban on eligibility if an adult receives a certain number of sanctions; in Georgia, for example, two sanctions will trigger this prohibition. Many states have also lowered the age of the youngest child that furnishes exemption from the requirement to one year or six months and have otherwise tightened up on exemptions from the regulations (Gallagher et al. 1998). The work requirements have also been strengthened by frequent requirements for job search and work registration at the point of application for TANF benefits that must be complied with before benefit receipt can begin.

With the aim of reinforcing these work requirements, states have generally lowered their tax rates. Table 5.4 shows state-by-state changes as of October 1997. Although ten states have kept the AFDC disregards (i.e., no disregards beyond $90 after twelve months of benefit receipt), the rest of the states have lowered their tax rates considerably. Many states have a tax rate of 50 percent, while there is a distribution above and below this value as well. A few states have 100 percent disregards, implying a tax rate of

12. However, the large states in the United States—who have a disproportionate share of the caseload—do not have time limits below sixty months (and Michigan has none at all).
13. It is worth noting at this point that the PRWORA legislation imposes the limit only on a family in which there is an adult caretaker who has been on welfare for sixty months, regardless of how long the children have been supported. In principle, children could be put under the care of a different relative and be eligible for another sixty months of benefits.
Table 5.4  Monthly Earnings Disregards in TANF as of October 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Flat Disregard</th>
<th>% of Remainder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>$90</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>20 percent</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>$225</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>20 percent</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>$90</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>$120–1,020</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>differs by county</td>
<td>differs by county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>$120</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>$90</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$90 or 20(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>$120</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>$170</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>$90</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
zero; these states limit benefits by imposing income limits of one form or another on eligibility (at which point the tax rate is effectively greater than 100 percent).

States have altered some of the other financial aspects of eligibility and the benefit formula but not all. Asset limits have generally been raised, as have gross income limits, but benefit levels themselves have for the most part been left the same as they were prior to PRWORA (Gallagher et al. 1998). The 100-hour rule limiting work in two-parent families has been dropped in the majority of states, although work requirements are now imposed on both parents in such families. Family caps have been adopted in twenty-two states, and one state (Wisconsin) has adopted a flat benefit that does not vary at all with family size. There has been significant reduction in the use of the child support pass-through (the requirement that the welfare recipient receive the first $50 of child support payment from the father). Finally, the majority of states have adopted some type of “diversion” program which seeks to divert families who have applied for TANF from coming onto the rolls. One type provides a family with a lump-sum cash payment together with a stipulation that they cannot reapply for a fixed number of months. Another provides families with child care, medical, or transportation services to assist them in cases where they are judged to be only temporarily needy. A third, common, program requires recipients to engage in a specified period of job search, sometimes merely by registering with a work agency but often requiring that the applicant show evidence of having applied for jobs or having contacted employers. The individual cannot be considered for assistance until the requirement is met.

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14. Details on state-specific benefit formulas can be found in the Welfare Rules Database of the Urban Institute (http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd).

Table 5.4 (continued)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40 on average (varies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>$200–400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gallagher et al. (1998, table 14)

Notes: In cases where the disregards change with the length of the spell, those for the longest spell are shown. AFDC = $90 flat disregard and zero percent of remainder after twelve months.

a Disregard is 100 percent as long as earnings are below poverty line; benefit goes to zero above.

b Disregard is $90 or 20 percent, whichever is greater.

c There is an additional disregard that varies with earnings and family size.

d Disregard is 100 percent as long as net income is below poverty line; disregard is 0 if net income is above poverty line but earnings are below poverty line; and benefits go to zero if earnings are above poverty line.
5.1.3 Goals of AFDC and TANF

The AFDC and TANF rules implicitly reveal many of the goals of the programs as they have changed over time. Originally the AFDC program was intended only to provide cash support for widows and their children, at a time when married women were commonly expected not to work and to stay at home to raise their children. Over time, as the general labor force participation rate of women with children rose, and as the composition of the caseload shifted toward divorced and unmarried mothers, the goals of the program gradually shifted as well, toward encouraging and requiring work to accompany the cash benefit. This shift took a major additional step with the state-level welfare reform efforts in the early 1990s and with the 1996 passage of PRWORA, whereby the goals of the program were moved toward the employment goal much more strongly than had been the case in the past.

Another significant shift in goals in the 1990s has been the shift from an education-training strategy toward a pure work strategy. There has been a tension between these two strategies ever since the employment goal began to enter into programmatic discussions in the late 1960s. The education-training strategy, or what was sometimes called the human capital strategy, aimed to improve recipient skills and potential wage rates in the labor market, whereas the pure work strategy emphasized instead work per se, even if the education or training content was not high. The education-training strategy is more expensive and has an uncertain rate of return but holds the promise of long-run improvement, whereas the pure work strategy is relatively inexpensive and promotes employment directly but may do less for long-run earnings capacity. The education-training, or human capital, strategy was most forcefully embodied in the Family Support Act of 1988, but the 1996 PRWORA strongly reoriented the strategy toward a pure work goal.

But the PRWORA legislation represented more than simply a redirection of the employment goal and an increased emphasis on work. A new goal appeared, which was to reduce “dependency,” a term much used in public discussions, which is more or less defined as long-term receipt of welfare benefits. Such dependency is presumed by the PRWORA legislation to have deleterious effects on adults and children, a hypothesis upon which research has a bearing. The time limits embodied in PRWORA are intended to reduce dependency directly by simply disallowing long-term receipt, thereby providing only temporary assistance to families. There is also an implicit hypothesis in the notion of a time limit by which welfare recipients are capable of becoming “self-sufficient” off the rolls, where “self-sufficiency” is meant as the attainment of a reasonable and sustainable level of income that is enough to allow a family not to have to apply for public support. The time limit provisions implicitly presume that it is pos-
sible to become self-sufficient after five years or less of welfare receipt, another hypothesis that is in principle possible to test.

Another new goal of welfare programs in the 1990s has been to reduce the rate of nonmarital childbearing and to encourage marriage. This goal is explicitly stated in the preamble to the PRWORA legislation, but the law itself has very few provisions directly relating to it. In part this is because it is presumed that reductions in dependency will lead to reductions in such childbearing and an increase in marriage, another hypothesis that can be subjected to test. The lack of direct provisions in PRWORA on childbearing and marriage is also partly the result of a lack of confidence by Congress in the efficacy of any specific set of programs directly aimed at those outcomes.

5.2 Caseloads, Expenditures, Participation, and Recipient Characteristics

5.2.1 Expenditure, Caseload, and Benefit Trends

The AFDC program experienced uneven growth of expenditures and caseloads over its lifetime. Whereas program growth was essentially comparable to population growth from 1935 through the late 1950s, expenditures and caseloads began to pick up in the 1960s. Figure 5.1 shows the growth of real per capita expenditures in the AFDC program from 1970 to 1995. A notable increase in AFDC expenditures occurred in the early 1970s (a continuation of an upward trend that began in the late 1960s) and ran through about 1977, a period known as the “welfare explosion.” Expenditures subsequently declined in real terms, until the early 1990s, when they underwent another period of growth, albeit much smaller in magnitude than that in the 1970s. This period of growth was not sufficient to offset the long-period decline, however, and by 1995 per capita expenditures on the AFDC program were at about the same level they were in 1972.

The second line in figure 5.1 shows per capita expenditure trends in the TANF program and for a reconstructed set of expenditures for the AFDC program to restore some measure of comparability. The TANF program’s expenditures cover many types of activities (e.g., jobs programs and emergency assistance) that were not included in official AFDC expenditures. As the line shows, expenditures including these additional programs were slightly higher than official AFDC expenditures but have fallen rapidly in the TANF program. This decline is largely a result of the decline in the caseload, as discussed next.

15. Of the four principal goals of the PRWORA legislation given in its preamble, only one relates solely to assisting the poor; the other three relate to increasing marriage and employment and to reducing nonmarital childbearing.

16. This figure and all subsequent ones use the Personal Consumption Expenditure deflator (base 1996) for conversion to real amounts.
The upper line in figure 5.2 shows the per capita caseload in the AFDC and TANF programs. The AFDC caseload grew dramatically in the early 1970s (again, a continuation of a trend that began in the 1960s) and then gradually declined until 1982 and leveled off for the rest of the decade. A new surge of growth occurred in the early 1990s, followed by a decline that began before 1996 but accelerated after it and led to a caseload level by 1999 that had fallen below its level in 1970. Overall, the pattern of caseload growth generally follows the pattern of expenditures in figure 5.1. Indeed, a decomposition of the per capita expenditure growth into caseload per capita and expenditures per recipient through 1995 shows that the former explains essentially all of the expenditure patterns (Moffitt 2001). The same correlation appears after 1995. Expenditures per recipient changed very little over the entire period.

The lower lines in figure 5.2 show trends in the fraction of single-mother families who received AFDC or TANF benefits, and trends in the fraction of earnings-poor single-mother families who did so. Participation rates grew rapidly in the 1970s and then declined somewhat through the early 1990s. Moffitt (2001) has shown that the fraction of the population that is in single-mother families grew steadily over the period and accelerated during the 1980s and early 1990s; this growth kept the caseload from

17. Earnings-poor families are those below their poverty threshold on the basis of family earnings alone. Only single-mother families are shown because married families have always been a minor fraction of the caseload.
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program

Fig. 5.2 AFDC and TANF caseload per capita and participation rates per capita, 1970–99


falling even more than it did from the decline in participation rates of single mothers alone. Indeed, the spike in the caseload in the early 1990s is not reflected in participation rates and is instead a result of the continued growth of single-mother families. Starting around 1994, participation rates declined drastically along with the caseload. The caseload decline was entirely the result of the drop in participation, for, at least through 1999, there was no dropoff in the number of single mother families (U.S. DHHS 2001, pp. III–50).18

Figure 5.3 shows trends in real welfare benefits for a family of four over the 1970–98 period.19 The lower line in the figure shows trends for AFDC-TANF, while the upper two lines show figures for the combined sum of AFDC-TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid. The higher of the two latter lines shows the straight sum of the three, and the lower of the two discounts the Medicaid benefit by an estimate of its cash-equivalent value and also takes into account the taxation of AFDC-TANF income by the Food Stamp Program.

The figure shows that AFDC-TANF benefits by themselves have declined secularly since 1970, and hence cannot provide an explanation for

18. The decline in participation was not a result of increases in income that made more single mothers ineligible. The decline in the participation rate of poor single mothers in figure 5.2 suggests this, but when income eligibility is more precisely determined, the data show a decline in the participation rate of income-eligible families as well (U.S. DHHS 2001, pp. II–21).
19. The figures show the maximum amount paid for a family with no other income, or what economists commonly call the guarantee.
any of the positive or negative fluctuations in the caseload or in participation rates conditional on single motherhood shown in figure 5.2. Mechanically, the decline in benefits results from a failure of states to raise nominal benefit levels to keep up with inflation. There has been very little change in this trend during the TANF program, although the benefit decline has slightly leveled off.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that food stamps and Medicaid were not received by many families in the late 1960s and came into their own only in the early 1970s, when they rapidly expanded around the country. Recipients of AFDC were automatically eligible for benefits from both programs (as TANF recipients continue to be). Consequently, a proper comparison of the change in benefits received by AFDC recipients is more closely approximated by comparing the AFDC benefit alone in 1970 to the combined benefit in 1975 and after. By that comparison, there was a strong growth of benefits in the early 1970s, thus providing a possible explanation for the growth in the caseload and in participation rates over that period. Moreover, the decline in the combined benefit subsequently has been entirely the result of the decline in AFDC benefits, for food stamp benefits have remained relatively constant in real terms and real Medicaid benefits have grown slightly. On net, by 1998, the combined benefit was still higher than the AFDC benefit alone in 1970.

The AFDC-TANF benefit decline after 1996 is also somewhat misleading because of the increase in the fraction of TANF expenditures spent on noncash services. Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of 1999 TANF expenditures by spending category and shows that only 59 percent of monies

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Fig. 5.3  Real monthly AFDC-TANF, food stamp, and Medicaid benefits, 1970–98
were expended on cash aid. The rest was spent on work activities, child care, administration, and a number of other categories (including social services). Indeed, when the post-TANF expenditures in figure 5.1 are divided by the number of cash recipients shown in figure 5.2, it can easily be seen that expenditures per recipient have actually increased after 1996, rather than fallen. In large part this is simply because the caseload has declined so drastically that states have used their block grant monies for other, noncash categories.  

5.2.2 Recipient Characteristics

Table 5.5 shows the trends in a few characteristics of the AFDC and TANF caseload 1969 to 1999. The percent of the caseload with earnings was only 13 percent in 1979 but dropped further in the 1980s, largely because of 1981 federal legislation that increased the tax rate on earnings to 100 percent (see table 5.1), effectively making many working families formerly on AFDC ineligible for benefits. The percent with earnings is a much higher 25 percent by 1999, a reflection of the emphasis of current welfare reform on work.

