

Explaining International Differences in Entrepreneurship: The Role of Individual Characteristics and Regulatory Constraints.

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Abstract

We use a micro data set that collects information across individuals, countries, and time to investigate the determinants of entrepreneurial activity in thirty-seven developed and developing nations. We focus both on individual characteristics and on countries' regulatory differences. We show that individual characteristics, such as gender, age, and status in the work force are important determinants of entrepreneurship, and we also highlight the relevance of social networks, self-assessed skills, and attitudes toward risk. Moreover, we find that regulation plays a critical role, particularly for those individuals who become entrepreneurs to pursue a business opportunity. The individual characteristics that are impacted most by regulation are those measuring working status, social network, self-assessed skills, and attitudes toward risk.

1 Introduction

The regulatory and legal environment is commonly held to be an important factor in determining a country's economic performance. Tight regulation of product and labor markets is one of the most frequently cited reason for slower growth and

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higher unemployment in Continental Europe than in the United States. Deregulation has been highly recommended to countries like Italy, France, and Germany, as well as to developing nations, to improve their economies.

One way in which the regulatory and legal environment can impact growth and employment is its effect on the rate at which new businesses are created. In fact, as suggested by the Schumpeterian approach to economic growth (Aghion and Howitt 1997), new entrepreneurial activities play a vital part in the process of creative destruction that fosters innovation, employment, and growth. While a burgeoning empirical literature has studied the influence of regulation of product and labor markets on GDP growth, TFP, investment and employment using macro data,¹ little is known about how a country's regulatory and legal environment affect individuals' decisions to engage in new entrepreneurial activity.

In our paper, we tackle this question using micro data. We study the effect of regulation on entrepreneurship in a broad sample of countries using a novel data set: the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). There are several advantages in using data from GEM. First, we can rely on cross-national harmonized data on entrepreneurship for about 180,000 individuals in thirty-seven developed and developing nations. This is the only dataset that allows researchers to compare the level of business creation and its determinants at the micro level across countries. Second, we can identify different types of entrepreneurs: those who enter entrepreneurship to pursue a business opportunity and those whose entrepreneurial activity is simply remedial, i.e., they could not find a better alternative. This distinction is important in that it allows us to perform an economic analysis of entrepreneurship that has not been possible in previous work. Third, we have information on a wide-ranging set of individual characteristics, including business skills, fear of failure, and social networks. Thus, we can account for a large set of potential determinants of entrepreneurship across countries. To be able to examine the impact of regulation on entrepreneurial activity, we merge data from GEM with data on measures of regulation in the product markets, the labor markets, and the legal system.

There are relatively few studies that investigate the factors affecting individual decisions to engage in new entrepreneurial activity in a broad sample of countries; most of the literature uses micro data from one particular country, the United States in the majority of the cases. Also, with the exception of Djankov et al. (2005), (2006a), and (2006b) who investigate the role of a broad set of macro and micro variables on entrepreneurship in Russia and China, empirical research has focused on a limited number of individual characteristics.² Moreover, while the literature

¹A non-exhaustive list of papers includes: Alesina et al. (2005), Bassanini and Ernst (2002), Bayoumi et al. (2004), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Fiori et al. (2007), Loayza et al. (2004), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).

²See, for example, the papers by Blanchflower ((2000) and (2004)), Blanchflower, Oswald, and

has focused on tax policy and liquidity constraints (see, for example, the work by Djankov et al. (2007), Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Guiso et al. (2004), Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and (2008)),³ our paper looks at other types of regulation, such as that of the product and labor market regulation and of contract enforcement. In this respect, our paper relates to the work of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006), Desai et al. (2003), Klapper et al. (2006), and Guiso and Schivardi (2006) who investigate the role of regulation in product markets on industries' entry rates and on several other firms' characteristics using firms' level data from developed and transitional countries.

Views about regulation vary widely in economic theory. According to public choice theory, regulation is socially inefficient and exists either because industry incumbents are able to lobby government officials to pass laws that grant them rents or because politicians use regulation to extract rents for their own benefit. Hence, regulation is a burden for new and existing firms. The public interest theory of regulation proposes an opposing view: regulation exists to cure market failures; hence, heavier regulation should lead to socially superior outcomes.⁴ More generally, regulation can foster or hinder entrepreneurial activity depending on the dimension of regulation one considers. In our empirical work, we consider three broad areas of regulation: regulation of entry, regulation of contract enforcement and regulation of labor. For each area, one can envision channels through which regulation affects entrepreneurship in potentially opposite directions. For example, as Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) show, entry regulation can delay the introduction of new product varieties in industries that experience expansionary global demand or technology shocks. Hence, the rate at which firms enter these particular industries is lower in countries that regulate entry more extensively. Second, credit constraints can bind a larger fraction of would-be entrepreneurs in countries where it is more expensive to comply with entry regulation. As a result, individuals who would like to start a new business are prevented from doing so by credit constraints. This is more likely to occur in less financially developed countries.⁵ Finally, as Klapper et al. (2006) discuss, entry regulation that protects investors enhances access to credit for would-be entrepreneurs. In this case, entry regulation increases entry rates

Stutzer (2001), and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), and the review in Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and (2008).

³See also Alfaro and Charlton (2007) for the effects of international financial integration on entrepreneurship.

⁴See Djankov et al. (2002) for an extensive review on the theory of regulation.

⁵See Banerjee and Newman (1994), and Desai et al. (2003) for the relation between entry costs, financial constraints and entrepreneurship. See also the work by Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) and Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and (2008) for an overview of the importance and empirical relevance of liquidity constraints.

and facilitates entrepreneurship. Similarly, both contract enforcement regulation, which affects the efficiency and the functioning of the legal system, and the regulation of labor markets can have opposite effects on the individual decision to start a new business (see, for example, Djankov et al. (2003), Desai et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (1998) and (2000)). Thus, whether regulation has a beneficial or detrimental effect on entrepreneurship is ultimately an empirical question; the specific goal of our empirical work is to understand whether entrepreneurship flourishes in more or in less regulated environments.

Consistent with the public choice model, we find that regulation acts as a detriment to entrepreneurship, particularly for those individuals who become entrepreneurs to pursue a business opportunity. In our empirical analysis, we estimate the effect of regulation via its impact on individual characteristics. Regulation impacts the most social network, business skills, attitudes toward risk, and working status. Specifically, regulation attenuates the effect of social networks, business skills, and working status on entrepreneurship while it strengthens the impact of attitudes toward risk. We find also that several individual characteristics—gender, age, and education—are important determinants of entrepreneurship, though their effects differ across types of entrepreneurship. For example, the estimates of education are positive and statistically significant for individuals who become entrepreneurs to pursue a business opportunity, while they are negative and statistically significant for those whose entrepreneurial activity is simply remedial. Finally, we provide ample evidence that our findings are robust to a variety of extensions and robustness checks. In particular, our results are virtually unchanged when we instrument countries' regulatory indicators with countries' legal origins to account for the potential endogeneity of regulation.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology and our results. The last section concludes.

2 Data

This section describes the data we employ in the empirical analysis. We begin by discussing the micro survey data. In section 2.2 we illustrate the institutional and regulatory data, and in section 2.3 we show some descriptive statistics on the relationship among entrepreneurship, personal characteristics (such as age, sex, and education), and countries' regulatory environments. We then perform an econometric analysis of the effect of regulation on different measures of entrepreneurship and several robustness checks.

