11.1 Introduction

Railways began operating in Australia in the 1850s and, in many ways, they transformed transport in the country. They became vital links between Australia’s cities and ports and the rural hinterland, facilitated export expansion, and were used by governments to pursue social and political objectives (Productivity Commission [PC] 1999).

However, much has changed since those early days. As more air, land, and sea transport options have developed, so the role of rail has changed. Although railways in Australia still play a significant role in the intrastate transport of bulk commodities and general freight along major corridors, and in urban transport, they are not as successful in other areas. Changing modal shares with the decline of rail in part reflect inherent advantages of other transport modes, particularly technological improvements. However, there have also been concerns that the poor performance of rail contributed to its own decline. Indeed, one Australian state government told the PC during its 1999 inquiry into rail reform in Australia that a lack of rail (and maritime) productivity has resulted in an overreliance on air and road transport in Australia (PC 1999, 1).

Concerns about the performance of rail led to a number of railway reforms and inquiries into the industry in the 1990s. However, it is not just in
Australia that reforms have occurred. Railways in many countries have undergone significant changes in aspects of their organizational structures, ownership, and access arrangements over this period. Widely differing approaches to rail reform are evident, both across countries (discussed briefly below) and in different jurisdictions in Australia (the focus of this paper).

Reforms have included structural separation (both vertical and horizontal), the introduction of commercial disciplines (corporatization and privatization), and arrangements for third-party access to track infrastructure.

The wide range of reforms being implemented raises the question of whether one approach is superior to another. Using Australian railways as an example, this paper argues that because rail networks differ in terms of their economic characteristics and the challenges they face, it is important that individual reform packages be tailored to each network.

11.2 International Reforms

During the 1990s, reforms in some countries, such as Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales), New Zealand, and Argentina, involved increased private-sector participation.1 In Great Britain, for example, twenty-five passenger service operations were established under franchising arrangements and the track, signals, and stations were sold to the private sector.2 Structural reform across these countries has involved different combinations of vertical and horizontal separation (table 11.1).

Other countries have adopted reforms that change structures within government-owned railways. For instance, in 1994 the publicly owned Netherlands Railway was separated vertically into track infrastructure and train operations, with the latter divided into four commercial business units (passenger, freight, stations, real estate). Some new private entrants have also entered the Dutch market.

Table 11.2 provides an overview of the structure and ownership of the railways in selected countries.3

Many teething problems have been associated with these reforms. A notable example has been Great Britain. An apparent deterioration of services and major safety problems—as evident from several rail crashes in the 1990s, as well as the Hatfield rail crash in October 2000—led experts to blame the fragmentation of the system. One transport specialist suggested


2. The British government released a white paper in 1992 proposing changes to the railways. The Railways Act of 1993 allowed the structural reform of the railways, which were sold or franchised in 1997.

3. PC (1999) benchmarked Australia’s railways with selected systems in Europe, America, and Japan. Railways in other Asian countries were not examined.
### Table 11.1 Definitions Relating to Structural Separation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural separation</td>
<td>Separation of businesses into discrete legal entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal separation</td>
<td>Occurs either by product (freight and passenger services) or by geographic area (interstate, regional, and urban railways).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical separation</td>
<td>Separation of functional levels (track infrastructure and train operations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above track, or train operations</td>
<td>Provision of rail freight and passenger transport services involving locomotives and other rollingstock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below track, or track infrastructure</td>
<td>Physically fixed rail facilities such as track, sleepers, signals, terminals, and yards.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table 11.2 Overview of Structure and Ownership of Overseas Railways, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Train Operator</th>
<th>Track Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Horizontally separated and vertically integrated</td>
<td>Franchisees</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Horizontally separated (by function) and vertically integrated with access for passenger services</td>
<td>Various private</td>
<td>Various private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Horizontal and vertical separation of accounts</td>
<td>Governments and private</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Horizontally and vertically separated</td>
<td>Franchisees</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Horizontally separated (by function) and vertically integrated with access for freight services</td>
<td>Franchisees and government freight operator</td>
<td>Government with franchisees having control of track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Horizontally and vertically separated</td>
<td>Government and various private</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Horizontally and vertically integrated</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Government (leased for nominal rent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Horizontally and vertically separated</td>
<td>Government and various private</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Horizontally separated (by function) and vertically integrated with access for passenger services</td>
<td>Various private</td>
<td>Various private</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: PC (1999, E2).*
that the complex structures created by privatization generated some problems, particularly relating to lines of accountability (Grayling 2000). Others have noted problems such as the setting of inappropriate benchmarks, shortcomings in liability regimes, and weak investment incentives (The Economist, 3 July 1999, 57–60; Trace 1999).

### 11.3 Australian Reforms

The development of railways in Australia since the 1850s reflects the fact that Australia is a federation of states. There is a national (commonwealth) government and eight state and territory governments.

Historically, railways have been (and many are today) under the jurisdiction of state governments. At the start of the 1990s the Australian rail system was characterized by integrated (state-owned) railways providing passenger and freight services in their respective jurisdictions.

Australian National (AN; owned by the commonwealth government) provided long-distance passenger services on the mainland, freight services across jurisdictions, and intrastate freight services in South Australia and Tasmania.

The state systems accounted for most rail freight transported. Of the more than 66 billion net-ton kilometers of rail freight transported in 1996–1997, for example, about three-quarters were accounted for by state railways. Queensland was the largest individual freight carrier, transporting about 43 percent of the total in that year. The busiest routes (in terms of net-ton kilometers) tended to be along the north-south corridor, that is, between Melbourne and Sydney and between Brisbane and Melbourne. However, rail had the most significant share of freight transport on the route between Perth and Adelaide (Industry Commission [IC] 1991).