The age of recipients appears to be slightly increasing and family size is declining, although most of this decline occurred in the 1970s. The fraction

20. There are unfortunately no concrete data on how many of the recipients of the noncash expenditures are AFDC-TANF recipients and how many are either former recipients—namely, those who have left the welfare rolls—or even poor families who have never been on AFDC-TANF. This makes the expenditure per recipient calculation potentially misleading, for the monies are now spread over a large population. Along with the decline in expenditures has probably been a redistribution within the poor population.
whose youngest child is less than two has also declined in the 1990s, either because of a general decline in the population of families with children in this age range or because mothers with very young children have left the welfare rolls. Another important trend has been an enormous increase in the 1990s in the fraction of the caseload composed of child-only cases. These are cases in which benefits are received by children but the parent, or other adult caretaker, is herself ineligible for benefits. Such ineligibility can occur if the parent is a noncitizen immigrant but the children are citizens; if the children are cared for by a nonparent with income above the TANF eligibility level; or if the parent has been sanctioned for violating one of many TANF rules (including those for work requirements) or has reached a TANF time limit and has gone off the rolls. The last category occurs only in those states with partial sanctions—that is, in the case of a violation only the portion of the benefit designated for the adult is terminated—and in those states where the time limit is applied only to the adult, not to the children. In child-only families, none of the work requirements or time limits affect benefits or eligibility because they are assessed only on adults.

The last row of the table shows trends in the fraction of the caseload without a high school education. This fraction declined secularly, as it did for the population as a whole from rising levels of education. However, it has increased slightly since 1996, possibly a sign that more educated recipients have left the rolls in the massive caseload decline illustrated earlier. This would leave the caseload more disadvantaged than it had been before.21

The types of single mothers on AFDC also shifted over time, as shown in figure 5.5. Initially most single mothers were widows, but in the 1960s...

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21. The evidence on whether this type of selectivity has occurred is weaker than one would predict. See Moffitt and Stevens (2001), Moffitt et al. (2001), and Smith (2001), and the references therein.
and 1970s the majority were divorced and separated women. In the 1980s and 1990s, the majority were unmarried single mothers. These trends have contributed importantly to the perception of welfare recipients by the general public and have probably increased its unpopularity.22

5.3 Research on the AFDC Program

This section reviews the research literature on the AFDC program. The AFDC program has received more research attention from economists than any other welfare program. It was the best-known cash means-tested program in the mind of the general public and policymakers. Its benefit structure was also fairly simple and came closest, among all means-tested programs, to the simple textbook model of such a program with a single guarantee and a single tax rate on income. This made it particularly well suited to the study of work incentives, which has always been the main interest of economists, beginning with the discussions of a negative income in the 1960s.

Research on the TANF program is considered later in a separate section.23 There is much less research on TANF, and, further, the character of that research is generally quite different from that on the AFDC pro-

22. For a study of how the general public perceives welfare recipients, and how that perception is affected by the marital status of recipients, see Moffitt (1999b).

23. That section includes research on the AFDC waivers of the 1990s because those waivers, while conducted within the AFDC program, are best understood as precursors to TANF.
gram, as will be seen from the review. Nevertheless, research on AFDC is still quite relevant to the TANF program because academic AFDC re-
search deals, by and large, with fundamental response issues—the effects of benefits and tax rates on behavior—and not with the effects of specific subfeatures of AFDC, which are not so generalizable. Consequently, AFDC research is still relevant in the TANF era, albeit in a generalized sense.

Although the issue of work incentives is by far the major area in which AFDC research has been conducted, some studies have also been con-
ducted on many other issues as well. The review below will include the main areas of such research: dynamics and turnover in the program; em-
ployment and training programs; effects of the program on demographic and family outcomes; and research on the state determination of benefits. The sections below on each of these topics will first consider the economic models used to analyze them, followed by a review of the empirical evi-
dence.

5.3.1 Work Incentives

Models

Economists' research on AFDC, as on most welfare programs, generally has taken the redistributive goals of the program as given and has tended to focus on the behavioral incentives and disincentives provided by the program structure and benefit formula. For work incentives, there is a well-
developed model for analyzing these incentives—the static labor supply model—which has been the workhorse of this literature. The model has en-
dured because it can capture the simple labor supply effects of a wide range of elementary program alternatives.

The model is illustrated with the familiar income-leisure diagram in fig-
ure 5.6, where the nontransfer constraint is shown as ADE with slope $-W$ (the hourly wage rate) and it is assumed that there is no nonprogram non-
labor income ($N$). The benefit formula (allowing positive $N$) is $B = G - t(WH + N)$, where $H$ is hours of work, generating the transfer constraint shown as ACD, with slope $-W(1 - t)$. Here $t$ is the marginal tax rate on benefits and the intercept $G$ is the guarantee level. The introduction of the program where there was none before uncontroversibly reduces (or at least does not increase) labor supply because income and substitution effects go in the same direction. Those initially on constraint AD will move to CD, reducing labor supply, and a few of those initially above point D will reduce labor supply to go onto the program (indifference curves not shown).

An increase in $G$, which shifts segment CD up in parallel fashion, re-
duces hours of work in this model if leisure is a normal good, but the more
important comparative static is that induced by a reduction in $t$. The negative income tax, a program originally proposed by Friedman (1962) and promoted by Lampman (1968), Tobin (1966), Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski (1967), and many others thereafter, was intended to provide work incentives by such a reform. Figure 5.7 shows the effect of a reduction in $t$ from 1.0 to some lesser value by the shift from CD to CD’. It is now a well-known result that the effect of such a reduction on average hours of work is ambiguous in sign. While some of those who are initially on welfare and not working increase their hours of work (arrow 1), those in the newly created eligible region will reduce their labor supply (arrow 2), as will some of those at higher income levels who are initially ineligible (arrow 3). Whether labor supply on net increases or decreases depends on the relative numbers of individuals at different points and on the magnitudes of their
responses. The ranges of $G$ and $t$ in the AFDC program typically resulted in a program breakeven point (D or D') somewhere in the part-time hours range, so the effect of a reduction in $t$ was thought to increase part-time work both by pulling nonworkers up to that range and inducing some full-time workers to reduce work to part time (to obtain benefit supplementation).

This result is a special case of a larger principle that has bedeviled welfare reform, namely, that any reform that provides a benefit to those on welfare that is not available off welfare tends to draw families onto the program, thereby increasing the caseload and decreasing labor supply. Providing benefit supplementation to those who work while on welfare—but not to those who are off welfare—is one example, but so is providing medical benefits, child care subsidies, and education and training programs, if those are provided only to those on welfare and not those off. There is no way within this general class of budget-constraint manipulations of the welfare formula to avoid these effects entirely, although they may be avoided by making such benefits universal and hence available to those off welfare as well as on.

With a minor modification, the model also provides a simple theory of welfare participation, which is also a useful tool in analyzing the AFDC program. Denoting $V(W', N')$ as the indirect utility obtained by an individual on a linear budget segment with slope $W'$ and rightmost intercept $N'$, we can write the determinants of welfare participation—$P$, equal to 1 if the individual participates and 0 if not—as

$$P^* = V[W(1 - t), N(1 - t) + G] - V[W, N] - C$$

$$P = 1 \text{ iff } P^* > 0; \quad P = 0 \text{ otherwise}$$

where $C$ is some implicit cost attached to being a welfare recipient. That cost may be a stigma cost—the individual suffers a utility loss from being on welfare per se—or a time and money cost arising from the process of applying for the program and complying with its ongoing reporting and other requirements. The first two terms in equation (1) imply that participation propensities are increasing in $G$ and decreasing in $t$, and there is a presumption (although not strictly required by theory) that they are decreasing in $W$. The basic trade-off in the model faced in the participation choice is between the potential benefit, on the one hand, and potential earnings off welfare, on the other. Welfare costs ($C$) are needed to explain why participation rates of eligibles are less than 100 percent—as all data

24. The decrease in $t$ has ambiguous effects on work effort but unambiguously increases the caseload and the participation rate in the program. The early literature on reductions in $t$ (e.g., Aaron 1973) emphasized that there is a trade-off between work incentives and program costs for this reason. But, in fact, the trade-off is more unfavorable than this implies because a reduction in $t$ may not only increase costs, it may also not increase labor supply.
calculations show them to be—for this implies that some families will be observed to be on segment AD in figure 5.1 and do not take advantage of a potential increase in income by going onto welfare. Note that equations (1)–(2) also cover the participation choice between locating above the break-even point D in figure 5.1 and below it, as well as the choice between segment AD and CD.

**Evidence**

There have been three major reviews of the literature on the effect of AFDC on labor supply (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981; Moffitt 1992b; Hoynes 1997), which cover most of the work on that topic. The studies as a whole confirm that AFDC reduces labor supply, and the estimates of its effect range from 10 to 50 percent of non-AFDC levels. Mean labor supply in the absence of AFDC is generally only about twenty hours per week, however (including nonworkers), so the absolute magnitude of the reduction is not as large as might be expected. Probably the major methodological problem with these estimates is the obvious one that they are not based on any data in which AFDC was literally absent, but rather are extrapolations from estimated effects of the existing, positive level of AFDC benefits down to a benefit level of zero. Benefit-level estimates (really, effects of \( G \)) are obtained from cross-state variation in benefits, which, although large, does not include zero benefits. These estimates must therefore be treated with some caution.

This literature also generally estimates income and substitution effects on labor supply, usually based, at least in part, on variation in \( G \) and \( t \) across states. This itself is also problematic because, while there was considerable variation in \( G \) in the AFDC program, as just noted, the nominal level of the tax rate was set by the federal government and hence was constant across states. Sometimes this problem was circumvented by constraining the effect of \( t \) to enter the labor supply function through \( W(1 - t) \), thereby allowing wage variation to identify the coefficient, but often variation in effective tax rates arising from a variety of sources was used. Either approach has problems. In any case, however, the elasticities estimated in the papers generally fell into acceptable ranges as those are defined

25. The estimates suffer from a data problem, namely, that they use household surveys that only contain information on hours of work over an entire year (divided by 52), which includes both welfare and nonwelfare weeks. Thus the estimates are themselves some average over weeks in which the individual was on welfare and weeks in which she was not.

26. See note 2 for ways in which states could manipulate the tax rate. These variations only changed the tax rate over some ranges of the data and hence still require some parametric restrictions to obtain general estimates of substitution effects. Some studies, rather than using the official manipulations of the tax rate, simply used estimated effective tax rates obtained by regressing benefits on income on a state-by-state basis (see Fraker, Moffitt, and Wolf 1985, and McKinnish, Sanders, and Smith 1999 for such estimates). However, these incorrectly linearized the benefit formula and also incorporated taxes and work-related expenses that should not be included.
by the general labor supply literature for women and single mothers, with moderately large and negative income effects and moderately sized and positive uncompensated substitution effects.

However, as noted in the Models section above, the net effect of changes in $t$ on labor supply depends on the relative magnitudes of offsetting positive and negative effects, regardless of whether uncompensated substitution effects are positive. On this issue, the evidence suggested that the net effect was reasonably close to zero; that is, that the positive and negative incentive effects of changes in $t$ essentially cancel each other out. The nonexperimental evidence, such as that provided by simulations from nonexperimental labor supply elasticities, demonstrates this, as does evidence from the NIT experiments. In the latter, comparisons of labor supply across alternative treatment groups that had the same $G$ but different $t$ showed no consistent evidence of differences in hours of work (SRI International 1983, table 3.9). As noted by Moffitt (1992b), the finding of a small or nonexistent effect of changes in $t$ on labor supply is consistent with the relative invariance of hours of work among female heads in time series before and after the 1967 and 1981 changes in the tax rate in the AFDC program.

There have been relatively few new studies of AFDC and labor supply since the past reviews. Three are noted in table 5.6. Hoynes (1996) studied the AFDC-UP program and found it to have significant negative effects on the labor supply of husbands and wives, but that marginal reductions in $t$ had little effect, consistent with prior work. Keane and Moffitt (1998) focused on the labor supply effects of participating in multiple programs, including not only AFDC but also food stamps, subsidized housing, and the Medicaid program. They showed that cumulative marginal tax rates were generally greater than 100 percent in this case. Nevertheless, although their estimated substitution and income elasticities were sizable, the net effect on labor supply of reducing the marginal tax rates to a level below 100 percent was negligible, again for the same reasons already noted. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) focused on an attempt to explain the increase in employment rates among single mothers from 1984 to 1986. They found that AFDC benefits and tax rates (the latter affecting potential benefits if working) had expected effects on employment probabilities, but that the time series increase in single-mother employment was less affected by changes in those parameters and other welfare variables than by a change in the generosity of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) over the period (see the EITC chapter in this volume).27

Simple static models of participation in AFDC also form a part of this

27. Because Meyer and Rosenbaum examined employment rather than hours of work, the “perverse” effect of a change in $t$ could not occur. They briefly examined effects on hours of work as a sensitivity test, but they noted that the model independent variables were not set up for that dependent variable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Welfare Variables</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoynes (1996)</td>
<td>Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1983–86</td>
<td>Low-asset married couples</td>
<td>Labor supply and participation in the AFDC-UP program</td>
<td>AFDC guarantee and tax rate evaluated at specific labor supply points</td>
<td>AFDC-UP has sizable negative effect on labor supply; marginal changes in $G$ and $t$ have little effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keane and Moffitt (1998)</td>
<td>Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1984</td>
<td>Low-asset single mothers</td>
<td>Labor supply and participation in AFDC, food stamps, and subsidized housing</td>
<td>Guarantees and tax rates in AFDC, food stamps, and subsidized housing evaluated at specific labor supply points</td>
<td>Substitution elasticity is 1.82 and total income elasticity is −.21; marginal changes in $t$ have no effect on labor supply</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
literature, generally estimating some version of equations (1)–(2). Again, most of this literature is summarized by prior reviews. The studies overwhelmingly confirm that participation propensities are positively affected by $G$ and negatively affected by $t$, and generally confirm that those propensities are negatively affected by $W$ and $N$. Two of the recent studies (Hoynes 1996 and Keane and Moffitt 1998) estimated participation equations jointly with labor supply equations and obtained results consistent with these findings.