2.1 GEM micro survey data

We use micro survey data collected by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a research program started in 1998 that annually collects cross-national harmonized data on entrepreneurship. Each year the project surveys (i) either by phone or face-to-face interviews a sample of at least 2,000 randomly selected individuals in each country (the Adult Population Survey), and (ii) an average of 35 national experts in each country, using face-to-face interviews and self-administered questionnaires (Expert Questionnaire Data). A coordination team at London Business School supervises the contracts to survey vendors, receives the data, checks all data files for inconsistencies, harmonizes the entire dataset, and generates new variables.⁶

In this paper, we use data from the Adult Population Surveys of 2001 and 2002. These are the most recent surveys available to researchers who are not directly involved in the GEM project and include information both on individuals' decisions to engage in entrepreneurial activity and on individuals' motivations to start a new business. One advantage of using these data is also that the definitions of variables and the methodology used in collecting the data are consistent between the two years. Countries included in our sample are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States.⁷ The total number of observations in our sample is 186,470.⁸

2.1.1 Measures of entrepreneurial activity and individual characteristics data

Our variable of interest is total entrepreneurial activity (*TEA*), which can be further split into total opportunity entrepreneurial activity (*TEAOPP*) and total remedial entrepreneurial activity (*TEANEC*). *TEA* is an indicator variable equal to one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm; it is equal to zero otherwise. *TEAOPP* is an indicator variable equal

⁶See Reynolds et al. (2005) for more information on the GEM project and on the data collection process.

⁷Adult Population Surveys have been conducted also in Iceland in 2001 and 2002. We exclude Iceland from our sample because regulatory variables for most of the indices we use are not available for this country. Including Iceland in the regressions in which we exclude the regulatory variables does not change the results.

⁸The data we use is unweighted. However, the difference between weighted and unweighted statistics and weighted and unweighted regressions is very small. Results using the weighted data is available upon request.

to one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity; it is equal to zero otherwise (opportunity entrepreneurs hereafter). *TEANEC* is an indicator variable equal to one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work; it is equal to zero otherwise (remedial or necessity entrepreneurs hereafter).⁹

Individuals starting a new business are individuals who (i) alone or with others are currently trying to start a new business, including any type of self-employment, or (ii) alone or with others are trying to start a new business or a new venture together with their employer as an effort that is part of their normal work, and who (a) have been active in the past 12 months in trying to start the new business, (b) expect to own part of it, and (c) had not paid salaries and wages to anybody, including the owner/managers, for more than 3 months. Individuals who are owners and managers of a young firm are individuals who, alone or with others, are the owners of a company they help manage, provided that the company has been paying salaries and wages for no more than 42 months.¹⁰ Thus, our focus is on firms at the initial planning or inception stage. Our data represents the potential supply of entrepreneurs rather than the actual rate of entrepreneurship.¹¹ This is a specific definition of entrepreneur that differs from what other papers have used so far (see Blanchflower (2004), Evans and Jovanovic (1989) Hurst and Lusardi (2004), Gentry and Hubbard (2000)), but it is appropriate given the focus of this paper.

These data present several advantages. First, we can concentrate on the start-up phase and on the first few years of a new business, rather than on well-established firms that have been active for many years and for which, for example, the regulatory environment can have different effects. Second, we can distinguish between different types of entrepreneurs, i.e., those individuals involved in entrepreneurship to take advantage of a business opportunity as opposed to those individuals for whom entrepreneurship is a remedial activity. This distinction is not available in many previous studies on entrepreneurship, but it can be particularly useful in studying the impact of individual characteristics and countries' institutional and regulatory differences on the creation of new businesses. Moreover, it can be useful in studying public policy related to entrepreneurship.

Table 1 reports the number of observations for each country in the sample

⁹We will use the terms remedial entrepreneurs and necessity entrepreneurs interchangeably.

¹⁰Appendix II reports the questionnaires' questions that the GEM coordination team uses to generate the variables *TEA*, *TEAOPP*, *TEANEC*. The exact methodology is based on procedures previously used in the US Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics and it is described in detail in the 2001 and 2002 Adult Population Surveys' data documentation and in Reynolds et al. (2005).

¹¹An additional reason to consider both the nascent and the early-stage entrepreneurs is that the size of those two groups can be quite small, particularly in some European countries.

(column 1); the mean and standard deviation of the variables *TEA*, *TEAOPP*, *TEANEC* (columns 2-7); and the ratio of the variables *TEANEC/TEAOPP* (column 8) for all countries in our sample and for different groups of countries. We group countries by income groups and by geographic regions using the World Bank classification, and by legal origins following the classification in Djankov et al. (2003). We also compute statistics for countries belonging to the European Union.¹² On average, in the entire sample, the percentage of individuals participating in entrepreneurial activity is 6.8%. Among them about 35% start a new business or are managers/owners of a young firm because other employment options are not available or not appealing, while the rest participate in entrepreneurial activities to exploit a perceived business opportunity. The average entrepreneurship rate is much higher in low and middle-low income countries than in high-income countries; with rates of 14%, and 5.7% respectively. However, the type of entrepreneurial activities undertaken in these countries is rather different: in poor countries more than 2/3 of individuals engage in remedial entrepreneurial activities, while this type of entrepreneurship drops to 22.8% in high-income countries (see also figure 1). Total entrepreneurial activity is highest in Latin America (14.04%), followed by countries in the East Asia and Pacific region (9.1%), while countries belonging to the European Union (EU) have the lowest rate of entrepreneurial activity (4.67%). However, as shown in figure 1, the ratio of remedial to opportunity entrepreneurial activity is much higher in Latin American than in the Organisation for Economics Co-operation and Development (OECD) and EU countries.

Entrepreneurial activity also varies with a nation's legal origin. While in countries with English (common law) legal origin and in countries with French (civil law) legal origin, the percentage of individuals engaging in any type of entrepreneurial activity is almost identical (7.22% and 7.62% respectively), individual motivation to start a new business or to be the manager/owner of a young firm varies. On average, 5.4% of people become entrepreneurs to take advantage of a business opportunity in countries with English legal origin, while 4.7% do so in countries with French legal origin, and the respective ratio *TEANEC/TEAOPP* goes from 28.1% to 51.4%.

Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviation of the regressors we use in the empirical analysis in all countries in the sample (column 1), in low-income (column

¹²The World Bank classifies economies in income groups using the gross national income per capita, calculated with the World Bank Atlas method. The most recent classification uses data for 2005, (see [www.worldbank.org /data/countryclass /classgroups.htm](http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm)). The groups are: low income, \$875 or less; lower middle income, \$876-3,465; upper middle income \$3,466-10,725; and high income \$10,726 or more. Low and middle income economies are also classified by geographical regions. We augmented this classification by including in the various groups the high income countries. See Appendix I for the exact classification of countries in each group.

2), middle-low-income countries (column 3), upper-middle-income countries (column 4) and high-income countries (column 5). We use a variety of demographic variables that are also used in many other studies: age, gender, education, working status, and income. Moreover, we use several new and important variables to explain entrepreneurship: self-assessed business skills, attitude toward risk, and social networks. We measure self-assessed business skills (*Skills*) with a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual answers that he has the knowledge, skill, and experience to start a new business; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise. Fear of failure, a proxy for individual attitudes toward risk, is measured by the dummy variable *Fearfail*, which is equal to 1 for individuals who answer that fear of failing prevents them from starting a new business; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise. Finally, we measure social networks with the dummy variable *Knowent*, which is equal to 1 if an individual knows someone who has started a business in the past two years and equal to 0 otherwise. Although we are aware that these variables may not be truly exogenous with respect to the choice of starting a new business, they can be critical indicators of the impediments or the stimulators of business creation and they can help explaining the wide heterogeneity we see among business owners. Given our focus on regulation, we will not account in this version for the potential endogeneity of these variables. Appendix I includes the precise definition of all the variables.