One of the legacies of the historical pattern of development of the railways was a degree of parochialism that resulted in a lack of standardization of rail gauges. Standardization of the interstate network was only completed in 1995 when the Melbourne-to-Adelaide broad-gauge route was converted to standard gauge.

A number of factors drove reform in Australian railways in the 1990s. These included the following:

- Increasing pressure on government budgets to finance railway deficits, subsidies, and investment (the total amount of explicit subsidies paid to railways by state governments in 1997–1998, e.g., exceeded Australian $2.3 billion, representing 4 to 5 percent of the outlays of some

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4. Rail reform in Australia is discussed further in PC (1999), Salerian (1999), and Scrathon (2001).
5. The states and territories of Australia are New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory, and Australian Capital Territory.
governments; PC 1999, 263). In 1996–1997, the rail deficit was A$1.36 billion (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport, and Microeconomic Reform [HORSCCTMR] 1998, 110), and total commonwealth, state, and local government investment in rail was about A$1.6 billion (HORSCCTMR, 112).

- Pressure on railway freight rates arising from increasing intermodal competition (this increased competition was due to the removal of the legislated monopoly previously given to rail for the carriage of certain bulk commodities, and improvements in road transport technology and infrastructure).
- Pressure on railway freight rates from increasing competition in downstream markets for some commodities.
- The introduction of a National Competition Policy.

A wide range of different structural, ownership, and access arrangements was introduced by the states in the 1990s (table 11.3). Queensland has retained a single, government-owned railway that provides freight and passenger services and maintains rollingstock and track infrastructure. This entity was, however, corporatized in 1995–1996. New South Wales (NSW), on the other hand, structurally separated its State Rail Authority in 1996, initially into four government-owned businesses (with responsibility for urban and nonurban passenger services, freight, track infrastructure, and track maintenance), of which three were corporatized.

In other states, reforms have led to greater participation by the private sector through franchising of urban and nonurban passenger rail services (Victoria) and privatization of freight operations (Victoria, Western Australia). The commonwealth government privatized parts of the AN railways and has plans to sell the National Rail Corporation (NRC), which assumed responsibility for AN’s interstate freight operations in 1993. The interstate track was transferred to a new federal authority, the Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC), in 1998. On the east-west corridor across Australia, private operators now compete directly with the government operator in niche markets. Overall the number of private railways rose from six in 1991 to nineteen in 1999.

6. Industry Commission (1991) and PC (1999) discuss the restrictions that existed on the intrastate carriage of particular commodities. For example, rail was required to transport coal (in NSW and Queensland) and domestic grains and petroleum (in Victoria, Queensland, and Western Australia).

7. In 1995 the Council of Australian Governments agreed to implement a package of measures to extend competition policies to previously exempt sectors of the economy. A Competition Principles Agreement established principles for structural reform of public monopolies, competitive neutrality between the public and private sectors, prices oversight of government business enterprises, regimes to provide access to essential facilities, and reviews of legislation restricting competition.

8. The former AN system now consists of two private operators (Australia Southern Railroad, Australian Transport Network), a corporatized government freight operator (NRC), a private passenger-train operator (Great Southern Railway), and a government track authority (ARTC).
As with the experience overseas, these reforms have not been without problems. In particular, problems similar to those in Great Britain seem to have arisen following structural reforms in NSW, where a series of rail accidents and concerns over track maintenance standards resulted in an inquiry into the safety of the network. This safety audit, released in April 2000, noted that poor coordination among the new government-owned rail agencies had impeded the system’s safety performance, and that a cultural change was required to allow the “effective delivery” of safety initiatives (D. Humphries, “Safety Gets Back Seat on Trains, Audit Finds,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 April 2000). In 2001, the businesses responsible for track access (Rail Access Corporation) and maintenance (Rail Services Australia) were merged into a single entity, the Rail Infrastructure Corporation, subject to direction from the NSW transport minister.

Until recently, attempts to privatize the NRC and the NSW Freight Rail Corporation (FreightCorp) had stalled. The sale of NRC was complicated by the fact that three governments—the commonwealth, NSW, and Victoria—had joint ownership of the corporation.9 Disputes over access to Victorian terminals and tracks initially delayed privatization (M. Skulley,

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9. NRC is 70 percent owned by the commonwealth, with minority stakes held by NSW (20 percent) and Victoria (10 percent).
“Full Steam Ahead: Rail Freight Sell-Off,” Australian Financial Review, 1 March 1999, p. 3). These issues were resolved in 1999. In NSW, the Labor government faced opposition (particularly within its own party) to a proposal, made in September 2000, to privatize FreightCorp in parallel with the NRC. Concerns were mainly related to job losses and the possible impact of the sale on the regions. The NSW government eventually received support for the privatization proposal from an Upper House committee of Parliament and a Country Labor Party conference.

The commonwealth and relevant state governments have now agreed to link the two businesses before selling them by the end of 2001. It is intended that the merged entity would have two divisions—a bulk haulage arm (FreightCorp’s business) and an intermodal arm for NRC’s interstate freight services. However, concerns have been expressed that the twin sale could substantially lessen competition, with the merged entity holding a high proportion of standard-gauge rollingstock. The governments have indicated that any competition issues raised by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) would be addressed through the sale process (Batchelor et al. 2001).

11.4 Performance of Australia’s Railways

Reforms in the 1990s transformed the structure and operations of Australia’s railways. There is now greater competition between railways and more private-sector participation in some corridors. The PC (1999) found that there were significant improvements in the productivity of (government-owned) railways providing freight and passenger services over the period 1989–1990 to 1997–1998.

Figure 11.1 indicates that the average annual growth in (total factor) productivity of Australia’s railways of around 8 percent was greater than that of Canada, Japan, and the United States.

