

Savings and Wealth Inequality

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Important open questions

- Why are some people rich while others are poor?
- To what extent can governments affect inequality?
- Which instruments should they use?

Important open questions

- Why are some people rich while others are poor?
- To what extent can governments affect inequality?
- Which instruments should they use?

To better answer these questions we need to better understand why people save

This talk

- Why do people save?
- How does saving behavior translate into wealth inequality?

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Talk roadmap

- Basic facts

Talk roadmap

- Basic facts
- Basic Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari-Imrohoroglu model

Talk roadmap

- Basic facts
- Basic Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari-Imrohoroglu model
- Richer models

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- Basic facts
- Basic Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari-Imrohoroglu model
- Richer models
- What have we learned so far about savings?

Talk roadmap

- Basic facts
- Basic Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari-Imrohoroglu model
- Richer models
- What have we learned so far about savings?
- What needs to be done?

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Basic facts

Earnings and wealth inequality

- Skewed distributions with thick upper tails
- Wealth more concentrated than earnings

		Top		Perc. at zero or negative
1%	5%	20%	40%	
Wealth, 1989 SCF data				
29	53	80	93	6
Gross earnings, 1989 LIS data				
6	19	48	72	8

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- Wealth and earnings becoming more concentrated over time

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- Wealth and earnings becoming more concentrated over time
- Rich people (high lifetime income, education, wealth) have a higher saving rate before and after retirement

Facts: U.S. earnings, income and wealth

- Many contributors, including Wolff (1987), Venti and Wise (1988), Davies and Shorrocks (2000), Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997) + updates, Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016), Bernheim et al. (2001), Kennickel (2003), Dynan et al. (2004), Campbell and Hercowitz (2015), Saez and Zucman (2016), Piketty's book...

Basic Bewley model of inequality

- Preferences

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^T} E \sum_{t=0}^T s_t \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

- Budget constraint

$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1+r)a_t - c_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

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- Ex-ante identical households hit by earning shocks
- Households are ex-post heterogeneous

Basic Bewley model of inequality

- Preferences


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- Ex-ante identical households hit by earning shocks
- Households are ex-post heterogeneous
- Constant distribution of people over states (assets, age) and individuals face a lot of uncertainty

Saving rate by age and wealth, median earnings level



Standard life cycle Bewley model

Key mechanism

- Precautionary savings behavior. People save to self-insure against
 - Earnings risk
 - Longevity risk
 - Retirement

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- The saving rate of the high wealth households is low or even negative

Key mechanism

- Precautionary savings behavior. People save to self-insure against
 - Earnings risk
 - Longevity risk
 - Retirement
- Once “buffer stock savings” is reached, people start dissaving. Carroll (1997)
- The saving rate of the high wealth households is low or even negative
 - Contrasts with much empirical evidence (Dynan Skinner and Zeldes, 2004 and De Nardi, French and Jones, 2010)

Limitations of the standard model

- Counterfactual saving behavior
- They do not generate the **high wealth people** that we see in the data
- They allow for very few saving motives. **Might miss important saving motives even for households whose saving behavior we think we understand**
- Why people save is important

An example

- Out of pocket medical and long-term-care (LTC) expenses in old age are large for upper and middle income people. \Rightarrow Additional motive to self-insure

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- When we evaluate government insurance

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- In a model in which we abstract from this risk, choose a higher discount factor to match observed net worth
- When we evaluate government insurance
 - Patient people might value government insurance less than people facing significant out-of-pocket medical costs
 - Misguided policy evaluation

Explaining wealth inequality

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^T} E \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \left(s_t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + (1-s_t) s_{t-1} \phi(a_t) \right)$$
$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1+r)a_t - c_t + b_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

1. Bequests and human capital transmission across generations

Explaining wealth inequality

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^T} E \sum_{t=0}^T \beta_i^t s_t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma_i}}{1-\sigma_i}$$

$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1+r)a_t - c_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

- 1.
2. Heterogeneous preferences

Explaining wealth inequality

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^T} E \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t s_t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1 + r_t^j) a_t - c_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

- 1.
- 2.
3. Idiosyncratic rates of return

Explaining wealth inequality

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^T} E \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t s_t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

$$a_{t+1} = [l_e f(\theta_t, k_t) + (1 - l_e) y_t] + (1 + r)(a_t - k_t) - c_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
4. Entrepreneurship

Explaining wealth inequality

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^T} E \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t s_t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1+r)(a_t - k_t) - c_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. Richer earnings dynamics

Explaining wealth inequality

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^T} E \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t s_t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1+r)(a_t - k_t) - c_t - m_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
6. Medical and nursing home expenses