2.1.2 Reliability of GEM data

GEM data have not been used extensively by academics yet and not much is known about these data. Therefore, in this paper we first provide an overview of the quality of the data. First, we compare the GEM data with data from other surveys and we review the comparisons of GEM data performed by other researchers (Reynolds et al. (2005) and Acs et al. (2007)). Second, throughout the paper we show that the descriptive statistics on entrepreneurship in many countries are consistent with the results reported in other studies on entrepreneurship. Third, for both the descriptive statistics and the econometric analysis, we check the robustness of our results across countries and/or groups of countries and across survey's years.

One data set that reports information similar to GEM is the Flash Eurobarometer Survey on Entrepreneurship collected by the European Commission.¹³ While not all countries covered in GEM are available in the Flash Eurobarometer, we can compare data of the countries common to both data sets, given that questions are rather similar between the two surveys. Table 3 shows results for individuals living in countries that are surveyed both in GEM in 2001 and/or 2002 (column 1) and

¹³See Appendix III for a description of the variables computed using data from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys.

in the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys in 2002, 2003, and/or 2004 (column 2).¹⁴ For each variable, we report the mean, its standard error, and the number of observations. The percentage of individuals involved in entrepreneurial activity is very similar in the two datasets (5.30% when we use GEM data and 5.45% when we use data from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Entrepreneurship), regardless of the significantly smaller sample surveyed by the European Commission, which is about 1/3 the size of the GEM sample. The percentage of individuals pursuing a business opportunity is equal to 4.06% in column 1 and 3.39% in column 2, while the percentage of individuals for whom entrepreneurship is a remedial activity is lower in the GEM dataset (0.92% in column 1) than in the Flash Eurobarometer Survey data (1.13% in column 2). Note, however, that the sample size shrinks further in column 2 because information on individual motivation to participate in entrepreneurship is available only in the 2004 data collected by the European Commission.

We can also compare demographic characteristics, such as age, the percentage of males, the percentage of individuals who work, and the percentage of individuals who think that fear of failing could prevent them from starting a new business. Results in Table 3 are very close regardless of the dataset used for all variables both when we look at the entire sample and when we average the characteristics among individuals who participate in entrepreneurial activities and among those who do not. The only exception is the variable measuring the percentage of individuals who think that fear of failing could prevent them from starting a new business. The average value is higher when we use data from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys (47.5%) than when we use GEM data (33.3%). However, the difference between the percentage of individuals who think that fear of failing could prevent them from starting a new business and are not entrepreneurs and those with the same beliefs but who are involved in an entrepreneurial activity is much closer in the two datasets: using GEM data, this difference is equal to 15.3% (34.16-18.85); using data from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys it is equal to 13.2%.

Reynolds et al. (2005) compare GEM national annual new firms' estimates and new firms' birth rates with data from the Official New Firm Census and data from the European Commission Report. They show that the *TEA* index and other entrepreneurship indices computed using GEM data are reliable and capture the creation of new firms on a scale comparable to that resulting from the use of other national administrative datasets.

Finally, Acs et al. (2007) compare the GEM data with the World Bank Group

¹⁴Countries surveyed in both databases are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.

Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES) dataset, which collected data on formal business registrations of limited liability corporations (LLCs) in 84 countries from 2003 to 2005. Specifically, Acs et al. (2007) consider separately the two components of the *TEA* index defined above (i.e., they distinguish individuals who are starting a new business —nascent entrepreneurs— from individuals who are owners and managers of a young firm —baby entrepreneurs) and calculate the spread between the nascent and baby entrepreneurship rates in GEM (defined as the proportion of the adult population in each country who engages in nascent or baby entrepreneurship) and the percentage of individuals who have started a formal corporation. The authors report a number of differences in the two datasets: (i) GEM data show higher levels of early-stage entrepreneurship in developing economies than WBGES data; (ii) WBGES business entry data tend to be higher than GEM data for developed countries; (iii) a significantly negative relationship is found between administrative barriers to starting a business and entrepreneurship when WBGES data are used but not when GEM data are used. Several explanations are given for such differences, which, in our view, are very important in clarifying the differences among the two datasets, but in no way suggest that one dataset is of better quality than the other. First, Acs et al. (2007) point out that, while WBGES only considers businesses that legally register as limited liability corporations, GEM data consider a larger set of entrepreneurial activities: from businesses that operate in the formal sector but opt for a different legal status than an LLC, to businesses that can be part of the informal economy, to entrepreneurial initiatives that are at the very early stage and, hence, can potentially become businesses operating in the formal sector but do not actually yet do so. Such a range of possibilities is likely to be more relevant for developing than developed countries given the extent of the informal sector. Second, GEM measures the number of individual entrepreneurs, while WBGES considers the number of businesses. Hence, GEM can overlook the number of individuals who are involved in multiple new businesses. Third, the definition of baby entrepreneurs in GEM considers data for 42 months of activity, not for 12 months, but when one estimates the annual rate for the United States they are of comparable magnitude of those recorded by the U.S. Census. Fourth, especially in developed countries, firms may register several limited liability corporations to limit liability for different lines of businesses, helping to explain why for some countries entrepreneurship rates computed using the World Bank data are higher than rates computed with GEM data.

We would like to offer an additional explanation. GEM data allow a distinction between remedial and opportunity entrepreneurship. As we have discussed in section 2.1.1, remedial entrepreneurship is more widespread in developing than in developed countries, and remedial entrepreneurs are less likely to register a business as an LLC. This can offer another reason for higher entrepreneurship rates

in developing countries when rates are computed using GEM rather than WBGES data. Finally, relative to the existence of a negative relationship between entry barriers and entrepreneurship rates, results below show that a negative and statistically significant relationship can be found when one uses data from GEM. However, it is important to consider opportunity and remedial entrepreneurship separately (see section 2.3), and/or to estimate the effect of regulation on entrepreneurship using micro rather than macro data. This allows to control for other possible institutional and policy differences that exist among various developed and developing countries (see section 3).

To further examine the quality of the data, we have estimated the probability of starting a business as a function of a set of demographic characteristics that are available in the data (age, gender, employment status, education, income, etc.), country by country. For the subset of countries for which we have data in both 2001 and 2002, we also performed regressions by country and by year. For brevity, results are not reported but are summarized below. We have first compared the estimates using GEM data for the United States with estimates from other studies on entrepreneurship (see Lusardi and Hurst (2008)). Estimates are very similar for the United States and for other countries as well, although some demographic characteristics that are expected to affect entrepreneurship are not statistically significant. Three countries: Russia, Poland and Slovenia, display results that are different than other countries but, as reported in the robustness check at the end of the paper, the inclusion or exclusion of these countries does not affect our main estimates. France also displays different estimates between 2001 and 2002, although we cannot exclude the possibility that they are genuine changes due to differences in macroeconomic conditions between years.

2.2 Regulatory data

To perform our empirical work, we merge the micro survey data described above with data on countries' institutional and regulatory environments. We follow the work of Loayza et al. (2004), and construct indices on several aspects of market regulation.¹⁵ In particular, we focus on entry regulatory indicators for the product markets, regulation of contract enforcement (indicators measuring the efficiency of the justice system in resolving legal disputes), and labor market regulation. While these aspects of regulation do not cover all regulatory and economic policies (e.g., taxes, tariff and non-tariff barriers, safety and environmental standards) that can

¹⁵We construct our indices, rather than using the ones provided to us by Loayza et al. (2004), because regulatory variables for eleven countries included in our sample are not available in Loayza et al. (2004).

influence individual entrepreneurial behavior, they include some of the most important regulatory constraints across countries.

The data we use are from the following sources: Doing Business Database (the World Bank Group), Index of Economic Freedom (the Heritage Foundation), International Country Risk Guide (the PRS Group), and Djankov et al. (2004). Data from Doing Business refer to the year 2003; data from Djankov et al. (2004) refer to the year 1997, all other data are averages of all the available data points till the year 2000. Appendix I lists the exact source, time period, and definition of each regulatory variable used in the empirical analysis.