Researchers have also sought to use this model to explain the time-series pattern of caseload and participation rates in different periods shown in Figure 2. Most explanations for the welfare caseload increase in the late 1960s and early 1970s rely on the gradual expansions of the Food Stamp and Medicaid programs to more counties in the United States, which, given the ties of these programs to AFDC receipt, made the program more attractive. Such an explanation is consistent with the economic model. However, most observers attribute part of the increase as well to court decisions relaxing eligibility restrictions and to declines in welfare stigma, although the latter may be endogenous. The relatively stable caseload trend in the late 1970s and 1980s is generally attributed to two offsetting and contradictory forces, one an increase in the fraction of single mother families in the population and the other a decline in the participation rate conditional on single motherhood. The latter is most often attributed to the decline in the real benefit level, while the causes of the former are still in considerable dispute. The economic model is better at explaining changes in participation conditional on single motherhood than changes in single motherhood, in general. Finally, the increase in caseloads in the early 1990s, which resulted from a rise in the participation rate conditional on single motherhood more than a rise in single motherhood, is more difficult to explain with the economic model, for neither declining wage rates nor increasing benefits can be reasonably tied to most of the growth. Blank (2001) shows that the majority of the caseload increase over this period arose from increases in child-only cases and the AFDC-UP caseload, neither of which is easily explainable by the economic model, whereas the remaining growth of the traditional single-mother AFDC caseload is reasonably well explained by an expanded model that includes not only benefits but also demographics, political factors, and other policy variables.28

28. Blank also argues, however, that the growth of the single-mother AFDC caseload over this period was more a result of an increase in the number of single mothers with income below the eligibility level than of an increase in take-up conditional on this eligibility. Moffitt (2001) showed that the caseload increase over this period was half a result of increases in the numbers of single mothers and half a result of increases in take-up conditional on single motherhood (but not conditional on income). Moffitt also argued that, over the period 1971–95, participation rates so defined fluctuated around a constant mean and hence had no effect on the long-run growth of the caseload, which is instead essentially entirely explained by the growth in single motherhood.
A small literature has also developed on the concept of welfare stigma, which, as mentioned above, is conceived of as a disutility of welfare participation which lowers participation rates in the program. Moffitt (1983) introduced the concept to the literature but considered it to be an exogenous heterogeneous parameter of the individual utility function that could be used to rationalize the need to estimate a participation equation and not just a labor supply equation. However, other studies have developed the idea of welfare stigma as a disutility that declines with the number of other families who are on welfare, setting up a social interactions, or contagion, model that can have multiplier effects once participation rates exceed a threshold. Besley and Coate (1992a), for example, assumed that the utility of being on welfare is reduced by some function of the fraction of the population that is not truly needy and is instead reducing labor supply to go onto welfare. Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) simply assumed that the utility of being on welfare is reduced by the number of others who are on welfare, but they went on to analyze the voting equilibria that would set benefit levels that would generate different welfare caseloads as an equilibrium outcome. In a somewhat different vein, Nechyba (2001) assumed that the stigma of having nonmarital births (which is a condition for welfare eligibility) is reduced by the magnitude of the aggregate nonmarital birth rate, and he then showed that a change in welfare benefits can initiate a nontrivial change in that birth rate through multiplier effects.

5.3.2 Participation Dynamics

A continuing area of research on the AFDC program focuses on participation dynamics, that is, the study of entry rates, exit rates, and spell distributions of time on AFDC. Interest in this issue arises from several sources. One is the recognition that, contrary to the impression given by the static labor supply model where participation seems to be a one-time, permanent decision, turnover rates in the AFDC program are quite high. Another is that attitudes toward the program, and policy measures to assist recipients, may differ depending upon whether recipients have only short spells of AFDC receipt or long spells. Short-spell recipients are likely to be those with stronger labor market skills who use the program for temporary support, whereas long-term recipients are likely to be those with the weakest skills. Further, long-term receipt may reduce skill levels further, as time out of the labor force results in deterioration of skills.

Models

The two building blocks of dynamic participation analysis are an entry rate and an exit rate. The standard static labor supply–participation model
is easily adapted to entry and exit in order to generate a conventional economic model of turnover. Supposing that the relevant population of eligibles is composed of myopic individuals who make decisions only on the basis of current period values, the decision for women who are off welfare at time $\tau - 1$ to enter or not enter the program (designate $EN_i$ as an entry dummy variable) and the decision for women who are on welfare at time $\tau - 1$ to exit or not exit the program (designate $EX_i$ as an exit dummy) can be formulated as

\begin{align*}
(3) \quad EN_t^* &= V[W_t(1 - t), N_t(1 - t) + G] - V[W_t, N_t] - C - F1 \\
(4) \quad EN_t &= 1 \text{ iff } EN_t^* > 0; \quad EN_t = 0 \text{ otherwise} \\
(5) \quad EX_t^* &= V[W_t, N_t] - V[W_t(1 - t), N_t(1 - t) + ] + C - F2 \\
(6) \quad EX_t &= 1 \text{ iff } EX_t^* > 0; \quad EX_t = 0 \text{ otherwise},
\end{align*}

where $F1$ are fixed costs associated with moving onto welfare and $F2$ are fixed costs associated with moving off welfare (and possibly into the workforce). Starting with initial positions on or off welfare, and with $G$, $t$, and $C$ fixed, transitions on and off welfare are driven by fluctuations in private market income opportunities $W_t$ and $N_t$, which are assumed to follow some stochastic process. Individuals leave welfare when good job or other income opportunities arise and enter welfare when those job or income circumstances deteriorate; benefit levels and tax rates affect the relative attractiveness of welfare in the decision.

Given that the utility structure of the entry and exit decisions in equations (3)–(6) is the same as that in equation (1), the same comparative statics apply: Entry rates are increasing in $G$ and decreasing in $t$ and $W$, while exit rates are decreasing in $G$ and increasing in $t$ and $W$. Since labor supply on welfare is always less than labor supply off welfare, we can also say that these entry and exit decisions operate to make labor supply decreasing in $G$ and increasing in $t$ and $W$. That work incentives are implied to increase in $t$ reflects the adverse work incentive effects noted above and can be seen in a dynamic context to operate through entry and exit: Decreases in marginal tax rates tend to decrease exit from the rolls and increase entry onto the rolls. Although the fixed costs reduce transition rates, an individual’s participation will tend to gradually move over time toward welfare if equation (3) is more positive than equation (5) conditional on $W_t$ and $N_t$ and toward nonwelfare if the opposite occurs.

If $\mu$ is the entry probability, $\lambda$ is the exit probability, and $p_t$ is the probability of being on welfare at time $\tau$, then we have the flow identity

\begin{align*}
(7) \quad p_\tau &= \mu(1 - p_{\tau-1}) + (1 - \lambda)p_{\tau-1} \\
&= \mu + (1 - \mu - \lambda)p_{\tau-1}
\end{align*}

which approaches the equilibrium value
Thus participation on welfare will be more likely if $\mu$ is greater than $\lambda$, and nonwelfare participation will be more likely if $\lambda$ is greater than $\mu$. Unless the fixed costs are large relative to the utility differences, these participation tendencies will be driven by the relative values of $G$, $t$, $W$, and $N$, as before.

In this simple setup, short-term recipients can be thought of as those with higher values of mean $W_r$ and $N_r$, which will generate lower entry rates, higher exit rates, and shorter spell lengths, and long-term recipients can be thought of as those with lower mean values of those variables, resulting in higher entry rates, lower exit rates, and longer spell lengths. A logical alternative in this model is that short-termers and long-termers have the same means for wages and nonlabor income, but short-termers have a higher variance, which will lead them to have higher turnover rates as well. If the variation in wage and nonlabor income from period to period, which generates turnover in this model, is not exogenous but rather depends on effort, then it is also possible that short-termers are those who put more effort into job search. Heterogeneity in the distaste for welfare can also generate differences in turnover rates, as those with greater distaste have a lower reservation wage for going off or failing to enter welfare.

These models can be made more realistic by allowing foresight, particularly if wage growth is made endogenous and allowed to be affected by whether the individual is on or off welfare. Current entry and exit decisions will then be affected by expectations of the future consequences for wages and labor market opportunities. Liquidity constraints are important because those going onto welfare may be those who are more greatly constrained and who cannot sustain themselves off welfare after a negative wage shock, and those on welfare may be discouraged from saving by the asset tests in the program (see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995).

**Evidence**

The empirical literature on participation dynamics has two strands, one consisting of simple descriptive work on the distribution of AFDC spells in the population and of what types of individual characteristics are associated with that distribution, and another consisting of estimates of entry and exit rate equations. The most influential descriptive work in the literature is that of Bane and Ellwood (1983, 1994) and Ellwood (1986), who used panel data to estimate distributions of AFDC spell lengths and also distributions of “total time on” AFDC in a fixed calendar interval. These authors realized upon examination of the data not only that turnover rates were high but that many of those who exited the AFDC rolls returned in fairly short order, a finding that has been repeatedly found in subsequent
work. This implies that many women do not have many long spells but nevertheless accumulate a considerable amount of time on welfare because of their high return rates. Consequently, they may have a high total time on welfare even though they do not have long spells. The data used by Bane and Ellwood indicated that up to one-quarter of all (new) recipients would be on AFDC for more than ten years in the subsequent twenty-five-year period, as compared to only 10 percent who would have a spell that lasted that long.  

In their later work (Bane and Ellwood 1994), the authors took the existence of high reentry rates to extend the categorization of welfare recipients to a threefold classification, consisting of long-termers, short-termers, and “cyclers.” Long-termers have long spells, short-termers have only brief periods of AFDC receipt, and cyclers have relatively short spells but return to the rolls frequently. The authors argued that policy toward the three groups should be different. In a recent paper, Moffitt (2002) has provided evidence, however, that cyclers do not appear to have greater labor market skills than long-termers, which is an implication of the conventional economic model, where high turnover is generated by higher labor market skill. Moffitt found that the education and wage rates of cyclers were equal to those of long-termers, if not lower, and that they are a very disadvantaged group of recipients. This suggests that their cycling on and off for the rolls must be arising from some other kind of behavior, such as an inability to comply with program rules.

The literature on estimating entry and exit equations is fairly large and is well summarized, for the most part, by the previous reviews of research on AFDC referred to earlier. Table 5.7 lists some of the more recent studies that have been conducted, which explore a variety of issues. On the issue of whether AFDC benefits affect the probability of entry and exit, the literature confirms prior work that the guarantee generally decreases exit and increases reentry. None of the studies estimated the effects of the tax rate. Blank and Ruggles (1994) emphasized the high rates of reentry in the program, and Blank and Ruggles (1996) emphasized that spells of eligibility are not the same as spells of welfare receipt, and some women enter the rolls after being eligible for some time and others leave the rolls and remain eligible, usually for unknown reasons. Fitzgerald (1995) and Hoynes (2000) examined the effects of local labor market conditions on exit rates, while Harris (1993, 1996) examined the “routes” to exit from the rolls and reen-

30. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services now routinely publishes these total time on figures. A recent report (U.S. DHHS 2001, table IND 10) shows that, in a period later than Bane and Ellwood considered and for the total recipient population (not just those with a new spell), one-quarter of recipients were on AFDC more than five years in a ten-year period, a much higher rate of dependence. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) examined how total-time-on had been trending, however, and found no trend from the 1970s to the 1980s. They also proposed an alternative measure, which was the percentage of income received from AFDC over a fixed calendar period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Welfare Variables</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blank and Ruggles (1994)</td>
<td>Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1986 and 1987 panels</td>
<td>Single mothers who have been on AFDC and have left</td>
<td>Probability of returning to AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC guarantee</td>
<td>Guarantee positively affects reentry rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank and Ruggles (1996)</td>
<td>Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1986 and 1987 panels</td>
<td>Single mothers</td>
<td>Probability of exiting AFDC and probability of becoming ineligible for AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC guarantee</td>
<td>Guarantee has a negative effect on exit; many women are still eligible after the exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris (1993)</td>
<td>Michigan PSID, 1984–86</td>
<td>Single mothers who are on AFDC</td>
<td>Probability of exiting AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC guarantee</td>
<td>Guarantee is insignificant; two-thirds of exits are for employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris (1996)</td>
<td>Michigan PSID, 1983–88</td>
<td>Single mothers who have exited AFDC</td>
<td>Probability of returning to AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC guarantee</td>
<td>Guarantee is insignificant; other variables do matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoynes (2000)</td>
<td>California administrative data on AFDC recipients, 1987–92</td>
<td>California welfare recipients</td>
<td>Probability of exiting AFDC and probability of reentry</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Local labor market variables affect transition rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoynes and MaCurdy (1994)</td>
<td>Michigan PSID, 1968–89</td>
<td>Single mothers who received AFDC</td>
<td>Probability of exiting AFDC</td>
<td>AFDC guarantee</td>
<td>Guarantee explains changes in length of welfare spells in some periods but not others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
try to it. The literature on “routes” was initiated to a large extent by Bane and Ellwood (1983), who found that most exits from AFDC were to marriage. Harris (1993, 1996) and others found that this was a result of using annual data and that when monthly data are used, exits are usually to work. The literature on these routes on and off welfare and reasons for exit are fraught with conceptual problems, for the immediate reasons for entry and exit may not be the long-run reasons. In addition, reasons that particular individuals enter and exit are endogenous to their unobserved characteristics, and it is difficult, as a result, to draw any implications about whether government policy should be to encourage certain routes off welfare.31