Freight customers benefited from this improvement in productivity. Real freight rates fell 30 percent between 1990 and 1998. This is comparable

10. The NSW Labor government support for the sale of FreightCorp was based on commonwealth government decisions to privatize NRC but prohibit the sale of NRC to FreightCorp. The NSW government argued that the privatization of NRC would have left FreightCorp vulnerable to “cherry-picking” of its most profitable contracts by NRC. After much debate, the NSW Country Labor Conference in November 2000 voted to condemn the privatization of NRC, but to make it a condition of sale of FreightCorp that it be sold to the same bidder as NRC (D. Murphy, “FreightCorp Sell-Off Wins Crucial Labor Support,” Sydney Morning Herald, 13 November 2000). An Upper House committee of the NSW Parliament also made several recommendations about conditions to be attached to the privatization, which were incorporated in legislation (NSW Legislative Council 2001).

11. The Trade Practices Act of 1974 prohibits mergers and acquisitions that have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a substantial market. The ACCC has the power to reject mergers that would substantially lessen competition, but can also authorize these where there is sufficient public benefit.
with decreases in Canada (33 percent) and the United States (26 percent) between 1990 and 1997.

However, while Australia has narrowed the gap in productivity, there remains a significant difference. Australia’s level of productivity in 1998 was about two-thirds that of the best-performing countries (in 1997).

Some of the difference is due to factors that inherently disadvantage Australia, such as scale of operation. However, technical efficiency (productivity adjusted for the effect of scale) remains 30 percent below that of the best-performing countries.

### 11.5 Future Reforms

As discussed in section 11.4, improvements in the productivity of Australian railways had occurred in the 1990s but there was room for further improvement. Reforms during the decade had contributed to the improved performance but the PC inquiry report (PC 1999) considered that more needed to be done to ensure further productivity gains in Australia. It argued that a greater commercial focus and the harnessing of competitive forces were the keys to ensuring further productivity gains. Numerous participants to the inquiry agreed with this view.

While steps had been taken to corporatize the remaining government-owned railways, the ongoing problems for these railways appear to reflect the way the corporatization model has been implemented. Corporatization aims to provide a public enterprise with similar objectives, incentives, and sanctions to those of a private-sector firm (Hilmer, Rayner, and Taperell
1993, 300). The Hilmer Report noted five basic principles for the effective implementation of corporatization. These were clarity and consistency of objectives, management authority, performance monitoring, effective rewards and sanctions, and competitive neutrality.¹²

However, governments still subject their rail operators to multiple, often conflicting objectives relating to social welfare, regional development, and employment. Governments as shareholders face budget constraints and are often reluctant to provide equity funding or to allow railways to borrow on their own behalf, even if justified commercially. Further, governments are often reluctant to maintain an arm’s-length relationship with their railway boards because of political and community pressures.

Even in theory, limitations apply to the corporatization model. In particular, public ownership subjects governments and taxpayers to considerable commercial risks.

Thus, private-sector alternatives to government provision have an important role to play in overcoming these problems. These alternatives can include contracting out and franchising. Competitive tendering and contracting (CTC) allows the introduction of competition into the provision of certain services and has been used increasingly by Australian railways, particularly in areas such as maintenance. Competition is introduced through the bidding process and so encourages providers to adopt efficient service-delivery methods. The main benefits of CTC are seen to include lower costs, improved service, and greater flexibility (King 1994). However, contract specification is an important determinant of the success of CTC. As well as specifying price, contracts need to contain incentives or conditions to maintain service quality.

Franchising involves the government granting a franchisee the right to operate a service for a fixed period. It can generate further gains because franchisees bear revenue risks, thus strengthening their incentives to improve service quality and expand the size of the market.

Full privatization can, in theory, offer a number of benefits over public ownership. Privately owned firms are said to have greater incentives and ability than public enterprises to be cost efficient, to make productive investments, and to be innovative and customer focused (see, e.g., Asterisis 1994). Privatization thus provides opportunities to change the leadership and culture of rail enterprises and transfer risk fully to the private sector.

In Australia, the Tasmanian rail system and interstate nonurban passenger systems have been privatized. The experience of privatization with these systems is encouraging and supports privatizing freight railways.

¹² In October 1992, a committee inquiry was established by the prime minister, with the support of state and territory governments, on the need for a national competition policy and its basic principles. The report of the inquiry (Hilmer, Rayner, and Taperell 1993) became known as the Hilmer Report, after the committee’s chairman Frederick G. Hilmer.
operating in competitive markets, such as NRC and NSW’s Freight-Corp. Scrafton (2001) argued that new entrants in freight and urban passenger rail appeared to be turning around markets that previously had been declining, with commitments to investment, new services, and courageous targets. For example, since purchasing Tasrail in 1997, the private owners have increased traffic volumes significantly, winning major contracts to haul logs and containers. Tasrail’s revenue increased, while costs fell, making the railway profitable for the first time in 130 years. The private owners have invested heavily in new sleepers, communications systems, and replacement of the aging rollingstock. Likewise, some interstate passenger routes began to generate positive margins following privatization (PC 1999).

Competition can improve performance further. There are a number of forms competition can take—both “in” the market and “for” the market. Much of the rail network is already subject to intermodal competition from road, air, or coastal shipping, or competition in downstream markets. The different forms of competition are summarized in table 11.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competition Type</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intermodal competition</td>
<td>Competition between rail and other modes of transport, such as road and coastal shipping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition “for” the market</td>
<td>Competition between bidders tendering for the exclusive right to provide a specified service over a given period of time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition “in” the market</td>
<td>Competition between train operators for the same customers on a given network (rail-on-rail competition).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition for train schedules</td>
<td>Competing demands by train operators for access to the track infrastructure. This can occur between train operators serving different markets (e.g., freight and passenger services), between operators competing for the same customers, or between trains with different origins/destinations wishing to travel over common segments of the network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition in downstream markets</td>
<td>Competition in markets that railways serve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yardstick competition</td>
<td>Involves comparing the performance of organizations with similar objectives operating in separate geographic markets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. The PC inquiry report recommended privatizing all remaining government-owned freight operations, with special arrangements for the rollingstock on the main coal lines (PC 1999, 145–151).
Competition can be facilitated by structural reform (e.g., vertical or horizontal separation; table 11.1) and the introduction of regulatory arrangements to enable access to track infrastructure. However, no single structure or access regime is appropriate for all networks.