Because our indices of regulation combines several different variables, we standardize each variables available in the databases using the formula $\frac{X_i - X_{\min}}{X_{\max} - X_{\min}}$ when higher values of the variable X indicate heavier regulation and the formula $\frac{X_{\max} - X_i}{X_{\max} - X_{\min}}$ when lower values of the variable X indicate heavier regulation. Hence, each standardized regulatory variable is simply an index ranging from 0 to 1, increasing with the amount of regulation. For each area of regulation, we construct a synthetic indicator of the tightness of regulation. Each synthetic indicator is the average of the standardized indices measuring regulation of the relevant area. The indices are described below.

Entry: The entry index measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business. It is the average of the number of procedures that are officially required to start and operate a new business, the time and cost needed to complete such procedures, and a composite index measuring not only how easy/difficult it is to operate a business but also the degree of corruption in the government and whether or not regulation is applied uniformly to all businesses.

Contract: The contract enforcement index is an indicator that measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes. It is the average of the number of procedures required to solve a dispute and of an index measuring the ability of the government to operate without dramatic changes in policy or interruptions of its services.

Labor: The labor index measures the difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. It is the average of indices measuring the difficulty in hiring and firing workers, the rigidity of labor contracts, and the percentage of the workforce affiliated with labor unions.

These indices are exactly those used by Loyaza et al. (2004) although for a larger set of countries. Use of these indices allows us to compare our results to previous studies and to capture many different aspects of regulation in the three areas we consider. However, we also perform a set of regressions to examine the effect of each individual component. We report the results in section 3.6.

Table 4 reports the value of the synthetic indices of regulation for all countries

in the total sample and for groups of countries. Note that the level of regulation is negatively related to countries' income: countries in the low-and middle-low income groups exhibit levels of regulation that are up to three times larger than the level of regulation in high-income countries. The ranking among groups of countries is quite similar for the entry and contract enforcement indices. The index measuring the regulation of labor shows that countries in the East Asia and Pacific region have the lowest level of regulation, while the level of regulation in OECD countries, and, in particular, in countries belonging to the European Union, is very close to that of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.

Consistent with the results of several papers,¹⁶ when we group countries by their legal origin, countries with English legal origin are among those with the lowest levels of regulation, while countries with French and Socialist legal origin are heavily regulated.

Table 5 shows the correlation among the regulatory indices. There is a strong positive correlation between the *Entry* and *Contract* indices, while the correlation of these two indices and the *Labor* index is lower. When we look at the correlation among the components of each synthetic index, in all areas but the labor market, we see a positive correlation that ranges from a minimum of 38% to a maximum of 70%. For the labor market index, we observe a very low correlation between indicators of hiring and firing costs and union density, and, in one case, the correlation is negative. Finally, given that we have a different sample, we computed the correlation of the indices we constructed with the ones of Loyaza et al. (2004). The correlation is equal to 0.97 for the entry regulatory index, 0.80 for the contract enforcement regulation index, and 0.74 for the labor market regulation index. Hence, even though our sample of countries differs from that of Loyaza et al. (2004), our indices are very similar.

2.3 Descriptive statistics

We start the empirical analysis with some descriptive statistics. We first discuss the relationship between entrepreneurship and personal characteristics (Table 6); we, then, turn to the relationship between entrepreneurship and countries' regulatory environments.

In Table 6, columns 1-3, we compute average values of the individual characteristics described in Table 2 separately for individuals who engage in entrepreneurial activity ($TEA = 1$) and for those who do not ($TEA = 0$). We also test for the equality of means between entrepreneur's types. Entrepreneurs' average age is

¹⁶A non-exhaustive list of papers relating countries' legal origins and their regulatory environment includes Djankov et al. (2002), Djankov et al. (2003), Djankov et al. (2004), and Klapper et al. (2006).

lower by approximately 5 years than the average age of non-entrepreneurs (i.e., individuals who are not operating a new or young firm) and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The percentage of males among entrepreneurs is higher than among non-entrepreneurs as is the percentage of working individuals (83% of nascent entrepreneurs are working at the time of the interview, while only 55.1% of non-entrepreneurs are working). As far as individual education is concerned, the largest difference relates to the percentage of people holding a post secondary degree, about 9% greater in the sample of entrepreneurs. Similarly, the percentage of high-income people starting a new business is 12% greater than that of people in the same income category who are not engaging in entrepreneurial activity. Finally, the percentage of individuals who know someone who has started a business in the recent past and the percentage of individuals who think that they have the knowledge, skills, and experience to start a new business is significantly higher among entrepreneurs than among non-entrepreneurs. The opposite occurs for the percentage of individuals who think that fear of failing could prevent them from starting a new business. Note that in all cases, we can reject the null hypothesis of the test on the equality of the means of the two groups of individuals at the 5% level of significance.

We have conducted the same type of analysis comparing characteristics of different types of entrepreneurs. Results are in Table 6, columns 4-6. On average, opportunity entrepreneurs are slightly younger than remedial entrepreneurs. Moreover, opportunity entrepreneurs are more likely to be male, to have a higher level of education and income, and to have more confidence in their skills and abilities and less fear of failure than remedial entrepreneurs. Contrary to the test results in Table 6, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the equality of means in the two groups of individuals for all variables. Means are statistically different between the two groups for variables such as the percentage of people who work, the percentage of people with more than a secondary degree, and with low and high (but not middle) income.

Finally, we have repeated the analysis in Table 6, dividing countries by income groups and geographical areas. Results, not shown but available upon request, are qualitatively identical to those just discussed.

We now turn to a cross-country analysis of entrepreneurship and regulation. We compute the proportion of opportunity entrepreneurs (*TEAOPP*) and remedial entrepreneurs (*TEANEC*) for each country in our sample and study the univariate relationship between the proportion of entrepreneurs in each country and the level of regulation, using the three indices we discussed in section 2.2. Figures 2 and 3 show the results for the group of high-income countries and middle- and low-income countries respectively. We find a negative relationship between *TEAOPP* and all measures of regulation. Thus, higher levels of regulation are associated

with lower rates of activity to pursue a business opportunity. This is true both in the high-income country group and in the low and middle-income group, even though the magnitude of the effects differs in the two groups of countries. Findings are different for the other measure of entrepreneurial activity: *TEANEC*. We find a positive correlation between the indices of entry regulation and of contract enforcement regulation and *TEANEC*, but a negative correlation between the level of regulation of labor markets and *TEANEC*. Thus, countries with more stringent regulation of entry, less efficient judicial systems, and less regulated labor markets exhibit higher remedial entrepreneurship rates. However, due to the small number of observations at the macro level (25 for the high income group, and 12 for low, middle-low and upper-middle-income countries), the coefficients of the univariate regressions are often not statistically significant.

3 Econometric analysis

3.1 Methodology

We now turn to a more formal analysis of the effect of individual characteristics and regulation on entrepreneurship. For individual i , in country j , at time t , let us define the outcome of interest y_{ijt} , where y is one of the three measures of entrepreneurial activity: *TEA*, *TEAOPP*, *TEANEC*. We estimate the following equation for y_{ijt} :

$$y_{ijt} = \alpha_j + \beta_1 X_{ijt} + \beta_2 X_{ijt} R_j + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where α_j is a vector of country dummies, X is a vector of variables measuring individual characteristics such as age, gender, employment status, education, income, the role of social networks, business skills, and fear of failure, R captures countries' regulatory and legal environment, and γ_t is a time dummy variable. Since the dependent variable is binary, we use probit estimation and correct the standard errors by clustering them at the country level.