5.3.3 Employment Programs

In addition to simply providing cash with a specified benefit formula, the AFDC program long conducted various types of employment programs for recipients. One type was an education or training program that attempted to provide labor market skills and hence to improve the wage rate of the recipient. In policy discussions, these programs are often termed “human capital” programs. A second type provided assistance in job search, or assisted recipients in locating transportation and child care for employment, or even instructed recipients on the kinds of behavior and dress needed at regular jobs. In policy discussions, these are generally not termed human capital programs, but economists’ conception of human capital should include them because there is some type of investment, or instruction, involved, which has a future return, however small and short-lived that return might be. A third type was a pure workfare program that simply required a recipient to work some minimum number of hours per week, without the assistance or other guidance from the welfare department (except, in the case of public service employment, to actually provide the job). Such a program should not be expected to affect the wage rate and is not a human capital program under any definition. Most programs had at least some elements of two or more of these ideal types, and it is not always easy to find any of the types in pure form. Nevertheless, prior to TANF and the pre-PRWORA waiver programs, AFDC employment programs typically drew mostly on elements from the first two of these program types, even though variations on the third were present to some degree.

Models

These programs, when viewed as human capital programs that require an investment of time (in education, training, job search, etc.) and yield some rate of return in the form of a higher future wage, can be simply ana-

31. In a review of the earlier literature in this subarea (Moffitt 1992b, 26), I noted that the studies needed more theoretical structure and content. This observation would seem still to hold.
lyzed with the standard investment framework familiar from human capital theory. The value to an individual of participating in the program is the present value of future wage and earnings gains minus the present value of the time costs and, if any, money costs. Here it is important to know whether the program is voluntary or mandatory. If it is voluntary, no recipient will participate in the program unless its net present value is positive, but if it is mandatory, then it is conceivable that the net present value will be negative for some recipients. If so, this will reduce the value of being on welfare and should be subtracted from the welfare benefit itself (or the present value of such benefits) to obtain the value of being on welfare.

There are a number of minor alterations in this familiar model that change things slightly but not in the main. Future gains in earnings must be multiplied by the probability of employment if the latter is less than one, and programs that change only that probability and not wages also have a potentially positive net present value. Second, the rate of return will depend on whether earnings are raised sufficiently to induce the individual to go off welfare altogether; if so, incremental earnings gains go untaxed (by the welfare department), but if not, earnings gains will be taxed at the welfare tax rate $t$ and hence will be reduced. The rhetoric of most education and training programs is that they are intended to move recipients off welfare altogether, but the reality is otherwise (see empirical review). The phrase “welfare trap” is sometimes used to describe a situation in which a very large rate of return is needed to make the recipient financially better off welfare altogether; this is particularly likely to occur if there is a notch at the point of going off welfare where tax rates are over 100 percent. Third, if there are opportunity costs in the form of forgone earnings—as in the classic education case of human capital—these forgone earnings will only be $W(1 - t)$, not $W$, and hence will be lower than they would be for such investment off welfare. If the recipient is not working, there is forgone leisure rather than forgone earnings but the former is not taxed.

Assuming that the opportunity cost is in earnings rather than leisure, the net present value of the program in a two-period model can be written as

$$NPV = -W_t(1 - t)I + \frac{1}{1 + r} \left\{ P_2 [(W_2 - W_1)(1 - t)H_2] + (1 - P_2)[(W_2 - W_1)H_2 - (G - tW_1H_2)] \right\}$$

32. Although traditional human capital theory presumes the effect of investment to affect the wage rate, a generalized interpretation would allow it to affect employment as well. For example, an investment in teaching a recipient improved job search techniques may lead to a better ability of the recipient to find a job at all, which would affect hours of work and not the wage rate. Although the theoretical discussion here assumes it is the wage rate that is affected, the same model can be extended to include effects on hours of work.

33. This point was made long ago by Kesselman (1976). The theoretical literature on the effect of transfer programs on human capital investment is virtually nonexistent. See Kesselman and Miller and Sanders (1997).
where $W_1$ is the wage if the recipient does not undergo the program, $W_2$ is the (higher) wage in period two if she does, $I$ is the amount of time required in period one, $H_2$ is hours worked in period 2, and $P_2$ is a welfare participation dummy in period two if the recipient undergoes the program. A second equation for the determination of $P_2$ is required but that is omitted for brevity. The welfare trap is illustrated by the last term, which shows that the gain to the program if the recipient goes off welfare subtracts off the lost benefit relative to the earnings gain.

The key empirical questions raised by this model are (a) what effect past programs have had on the wage rate or earnings and (b) to what degree they have moved recipients off welfare in subsequent periods.

Moffitt (1996) has noted that there is a third empirical question, which is (c) whether these programs affect the desirability of being on welfare in the first place, which is commonly termed an effect on entry into the program. If the program is voluntary, no recipient can be made worse off by its presence and the welfare program can only be enhanced in value, which will increase the caseload by making welfare more attractive. If the program is mandatory, it may reduce the caseload to the extent that recipients or potential recipients see it as making them worse off.

**Evidence**

The main employment programs in the history of the AFDC program—at least prior to the waiver programs of the 1990s—were the WIN program, the WIN demonstrations of the 1980s, and the JOBS program, all referred to in section 5.2 in the discussion of the history of the AFDC program. As noted there, the WIN program was a work-registration program that provided simple job placement and job search assistance to eligible recipients; the WIN demonstrations tested new employment programs involving community work experience (close to workfare), work supplementation, and heightened job search; and the JOBS program required states to offer some mix of education, job skills training, job search, on-the-job training, work supplementation, and community work experience.

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34. The change in $H_2$ resulting from the increase in the wage is ignored for simplicity.

35. This is a slight misnomer given the high turnover in the program. Recipients who are already on welfare but who know that they may be engaged in a program subsequently may also change their exit decisions given the presence of the program (e.g., whether to accept a job offer off the rolls or not).

36. “Community work experience” meant workfare because it was usually work at a publicly created job in the community such as cleaning up public parks. “Work supplementation” allowed welfare departments to use welfare benefits to subsidize private sector jobs. See U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways and Means (1994, table 10.4) for the programs chosen by the states under the JOBS programs; these usually were job search, on-the-job training, and community work experience, with sometimes some type of education. Although education was required to be one of the programs offered, states rarely supplied the necessary funds to establish significant programs of that type.
Neither the WIN demonstrations nor the JOBS program was ever evaluated in a nationally representative sense, that is, by a random sample of all programs around the country or by a universal sample of all programs. Instead, there were a series of evaluations of the programs in selected state and local areas. In both cases, probably enough areas were selected that a reasonably good sense of the effects of different types of programs were obtained. For the WIN program, however, there was one major evaluation, which was national in scope (Ketron 1980). It used a methodology that is now regarded as undesirable (the use of individuals on waiting lists as a comparison group) and found very modest impacts of the program on recipient earnings, between $200 and $300 per year on average but larger for public service employment.

The results of the WIN demonstration and JOBS evaluations have been reviewed and summarized in several other places (Burtless 1995a, b; Devere, Falk, and Burke 2000; Gueron and Pauly 1991; Moffitt 1992b; O’Neill and O’Neill 1997; Plimpton and Nightingale 2000; U.S. General Accounting Office 1999; see also LaLonde, chap. 8 in this volume). Both the WIN demonstration and JOBS evaluations concentrated on answering the first empirical question noted above, namely, whether there is a positive return to the programs in terms of wage rates or earnings, and devoted some attention as well to the second question—whether caseloads were reduced. Virtually no attention was paid to the third question (whether there was induced entry) primarily for methodological reasons, for most of the estimates of program effects were obtained from random assignment trials, and those trials are inherently incapable of estimating entry effects (Moffitt 1992a).

The results of the evaluations of the WIN demonstration programs show generally positive impacts on employment and earnings, with impacts on the latter usually in the range of $300 to $600 per year. However, some programs had a much smaller impact, close to zero, and others had larger impacts, occasionally around $900 per year. These impacts are not large enough to make a major dent in the poverty rate, but are large enough to make the programs worth considering, especially in light of the view in the 1980s that most employment programs for welfare recipients had no impact at all. Furthermore, the expenditure on the WIN demonstration programs was quite small, around $500 per recipient in some cases, because only a modest amount of services were provided; these were very small-scale programs. The earnings impacts are perhaps larger than one might expect from such a minor investment.37

37. The evaluations also showed that most employment impacts arose from increases in the amount of time employed rather than on the hourly wage rate. This is not too surprising given that the programs made little investment in human capital. However, it also implies that the impacts are likely to fade over time, and, indeed, Friedlander and Burtless (1995) showed that they were gone in most sites after five years.
On the other hand, another finding from the WIN demonstrations was that the reduction in AFDC participation, caseloads, and expenditures on AFDC benefits was quite modest. The employment and earnings impacts were either not enough to move recipients over the break-even point, or not enough to prevent recipients from coming back onto the AFDC rolls in sufficient frequency to result in significant declines in welfare expenditures.

The evaluations of the JOBS program have also generally yielded positive impacts on employment and earnings. Evaluations of the California Greater Avenues to Independence (GAIN) program, the best-known of the early JOBS evaluations, showed positive earnings gains of $636 (about 25 percent) in the third year after the evaluation began (Riccio, Friedlander, and Freedman 1994). The GAIN evaluation involved six different counties in California, and the results from an evaluation of one of the counties—Riverside—showed especially large earnings gains (almost 50 percent) for reasons that have never been completely resolved, partly because the random assignment methodology used does not enable any rigorous investigation of mechanisms by which the treatment has an effect. Speculation has been that the Riverside program was so successful because it offered a particularly strong “work first” program that emphasized immediate job placement through job search (although others believe it had a good mix of rapid-employment job search and human capital education and training); because the labor market in Riverside was relatively weak and hence control families did not do well; and even because of a charismatic and energetic director. Whatever the reason, the Riverside evaluation has come to be one of the genuine success stories of employment programs in the 1990s.

One of the problems with evaluations that this illustrates is that conducting experimental tests of a program in only a handful of areas, and allowing each area to offer a different variation on the general program, essentially prevents learning whether differential effects that occur across areas are the result of site-specific factors (the economy, charismatic directors, etc.) or of the particular program that was tested in the area. Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2000) compared different sites in the GAIN evaluation to determine if the different impacts across sites could be ascribed instead to differences in the types of recipients enrolled in each site; they found that such differences did not explain the cross-site differences. Greenberg et al. (2001) ran regressions of the estimated program effects in each of several JOBS sites on characteristics of the area, the sample, and the program, and found it impossible to explain the cross-site differences. This makes it difficult to use the results for policy because extrapolation to the nation as a whole or to any other particular area around the country is very problematic.

A JOBS evaluation involving eleven different sites has also yielded re-
results but is still in progress at this writing. A unique aspect of this evaluation was that it tested different program strategies within the same sites, thus eliminating some of the site effects just described. For the most part, the variation of interest was whether the program tested a rapid-employment, low-cost job search program or a human capital, high-cost education and training program. The distinction is important because the TANF program that replaced AFDC emphasized the former over the latter, as part of the work first philosophy (this was also an issue in the Riverside GAIN program, as just noted). The results to date indicate that, four years after the evaluation began, positive employment and earnings gains resulted, falling generally in the range of $300 to $500 per year (Freedman 2000). Both rapid-employment and human capital programs were found in this range, although some of the human capital programs yielded results that were lower. The trend in impacts after three years suggests that the rapid-employment programs have large initial impacts that fade over time, whereas the human capital programs have impacts that do not decline as fast or may even grow over time, and that the earnings and employment gains end up by the third year not far different (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001). This has led some observers to conclude that the two strategies yield about the same impacts. If the two have the same impacts, then, because the human capital strategy is more expensive than the job-search strategy (up to double the cost by some estimates), the former must necessarily have a lower rate of return than the latter.

Another important finding from this JOBS evaluation was that, although earnings impacts of the programs were positive, household income changed very little as a result of the program. This occurred because the increases in earnings were mostly cancelled out by declines in welfare benefits. This implies that recipients would have very little incentive themselves

38. The evaluation began in the early 1990s, and results from a five-year follow-up measuring impacts have not yet been completed.