11.6 Decision-Making Framework

So how do governments decide which approach is appropriate in reforming their rail networks? The specification of objectives and examination of the characteristics of the rail network can help in the decision-making process. Taking these steps allows identification of the forms of competition and structural reform that may be appropriate in each market.

Specifying the objectives of reform at the outset helps to identify the rationale for reform, and hence provides guidance on how best to implement reform (and, indeed, helps to identify whether reform is needed at all). For instance, the overarching objective of reform may be to have an efficient transport system meeting the freight and transport needs of a country, not to raise revenue from the private sector or to increase the aggregate level of service from railways. This implies that the extent to which each transport mode is used in the transport system would depend on its economic merit. Railways simultaneously compete with and complement other modes in providing a seamless transport service.

The efficient operation of railways is an important contributor to an efficient transport system. The sources of improved efficiency in railways—as in other industries—are static and dynamic efficiency gains. Static gains are achieved through one-off improvements to eliminate the sources of x-inefficiency. This can involve making better use of existing labor, equipment, and infrastructure. Dynamic efficiency gains involve continual improvement through innovation and, in the case of rail, continually optimizing its position in the transport logistics chain.

In most instances rail reform packages implemented across countries have delivered static efficiency gains. In New Zealand, for example, there were significant improvements in labor productivity, asset utilization, traffic levels, and profit in the five years following privatization (PC 1999, 149). To some extent these are the “easy” gains. But dynamic efficiency is likely to be more important to rail in the long run. Achieving greater dynamic efficiency is more difficult as it is likely to involve fundamental changes to the culture and operations of railways.

It is also important to understand the differing economic characteristics of individual rail networks. In a few markets, such as the transportation of bulk commodities such as coal, railways are able to exercise market power and extract monopoly rents from users. For other freight operations, railways may generate just sufficient earnings to be commercially viable and
support future investment. Urban passenger rail services tend to be loss-making and rely on government subsidies for survival.

In addition, network interface issues, which occur when a train from one network needs access to another network, can potentially impede the efficiency of train operations and influence the appropriateness of different policy options. The extent of interface issues will depend on several factors, including the number of trains from other networks seeking access, the complexity of the network, and the level of traffic density.

Having identified objectives and network characteristics, the forms of competition likely to be effective in each network can be identified. Competition “for” the market, as occurs with franchising, is typically suited to natural monopoly situations where it is most cost effective to have only one provider of the rail service. In other markets, it may be possible to have multiple train operators competing for the same customers—that is, competition “in” the market (e.g., long-distance rail lines). This can encourage market segmentation and product diversity. In other markets, intermodal competition or competition in downstream markets may be sufficient to promote operational efficiency.

Finally, the emphasis in rail reform on promoting various types of competition is underpinned by structural reform. In essence, structural reform involves breaking up established railways into separate entities, with separation occurring on a geographic, functional (track, rollingstock, maintenance), and/or product (passenger or freight) basis.

The potential benefits of structural separation may include the promotion of competition, facilitation of the regulation of natural monopoly elements of the track, and the implementation of appropriate policies in different markets (PC 1999).

Separating train operations from the track (vertical separation) is designed to facilitate competition between train operators for the same customers and competition for train schedules. But vertical separation may not be effective in markets where there is limited scope for more than one operator, or there is already effective competition from other modes of transport or competition in downstream markets (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 1999). It may also result in coordination and safety problems.

Separating railways by function or geography (horizontal separation) can improve the effectiveness of policies and regulatory regimes relating to different rail businesses. Contractual arrangements to meet noncommercial objectives (social, regional, or environmental) can also be implemented more readily. It also enables services to be franchised in order to introduce competition “for” the market through periodic competitive bidding.

The potential benefits of structural separation need to be balanced against the costs. The costs of structural separation potentially can include
loss of economies of scope, interface problems between networks, loss of commercial sustainability, adverse effects on safety, and adjustment costs.14

11.7 Applying the Decision-Making Framework

The PC (1999) inquiry report into progress in rail reform applied this decision-making framework to the Australian railway system. Based on their economic characteristics, four different types of rail network can be identified in Australia—urban passenger, regional, main coal lines, and the interstate network. For each network the problems to be addressed and the impediments to improved performance differ, requiring differing policy solutions.

11.7.1 Urban Rail Passenger Networks

Urban rail passenger networks exist in the mainland state capital cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, and Adelaide. These networks are noncommercial and exist in their current form only because of continued government support. In the markets served by these networks there is strong intermodal competition from private motor vehicles and from alternative public transport modes in some instances. There is no rail-on-rail competition.

Urban rail passenger networks pose a variety of challenges to governments and their operators. These railways are often criticized for their deficiencies in productive efficiency, large financial deficits, and poor service quality. These problems are further compounded by the fact that urban rail passenger services are highly visible to the public, often in need of capital investment, and subject to industrial disputes.

Given the loss-making nature of these networks, governments ultimately decide which services will be provided and the contribution users make toward the cost of provision. The performance of the urban transport system can be improved by ensuring that urban rail services fulfill an appropriate role within the system (improving allocative efficiency) and then that those services are provided at least cost to taxpayers (improving operational efficiency).