Because regulatory variables are country and time invariant, once we include α_j among our regressors, we can only measure the differential effect that personal characteristics have on the decision to engage in entrepreneurial activity because of cross-country differences in the regulatory and legal environment. In other words, we can only measure the effect of regulation via the interaction between countries' regulation and individual characteristics. Our sample includes many different countries whose macroeconomic and institutional characteristics (level of economic development, growth rates, level of taxation, degree of openness, just to mention a few) can be correlated both with the entrepreneurship indices and with

the regulatory variables. While we cannot separately account for each country's macroeconomic and institutional variable, we can control for countries' specific characteristics, including the level of the regulatory environment, by adding country fixed effects to our regressions.

3.2 Entrepreneurship and personal characteristics

In Table 7 we estimate the effect of individual characteristics on the indices of entrepreneurial activity *TEA*, *TEAOPP*, *TEANEC*. In columns 1-3, we exclude the variables measuring the income group to which the individual belongs. We include income dummies in columns 4-6. When we do so, the sample shrinks significantly because the income data is not available for many countries.

The variable that has the largest effect on the likelihood of an individual becoming an entrepreneur is *Skills*, a proxy for individual degree of self-confidence (or self-assessed skills and abilities). *Ceteris paribus*, when *Skills* = 1, the probability of engaging in entrepreneurship increases by more than 6% in column 1, by 4.5% in column 2, and by 1.14% in column 3.

Fear of failure, a proxy for individual attitudes toward risk is another important variable and negatively affects entrepreneurship. Note that fear of failure affects opportunity entrepreneurs and our total index of entrepreneurship, but does not affect those for whom entrepreneurship is a remedial activity. Similarly, the effect of education on entrepreneurship depends on entrepreneurial type. The coefficients of the dummy variables *Highschool* and *College*¹⁷ are both positive and statistically significant when we estimate equation (1) for *TEAOPP*, while both are negative and statistically significant for *TEANEC*. This may explain why evidence of the effect of education on entrepreneurship in the literature is rather mixed when using a measure of entrepreneurship that does not account for individual motivation to become an entrepreneur (see, for example, Blanchflower (2004)). These findings again highlight the importance of distinguishing between types of entrepreneurial activity.

Entrepreneurship is also affected by social networks. In all specifications, the coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Its magnitude differs according to entrepreneurial type: the probability of becoming involved in an entrepreneurial activity when knowing someone who has started a business increases by 2.3% for opportunity entrepreneurs and by 0.4% for remedial entrepreneurs. Other authors have found evidence of the importance of social networks and social capital on entrepreneurship (see, for example, Djankov et al.

¹⁷The dummy variable *Highschool* is equal to 1 if the individual has a high school degree and to 0 otherwise. The dummy variable *College* is equal to 1 if the individual has at least a college degree and to 0 otherwise.

(2005) and (2006), Guiso et al. (2004) and Nanda and Sorensen (2007)). Our work adds to this literature by highlighting that networks are an important factor, particularly for specific entrepreneurial types.¹⁸

Turning to the effect of variables measuring individual status in the workforce, people who do not work, students, retired and disabled individuals are less likely to become entrepreneurs than individuals who work. This is true both for remedial entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs, even though differences are again more important for the latter category of people than for the former. We also find evidence of a nonlinear effect for age: while the coefficient of the linear term is positive and statistically significant, the coefficient of the square term is negative and statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficients implies that the probability of starting a new entrepreneurial activity increases with age for individuals younger than 31 in column 1, younger than 27 in column 2, and younger than 38 in column 3, and decreases with age afterwards. Finally, men are more likely than women to pursue entrepreneurial activity; this is true both for necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs.

In columns 4-6, we control for the dummy variables *Lowestinc*, *Middleinc*, *Upperinc*. These indicators are equal to 1 if individuals' income is in the lowest, middle, or upper third income percentile of their country's income distribution, and equal to 0 otherwise. We find a non-linear relationship between the composite index *TEA* and individual income. The probability of starting a new business is higher for individuals in both the lowest and the upper income groups. This non-linearity captures the different effect income has on entrepreneurial type. For *TEAOPP*, the coefficient of the variable *Lowestinc* is not statistically significant, while that of *Upperinc* is positive and statistically significant. For *TEANEC* equation, the coefficient of the variable *Lowestinc* is positive, that of *Upperinc* is negative, and both coefficients are statistically significant. Thus, again it is crucial to be able to distinguish between individual motivations to become entrepreneurs. Also, while income is an important control, the estimates of the other variables do not change significantly when adding income dummies to the regression.¹⁹ This provides further evidence of the robustness of our estimates since the sample reduces considerably when adding income dummies.

There are other potential determinants of entrepreneurship that previous studies

¹⁸Estimating the impact of peer effect on entrepreneurship is complex and other studies were able to take account of the endogeneity of peers (see Nanda and Sorensen (2007) and their discussion on the difficulty of estimating peer effects)). Since we only have a cross section of data, we cannot address this problem in our empirical analysis.

¹⁹The coefficient of the variable *Age* in column 5 and the one of the variable *Highschool* in column 6 become insignificant. The coefficient of the variable *Fearfail* becomes significant at the 10% level in column 6.

have considered such as wealth, family background, and optimism (see, for example, Blanchflower (2004), Fairlie and Robb (2007), and Puri and Robinson (2006)). Unfortunately, we do not have information about these variables in the years under consideration and cannot account for them in our empirical work.

3.3 Entrepreneurship and regulation

We now consider the effects of regulation by interacting the synthetic indices: *Entry*, *Contract*, and *Labor* with the vector of individual characteristics. Because indices are highly correlated, we consider each regulatory index separately. Results are reported in Table 8; they refer to the specifications in which we exclude income dummies. We discuss specifications which include income dummies in section 3.7.

Columns 1-3 report the results for the regulation of entry. The parameter of interest is β_2 . Positive values of β_2 in equation (1) indicate that heavier regulation of entry reduces the effect of personal characteristics on the likelihood to engage in entrepreneurship when β_1 in equation (1) is positive and reinforces the effect of personal characteristics when β_1 is negative. For example, while the probability of engaging in entrepreneurship is higher for individuals who know someone who has started a business recently (i.e., those for whom $Knowent = 1$), in countries where entry is more heavily regulated, the effect of social network is much reduced. To evaluate its magnitude, we calculate the marginal effect due to a change in the variable $Knowent$ from 0 to 1 in two hypothetical countries: one in which the entry regulatory index is equal to 0 (the index minimum value) and one in which the index is equal to 1 (the index maximum value). Using the estimates reported in column 1, we find that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur changes from 4.8% to 1.3%. Thus, regulation curbs the positive effect of social networks on entrepreneurship. A similar effect also occurs when we distinguish opportunity entrepreneurs from necessity entrepreneurs. Consider first the former (see column 2). The probability to engage in entrepreneurship for individuals who know someone who has recently started a new business is higher by 3.1 percentage points than for individuals who do not know entrepreneurs if they live in a country in which $Entry = 0$. However, individuals who know people who are entrepreneurs have only a 1.4% higher probability to become entrepreneurs than individuals for whom $Knowent = 0$ if they live in a country in which $Entry = 1$. Hence, the positive effect of social capital on entrepreneurship is reduced by half if $Entry$ changes from 0 to 1. For necessity entrepreneurs (see column 3), the marginal effect due to a change in the variable $Knowent$ from 0 to 1 is equal to 0.7% when $Entry = 0$ and it is reduced to 0.1% when $Entry = 1$. Hence, the positive effect of social capital on entrepreneurship is almost eliminated if $Entry$ changes from 0 to 1.

Regulation also diminishes the effect of *Skills*. Individuals who report having business skills (i.e., those for whom *Skills* = 1) are less likely to engage in new entrepreneurial activity when entry regulation is more stringent. This effect is entirely driven by individuals who engage in entrepreneurship to pursue a business opportunity. In fact, the coefficient of the interaction term *Entry * Skills* is not statistically significant in column 3, but it is statistically significant at the 5% level in column 2.