39. In a study of the earlier GAIN program that followed recipients nine years after enrollment, Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2000) found the same pattern when comparing treatment effects in different counties—those with rapid-employment programs had impacts that faded over time compared to those emphasizing education, and after nine years they were statistically no different from each other.

40. A later analysis (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001) concluded that “mixed” strategies were best, rather than a pure rapid-employment or pure human capital strategy. This conclusion was based largely on a comparison of pure strategies in this JOBS evaluation with several of the earlier GAIN evaluations, which were characterized as “mixed” as well—with a dominant emphasis on one strategy but with elements of the other. The only JOBS evaluation with such a mixed strategy was tested in one site (Portland), which stood out from the rest and had above-average impacts. Portland was initially known as a rapid-employment program city, but in fact it offered some education and training to certain recipients. Perhaps more important, it offered individualized treatments to different types of individuals after assessing their needs. There were other differences in the program operated in Portland as well, together with differences in its local economic environment from those in the other cities. Unfortunately, as with the Riverside GAIN program, it is almost impossible to determine what the true reason for the difference in impacts in Portland was.
to engage in these programs, unless they expected greater gains in the future than were measured by the evaluation. This suggests that the programs would have to be mandatory in order for the welfare departments to induce recipients to enroll in them.

Although the overall sense of the JOBS evaluations is that there are indeed employment and earnings gains from these programs, both inherent problems and practical problems with the random-assignment methodology limit what has been learned. Aside from the difficulty of incorporating entry effects and separating site effects from treatment effects, as already noted, many of the programs allowed control group members to start receiving the program after three years or so. Thus, impact estimates beyond that period are not true estimates of the program by itself. In addition, in many of the areas the local program environment continued to change after the evaluation was initiated, further affecting the outcomes of experimentals and controls.

5.3.4 Family Structure

Models

The suggestion that the AFDC program encourages women to have children out of wedlock has been a staple of popular views of welfare for decades. This popular view is consistent with the fact that AFDC benefits are primarily provided only to single-parent families and those are virtually all families with a female single parent. This view has been addressed by a large volume of research by economists in the last fifteen years or so and by a smaller volume of work by demographers in prior years. It has been accompanied by a more expansive examination of the effects of AFDC on family structure in general, including not only its effects on whether a woman is a single mother, but also on cohabitation, childbearing, and whether a woman lives with her parents or other relatives.

Virtually any economic model of marriage, including Beckerian utility-differences, or gains-to-marriage, models, predicts that the offer of a benefit to an individual contingent entirely on whether he or she is unmarried and has children will induce behavior that leads to a higher incidence of such events. One theoretical framework that would predict the opposite is one in which marriage is entered into voluntarily but where marital dissolution is an exogenous event. In this case, single motherhood is in part an unlucky random outcome of marriage that should in principle be insured against, and AFDC is a form of public insurance that plays that role. The presence of such insurance should, therefore, encourage individuals to take the risky action, namely, to enter into marriage, to a greater degree than they would in the absence of insurance. However, the moral hazard problem is severe, for individuals can clearly exert much control over becoming a single mother and, further, much single motherhood takes place
prior to marriage. This makes insurance forces unlikely to change the net direction of effect of AFDC.

The precise rules of the AFDC program, and its two-parent counterpart, the AFDC-UP program, complicate the incentives in several respects (Moffitt, Reville, and Winkler 1994). Because eligibility for AFDC is based on the deprivation of the support of a biological parent, a woman who marries a man who is not the father of her children, or who cohabits with a man who is similarly not the biological parent, is eligible for AFDC. Thus AFDC does not discourage marriage or cohabitation universally but only if it is with the male who is the children's actual father. If a woman does marry or cohabit with a nonbiological male, and that male provides financial support to the children, the income will be counted in full or in part against the grant, and it is possible that the woman in question may end up financially ineligible for the program. However, at least for cohabitation, enforcing this provision is difficult. On the other hand, the AFDC-UP program does provide some outlet, for it provides benefits not only to families where both biological parents are married, but also where they cohabit; eligibility is only based on the presence of both parents, not on the presence of a legal union. However, the eligibility provisions in AFDC-UP have been sufficiently strict historically that it is more difficult to qualify for benefits under it than under AFDC, so the incentives for a woman against joining up with the father of her children are still quite strong.

The literature on the effects of AFDC on marriage has a parallel in models of the effect of the income tax, and of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), in creating marriage disincentives (for the latter, see Hotz and Scholtz, chap. 3 in this volume). That literature is instructive because it implies that even if AFDC benefits were provided to married couples (or unmarried biological parents), there would still be a potential for incentives for or against marriage. If the unit of taxation is the family, then married couples are more likely to be above the income eligibility point—assuming that both male and female have income—than if they are separate, to take just one example. As the taxation literature demonstrates, the only neutral program that does not distort family structure private incentives is one in which benefits are paid entirely on an individual basis. But then such a program would violate vertical equity considerations and would also be complicated by the presence of children. As Hotz and Scholz note, a tax or benefit system cannot simultaneously be progressive, treat the family as the unit of taxation, and be neutral with respect to marriage (see also Alm, Dickert-Conlin, and Whittington 1999).

Another theoretical observation worth noting in this context is that a universal benefit system that provides nonzero benefits to all household structures—in particular, to single individuals—could alter predictions of the effect of AFDC on marriage. If the AFDC system were altered so as to allow benefits to be paid to both married couples and single individuals,
then some marriages would dissolve so that the single individual—most often the male—could collect the benefits for which he is newly eligible. In addition, some currently single mothers and absent fathers would choose not to marry despite the new benefits they could obtain from that action because the absent father would now also receive increased income. These effects would have to be counted against the marriage-increasing results of the program change, with unknown, and therefore ambiguous, net effect.

The AFDC program alters incentives for childbearing and living arrangements as well. With regard to childbearing, the effect is through the route of single motherhood, for childbearing outside of marriage makes a mother eligible for benefits whereas childbearing inside marriage generally does not. An additional incentive for childbearing appears in the benefit structure in states in which benefits are calibrated to family size and higher benefits are paid to larger families. In this case there is an income gain to having additional children that is not present in the absence of a government welfare program and hence distorts choices in that direction. Living arrangements refer generally to whether a single mother lives with others, either her parents or a cohabiting male. The rules governing cohabitation have already been discussed, and it is only necessary to note that living with parents is governed by the same rules. That is, living with parents does not alter the basic eligibility condition based on the absence of a biological parent, and it will affect the grant only if the parents provide financial support to the mother or child. However, because that type of support is more verifiable than support from a cohabiting male, states are more likely to reduce the benefit in this case. The less-than-full taxation of parental support provides an incentive for a woman to live with her parents, as noted by Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz (1989). The fact that support is partly taxed provides a disincentive for a woman to live with her parents relative to a family-structure-neutral system in which the AFDC benefit is not affected by this type of family structure. This provides another example of the trade-offs noted above that always come up in balancing equity with neutrality in tax and transfer systems.

Evidence

There has been built up in recent years a fairly large literature on the effect of AFDC benefits on family structure, mostly concerned with the effects of benefits on the probability of being a single mother. The literature has been reviewed many times, but the most recent review is by Moffitt (1998) and reviewed sixty-eight separate estimates of the effect of AFDC on various aspects of marriage, fertility, and single motherhood. This review covered studies conducted through approximately 1996. The results of this survey are shown in table 5.8, which reports counts of estimates showing insignificant, significant, or a mixture of insignificant and significant effects of welfare. The results are broken down by race, when pos-
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*Note:* Dashes indicate absence of data.
sible, and by the source of variation in benefits used to identify welfare effects—either cross-state variation in benefit levels, cross-state changes in benefits (i.e., state fixed effects models), within-state variation assuming the existence of some determinant of benefits that does not simultaneously directly affect family structure, or pure time series studies. Overall, although there is a very slight excess of significant estimates over insignificant ones across all races, it is quite small. However, the patterns differ by race and source of benefit variation, with stronger effects appearing for white women, and for white women using cross-state levels and for black women using cross-state changes in benefits. The difference in how benefit variation affects family structure between the two races is a result of a different sorting of single mothers by state for the two races, with white single mothers tending to be concentrated in high-benefit states but black single mothers tending to be concentrated in low benefit states.

Nevertheless, the most important implication of the review is that none of the significant estimates were in the “wrong” direction—all were in the expected direction (positive on single motherhood, negative on marriage, etc.). A simple unweighted average of the estimates, therefore, reveals a central tendency suggesting the presence of an effect of welfare benefits on family structure. Moreover, when distinctions are made between the studies by the likely credibility of the estimates—those controlling for the most other variables, which concentrate on the most appropriate part of the distribution of women, and use the most careful econometric methods—effects are sometimes stronger, sometimes substantially so (Moffitt 1998). Therefore, although there is still considerable uncertainty in the literature and there remain a large number of studies reporting insignificant estimates, this reading of the literature leads to the conclusion that welfare is likely to have some effect on family structure.41

There have been a few newer studies not included in the review just described. One of particular note is that of Hoffman and Foster (2000), who were able to replicate a study of Rosenzweig (1999) using Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics data, finding significant effects of welfare on nonmarital fertility, albeit only in certain age ranges. Foster and Hoffman (2001) conducted another study with the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and found, as have many prior studies, that welfare impacts are greatly reduced when state fixed effects are added to the model. Blau, Kahn, and Waldfogel (2000) use microdata from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 censuses to estimate metropolitan-area fixed effects models of the effect of

41. This is a slight change from the author’s earlier reading of the literature (Moffitt 1992b). As discussed in Moffitt (1998), the magnitude of the effect is more uncertain than the existence of an effect. Estimates range from quite small effects to rather large ones. The difference is not easily explainable by the preferred study characteristics just mentioned, and is consequently not currently resolved.
AFDC benefits on marriage rates and find them to have no statistically significant effect in their preferred models.

An issue in the literature has been that real AFDC benefits have declined over time while single motherhood rates have increased, suggesting that benefits could not have caused the rise in headship. Nechyba (2001) constructs a theoretical model in which social interactions between low-income families cause lags in the response to a change in benefits, consistent with the hypothesis that rising welfare benefits in the late 1960s and early 1970s could have had lagged effects over the next two decades (a hypothesis also suggested by Murray 1984). Moffitt (2000) takes a more direct approach and conducts a time series analysis of the relative importance of trends in female wages, male wages, and welfare benefits, and finds that a decline in the wages of less-educated males was the main contributor to the rise in female headship, and that the decline in welfare benefits slowed that rise, thus providing one possible reconciliation between the cross-sectional and time series evidence.

The living arrangements literature has examined the effects of welfare on the propensity of a single mother to live with her parents, and on her propensity to cohabit. Ellwood and Bane (1985) found that higher AFDC benefits were associated with greater propensities for single mothers to live independently of parents, whereas Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz (1989) argued that the proper variable is the relative benefit between living with and without parents—equal to the benefit penalty imposed for living with parents—and found it to have a statistically significant effect on the propensity to live independently. Hu (2001) found that the probability that a teenager in a welfare family leaves the household is inversely related to the size of the benefit reduction suffered by the parent if the teen were to leave. Moffitt, Reville, and Winkler (1998) found cohabitation rates to be very high among AFDC recipients, but their econometric model did not turn up any strong effects of benefits, or state rules governing cohabitation, on the likelihood of cohabiting. Evenhouse and Reilly (1999), examining the issue with the Survey of Income and Program Participation, find stronger effects of benefits, however, on the likelihood of cohabiting with a male who is not the natural parent of the children.

5.3.5 State Benefit Determination

Models

A final area of considerable economic research has been on the determinants of state benefit level and on the effects of federal matching grants on the level of state benefits. The models used in this literature for state benefit determination are generally drawn straight from the literature on median voter models of public choice, considering aid to the poor as a posi-
tive argument in that voter’s utility function but with the taxes needed to pay for those benefits to be a negative argument. Income effects are generally assumed to be positive, with higher median voter income leading to greater benefit levels. In the typical model, assuming a head tax on all voters to finance benefits, the price of benefits is equal to the per capita caseload times one minus the federal matching rate. Thus higher caseloads imply that the cost of a dollar increase in the benefit level is greater, and a lower matching rate implies the same. Lower matching rates, assuming they are partially spent on tax relief or other public goods, have some “leakage” because a dollar of grant does not translate into an extra dollar of welfare expenditure. For many years the matching rate structure of the federal subsidy formula for AFDC was progressive, with higher matching rates at low benefit levels than at high benefit levels, thus indirectly encouraging a reduction in the dispersion of benefit levels across different states. However, this structure was gradually replaced over the 1970s by a simple constant proportional matching rate, regardless of the level of the state benefit, in an open-ended match at that rate.

Evidence

One focus of the empirical literature has been to estimate price and income elasticities for benefits, usually from a regression of benefit levels on state median income and on a price variable, usually constructed as the caseload times one minus the matching rate, as just discussed. There are several econometric issues that arise in such estimation that will not be discussed in detail here. The first model of this type was conducted by Orr (1976), who found that the federal matching rate, state per capita income, and other variables measuring the characteristics of the taxpaying population and the recipient population all had effects on a state’s chosen benefit. Orr concluded that the results were generally supportive of a public choice view of state benefit determination. A number of additional studies were conducted thereafter and a range of price and income elasticities obtained. Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) have surveyed the estimates, and they conclude that price elasticities are of the correct sign but weak in significance and relatively small in magnitude—in the range (–0.14, 0.02)—in contrast to income effects, which are generally significantly positive and somewhat larger in size—in the range (0.11, 0.82). Chernick (1998) also reviews the evidence and argues that the price elasticities of changing the matching rate are somewhat greater than this. Baicker (2001) uses a different estimation strategy and obtains yet higher price elasticities.