Allocative efficiency can be improved through the rigorous application of the purchaser-provider framework. The purchaser-provider framework separates the responsibility for deciding which goods and services are provided to the community from the responsibility for delivering the services (PC 1999). Governments consider and decide on the choice and mix of

14. PC (1999, 107–108) discusses the potential costs of vertical separation in more detail. Further information can also be obtained from Kessides and Willig (1995); Brooks and Button (1995); Thompson (1997); King (1997); OECD (1998); van de Velde and van Reeven (1998); and OECD (1999).
transport services purchased to promote stated objectives, rather than leaving such decisions to railway management.\(^{15}\)

Greater operational efficiency can be encouraged by generating competition for the market through contracting or franchising. This approach is preferred to promoting competition between train operators. Urban rail passenger services require that trains run frequently and to a complex timetable. Coordination of services to meet the timetable is likely to be more effectively undertaken by one operator. In addition, the relatively small size of many urban passenger networks in Australia limits the scope for competition between train operators for the same customers.

Vertical integration can facilitate the franchising process and operational efficiency of urban passenger networks. Vertical separation is not warranted because there are no benefits to be obtained (through competition between train operators) to offset the costs of separation. In addition, accountability is also likely to be weakened in such a structure. If service standards are not achieved or if accidents occur, a regulator will be required to apportion responsibility and impose sanctions. As noted by Kain (1998), apportioning blame for poor performance may require considerable information and administration on the part of the regulator.

Horizontal separation of urban rail passenger networks from other rail networks can facilitate the application of the purchaser-provider framework by clearly delineating those services requiring government support from other commercial rail operations and networks. In addition, it may be worthwhile to horizontally separate the networks further into two or more geographically based franchises to promote “yardstick” competition, provided the population size is sufficient to support such separation.\(^{16}\)

The benefits of further horizontal separation need to be balanced against potential interface and coordination issues that may occur between operators over shared segments of the network.\(^ {17}\) It has been argued, including by participants to the PC’s inquiry into rail reform (PC 1999), that in some instances the horizontal separation of urban rail passenger networks from other rail networks is impracticable due to the interface issues between them. However, there are examples both in Australia and overseas of the use of contractual arrangements to overcome such problems. In Vic-

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15. The PC identified five stages in the implementation of the purchaser-provider framework, including the specification of policy objectives, specification of rail services required to promote the objectives, determination of the level and form of subsidy, delivery of specified services, and costing of rail services (PC 1999, 12–16).

16. The establishment of the twenty-five horizontally separated passenger franchises in the United Kingdom is an example. In Victoria, the U.K. approach was adopted with the horizontal separation of the Melbourne urban train system into two franchises (Bayside Trains and Hillside Trains).

17. In Australia, network interface issues are of particular concern in Sydney, where congestion in the urban passenger network restricts the passage of freight trains. Interface issues also arise between the interstate and regional networks, as well as between the main coal lines and regional networks.
toria, there are contractual arrangements between an urban passenger operator in Melbourne, M-Train (formerly Bayside Trains), and interstate and regional operators that allow the use of the urban network by nonurban and freight trains. Similar arrangements also apply in the United States (PC 1999, 110, E24). The balance of evidence indicates that the benefits that can be obtained from horizontally separating urban rail passenger networks outweigh the cost of such contractual arrangements.

11.7.2 Regional Networks

Regional networks in Australia refer to those rail lines that extend from the ports and capital cities into the regional areas as well as lines from regional areas that connect into the interstate network. Within the regional networks of NSW and Queensland are the main coal lines that are discussed separately below. The services provided by regional networks are dominated by the transport of general freight and grains. The financial performance of these networks is mixed. Some networks have been able to generate sufficient revenues to earn a commercial return, while others are reliant on government support. In virtually all instances, the freight carried on regional networks is subject to strong intermodal competition, especially from road transport.

The poorly performing regional networks are confronted with the problems of declining market shares, increasing financial deficits, and a running down of existing infrastructure. These problems have arisen primarily due to these railways’ inability to meet new competitive challenges, especially from road transport. This stems mainly from government involvement. In many instances, governments have required railways to pursue a range of conflicting objectives, interfered with their day-to-day operations, and restricted their access to capital. This has reduced the ability of these railways to meet customer needs at competitive prices, which is further compounded by the continual running down of the infrastructure base. At the same time, governments have deregulated freight carried by road, exposing rail to increasing competition.

Regional networks in Australia need to achieve both static and dynamic efficiency gains if they are to survive in the competitive transport markets in which they operate.

As the impediments to improved performance primarily stem from government involvement, the most effective way of overcoming them is to increase the commercial focus of regional networks. This requires that railway managers have the flexibility to make timely decisions, as well as the ability to form strategic alliances, to access capital, and to face no undue restrictions on input choice.

The commercial focus of government-owned railways can be improved through corporatization. However, as noted earlier, there are often limitations on how well the corporatization model is applied. In particular, gov-
ernments are often unable to maintain an arm’s-length relationship from their railway boards because of political and community pressure.

The limitations of government ownership can be overcome through greater private-sector participation by either franchising or full privatization. Privatization of rollingstock and a long-term lease on infrastructure are preferred to franchising in this case because it allows for greater commercial focus and increased flexibility.

Alternatively, the performance of regional railways could be improved by encouraging competition between train operators through vertical separation combined with access arrangements. However, the small volumes of freight carried on regional networks, and the resulting inability to achieve economies of scale, suggest that profitable entry by third-party operators is likely to be limited in most instances. Importantly, as already noted, there is competition from other transport modes, which would encourage improved performance by the incumbent operator. The impediment to improved performance is not a lack of competition but rather an inability to meet existing competitive challenges.