Tougher entry regulation also decreases the probability of starting new entrepreneurial activity for individuals who do not work and for students, a finding that has important policy implications. Consider, for example, Italy and the United States, whose values of the entry regulation index are 0.38 and 0.14, respectively. An American who does not work faces a lower probability of engaging in entrepreneurship than an American who is employed; the estimate is -1.08% (-0.0042 - (0.047*0.14)). The same figure is much higher for Italians who do not work; it is -2.2% (-0.0042 - (0.047*0.38)). Thus, individuals who do not work are two times less likely to start a new business than individuals who do work if they live in Italy rather than in the United States. More generally, the average value in the sample of the index of entry regulation is equal to 0.32 and the standard deviation is equal to 0.17. Thus, individuals who do not work are less likely to become entrepreneurs than individuals who work by 1.9%. A one standard deviation increase in the index reduces this number to 2.8%. Finally, individuals who want to pursue a business opportunity and do not have a job are less likely to engage entrepreneurship than individuals who work by 1.3% in countries in which *Entry* = 0.32. This number becomes 0.8% if *Entry* increases by one standard deviation.

For necessity entrepreneurs who do not have a job, the probability of starting a new business is not statistically different than for those who work if there are no regulatory constraints on entry. However, if entry is constrained in their country these entrepreneurs find it more difficult to start a new business.

Our estimates are in line with the results in Klapper et al. (2006). They find that relative entry into industries with high entry in the United States is disproportionately higher in countries with low entry costs and that this effect is particularly stronger in countries with high income per capita and low corruption. Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) also find slower entry in expanding industries in countries where it takes longer to comply with procedures required to open a new firm.

Our other indices of regulation show similar results. When we interact personal characteristics with the *Contract* index, which measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes, we find estimates similar to those reported in column 1 (see columns 4-6). Thus, contract regulation can also curb the effects of skills, social network, and labor force status. A country's legal environment also plays an important role in individual decisions to engage in

entrepreneurship, and this is especially true for those individuals who wish to pursue a business opportunity. Using data from Eastern and Western European firms, Desai et al. (2003) also find that industries' entry rates are higher in countries in which courts are fair and impartial, even though this result seems to be driven by Eastern and Central European countries, not by Western European ones. The economic magnitude is also relevant. For example, while the probability of engaging in entrepreneurship is higher for individuals who know someone who has started a business recently (i.e., those for whom *Knowent* = 1), in countries where the legal system is more regulated, the effect of social networks is much reduced. We calculate again the marginal effect due to a change in the variable *Knowent* from 0 to 1 in two hypothetical countries: one in which the contract regulatory index is equal to 0 (the index minimum value) and one in which the index is equal to 1 (the index maximum value). Using the estimates reported in column 4, we find that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur changes by 3.1%. Thus, this different type of regulation also curbs the positive effect of social networks on entrepreneurship.

When we investigate the effect of labor market regulation on the determinants of entrepreneurship (see columns 7-9), we find an effect of regulation on other important variables. For example, labor market regulation has an effect on *Age*, particularly among the young. If labor markets were completely unregulated (i.e., *Labor* = 0), the probability of starting a new entrepreneurial activity would increase with age for individuals younger than 40 in column 7, younger than 38 in column 8, and younger than 44 in column 9, and would decrease as age increases beyond these thresholds. On the other hand, in countries in which labor markets are regulated, the age beyond which the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurship decreases also falls. For example, if the labor market index is set equal to its mean value in the sample, 0.36 (or to the value of the index in Belgium, where *Labor* = 0.356), the probability of starting a new entrepreneurial activity increases with age for individuals younger than 31 in column 7, younger than 28 in column 8, and younger than 38 in column 9. A one standard deviation increase of the index, equal to 0.17 (which brings *Labor* slightly above the value for Sweden) reduces the age beyond which the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurship decreases with age to 27, 23, and 35 years. Finally, note that the interaction term *Fearfail* * *Labor* is statistically significant for every measures of entrepreneurship we use, while it was not in the other two indices of regulation. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, in countries that heavily regulates the labor market individuals' risk taking attitudes seem to play a more important role than in countries with more extensive regulation of other areas.

3.4 Instrumental variables estimation

A potential problem of the estimates reported above is that the underlying variables that may be driving entrepreneurship in a country (e.g., an educational system that encourages individual responsibility or an extensive welfare system that insulates against unemployment and health risks) may also be driving the regulatory system in that country. Thus, the relationship between entrepreneurship and regulation may simply be the result of these omitted variables. Alternatively, it could be that the desire to achieve a certain level of entrepreneurship in a country shapes regulation in that country. In other words, the causality may go from entrepreneurship to regulation rather than the other way around. This problem may be less relevant in our empirical work since we only look at the interaction of regulation with individual characteristics rather than simply looking at the effect of regulation on entrepreneurship. However, in this section, we tackle these problems by using instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Our instruments need to be correlated with regulation but uncorrelated with the error term.

We use countries' legal origins as instruments. Several papers have shown that the current regulatory environments correlate with each country's legal tradition; for example, countries with English legal origin are among those with the lowest level of regulation, while countries with French and Socialist legal origin are more heavily regulated.²⁰ Because countries' legal origins have been transplanted through conquest and colonization that occurred centuries ago, legal origin is unlikely to be correlated with omitted variables that influence individuals' decisions to begin a new entrepreneurial activity in 2001.

We follow the existing literature and group countries with English (common law), French (civil law), Socialist, German and Scandinavian legal origins. We estimate equation (1) instrumenting the variable R with the indicator variables that measure countries' legal origins. Results are reported in Table 9. Note that coefficient estimates are included in Table 9, while marginal effects are reported in all the other tables of the paper; hence, the numbers in the tables are not directly comparable. The estimates continue to confirm the results reported in Table 8. In some cases, regulation has an even more powerful effect. For example, in the IV estimates using TEA and $TEAOPP$ as dependent variables, the coefficients of the interaction terms between the variable $Fearfail$ and the regulatory indicators $Entry$ and $Contract$ are larger and more significant. Regulation reduces the beneficial effect of social networks on individual likelihood to engage in entrepreneurship, but this effect strengthens when we instrument the regulatory indicators with countries' legal origins. Finally, note that for the specifications for TEA and $TEAOPP$, the p-value of a Wald test on the exogeneity of the regressors does not

²⁰See section 2.2 and footnote 16.

reject exogeneity. Thus, our estimates in Table 8 do not seem to be biased due a potential endogeneity problem.

3.5 Experts survey data

While our indices of regulation measure important features of the structure of different countries and are similar to what has been used so far in the literature, there may be other important impediments to entrepreneurship that are not captured by our indices. Another novelty of the GEM data is that it asks a small set of "national experts" to evaluate the regulatory environments in their own countries (see the exact wording of the questions in the appendix IV). These data are collected from about 35 national experts in each country using face-to-face interviews and self-administered questionnaires. Given that we have more than one measure of regulation in this case, we can estimate the effect of regulation directly in addition to estimating its effect via individual characteristics.

Using the 2001 Expert Survey database, we estimate the following equation:²¹

$$y_{ijt} = a_j + \tilde{\beta}_1 \tilde{X}_{ijt} + \tilde{\beta}_2 \tilde{X}_{ijt} \widetilde{R}_{ijt} + \tilde{\beta}_3 \widetilde{R}_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (2)$$

where, for individual i , in country j , at time t , y_{ijt} is equal to the indicator variable TEA , a_j is a vector of country dummies, \tilde{X} is a vector of variables measuring individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, the role of social networks, self-assessed business skills and fear of failure, and \widetilde{R} captures experts' perceived levels of regulation in their respective countries.