Bequests and human capital, facts

- A large fraction of wealth is inherited
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), Modigliani (1988), Gale and Scholz (1994)
- Earnings of parents and children are correlated
Solon (1992), Zimmermann (1992), Stokey (1996), ... Chetty et al. (2014)

Bequests and human capital, model De Nardi, 2004

- OLG with retirement period.
- Earnings and lifetime uncertainty. Accidental bequests

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- Parents value leaving bequests. Voluntary bequests

Bequests and human capital, model De Nardi, 2004

- OLG with retirement period.
- Earnings and lifetime uncertainty. Accidental bequests
- Parents value leaving bequests. Voluntary bequests
- Children partially inherit parents' earnings ability

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^T} E \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \left(s_t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + (1-s_t) s_{t-1} \phi(a_t) \right)$$

$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1+r)a_t - c_t + b_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

The bequest motive

- "Warm glow altruism."

$$\phi(a_t) = \frac{(a_t + \eta)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

- The larger is η , the more **bequests are luxury goods**. **Non-homotheticity**

The bequest motive

- "Warm glow altruism."

$$\phi(a_t) = \frac{(a_t + \eta)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

- The larger is η , the more **bequests are luxury goods**. **Non-homotheticity**
 - Many people leave no bequests. Hurd and Smith (2001)
 - The altruistic model has strong implications about risk sharing across generations that have been strongly rejected by data, Altonji, Hayashi, Kotlikoff, 1997
- **Do not pick model parameters to match wealth inequality**

Data and basic Bewley life cycle model

Wealth Gini	Percentage wealth in the top					% ≤ 0 Wealth
	1%	5%	20%	40%	60%	
U.S. data, SCF 1989						
.78	29	53	80	93	98	6
Accidental bequests distributed equally to all						
.67	7	27	69	90	98	17
Accidental bequests distributed to one's children						
.68	7	27	69	91	99	17

Data and richer life cycle model

Wealth Gini	Percentage wealth in the top					% ≤ 0 Wealth
	1%	5%	20%	40%	60%	
U.S. data, SCF 1989						
.78	29	53	80	93	98	6
Accidental bequests to one's children						
.68	7	27	69	91	99	17
+ Voluntary bequests						
.74	14	37	76	95	100	19
+ Voluntary bequests + HC inheritance						
.76	18	42	79	95	100	19

Bequests and human capital: main results

- Accidental bequests do not help explain the concentration in the upper tail of the wealth distribution

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Bequests and human capital: main results

- Accidental bequests do not help explain the concentration in the upper tail of the wealth distribution
Voluntary bequests help explain wealth concentration because of non-homotheticity
- Transmission of earnings ability across generations increases wealth concentration in the upper tail
- But, the wealthy in the model are still not wealthy enough and the poor are too poor
- The family that you are born to matters a lot for your lifetime expected utility. De Nardi and Yang, 2015

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2. Heterogeneous preferences

Heterogeneous preferences, facts

Lots of evidence of preference heterogeneity

- Estimate Euler equations. PSID. Lawrence (1991).
- Estimate life cycle model with SMM. PSID. Cagetti (2003)
- Heterogeneity of effects of earnings shocks on consumption. PSID. Alan, Browning, and Ejenæs (2016)
- Estimate life cycle model with ML. Danish registry. Druedhal and Jorgensen (2015)
- Many others...

Heterogeneous preferences, models

$$\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^T} E \sum_{t=0}^T s_t \beta_i^t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma_i}}{1-\sigma_i}$$

- **Krusell and Smith (1998)- Infinitely-lived agent model:** A little heterogeneity in β generates
 - More wealth concentration
 - But not enough very wealthy people

Heterogeneous preferences, models

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- **Krusell and Smith (1998)- Infinitely-lived agent model:** A little heterogeneity in β generates
 - More wealth concentration
 - But not enough very wealthy people
- **Hendricks (2007), Paz Pardo (2016) - Life cycle model:**
 - Even large heterogeneity in both parameters does not generate very wealthy people

Heterogeneous preferences: main results

- Heterogeneous preferences might drive important difference in savings
- But, little evidence they are the key reason why the wealthiest are so wealthy
- Interesting mechanisms that might interact with other savings motives in richer Bewley models

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3. Heterogeneous returns

Heterogeneous rates of returns, facts

Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino, Pistaferri (2016) find that rates of returns are

- Heterogeneous across households (over 200 basis points between 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of returns)
- Also heterogenous within asset classes
- Persistent
- Correlated with household wealth and across generations

Exogenous rates of return, models Benhabib, Bisin and Luo (2015)

$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1 + r_t^i)a_t - c_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

- Choose model parameters to match wealth inequality

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- Exogenous and stochastic rates of return alone do not give rise to very rich people, also need bequest motives

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- Choose model parameters to match wealth inequality
- Exogenous and stochastic rates of return alone do not give rise to very rich people, also need bequest motives
- Discipline on the choice of rates of return? Are they consistent with the data?