Thus vertical integration appears to be appropriate for regional railways, since vertical separation makes little, if any, contribution to overcoming the main impediments to improved performance.

Regional networks are also particularly suited to horizontal separation. This would clearly delineate those markets where direct government involvement is not required. Rail management would have the freedom to focus on developing new market opportunities and to increase operational efficiency. “Light-handed” access arrangements can be tailored to ensure that noncompeting trains from other networks can gain fair and reasonable access. However, it is expected that access would not be an issue because owners would have incentives to provide access to noncompeting trains as the increased traffic flow could increase profits to the track owner or lessee.

11.7.3 Main Coal Lines

The main coal lines in Australia are defined as the Hunter Valley coal network in NSW and those lines centered on the Goonyella and South Blackwater regions in Queensland. These networks carry high volumes, are highly profitable, and have a natural monopoly in the carriage of almost all coal in these regions (i.e., there is little competition from road or rail-on-rail competition).

Unlike other rail networks in Australia, the main coal lines have maintained their market share in the transport of coal, and investment has been easily justified on a strictly commercial basis. In this instance, the problems associated with the main coal lines are those of market power and the extraction of monopoly rents from mining companies, as well as inefficient operations.
There are two main reform packages the state governments could implement to control the existence of market power on the main coal lines. First, competition between train operators could be encouraged, with monopoly pricing of the track infrastructure addressed through access regulation. Alternatively, franchising of a vertically integrated network may be used to promote competition “for” the market by awarding contracts for the right to supply rail services (track and train). Tenders could be awarded on the basis of the lowest total cost of service provision over a relevant period. Track and rollingstock could be leased to the franchisee and access conditions incorporated into franchise agreements.

The appeal of the first approach is that competition between train operators can control monopoly pricing on the part of operators, while vertical separation can increase the transparency of access-price regulation. However, there are some practical problems with this approach. In the first instance, sunk costs associated with investing in locomotives and wagons can act as a substantial barrier to entry to potential new entrants. This problem is compounded by the fact that the rollingstock used to haul coal (especially the wagons) is specific to the haulage of bulk commodities, reducing its transferability to other rail markets.

In addition, even if effective competition between train operators could be achieved, the issue of monopoly pricing still exists in track infrastructure. The control of such monopoly power requires complex regulation.

Franchising has the advantages that the bidding process can be designed to facilitate the transfer of assets (especially the rollingstock), removing a substantial barrier to entry and making the market more contestable (OECD 1999). The franchisee has commercial incentives to obtain dynamic efficiencies and lower costs by improving the role of railways in the transport logistics chain between the mines and ports. In addition, franchising reduces the need for prescriptive access regulation. Periodic re-tendering and awarding contracts on the basis of the lowest freight rate can help to reduce monopoly rents (PC 1999).

However, franchising is not a perfect or costless solution to controlling monopoly pricing. The OECD (1999) identified three potential difficulties with the franchising of rail services, including the possibility of uncompetitive bidding when there are insufficient bidders, the difficulties of choosing between bids that offer different packages, and the specification and administration of contracts.

On balance, the economic characteristics of the main coal lines suggest that a process of franchising through competitive tendering is likely to be superior to facilitating rail-on-rail competition. Government involvement continues under both approaches through access regulation or the franchise process and agreements. However, it is less certain that vertical separation and access regulation will lead to new operators’ entering the market owing to the sunk costs associated with the rollingstock required. As
noted earlier, the franchising process can be designed to overcome this problem, making the market more contestable to potential operators.

To facilitate the franchising process, the main coal lines could be horizontally separated from other networks. The isolation of the network, together with transparent information on the costs and revenues of the franchise, would provide confidence to coal companies that monopoly pricing practices had been eliminated.

11.7.4 Interstate Network

The interstate network can be broadly defined as the standard-gauge track linking all mainland state capital cities. The markets served by the interstate network are varied, including freight (generally containerized) and interstate passenger services.

The financial returns on the interstate network have traditionally been poor. Although never highly profitable, the profitability of the NRC, which carries freight on the interstate network, deteriorated significantly after the introduction of private operators on the network in 1995–1996 (PC 1999, 29).\(^{18}\) There is strong intermodal competition (from road and coastal shipping) in almost all markets served by the interstate network.\(^{19}\) The key feature that differentiates the interstate network from regional networks is that for the former there are multiple network owners, responsible for allocating train schedules and undertaking investment.

Currently the ARTC’s responsibilities for the interstate network are limited to the track that it owns (i.e., in South Australia and parts of NSW, Western Australia, and Northern Territory) or manages (in Victoria). Operators face significant costs in negotiating access and train schedules with numerous owners.\(^{20}\)

Figure 11.2 shows that the interstate network initially lost considerable market share to road, in both the transport of nonbulk freight and interstate passengers.\(^{21}\) The operating deficits of the network have discouraged investment, resulting in a deterioration of the infrastructure, further eroding the competitive position of railways. It has been estimated that more than half the expenditure of the commonwealth from the late 1970s to


\(^{19}\) For example, in 1994–1995, the interstate transport of bulk commodities was dominated by coastal shipping (95 percent of the market). In contrast, road dominated the transport of nonbulk freight (57 percent of the market, compared to 32 percent for rail).

\(^{20}\) Currently, four authorities are responsible for the administration of access, five authorities have a role in allocating train schedules, and five authorities undertake investment in the network.

\(^{21}\) Rail market share of freight traffic on the east-west corridor reached a low of 65.2 percent in 1995–1996 but has started to rise again, to 77 percent in 1999–2000, the highest level in a decade. This in part reflects the recent growth in rail-on-rail competition from private niche operators (ARTC 2001).
1996–1997 covered operating losses and historical debt of its railway bodies (HORSCCTMR 1998). This, it has been argued, diverted expenditure from capital works. Some participants to the PC’s rail inquiry (1999, 237) noted that there has also been “neglect” of the interstate network by state governments. A number of reports in the 1990s (HORSCCTMR; Maunsell 1998; Booz-Allen and Hamilton 1998) presented evidence of the inadequacy of rail infrastructure. Participants to the PC’s inquiry also discussed the inadequacy of investment that contributed to problems in the interstate network and hindered rail’s ability to compete (PC 1999, 236–38).