Estimates are reported in Table 10. We do not find evidence of a direct effect of regulation on the propensity to start a new business. The coefficient $\tilde{\beta}_3$ is never statistically significant. This may simply reflect the fact that there is not enough variation in the variables \widetilde{R}_{ijt} within each country. Similar to the estimates in Table 8, the coefficient $\tilde{\beta}_2$ is statistically significant and works in the same way as β_2 . For example, we find that the higher the perceived cost of entry regulation, the lower the positive effect of social capital is on entrepreneurship (the interaction term between the variable $Knowent$ and the indicator measuring the cost of entry regulation is negative and statistically significant). Similarly, individuals who have had some previous experience in entrepreneurship are less likely to start a new business activity if they live in more regulated economies.

3.6 Additional robustness checks

Our results are robust to a variety of additional specification changes. In what follows, we discuss several extensions of our models. For brevity, results are not

²¹We can only use data for 2001 because data for 2002 are not yet complete.

reported but are available upon request.

First, we interact the components of each synthetic index of regulation with the vector of individual characteristics. Our goal is to investigate whether a particular aspect of regulation, in each of the areas we consider, is driving the results reported in Table 8. For all of the synthetic indicators, we find that the components of the indices generally have similar effects on entrepreneurship even though some components have a larger and more significant effect through some personal characteristics' variables than through others.

Second, we include an income variable (aggregated in broad groups) among the regressors in Table 8. Our results are, overall, the same. In the regressions in which we interact the indices of entry and contract enforcement regulation with personal characteristics we find evidence that regulation has an effect through the age variable along the direction we discussed in section 3.3 regarding the regressions on the regulation of labor markets. However, the coefficients of the interaction terms between all the regulatory indices and *Skills* are not statistically significant.

Third, we estimate the specifications in Table 8, separately, for 2001 and 2002 data for the sample of countries for which we have data for both years.²² We find no evidence of relevant changes between regressions for 2001 and 2002 and results in Table 8.

Fourth, we check that our results do not hinge on data for a particular country. We exclude one country at a time and reestimate the specification used in Table 8. Results are qualitatively the same, even when excluding Russia, Poland and Slovenia, whose data may be of poorer quality, as discussed above.

Finally, we estimate equation (1) for subgroups of countries. Specifically, we consider the specifications in Table 8 for high-income countries and the other countries (i.e.: countries with low, middle-low and upper middle income countries). We find a stronger effect of labor regulation in the wealthier countries than in the others, but in general, results do not change substantially.

4 Conclusions

In this paper, we use GEM data from thirty-seven countries to estimate the differential effect that individual characteristics, such as work status, education, and attitudes toward risk, have on entrepreneurship because of cross-country differences in regulatory constraints. Using our data set, we can distinguish between different types of entrepreneurs, i.e., those who enter entrepreneurship to pursue a business opportunity versus those who enter entrepreneurship because they could

²²Data for Portugal are not available in 2002. Data for Switzerland, Chile, Thailand, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Croatia, and Slovenia are not available in 2001.

not find better work. We also use different measures of regulation, from measures of regulation in the product markets to regulation in the labor markets and the legal system.

We find evidence that regulation plays a critical role in the individual decision to start a new business, particularly for individuals who engage in an entrepreneurial activity to pursue a business opportunity. The variables through which regulation affects entrepreneurship are social network, working status, business skills, and attitudes toward risk. Our results are robust to a variety of robustness checks.

This is one of the few studies that performs a micro analysis of the determinants of entrepreneurship and the effect of regulation in a large cross section of countries. While our approach does not allow us to measure the total effect of regulation, we can measure the effect of regulation on individual characteristics, which has important implications for public policy.

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Appendix I: Variables used in the empirical analysis

Entrepreneurship indices - source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)

- *TEA* = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise.
- *TEAOPP* = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise.
- *TEANEC* = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise.

Individuals' characteristics - source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)

- *AGE* = age of the individual at the time of the interview.
- *MALE* = 1 if male, 0 otherwise.
- *WORKING* = 1 if individual works at the time of the interview, 0 otherwise.
- *STUDENTS* = 1 if individual is a student at the time of the interview, 0 otherwise.
- *RETIRED DISABLES* = 1 if individual is retired or disable at the time of the interview, 0 otherwise.
- *NOTWORKING* = 1 if individual does not work (and he is not a student, nor a retired or disable individual) at the time of the interview, 0 otherwise.
- *HIGHSCHOOL* = 1 if individual has a high school degree, 0 otherwise.
- *COLLEGE* = 1 if individual has at least a college degree, 0 otherwise.
- *KNOWENT* = 1 if the person knows someone who has started a business in the recent past, 0 otherwise.
- *SKILLS* = 1 if the person thinks she has the knowledge, skills and experience to start a new business, 0 otherwise.
- *FEARFAIL* = 1 if the person's fear of failing can prevent her to start a new business, 0 otherwise.

- *LOWESTINC* = 1 if individuals report that their income is in the lowest 33rd income percentile of their country's income distribution, 0 otherwise.
- *UPPERINC* = 1 if individuals report that their income is in the upper 33rd income percentile of their country's income distribution, 0 otherwise.

Regulatory Indices - various sources

- *ENTRY* measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; $ENTRY = (\text{procedures} + \text{time} + \text{cost} + \text{regulation (IEF)})/4$.
- *PROCEDURES* = number of procedures that are officially required to start and operate a new business. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
- *TIME* = time in calendar days needed to complete procedures that are officially required to start and operate a new business. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
- *COST* = cost (measured as a percentage of the country's income per capita) needed to complete procedures that are officially required to start and operate a new business. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
- *REGULATION (IEF)* = composite index measuring not only how easy/difficult it is to operate a business but also examining the degree of corruption in the government and whether or not regulation is applied uniformly to all businesses. Source: Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation), variable name in IEF database: regulation, average 1995-2000.
- *CONTRACT* measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; $CONTRACT = (\text{procedures} + \text{quality of bureaucracy})/2$.
- *PROCEDURES* = number of procedures required to solve a dispute. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
- *QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY* = index measuring the ability of the government to operate without dramatic changes in policy or interruptions of its services. Source: International Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group); variable name in ICRG database: bureaucracy, average 1984-2000.

- *LABOR* measures the difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. $LABOR = (\text{hiring index} + \text{firing index} + \text{firing costs} + \text{rigidity of labor contracts} + \text{union density})/5$.
- *HIRING INDEX* = index measuring the availability of term contracts for temporary/permanent task, the maximum cumulative duration of term contracts, and the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first time employee to the average value added per worker. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
- *FIRING INDEX* = index measuring whether redundancy is disallowed as a basis to fire a worker, the need for the employer to notify a third party and/or to get approval from a third party when firing one redundant worker and/or a group of more than 20 redundant workers, whether the law requires the employer to consider retraining or reassignment before firing a redundant worker, whether priority rules apply for redundancies and reemployment. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
- *FIRING COST* = index measuring the cost in weekly wages of advance notice requirements, severance payments and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
- *RIGIDITY LABOR CONTRACTS* = index measuring whether night and/or weekend work is unrestricted, whether the workweek can consist of 5.5 days and/or can be extended to 50 hours or more (including overtime) for 2 months a year, whether paid annual vacation is 21 working days or fewer. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
- *UNION DENSITY* percentage of total workforce affiliated to labor unions in 1997. Source: Djankov et al. (2004).

Countries' groups

- *LOW INCOME* includes India. Source: World Bank's classification, see [www.worldbank.org /data/countryclass /classgroups.htm](http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm).
- *MIDDLE LOW INC* includes Brazil, China, Thailand. Source: World Bank's classification, see www.worldbank.org /data/countryclass /classgroups.htm.
- *UPPER MIDDLE INC* includes Argentina, Chile, Croatia, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Russia, South Africa. Source: World Bank's classification, see www.worldbank.org /data/countryclass /classgroups.htm.