A puzzle that has garnered additional attention is the reason for the

42. There are a number of issues in using aggregate state median income to proxy the income of the median voter, and also whether median income itself identifies the median preference voter. See Moffitt, Ribar, and Wilhelm (1998) for a discussion.
long-term decline in real AFDC benefits over the 1970s and 1980s. Neither changes in matching rates nor in income can explain the decline; in fact, real income growth should have led to an increase in benefits. Several hypotheses have been suggested, including that AFDC benefits were replaced by food stamp and, possibly, Medicaid benefits in the voter’s utility function, or simply that voters’ preferences shifted. Shifts in the nature of the caseload, from divorced women to unmarried mothers, has also been posited to be partly responsible for the trend. Others have suggested that the decline in real wages for low-skilled workers led to an increase in the price of redistribution as well as an increase in “distance” from the median voter, both leading to a decline in the desire for redistribution. No consensus has emerged in the literature on the reasons for the change.43

5.4 Research on the TANF Program

Research on the TANF program is much smaller in volume than that on AFDC, not only because TANF has been in existence for a shorter period but also because economists and other researchers have encountered many difficulties in studying the program that were not present, at least to the same degree, for the AFDC program. Estimating the overall impact—that is, the combined effect of all individual component changes—of the transition from AFDC to TANF, for example, is hampered by the fact that it was introduced in all states at approximately the same time. This is a traditional problem in studying the effects of national legislation that introduces a program simultaneously in all states and areas.44 A second problem is that cross-state variation under TANF is much more complex than it was under AFDC, for in the AFDC environment most state programs were of the same general type—because they were required to be so by federal regulation—and hence differences could be characterized by differing levels of only a few simple parameters (the guarantee, tax rate, etc.). Under TANF, each state has freedom under the block grant to develop programs that differ from those in other states in dozens of ways. States have taken advantage of this freedom to tailor their programs individually, with the result that there are more than fifty-one dimensions by which state programs differ, leaving no degrees of freedom to estimate their effects. A related problem is that each dimension is itself quite complex and difficult to measure; for example, the way a simple concept such as time limits is imple-


44. As will be noted below, some of the pre-TANF AFDC waiver programs discussed in section 5.2 have, however, been used in an attempt to estimate TANF effects. Also, not all states implemented their TANF programs at exactly the same time.
mented can vary tremendously by the number and types of exemptions and extensions granted, whether the state allows the “clock” to stop temporarily for families, and so on. Documentation of these differences across states has also been spotty, at times, and this has also limited research.

In what follows, the discussion will first consider models of behavior under TANF and will then consider evidence on those behaviors as well as any other TANF issues that have been discussed in the literature.

5.4.1 Models

Many of the features of TANF can be understood as variations in parameters that were present in the simple AFDC models discussed earlier, with equivalent predictions. Among these are reductions in welfare tax rates, which, as noted previously, should increase the employment rate of women initially on welfare but which has ambiguous effects on overall labor supply including initial ineligibles.\textsuperscript{45} Another is the imposition of family caps, which reduce or eliminate the increase in benefits ordinarily provided by the presence of additional births; this represents a simple change in the relationship of the guarantee level to family size, with expected effects on both welfare participation and the birth rate. A third is the provisions which make minor mothers ineligible for benefits if they live apart from their parents, which, as the living arrangements literature in AFDC makes clear, should be expected to reduce the incidence of such living apart.

There are three new features of TANF whose effects are not directly apparent in the simple AFDC models discussed previously. These are work requirements, time limits, and, to some extent, the increase in general costs of welfare participation through provisions for diversion, numerous requirements for continued participation, and informal pressure on women to leave the welfare rolls. Each of these three will be discussed in turn.

Work requirements can, at one level, be easily incorporated in the standard static labor supply model, for they can be modeled simply as a requirement that a recipient work some minimum number of hours. As illustrated in figure 5.8, where $H_{\text{min}}$ is the minimum required work hours, the portion of the welfare constraint $C_J$ is eliminated by the requirement. An individual initially at $C$ (work requirements are aimed at nonworkers) will move either to $J$ (arrow 3) or to segment $AK$ (arrow 2)—increasing labor supply in either case—or to point $A$ (arrow 1), remaining as a nonworker.\textsuperscript{46}

The caseload and participation rate in welfare both fall, as do expenditures

\textsuperscript{45} Giannarelli and Wiseman (2000) have suggested that the popularity of earnings disre- 
gards in the post-TANF period may partly arise from the need to satisfy federal requirements under the TANF program that minimum fractions of the caseload be employed or engaged in a work-like activity. Ironically, the more successful a state is in moving employable recipients off welfare and into jobs, the more likely it is to run afoul of these federal requirements. These create a perverse incentive for states.

\textsuperscript{46} The latter is more realistic if $N$ is positive.
on benefits, and average hours of work rise. If $H_{\text{min}}$ falls to the left of the hours corresponding to point D, the work requirement is equivalent to eliminating welfare completely. Holding $H_{\text{min}}$ fixed, this is more likely in low-guarantee states and has been shown to hold for some recipients in those states with sufficiently high hourly wage rates and using the official hours of work requirements in PRWORA.

Although work requirements achieve the goals of increased labor supply and reduced caseloads, they do so by redefining the underlying goals of the program. Work requirements achieve work incentives by giving up on the original negative income tax goal of achieving work incentives at the same time as providing support to those who “cannot” work in a single, integrated system that provides a guarantee to all families with no questions asked. Welfare programs with work requirements at their center must instead redefine those who can work and those who cannot work; the former are provided with the benefit formula illustrated in figure 5.8, and the latter are simply given $G$, or possibly $G$ plus a low tax rate as an encouragement to work even a small number of hours. Because making the separation of the population—or categorization—into those who can and cannot work is fraught with practical as well as conceptual problems, the desirability of work requirements depends upon the magnitude of the costs incurred by whatever system of categorization is implemented.

There have been two strands of research on these issues. One dates from the late 1960s and early 1970s, during debates over the negative income tax. Categorical systems were heavily criticized by economists at that time for a variety of reasons. One was that the administrative difficulty in assigning recipients to categories is too great, and, more generally, because economists tend to believe that everyone can work, at least some amount, at some wage

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**Fig. 5.8 Effect of work requirements on labor supply**

![Diagram showing the effect of work requirements on labor supply.](image-url)
and with some kind of work support; that is, the variation in individual ability is continuous rather than discrete. Another was that, because true ability to work is partly unobserved by the policy maker, work requirement systems provide individuals with incentives to switch categories by altering, to the extent possible, the observable characteristics that the government uses to assign recipients to different categories. Yet another was that, because work requirements necessarily involve individual-specific judgments on ability to work, they would result in excessive caseworker discretion and consequent inequitable treatment across individuals.

The second strand of literature examines the possible optimality of work requirements in various models of optimal taxation. An early set of papers demonstrated that, if heterogeneity in preferences and abilities is unobserved by the government, then tying in-kind transfers to cash transfers could be used to induce individuals to self-select into welfare according to need (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988; Dye and Antle 1986; Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982). Work requirements are an inverse case in which the imposition of negative tied transfer—work—along with cash can be used to induce those with higher ability to opt out of the welfare program. Beaudry and Blackorby (1998) and Cuff (2000) make this connection explicit and introduce additional heterogeneities into the model, in both cases demonstrating the optimality of workfare as a screening device when unobservables are present. Besley and Coate (1992b, 1995) showed that, under a different optimization criterion, workfare can be also used as a screening device to ensure that higher-wage individuals do not take advantage of the program. In this rather different justification for work requirements, all recipients must undergo the cost of complying with work requirements, but benefits can be higher because high-wage individuals no longer have an incentive to apply. Another strand of the literature was that begun by Akerlof (1978), who showed that if individuals can be tagged as truly needy, they can be given a greater $G$ and lower $t$ than they could under a noncategorical negative income tax. He likewise directly dealt with the incentive problem to change categories by requiring that an incentive compatibility constraint be set that would discourage such behavior. Although not directly related to work requirements, it is easily extended in that direction. Unlike the prior papers, Akerlof assumes that there are at least some observables that can be used to discriminate between different types of individuals. This literature is continuing with further refinements and special cases.

The 1996 legislation has made these issues of renewed importance. The

47. See Barth and Greenberg (1971), Browning (1975), Lurie (1975) for examples of these early critiques of work-requiring systems as compared to a negative income tax. Barth and Greenberg note that the drawbacks to a system that requires separating the employable and nonemployable was a principle criticism of the AFDC program as it existed in the 1960s.

48. For example, Chone and Larque (2001) and Immonen et al. (1998). See also Parsons (1996) for an analysis, albeit in the context of social insurance programs, of the consequences for these models of assuming “two-sided” error—that is, that some tagged individuals can indeed work as well as that some untagged individuals cannot work.
PRWORA requires states to more rigorously enforce work requirements by regularly assessing benefit penalties (called “sanctions”) on those who do not comply with the requirements (i.e., those who work less than $H_{\text{min}}$). Indeed, to some extent the most important work-related feature in the legislation was the requirement that states, for the first time, actually enforce the benefit reductions that figure 5.8 portrays. Within the federal guidelines, states now have much more freedom to assess sanctions than they did under the AFDC program, and many have adopted very stringent sanction policies. The federal government has also tightened up the definition of $H_{\text{min}}$, setting specific values for it such as twenty hours per week for single mothers with children under six, for example. States are allowed to exempt families from the work requirement (e.g., women who are ill or incapacitated, elderly, pregnant, or have a child under one year old), which can be interpreted as the assignment of families to the “cannot work” status. However, the federal legislation also sets numerical minimums on the fraction of a state’s recipients that must be engaged in a work activity and most of these exempt families are not excluded from the denominator of the ratio.

Time limits are a relatively new programmatic feature and have yet to be subjected to much economic analysis. In one sense time limits require no new models because they simply eliminate welfare after some point and this necessarily moves the individual to the nonwelfare constraint in figure 5.5, thereby increasing labor supply and decreasing the welfare caseload. However, the dynamics of this response could be fairly complex if welfare recipients anticipate the onset of time limits and alter their behavior before hitting the limit. For example, similar to behavior that has been found for the response to unemployment benefits with a fixed exhaustion point, welfare recipients may begin to leave welfare prior to the time limit date, and their leaving rates may accelerate as the time limit approaches. In the unemployment insurance (UI) case, this behavior is generally explained by the randomness of wage offers and the desire to accept an attractive offer when it arrives even if it does so somewhat in advance of the benefit exhaustion date. The same may apply for welfare recipients approaching a time limit. A more complex response can occur if recipients “bank” their benefits by going off the rolls during good (labor market) times and saving their benefits for bad times (a downturn in the labor market, unexpected negative income shock, etc.). Whatever the model, time limits will tend to increase labor supply and reduce welfare participation and the caseload.

The implementation of time limits in the states has been far from this...
Many states have made liberal use of exemptions and extensions from time limits, resulting in many fewer families’ hitting the limits than anticipated. In many cases these exemptions and extensions are granted at the discretion of individual caseworkers and local welfare offices, who make subjective judgments on whether recipients have made a good faith effort to find work. Other states have put in place programs funded out of state revenues that will support families after they exhaust their benefits, although sometimes at a reduced level and sometimes only for the children. Still other states stop the clock from ticking if the recipient works more than a specified number of hours of work, if the recipient has not been offered a job training slot, or under other conditions. At this writing, many fewer families have exhausted their benefits than anticipated for all these reasons as well as because so many families have left the rolls; the latter could be either because of the favorable economy or from banking behavior. However, despite these factors, in the long run the time limit will bind on more families if it is kept in place.

Finally, the numerous additional costs and penalties that have been imposed on welfare participation have resulted in many more involuntary terminations under TANF than were present under AFDC. Indeed, it is no longer clear that a simple voluntary model of welfare participation—even one with work requirements and time limits added to the model—adequately describes reality. Diversion programs and related devices to discourage women who apply for the rules can still be retained in a voluntary model but one in which the cost of application is much higher than before, discouraging application. The cost of being on welfare even after applying and being accepted is also raised by the many rules that TANF recipients must obey, ranging from mandatory attendance at meetings with caseworkers to compliance with child support enforcement, requirements for school attendance (minor TANF mothers without a high degree only), and requirements that children of the TANF mother have regular school attendance, receive immunization shots, or have health exams. Failure to comply with any of these rules carries a penalty that may either reduce benefits or even terminate the families from the rolls. Finally, much anecdotal evidence suggests that welfare departments have exercised discretion to push women off welfare by using administrative devices to end eligibility. These administrative terminations were thought to be present in the AFDC program but are now much more common. This should probably be modeled as a random involuntary termination rate from the program.