There are two main underlying causes of the loss of competitiveness of rail. First, government ownership and incentive arrangements have impeded the ability of train operators to improve operational efficiency and achieve dynamic efficiency gains through market segmentation and better integration into the transport logistics chain. Second, the multiplicity of network managers imposes costs on train operators in negotiating train
schedules and access charges. This impedes the efficient allocation of train schedules, overall use of the network, and investment.

These impediments can in part be overcome through the proposed privatization of NRC and encouragement of more rail-on-rail competition from private niche operators. To overcome the problems associated with multiple owners of the track infrastructure, integrated management of the network is required. This could be achieved by establishing a single network manager to manage the operation of the interstate track on behalf of both train operators and track owners. This approach has a number of possible advantages. For instance, it reduces the coordination issues inherent in having multiple managers of the network. It also avoids the conflicts of interest that could arise if the manager also owned the track or rolling-stock. An access regime could allow for train schedules to be allocated by auctioning or other market trading methods. This would maximize the economic value of the network by allocating train schedules to those operators that valued them the highest. Flexible pricing arrangements would facilitate investment.

The successful implementation of this approach would be dependent on the vertical separation of train operations from the track infrastructure. This is to avoid any conflict of interest or difficulties that may arise from one party both owning one segment of the network and providing train services in competition with other operators.

11.8 Implications for Existing Arrangements

The differentiated approach described above has different implications in each Australian jurisdiction because of differences in the characteristics of their railways. The potential for further reform exists in them all.

It has particular implications in states where coal lines are horizontally integrated with the rest of the network (Queensland and NSW), or where freight operations are still government-owned (Queensland and, until the sale of FreightCorp was announced, NSW).

In NSW, consideration could also be given to going further and reintegrating the track and operations. It could adopt the Victorian model such that the privatization of FreightCorp would involve a long-term lease over the nonmetropolitan intrastate track (with appropriate access arrangements). All passenger services could be franchised. The franchisees would buy (or lease) the rollingstock and lease the track from the government.

Further reform of the interstate network has particular implications for the commonwealth, NSW, and Western Australian governments. They are currently owners of parts of the network and have separate access regimes. The single-network-manager approach would be more effective if the interstate network were vertically separated and the manager did not own the track infrastructure. This approach would allow coordinated management
and promote competition over the entire interstate network, generating significant benefits and giving rail an opportunity to strengthen its competitive position on this important transport corridor.

Further investigation could also show that the PC’s recommended approach may have relevance for some networks in other countries.

The European network, for example, traverses many countries in the same way as Australia’s interstate network traverses a number of states. It is used heavily by both freight and passenger trains. This suggests that the approach suggested for Australia’s interstate network—involving vertical separation and a single network manager—could be relevant in this context.

Like Australia’s regional railways, Eastern European railways are often heavily involved in moving general and bulk freight to ports. Where there is already sufficient intermodal competition, consideration could be given to greater private-sector participation in vertically integrated, horizontally separated railways.

### 11.9 Conclusion

The Australian Productivity Commission considered that the overarching objective of rail reform should be to improve the efficiency of a country’s transport system. It argued that it should not be seen as a means of involving the private sector to compensate for inadequate government investment in loss-making railways.

An important conclusion from the PC inquiry was that the implementation of a common reform package is unlikely to overcome the impediments to improved performance in all markets. Individualized approaches need to be developed on a case-by-case basis for each type of rail network.

Crucial to developing individualized approaches is identifying the characteristics of markets and their boundaries. Even where rail infrastructure is considered a natural monopoly in a technological sense, other characteristics influence the ability of providers to exercise market power and, thus, the appropriate policy approach for a particular network. These characteristics, which will differ across rail networks, include the strength of intermodal competition from air and road, the degree of competition in downstream markets, and traffic density. Hence the appropriate structural and ownership arrangements will differ for long-distance, regional, and urban passenger rail networks.

Trade-offs are inevitable. While vertical separation may assist in promoting competition and reducing monopoly rents, it may result in a lack of accountability, major coordination problems, and significant safety concerns, as evidenced in Great Britain and NSW. In particular, the implementation of strong access regulation to promote competition may diminish incentives for business to invest in maintaining and upgrading the rail
infrastructure. Horizontal separation of different networks may promote viable businesses but interface issues between networks may arise. Where viable, however, horizontal separation can allow different policies to be implemented for networks with different characteristics.

Systematic analysis of structural reform and ownership options would involve assessing the relevance and likely magnitude of the associated costs and benefits.

This paper has highlighted considerations that may be relevant to determining the preferred vertical structure of particular networks.

- Where there is sufficient intermodal competition and the possibility of the development of rail-on-rail competition, vertical separation would be appropriate. Benefits are likely to be most significant when infrastructure and operations are relatively independent (OECD 1999).
- Where there is intermodal competition but little possibility of rail-on-rail competition (e.g., where the potential market is small), gains from vertical separation are unlikely to outweigh the costs. In this case, vertical integration and promotion of competition for the market (e.g., through franchising) would be preferred.
- Where there is market power in the network, vertical integration may also be appropriate. Periodic retendering and the awarding of contracts on the basis of the lowest freight rate can help to reduce monopoly rents. Vertical separation, on the other hand, could result in the transfer of monopoly rent from train to track operations. In addition, where there are barriers to entry, such as sunk costs in above-rail operations, rail-on-rail competition is unlikely to develop.

