Authors, please upload your paper here.

 

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC.

 

Market Design Group Meeting

Susan Athey and Parag Pathak, Organizers

 

October 8 and 9, 2010

 

NBER, 2nd Floor Conference Room

1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, Massachusetts

 

Program

 

Friday, October 8

 

 

 

Shuttle leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER at 8:15 am and 8:30 am

 

 

8:30 am

Breakfast

 

 

8:55 am

Opening Remarks

 

 

9:00 am

Dynamic Auctions

 

 

 

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

 

Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner, Yale University

 

 

 

Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Durable Goods: Posted Prices and Fire-Sales

 

Simon Board, UC, Los Angeles

 

Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University

 

 

10:30 am

Break

 

 

10:45 am

Auction Design: Theory

 

 

 

Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders

 

Mallesh Pai, University of Pennsylvania

 

Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University

 

 

 

Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information

 

Lawrence Ausubel and Oleg Baranov, University of Maryland

 

 

12:15 pm

Lunch

 

 

1:15 pm

Design of Online Markets

 

 

 

Hidden Market Design: A Peer-to-Peer Backup Market

 

Sven Seuken and David Parkes, Harvard University

 

Denis Charles, Max Chickering, Mary Czerwinski, Kamal Jain, Sidd Puri, and Desney Tan, Microsoft

 

 

 

Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information

 

Gary Bolton, Pennsylvania State University

 

Ben Greiner, University of New South Wales

 

Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne

 

 

 

Propose with a Rose?  Signaling in Internet Dating Markets

 

Soohyung Lee, University of Maryland

 

Muriel Niederle, Stanford University and NBER

 

Hye-Rim Kim and Woo-Keum Kim, Korea Marriage Culture Institute

 

 

3:30 pm

Break

 

 

3:45 pm

Empirical Approaches in Matching Markets

 

 

 

Gaming the School Choice Mechanism

 

Yinghua He, Toulouse School of Economics

 

 

 

Aggregate Matchings

 

Federico Echenique, SangMok Lee, and Matthew Shum, California Institute of Technology

 

 

5:15 pm

Adjourn

 

 

 

Shuttle leaves NBER for Royal Sonesta Hotel at 5:15 pm

 

 

6:00 pm

Dinner, Bambara Restaurant, Hotel Marlowe, 25 Edwin Land Boulevard, Cambridge, MA

 

 

Saturday, October 9

 

 

 

Shuttle leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER at 8:15 am and 8:30 am

 

 

8:30 am

Breakfast

 

 

9:00 am

Applications of Large Matching Markets

 

 

 

Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets

 

Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University

 

Parag Pathak, MIT and NBER

 

Alvin Roth, Harvard University and NBER

 

 

 

Participation (versus Free Riding) in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange

 

Itai Ashlagi, MIT

 

Alvin Roth, Harvard University and NBER

 

 

10:30 am

Break

 

 

10:45 am

Auction Design: Applications

 

 

 

Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment

 

Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford Univeristy

 

Michael Schwarz, Yahoo! Labs

 

 

 

Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions

 

Susan Athey, Harvard University and NBER

 

Dominic Coey, Stanford University

 

Jonathan Levin, Stanford University and NBER

 

 

12:15 pm

Lunch

 

 

1:15 pm

Matching Market Design

 

 

 

Incentive Compatible Allocation and the Exchange of Discrete Resources

 

Marek Pycia, UC, Los Angeles

 

Utku Unver, Boston College

 

 

 

Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks     not to be posted

 

John Hatfield and Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University

 

Scott Kominers, Harvard University

 

Alexandru Nichifor, University of Maastricht

 

Alexander Westkamp, University of Bonn

 

 

2:45 pm

Adjourn

 

 

 

 

7 sessions, 40 minutes per paper, no discussants, 10 minutes for general discussion