5.4.2 Evidence on TANF and Pre-TANF Waiver Reforms

As noted previously, the volume of research on TANF is necessarily much less than that for the AFDC program. In addition, the largest volume of data analysis conducted on TANF is descriptive in nature and does not seek to estimate the effect of the 1996 legislation in a causal sense—that is, the effect of the legislation on outcomes relative to what would have hap-
pened if the law had not been passed. The descriptive literature, for example, has demonstrated that poverty rates have mostly fallen since 1996, the TANF caseload has dropped by over 50 percent since 1994, women who have left the TANF rolls have employment rates of approximately 60 percent, and there is a lower tail of the single-mother income distribution whose income has fallen since 1996. Separating the PRWORA contribution to these outcomes from the effects of general trends, the improving economy, and other programmatic developments (e.g., EITC and Medicaid expansions) is not attempted in this literature. The review to follow will instead discuss only studies that attempt to make causal inferences.51

Table 5.9 lists the studies that have estimated the overall impact of 1990s welfare reform (i.e., the effect of all the individual components combined) on income, employment, and welfare participation outcomes.52 Studies of the effects of pre-1996 waiver reforms are shown in the first panel of the table. Most of these studies made use of the differential timing at which states introduced their reforms in the pre-1996 period. With a few exceptions, the studies show waivers to have had positive effects on most measures of labor supply and negative effects on measures of AFDC participation, as expected. All of these studies include variables for the state unemployment rate or related cyclical variables in their models, and hence the estimated effects of welfare reform are all intended to be net of the strong economy.

Two exceptions to the results are Bartik and Eberts (1999) and Ziliak et al. (2000) who find very little effect of welfare reform, net of the economy, on the size of the AFDC caseload. The main difference between these two studies and the others is that these two enter the lagged AFDC caseload into the regression model. The reduction in the estimated size of the effect of welfare reform is an indirect sign that states that implemented reforms had above-average caseloads and that caseloads regressed to the mean thereafter, causing a spuriously estimated decline in the caseload in the studies that omit this lag. A debate has ensued over the econometric properties of including lagged dependent variables in the models in question, which has not yet been resolved.53

Randomized trials are represented in two of the entries in table 5.9.

51. See Moffitt and Ver Ploeg (2001) for a list of all types of studies that have been conducted on TANF as of approximately spring 2001, including descriptive studies, as well as a comprehensive discussion of the alternative evaluation methodologies that have been used to estimate causal effects of welfare reform.
52. A number of studies are excluded from the table, including those conducted on a single state but which were not random assignment, and a number of random assignment evaluations that were discontinued or that have not produced results (Harvey, Camasso, and Jaganathan 2000 has a comprehensive list).
53. Klerman and Haider (2001) demonstrate that building up an aggregate caseload model from a more fundamental set of entry and exit equations will necessarily result in the need for lags in the aggregate model. However, they argue that the caseload model that results from this aggregation is easily misspecified because of duration dependence and other properties of the underlying dynamic model.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Program(s) Studied</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Source of Program Variation</th>
<th>Estimated Effect of Welfare Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-1996 Waiver Programs</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartik and Eberts (1999)</td>
<td>All state waiver programs</td>
<td>AFDC caseload</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver intro-</td>
<td>Essentially zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank (2001)</td>
<td>All state waiver programs</td>
<td>AFDC caseload</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver intro-</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001)</td>
<td>Waiver programs in Connecticut, Florida,</td>
<td>Employment, earnings, income, AFDC participation</td>
<td>Randomized assignment on population of AFDC</td>
<td>Positive effect on employment and earnings, no effect on income, small or zero effects on AFDC participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Vermont</td>
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<td>recipients</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Economic Advisors (1997)</td>
<td>All state waiver programs</td>
<td>AFDC caseload</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver intro-</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fein et al. (2001)</td>
<td>Waiver program in Delaware</td>
<td>Employment, earnings, AFDC participation</td>
<td>Randomized assignment on population of AFDC recipients and applicants</td>
<td>After two years, no effect on employment and earnings but negative effect on AFDC participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figlio and Ziliak (1999), Ziliak et al.</td>
<td>All state waiver programs</td>
<td>AFDC caseload</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver intro-</td>
<td>Essentialy zero</td>
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<tr>
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<td>tion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moffitt (1999a)</td>
<td>All state waiver programs</td>
<td>AFDC participation rate, labor supply, and earnings of less educated women</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver intro-</td>
<td>No effect on employment or earnings; positive effect on weeks and hours worked; negative effect on AFDC participation rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mueser et al. (2000)</td>
<td>Waiver programs in five urban areas</td>
<td>AFDC entry and exit rates, employment rate of welfare leavers</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver intro-</td>
<td>Negative effect on entry rate, positive effect on exit rate, positive but small effect on employment rate of leavers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s) (Year)</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>Outcome(s)</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Result</td>
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<tr>
<td>O’Neill and Hill (2001)</td>
<td>All state waiver programs</td>
<td>Employment, AFDC participation</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver introduction</td>
<td>Positive on employment, negative on AFDC participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoeni and Blank (2000)</td>
<td>All state waiver programs</td>
<td>Labor supply, earnings, income, AFDC participation</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver introduction combined with difference-in-difference using high-educated control group</td>
<td>Positive effects on labor supply, earnings, income; negative effects on AFDC participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace and Blank (1999)</td>
<td>All state waiver programs</td>
<td>AFDC caseload</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver introduction</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziliak et al. (2000)</td>
<td>All state waiver programs</td>
<td>AFDC caseload</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of waiver introduction</td>
<td>Zero (or positive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANF Council of Economic Advisors (1999)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>AFDC-TANF caseload</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of TANF implementation</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellwood (2000)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Employment, earnings</td>
<td>Difference-in-difference with high-wage control group</td>
<td>Cannot separate effect of EITC and welfare reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKernan et al. (2000)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Difference-in-difference with childless women control group</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Neill and Hill (2001)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Employment, AFDC-TANF participation</td>
<td>Cross-state variation in timing of TANF implementation</td>
<td>Positive on employment, negative on AFDC-TANF participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoeni and Blank (2000)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Labor supply, earnings, income, AFDC-TANF participation</td>
<td>Difference-in-difference with high-educated control group</td>
<td>No effect on labor supply or individual earnings, positive effect on family earnings and income, negative effect on AFDC-TANF participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace and Blank (1999)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>AFDC caseload</td>
<td>1996+ year dummy</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Dashes indicate that program studied is TANF.*
These studies made use of traditional random-assignment methods rather than cross-state variation to estimate the effects of reform. These studies generally also find positive effects on employment and earnings and negative effects on welfare participation, like the nonexperimental studies. However, the estimated effects on both income and welfare participation are considerably smaller than those estimated from the nonexperimental literature. This may be because random-assignment methods are not well suited for major structural reforms like the pre-1996 welfare waivers—or for TANF itself—because such structural reforms tend to cause changes in local labor markets and local communities that feed back onto the control group. The policy-induced changes in the economic and programmatic environment, and in the expectations of the eligible population for what level of work is to be required of welfare recipients, are unlikely to have affected the control group. This is likely to have made control and experimental group behavior more similar and therefore to have biased estimated effects downward. Another important difference between experimental and nonexperimental estimates is that the former cannot capture entry effects, whereas the latter can. Much of the effect of welfare reform on the caseload, and therefore also on labor supply and earnings, has occurred through decreased entry onto welfare. This will also lead to bias in the experimental estimates.

The more important policy issue is the effect of TANF, for the welfare waivers fell far short of the major restructuring that occurred after 1996 and hence cannot be taken as predictive of the effects of TANF. Unfortunately, estimating TANF effects is more difficult than estimating the effects of waivers because the vast majority of the states more or less implemented TANF at the same time, leaving no cross-state variation in the timing of introduction to use for estimation. Two studies made use of the fact that four or five states actually implemented reforms somewhat later than the rest of the states, but this source of variation is unlikely to be reliable because there may have been unique differences between those states and the others which were correlated with their late implementation, and because there are likely to be significant lags in the effects of the reforms. Most studies have, instead, used difference-in-difference methods which compare trends in outcomes for low-wage or less-educated single mothers to trends in outcomes of various other groups (high-wage or highly educated single mothers, or women who are not single mothers) to assess the effect of welfare reform. As Ellwood (2000) and Schoeni and Blank (2000) note, use of these methods is particularly problematic when other reforms, such as the EITC, were occurring roughly simultaneously, and when business-cycle and

54. There have been many more random-assignment studies in this period, but those listed in table 5.9 are those that had the main features of PRWORA, namely, time limits, work requirements, sanctions, and enhanced earnings disregards, and that made these reforms within the AFDC system rather than outside of it.
economywide trends were occurring that could affect different groups differentially. Ellwood concludes that these difficulties are sufficiently severe that the separate contributions of welfare reform, the EITC, and the economy cannot be identified. The only remaining studies in the table (excluding Wallace and Blank 1999, which uses pure time series variation) are McKernan et al. (2000) and Schoeni and Blank (2000), one of which finds TANF to have increased employment, whereas the other finds it not to have done so but to have affected family earnings, income, and AFDC participation. The two studies used different control groups, so this may be the source of the difference. What evidence there is, therefore, indicates some TANF effects in the expected direction, but the small number of studies and problems in statistical inference make the conclusions rather uncertain.

There have also been a number of studies that have attempted to estimate the separate effects of different components of pre-1996 waiver reforms or of TANF, such as time limits, work requirements, sanctions, earnings disregards, and other features. Unfortunately, the results from these studies have been inconsistent with each other (often providing oppositesigned effects) have generated many insignificant effects, and have generally yielded an uninterpretable set of findings.\textsuperscript{55} There are many likely reasons for this pattern, including the enormous proliferation of different policies across the states and the difficulty in accurately characterizing those differences with a few simple variables; inherent difficulty in separating the effects of one component from another when they no doubt strongly interact; differences in the official characterization of policies from those implemented in practice; and lack of statistical power in the data to detect reasonable-sized effects. For whatever reason, despite the initial view that the devolution that would follow PRWORA would generate useful cross-state variation in policies for research, very little progress has been made in that direction to date.\textsuperscript{56}

There has been some research as well on the impact of pre-1996 waivers and TANF on demographic outcomes such as marriage, fertility, and living arrangements. The direction of impact of reform on marriage and fertility is ambiguous at the simplest level, for although a reduction in the caseload and generosity of a program that mainly supports one-parent families should have positive effects on marriage and negative effects on childbearing, an increase in women’s employment should have the opposite effects, as demonstrated by a large empirical literature on the effect of

\textsuperscript{55} See Bell (2001) for a discussion of the results with caseloads as a dependent variable.

\textsuperscript{56} In addition, with a few exceptions, there have been no random-assignment evaluations that have varied each feature of reform individually while holding all the other features fixed, even though this is possible in principle in an experiment. It should also be noted that Grogger (2000, 2001) has attempted to estimate the independent effects of time limits by using age variation in children combined with assumptions that that variation does not interact identically with other welfare reform features. The validity of the assumptions needed for these methods to be valid is unknown.
female wages and labor supply on marriage and fertility. In addition to these broad factors, TANF allows states to impose family caps (restrictions on additional benefits from extra births while on welfare) and denies benefits to minor mothers who wish to live apart from their families, both of which should be expected to have direct effects on family structure.

The evidence to date on the presence of an effect of welfare reform as a whole on these outcomes is suggestive of a weak effect, at best. Analyses of pre-1996 waivers are inconsistent, with some showing a negative effect on nonmarital fertility (Horvath and Peters 1999) and others showing no effect (Fitzgerald and Ribar 2001). Analyses of TANF using difference-in-difference methods, comparing either more-educated and less-educated women or high-wage and low-wage women, show no effect of TANF on marriage but possibly a negative effect on living independently (Ellwood 2000; Schoeni and Blank 2000). Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2002) found a positive effect of TANF on the likelihood that a child lives with neither parent and a negative effect on the probability of living with an unmarried parent, but the effects were estimated only on cross-state variation in TANF implementation dates within a fourteen-month window. Random-assignment evaluations are particularly problematic for the study of family structure because of the entry-effect problem and the problems of contamination noted earlier. Of those noted in table 5.9, only one (the Delaware study) showed a significant effect on marriage. The reason that particular experiment showed an effect and others did not is not clear.

The evidence on the specific effects of family caps and living arrangements restrictions in the law is quite weak, for the same reason that separating the impacts of the individual components of welfare reform from each other has not been successful in the study of employment and earnings impacts. Some waiver evaluations, particularly one conducted in New Jersey (Camasso et al. 1998a, b), have been used to assess the effects of family caps, but these evaluations are problematic because the family cap was bundled in with changes in work requirements, earnings disregards, and other features common in welfare waiver programs. Thus there is no direct evidence from random-assignment evaluations of family cap effects because none has varied the presence of the family cap, holding other reform features fixed.