In short, there can be no “one-size-fits-all” approach to rail reform. Care must be taken to ensure that the reform strategy adopted is relevant to the network type, taking into account its economic characteristics, and that it is implemented only when the gains exceed the costs.

11.9.1 Postscript

Since this paper was originally presented, the Australian rail reform process has continued, including the sale of NRC and FreightCorp in January 2002, and the establishment of access arrangements for the parts of the interstate network controlled by the ARTC.

In addition, several developments have highlighted difficulties that can arise in implementing reform.

In December 2002, one of the private operators of the Victorian urban rail passenger network (M-Train), which had incurred large financial losses, withdrew from the system. (Its part of the network is being operated by receivers on behalf of the Victorian government, until a decision is made about longer-term arrangements.) Several factors are likely to have contributed to M-Train’s withdrawal. In part, it may reflect problems with hor-
horizontal separation within a market (e.g., urban passenger), if it leaves individual providers with a market that is too small or fragmented. Connex, the current operator of the other part of the system, argued that horizontally separating the Victorian urban network has been inefficient, and has expressed interest in operating the whole system (J. Masanauskas, “Train Stations Are Just ‘Crap,’” Herald Sun, 4 February 2003, p. 8). Thus, the attempt by the Victorian government to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to its urban network, by emulating the United Kingdom, appears to have failed because it paid insufficient attention to local conditions, particularly the relatively small size of the market. This does not, however, undermine the principle of horizontally separating the urban rail passenger network from other rail networks.

In 2001, investment disincentives—purportedly created by the pricing rules for the rail freight access regimes in Victoria and NSW—were raised as an issue to a PC inquiry into the Australian national access regime (PC 2001). The potential “chilling” effect of access regulation for investment (in all industries) was highlighted as a major concern in the commission’s final report (2001). It suggested some general principles that would allow access regimes to facilitate efficient new investment. These included setting regulated access prices to generate expected revenue that at least meets the efficient long-run costs of providing access, that covers the directly attributable or incremental costs of service provision, and that includes a return commensurate with (regulatory and commercial) risk.

References


Trace, K. 1999. Rail privatisation: Lessons from the U.K. In Regulation, competi-
This paper comprehensively lays out the pros and cons of the alternative mechanisms of railway reform, and gives a useful catalogue of where they apply.

The main point of the paper bears repeating, as it is very important: there is no uniquely right approach to railway reform. What works in one set of circumstances fails in another. One size doesn’t fit all.

The approaches to rail reform include downsizing (by means of either horizontal or vertical separation of activities), corporatization, privatization, and offering access to the tracks by competitive service providers. Each of these approaches has its place, as Helen Owens explains.

The bad news, a corollary of one size doesn’t fit all, is that any approach to reform necessarily has some shortcomings. Choosing the best feasible solution means making trade-offs and compromises. Whatever solution is adopted, there will always be room for critics to find fault with it.

It is the complexity of the exercise of railway reform that means one size doesn’t fit all. The railway industry is harder than most industries to reform successfully, for several reasons.

First, the system of tracks creates a natural-monopoly element, meaning that competition is hard to achieve. One of the main lessons from the post-1980s privatization exercises in many industries around the world is that privatization often fails to bring its intended efficiency gains where the privatized firm remains a monopoly. It is not enough merely to transfer assets to private hands and rely on the profit motive to induce the new owners to improve the firm’s efficiency. The discipline of competition is also needed. It is difficult to run a firm as a lean operation if its managers do not feel the continual pressure of competition. In railways, with limited scope for competition, privatization is not guaranteed to bring major efficiency gains.

Second, the policymaker must take account of externalities. Road transportation brings large negative externalities, from congestion, pollution, and accidents. The Federal Highway Administration estimates that the uncompensated negative externalities from driving in the United States come to some $330 billion per year. To the extent that railways reduce these ex-

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ternalities, some form of public support is warranted. Especially for urban commuter rail systems, externality arguments justify public subsidy. This complicates any attempt to privatize or corporatize railways, for simple profitability may not, from a social point of view, be the right criterion for evaluating performance.

Third, the coordination of timetables can be complex, and can raise safety concerns. If multiple rail companies use common tracks, some form of central coordination is needed to avoid crashes.

Finally, technological progress is unlikely to come to the rescue of the reformers. In telecommunications, for instance, technological advances in the 1980s and 1990s reduced the scope of natural monopolies, and made reform easier than it would have been earlier. Such dramatic technological change seems unlikely in railways.

For these reasons it is a delicate matter to judge just which mix of market forces and government control is the right one in any particular set of circumstances, as the paper makes clear.

There is one form of ongoing technological progress, however, that may over time change this mix: the design of market mechanisms. Paul Brewer and Charles Plott designed a mechanism for scheduling the use of the Swedish railways. Multiple rail firms used the common, publicly owned tracks (Brewer and Plott 1996). To generate consistent schedules and avoid train crashes, the traditional approach to scheduling was for a committee to centrally set the timetable. The Brewer-Plott mechanism attempts to capture the informational benefits of decentralized decision making. The rail users bid for the right to use specific lengths of track at specific times. An algorithm first retains only the highest bids. Then it sorts the bids into all possible combinations that are feasible, meaning they respect safety margins for track use. Finally, it computes the bid total for each of the feasible combinations. The combination with the highest bid total is declared the provisional winner. Now a new round of bids is called for, and the process repeats until no one wants to bid higher. In experiments, this mechanism works well, in eliciting close to efficient allocations.

The lesson from the Brewer-Plott mechanism is that we should not underestimate what markets can do. As computing power increases and as economists’ ability to design sophisticated bidding mechanisms expands, the balance of the trade-offs Helen Owens analyzes will change.

Reference