Endogenous rates of returns

- Rates of return depend on investment choices
- Important to study their determinants. What might be affecting them?

Endogenous rates of returns

- Rates of return depend on investment choices
- Important to study their determinants. What might be affecting them?
 - **Entrepreneurial choices:** Quadrini (1999), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006 and 2009), Bassetto, Cagetti, and De Nardi (2015)

Endogenous rates of returns

- Rates of return depend on investment choices
- Important to study their determinants. What might be affecting them?
 - **Entrepreneurial choices:** Quadrini (1999), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006 and 2009), Bassetto, Cagetti, and De Nardi (2015)
 - **Portfolio choice:** Khan and Kim (2015)
 - **Heterogeneous investor sophistication:** Kacperczyk, Nosal, and Stevens (2015)

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4. Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs, facts

Many entrepreneurs are wealthy and many wealthy people are entrepreneurs. Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006

Fraction of entrepreneurs, SCF 1989

Wealth percentile, top	1%	5%	10%	20%
Self-employed business owners	54%	39%	32%	22%

Entrepreneurs, facts

- Entrepreneurs have a **high saving rate** before and after entry. (Quadrini (1999) and (2000) and Buera (2009))
- Entrepreneurs face **borrowing constraints** (Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Gentry and Hubbard (2004), and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006))
- Entrepreneurs hold **very undiversified portfolios**. (Vissing-Jorgensen and Moskowitz, 2002)

Entrepreneurs, models Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006

- Every period agents decide whether to be a worker or run a business
- Entrepreneurial technology

$$f(\theta_t, k_t) = \theta_t k_t^\nu + (1 - \delta)k_t$$

$$k_t \leq k(a_t)$$

- Budget constraint

$$a_{t+1} = [l_e f(\theta_t, k_t) + (1 - l_e)y_t] + (1 + r)(a_t - k_t) - c_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

Entrepreneurs, results

- Do not pick model parameters to match wealth inequality

		Percentage wealth in the top			
Gini	entrepreneurs	1%	5%	20%	40%
1989, SCF data					
0.8	7.55%	30	54	81	94
Baseline with entrepreneurs and altruism					
0.8	7.50%	31	60	83	94

Entrepreneurs: main results

- Entrepreneurship can generate a realistic wealth distribution.
- Key **mechanism**: Some entrepreneurs
 - Have potentially very high rates of returns from investing in their firm
 - Are borrowing constrained
 - Have a large optimal firm size
 - Keep saving to grow their business even when they are wealthy

Entrepreneurs: main results

- Entrepreneurship can generate a realistic wealth distribution.
- Key **mechanism**: Some entrepreneurs
 - Have potentially very high rates of returns from investing in their firm
 - Are borrowing constrained
 - Have a large optimal firm size
 - Keep saving to grow their business even when they are wealthy
- Model rationalizes entrepreneurial undiversified portfolios, high saving rates, and high wealth

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4. Earnings dynamics

Richer earnings dynamics, facts

- Earnings dynamics are typically much richer than in our models
- High earners face more downward earnings risk

Arellano, Blundell, and Bonhomme (2015), Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015), DeBacker, Panousi, Ramnath (2013)...

Earnings risk, model

Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull, 2003

$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1 + r)(a_t - k_t) - c_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

- Choose earnings to match cross-sectional moments of earnings and wealth inequality. Hence, it matches wealth concentration by construction

Earnings risk, model

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Earnings levels	1.0	3.0	10.0	1060
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+ High earners face 20% risk of dropping every period \Rightarrow Can generate the wealth concentration observed in the data

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+ High earners face 20% risk of dropping every period \Rightarrow Can generate the wealth concentration observed in the data

- Rationale: earnings processes are typically estimated on data sets that miss the highest earners

Earnings risk, model

De Nardi, Fella, and Paz Pardo (2016)

$$a_{t+1} = y_t + (1 + r)(a_t - k_t) - c_t, \quad a_{t+1} \geq \underline{a}$$

- Do not pick model parameters to match wealth inequality
- Estimate rich earnings process from tax data (which includes high earnings workers) and use it in a standard life cycle model
- \Rightarrow This richer earnings process

Earnings risk, model

De Nardi, Fella, and Paz Pardo (2016)

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- \Rightarrow This richer earnings process
 - Does not generate more wealth concentration at the top
 - Fits the wealth holdings of the poorest 60% of people better. The poor people are realistically poor

Earnings risk, model

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- \Rightarrow This richer earnings process
 - Does not generate more wealth concentration at the top
 - Fits the wealth holdings of the poorest 60% of people better. The poor people are realistically poor
 - Matches the increase in the variance of consumption over the life cycle