Finally, there has been considerable analysis of the effect of the block grant structure of TANF on spending on the poor. As noted previously, the shift from a matching to a block grant should be expected to reduce spending. Predictions of the magnitude of the spending decline depend directly on the size of the price elasticity of benefits, which, as noted before, is not agreed upon in the empirical literature. Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) predict very small reductions, whereas Chernick (1998) predicts benefit declines in the range of 15 to 30 percent (see also Chernick and McGuire 1999); Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) predict spending declines of 40 to 66 percent in
low-income states and 0 to 18 percent in high-income states. In addition, there has been considerable speculation that there will be a “race to the bottom,” as states facing a higher price of benefits become more sensitive to the influence of cross-state migration in search of higher benefits, leading to a cascading series of real benefit cuts across the states. Theoretical work supports this intuitive prediction, and simulations suggest that benefits could be seriously underproduced in such a system relative to the social optimum (Brueckner 2000; Wheaton 2000).

To date, none of these predictions have been capable of testing because the block grant levels in the 1996 legislation were set at 1994 AFDC levels. Because the AFDC-TANF caseload has fallen so drastically since 1994, states have generally not been able to spend all of their block grant funds. Thus the block grant constraint has not become binding, and hence one should not expect either the (extra) spending declines or the race to the bottom predicted in the literature to have occurred. Further work on this issue must await a rise in spending up to the block grant level.57

5.5 Reforms: Financial Incentives

Most reform discussions at the current point in the evolution of the AFDC-TANF program concern whether the provisions of the 1996 welfare law should be modified in some way, such as changing or removing the time limits, work requirements, rules governing sanctions, block grant and funding formulas, and the like. There has been no research on the effects of altering these provisions beyond what has already been discussed in the review of research on AFDC and TANF; as noted, the research base for forecasting the effects of altering most of these provisions is exceedingly slim.

One area of discussion where economists have a strong research base is in the area of additional financial incentives to encourage TANF recipients to work, which is the traditional area of interest in the economics literature. Three different types of reforms have been discussed: (a) reductions in the tax rate on earnings in the TANF program (or what are called “enhanced earnings disregards” in policy discussions); (b) earnings or wage subsidies made available only to those on TANF; and (c) earnings or wage subsidies made available universally to the low-income population. Each will be discussed in turn.

Reductions in the tax rate on earnings have been enacted by many states

57. In fact, TANF spending by the states stopped declining in 1998 and has risen since then, even though the economy was still strong, because states began spending their funds on ancillary services like child care. If this trend continues, it is likely that a relatively modest recession could force spending up to the block grant level. Other issues debated in the literature are the adequacy of countercyclical funds to alleviate the potential spending volatility under a block grant system, and how to reduce inequities in the block grants to high- and low-income states.
in their post-reform benefit schedules, as noted earlier in this review, as a means to encourage work among recipients in addition to work requirements. Economic models predict that the effect of reducing welfare tax rates on labor supply is ambiguous in sign because new recipients are drawn onto the welfare rolls, whose labor supply is thereby reduced. The majority of the evidence, both from nonexperimental and negative income tax (NIT) experimental studies, indicates that the net effect of such reductions on labor supply is approximately zero. This should, therefore, be the prediction one should make for the recent tax rate reductions enacted by the states.

A few recent experiments have addressed the labor supply effects of reduced welfare tax rates and have shown, instead, that they generally increase earnings and employment (Berlin 2000; Blank, Card, and Robins 2000). However, the majority of these experiments only test the effects of reduced tax rates on those who are initially on welfare, and, for that group, positive effects on labor supply should occur. Consequently, although the experimental results are of value because they confirm, in broad outlines, the predictions of the static labor supply model for how initial recipients would respond, they do not contradict the literature from prior econometric studies and the NIT experiments because they do not account for the offsetting labor supply effects of new entry.58

A new element in recent discussions, however, is an emphasis on coupling work requirements and minimum hours restrictions with tax rate reductions. The argument is that the work requirement limits the negative labor supply effects that serve as an offset to the work incentives of tax rate reductions and is thus superior to welfare programs with tax rate reductions but no work requirements, and that tax rate reductions accompanied by such restrictions are more likely to increase labor supply.59 However, this

58. See Blank, Card, and Robins (2000) for a discussion of entry and how it might be reduced by imposing barriers such as a waiting period before the financial incentives are allowed (see also Card, Robins, and Lin 1998). Berlin (2000, 35) also draws a contrast between the findings of these recent experiments and those of the NIT experiments, noting that the NIT reduced labor supply whereas the tax rate reductions in the new experiments increased labor supply. However, this is not a proper comparison because the negative labor supply effects in the NIT experiments pertained to the effect of an NIT versus nothing at all (i.e., the treatment–control group comparison), which is expected to be negative from simple theory. In fact, as noted previously, the alternative treatment groups in the NIT experiments that tested alternative welfare tax rates holding the guarantee fixed found generally a zero net effect on labor supply, consistent with the findings of complete offset in nonexperimental econometric models. The NIT experiments included not just recipients but rather a sample of the entire low-income population, so that the offsetting, negative effects of lowering the tax rate were captured by the comparison of outcomes across alternative treatment groups. This is entirely consistent with a positive effect on labor supply of those initially on welfare, and therefore the results of the NIT experiments and recent recipient-only experiments are not inconsistent.

59. Again, see Berlin (2000) and Blank, Card, and Robins (2000) for a discussion of these programs, such as New Hope and the SSP program. Some of the programs tested in these demonstrations allowed recipients to take their “earnings supplements” (i.e., benefits) off welfare. However, in the type of pure transfer program illustrated in figure 5.8, it is immaterial whether individuals receiving benefits in the region above point K are called welfare recipients or not; they are incontrovertibly welfare recipients in the behavioral sense.
is an incorrect comparison because, as discussed previously, work requirements achieve their positive effects on labor supply by eliminating government support for those who do not work, which is the rationale for an income support program in the first place. Consequently, they must be accompanied by a categorization of the population into those who can and cannot work. The relative merits of the two approaches depend on whether the stronger labor supply effects provided by the work requirement system are countered by the inefficiencies, disincentives, and possible inequities created by a feasible categorization system.

Some programs with such minimum full-time work conditions have been voluntary instead of mandatory (e.g., New Hope, Self-Sufficiency Program [SSP], and some treatments in the Minnesota Family Investment Program [MFIP]). That is, the greater benefits made possible by the reduction in the tax rate, and which are available only if hours worked are close to full time, are simply offered to the recipient as an option. Such a program is not a work requirement program at all but is instead just an NIT with part of the budget constraint deleted (namely, the portion in the part-time range). Relative to an NIT with no hours restrictions, a voluntary program of this type would affect labor supply in an ambiguous direction, as some who would have worked part time chose to work full time but some chose not to work at all. Relative to a program with a tax rate of 100 percent, however, such a restricted tax reduction is indeed more likely to increase labor supply than an unrestricted NIT. But that does not mean that it is preferable, because then the issue is why part-time work is not desirable and why the benefits of work supplements should be denied to those who can only work part-time, some of whom will instead choose not to work at all.60

The second type of program, offering wage or earnings subsidies to welfare recipients instead of reducing welfare tax rates, has essentially the same effect if those subsidies are permitted only for those who remain on welfare. It is immaterial whether an increase in \( W(1 - t) \) comes from an increase in \( W \) or a reduction in \( t \).61 The major alternative proposal is instead that welfare recipients be allowed to carry those subsidies off the welfare rolls and to keep them after exiting. The effect of this reform on the budget

60. This illustrates the more general principle that increases in labor supply should not be the sole criterion for judging a reform because it must always take into account how the relative benefits of program expenditure are spread across individuals at different points on the budget constraint and therefore different points in the income distribution. For example, it should always be possible in principle to increase labor supply simply by offering the population a large increase in income to anyone willing and able to work high enough hours; that is incontrovertible. But that costs money, and the proper comparison for such a program is instead with an equal-expenditure program which would therefore have to reduce funds going to low-hours workers. The issue of distributional weights, and the relevant optimal tax problem, cannot be avoided.

61. The two may have different effects around the break-even level, however depending on how the phaseout and cutoff of the earnings or subsidy are handled. A simple graphical analysis easily demonstrates this (not shown for brevity).
constraint is shown in figure 5.9, where CDE is the initial constraint and CD’E’ is the constraint after the subsidy is implemented. Assuming that substitution effects dominate income effects and therefore that labor supply curves for this population group are forward-bending, this change has an unambiguously positive effect on labor supply relative to the initial welfare program for those initially on the welfare portion of the constraint. The drawbacks to such subsidies are the same as those for a universal wage or earnings subsidy, to be considered next.

It is worth noting that this type of program would approach that of a universal subsidy program if (a) those who carry the subsidy off the program are allowed to keep it indefinitely and (b) all eligibles in the population have a finite probability of entering the program within their lifetimes. If both of these conditions hold, all eligibles, including those initially on segment DE, will eventually cycle through the program and hence will have the subsidy available to them off welfare.

The third reform is indeed the offer of a universal earnings or wage subsidy to all low-income families. Graphically, this is identical to figure 5.9 except that those initially off welfare, on segment DE, are also eligible. The relative merits of wage rate and earnings subsidies, on the one hand, and

62. Assuming the subsidy is $s$ percent of earnings, the on-welfare portion of the constraint, segment CD’, has slope $W(1 + s)(1 - t)$, while the off-welfare portion of the constraint, segment D’E’, has slope $W(1 + s)$. This assumes that the subsidy is included in countable income by the welfare agency along with presubsidy earnings; if it does not, the on-welfare portion of the constraint has slope $W(1 - t + s)$. The figure assumes $t = 1.0$, but all statements in the text apply as well for $t < 1$. 

Fig. 5.9  Effect of earnings subsidy on budget constraint
an NIT or similar income support program with a $G$ and $t$, on the other, were debated extensively in the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., Barth and Greenberg 1971; Garfinkel 1973; Kesselman 1969, 1973; Zeckhauser 1971). That literature showed that there will almost certainly be positive effects on labor supply if an income support program is completely replaced by a wage or earnings subsidy. This should not be surprising since benefits are no longer paid to nonworkers under a wage or earnings subsidy, and since, from an equity and distributional point of view, a progressive tax system is replaced by a regressive one. As this early literature recognized (Kesselman 1969; Barth and Greenberg 1971), and has been noted in this review, replacing an income support program with such a subsidy would require a categorization of the eligible population that has its own difficulties which would have to be factored into the comparison.

The literature also addressed the relative merits of wage rate versus earnings subsidies. In general, the former were shown to be superior but were acknowledged to have implementation problems created by the need for employers and workers to document hours of work, and the strong incentives for fraudulent reporting of those hours and for collusion between workers and employers to overreport hours worked. To date, these difficulties have prevented a wage rate subsidy from being enacted in the United States. Earnings subsidies, on the other hand, have the disadvantage that they must be phased out at some earnings level; at and above that point, labor supply disincentives are created.63 The corresponding issue for welfare reform is how eligibility for a universal earnings or wage subsidy program aimed at the welfare-eligible population would be determined. If family income is used as the eligibility criterion, then a notch will be created at that income level where the subsidy is lost, creating disincentives to go beyond that point as well as incentives for those with higher income to reduce labor supply to become eligible. Alternatively, if the subsidy is phased out gradually, as it is in earnings subsidies such as the EITC, then work disincentives will be created in that region, which will have to be counted against the positive labor supply incentives created at lower earnings levels. Thus the offsetting effects of earnings subsidies on labor supply cannot be avoided.64

63. See the chapter on the EITC (Hotz and Scholz, chap. 3 in this volume) for a discussion.

64. Once again, an alternative program offers universal earnings subsidies to low-income families but with a minimum hours constraint. As before, the increased labor supply effects of this program would have to be balanced by the increased need for categorization of the population, at least if it were made mandatory. If it is made voluntary, then, as noted previously, the only issue is whether part-time work should not also be subsidized. It should also be noted that, with a mandatory minimum hours constraint, there is little difference between a wage or earnings subsidy program and an NIT-like income support program with a reduced tax rate, for the two only differ in the nature of the budget constraint above the hours constraint point. If the major labor supply decision is the margin between working at the constraint point or locating below it off welfare, the two programs would have the same effects.
5.6 Summary

Although the 1996 legislation is now six years past, the TANF program must still be regarded as being in a state of transition and not as having fully coalesced into a final form. The implementation of the program, as well as myriad of its provisions, such as the imposition of stricter work requirements with more rigorously enforced sanctions for noncompliance and the imposition of time limits, continues to evolve. States are continuing to modify their programs and attempt to change them over time, as they search for new ways to deal with the difficulties of the population that they aim to serve. The uncertainties created by a possible recession, the increasing impact of time limits as more recipients hit those limits over the next few years, and the possibility of further congressional action, all have the potential to lead to further modifications in the program.

While research on the AFDC program is still useful in many ways, and while the models developed for that program are still applicable to TANF, there are many new features of TANF whose effects cannot be easily extrapolated from AFDC research results. At the same time, direct evaluation of the effects of the TANF program, particularly the evaluation of the independent contributions of its separate individual components, poses many empirical challenges. Although the evidence to date is reasonably strong that the TANF program has increased employment and earnings and decreased the caseload, relative to what would have occurred if AFDC had remained in place, the separate effects of work requirements, time limits, sanctions, family caps, and other individual features are essentially unknown. These continuing research challenges, as well as those posed by additional modifications in the TANF program as they occur, will provide a rich agenda for further research.

References


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