Earning risk: main results

- If the high earners face very high earnings risk, they might save a lot to smooth consumption and thus also be very wealthy (Castaneda et al. 2003)

Earning risk: main results

- If the high earners face very high earnings risk, they might save a lot to smooth consumption and thus also be very wealthy (Castaneda et al. 2003)
- De Nardi, Fella, and Paz Pardo (2016) use richer tax data and do not find evidence for this mechanism but their data does not contain entrepreneurial earnings

Earning risk: main results

- If the high earners face very high earnings risk, they might save a lot to smooth consumption and thus also be very wealthy (Castaneda et al. 2003)
- De Nardi, Fella, and Paz Pardo (2016) use richer tax data and do not find evidence for this mechanism but their data does not contain entrepreneurial earnings
- However, if entrepreneurs face much more risk, it is both wage and capital income risk and is important to model it explicitly

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
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6. Medical expenses


Medical expenses in the US, facts

De Nardi, French and Jones, 2010



- Out-of-pocket medical costs rise with age and permanent income (HRS data)

Old age savings in the US, facts



- The high permanent income (PI) elderly do not dissave. The low PI elderly never save. The middle PI elderly do dissave (HRS data)


Medical expenses, model De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2010

- Medical expenses hit the budget constraint (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994 and 1995)

$$a_{t+1} = (1 + r)a_t + y_t - m_t, \quad a \geq \underline{a}$$

- There is a **consumption floor**

De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2010



- Medical expenses increasing with age and permanent income are an important reason why the high PI elderly do not run down their assets. Government insurance covers the the low PI, who never save

Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti, 2016

- Vanguard data + different identification strategy
- Long term care risk (LTC) + government insurance \Rightarrow wedge in saving behavior between people with low wealth/PI and those with higher wealth/PI

Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti, 2016

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 - Over 100K: LTC risk adds 200K at age 75
- Increase in savings is strongest in % terms at the top 20th percentile of financial wealth

Medical and nursing home expenses: main results

- Medical expenses/LTC risk + government programs
 - Have large effects on savings
 - Have heterogeneous effects depending on lifetime income
- Are important to understand savings

Intro
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Models
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Bequests
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Preferences
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Returns
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Entrepreneurs
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Earnings
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Medical expenses
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Conclusions
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Conclusions and directions for future research

What have we learned so far?

- Not everyone is middle aged (as in the infinitely-lived model)
- Precautionary savings against earnings risks are not the only reasons why people save (as in the infinitely-lived model)

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 - Better model retirement. Retirement is a period of big risks (medical expenses and LTC risk) and government insurance has a large effects on savings (or lack thereof)
 - Model intergenerational links explicitly. Who your parents are matters for your lot in life

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- Entrepreneurship can explain why many households are wealthy
- Household-level earnings dynamics over the life cycle matter

Directions

- Contents
 - Human capital
 - Health
 - The family
 - Rates of returns on wealth
 - Changes in inequality over time
- Methods

Human capital

- We have seen that household-level earnings dynamics over the life cycle matter
- Where do earnings and wages come from?

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- Where do earnings and wages come from?
- Jointly modeling human capital and wealth inequality, and their evolution and interaction over the life cycle is crucial

Health

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- Study the evolution of health and its effects over the life cycle, going beyond medical expenses and LTC during retirement
De Nardi, Pashchenko, and Porappakkarm, 2016

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- Study the evolution of health and its effects over the life cycle, going beyond medical expenses and LTC during retirement
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- Modeling health accumulation:
 - How does health evolve and interacts with earnings and wealth? What are their inequality implications?

The family

- From bequests and intergenerational links to modelling the family
- **The family is an important source of both risks and insurance** Blundell, Ecksten-Saporta, Pistaferri (2016). Attanasio, Sanchez, Low (2005). Borella, De Nardi, and Yang (2016)

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- Study the role of the family in affecting inequality
 - Wage risk and labor supply of both spouses
 - Marriage and divorce risk

Rates of return on wealth

- What are the important determinants of rates of returns? Why are they different across people?
- To what extent is entrepreneurship a crucial determinant?
- Are there other determinants?

Dynamics over time

- Modelling changes in wealth inequality and their determinants over time
 - Gabaix, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2015)
 - Kaymak and Poschke (2015)
- Much more work is needed

Methods

- Introducing **several saving motives** in one model and determining their relative importance
- Thinking about the **identification** of the various saving motives

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- Introducing **several saving motives** in one model and determining their relative importance
- Thinking about the **identification** of the various saving motives
- Use **household-level data** to
 - Establish key new facts that the model needs to capture
 - Model the sources of risks that household face over their life cycle, not just cross-sectional facts