- *HIGH INCOME* includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States. Source: World Bank's classification, see [www.worldbank.org /data/countryclass /class-groups.htm](http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/class-groups.htm).
- *OECD* includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
- *EU* includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom;
- *ECA* includes Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia.
- *EAP* includes China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand.
- *LATINAMERICA* includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico.
- *Legal Origin :*
- *ENGLISH* includes Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States. Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
- *SOCIALIST* includes China, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia. Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
- *FRENCH* includes Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. Source: Djankov et al. (2003)
- *GERMAN* includes Germany, Japan, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan. Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
- *SCANDINAVIAN* includes Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden. Source: Djankov et al. (2003).

Appendix II: GEM questionnaires' questions

The following are the questionnaires' questions that the GEM coordination team uses to generate the variables *TEA*, *TEAOPP*, *TEANEC*. Questions are from the 2002 data documentation manual. Questions asked in 2001 were exactly the same, even though the numbering of the questions changes. The methodology followed to construct the indices is based on procedures previously used in the US Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics and it is described in detail in the 2001 and 2002 Adult Population Surveys' data documentation and in Reynolds et al. (2005).

- 1. Which of the following would apply to you? (Possible answers: Yes, No, Don't Know, Refused)
- 1a. You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, including any self-employment or selling any goods or services to others.
- 1b. You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or a new venture for your employer— an effort that is part of your normal work.
- 1c. You are, alone or with others, currently the owner of a company you help manage, self-employed, or selling any goods or services to others.
- If "Yes", Or "Don't Know" To Qu. 1a or Qu. 1b, Ask Qu 2a. If "Yes", Or "Don't Know" To Qu. 1c, Ask Qu. 3a.
- 2a. Over the past twelve months have you done anything to help start a new business, such as looking for equipment or a location, organizing a start-up team, working on a business plan, beginning to save money, or any other activity that would help launch a business?
- 2b. Will you personally own all, part, or none of this business?
- 2d. Has the new business paid any salaries, wages, or payments in kind, including your own, for more than three months?
- 2d1. What was the first year the owners received wages, profits, or payments in kind?
- 2g. Are you involved in this start-up to take advantage of a business opportunity or because you have no better choices for work?
- 3a. Do you personally own all, part, or none of this business?

- 3c. What was the first year the owners received wages, profits, or payments in kind? Payments in kind refers to goods or services provided as payments for work rather than cash.
- 3g. Are you involved in this firm to take advantage of a business opportunity or because you have no better choices for work.

The following are the questionnaires' questions used to define the variables *Knowent*, *Skills*, and *Fearfail* respectively. Questions are from the 2002 data documentation manual. Questions asked in 2001 were exactly the same even though the numbering of the questions changes.

- 1. Which of the following would apply to you? (Possible answers: Yes, No, Don't Know, Refused)
- 1g. You know someone personally who started a business in the past 2 years
- 1h. In the next six months there will be good opportunities for starting a business in the area where you live
- 1i. You have the knowledge, skill and experience required to start a new business
- 1j. Fear of failure would prevent you from starting a business

Appendix III: Flash Eurobarometer Surveys

The questions from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys used to generate the variables *TEA_Euro*, *TEAOPP_Euro*, *TEANEC_Euro* in Table 3, column 2 are as follows:

- 1) Have you started a business recently or are you taking steps to start a new one? (Possible answers: a) It never came to my mind. b) No, but you are thinking about it. c) No, you thought of it and you had already taken steps to start a business but gave up. d) Yes, you are currently taking steps to start a new business. e) Yes, you have started or taken over a business in the last three years which is still active today. f) Yes, you started or took over a business more than three years ago and it is still active. g) No, you once started a business, but currently you are no longer an entrepreneur (business has failed, business was sold or the interviewee has retired). h) Don't Know).
- 2) All in all, would you say you started, or are starting, your business because you saw an opportunity or you started it out of necessity? (Possible answers: a) You started it because you came across an opportunity. b) You started it because it was a necessity. c) Both. d) Don't Know).

To create variables consistent with the ones in GEM, the indices *TEA_Euro*, *TEAOPP_Euro*, *TEANEC_Euro* in Table 3, column 2 are defined as follows:

- *TEA_Euro* = 1 if individuals replied "Yes, you are currently taking steps to start a new business" or "Yes, you have started or taken over a business in the last three years which is still active today" to question 1 above, 0 otherwise.
- *TEAOPP_Euro* = 1 if individuals replied "Yes, you are currently taking steps to start a new business" or "Yes, you have started or taken over a business in the last three years which is still active today" to question 1 above and individuals replied "You started it because you came across an opportunity" to question 2 above, 0 otherwise.
- *TEANEC_Euro* = 1 if individuals replied "Yes, you are currently taking steps to start a new business" or "Yes, you have started or taken over a business in the last three years which is still active today" to question 1 above and individuals replied "You started it because it was a necessity" to question 2 above, 0 otherwise.

The questions from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys used to generate the variable *FEAR OF FAILURE_Euro* in Table 3, column 2 is the following: do

you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following opinion? One should not start a business if there is a risk it might fail. *FEAR OF FAILURE_Euro* measures the percentage of people who strongly agree or agree with this opinion.

Appendix IV: GEM Expert Survey questionnaires' questions

The following three questions are used to construct the regulatory indicators \tilde{R} in equation (2) and in Table 7.

- In my country, new firms can get most of the required permits and licenses in about a week.
- In my country, new and growing firms can afford the cost of market entry.
- In my country, the anti-trust legislation is effective and well enforced.

For each question, five possible answers are allowed: completely true, somewhat true, neither true nor false, somewhat false, completely false, and, for each question, we compute an indicator variable equal to 1 (i.e.: high regulation) if the respondent answered completely false, somewhat false, or neither true nor false and equal to 0 if the respondent answered completely true or somewhat true. This variable measures \tilde{R} , the individuals' perceived regulatory level.

Table 1: Entrepreneurship rates

	N. OF OBS	TEA		TEAOPP		TEANEC		(8)
		mean	s.dev	mean	s.dev	mean	s.dev	
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
ARGENTINA	3991	11.65	32.09	5.96	23.68	5.41	22.63	90.77
AUSTRALIA	5450	8.66	28.13	6.86	25.28	1.45	11.95	21.14
BELGIUM	6095	2.62	15.99	2.02	14.06	0.38	6.13	18.81
BRAZIL	4000	13.05	33.69	6.67	24.96	6.32	24.34	94.75
CANADA	4953	7.69	26.65	5.75	23.29	1.55	12.37	26.96
CHILE	2016	15.38	36.08	8.13	27.34	6.84	25.25	84.13
CHINA	2054	12.61	33.20	7.11	25.70	5.50	22.81	77.36
CROATIA	2001	2.89	16.78	1.70	12.93	0.7	8.33	41.18
DENMARK	4031	6.00	23.76	5.21	22.22	0.35	5.88	6.72
FINLAND	4006	4.34	20.38	3.54	18.49	0.40	6.30	11.30
FRANCE	4020	3.38	18.08	2.11	14.38	0.47	6.86	22.27
GERMANY	22099	4.80	21.37	3.54	18.49	1.09	10.39	30.79
HONG KONG	2000	2.90	16.78	1.90	13.65	1.00	9.95	52.63
HUNGARY	4000	8.82	28.37	5.77	23.32	2.7	16.2	46.79
INDIA	5058	13.46	34.13	7.59	26.49	5.51	22.83	72.60
IRELAND	3971	8.26	27.53	6.40	24.47	1.38	11.69	21.56
ISRAEL	4059	4.90	21.59	2.91	16.80	0.8	8.98	27.49
ITALY	3975	6.69	24.99	4.63	21.01	1.06	10.22	22.89
JAPAN	3999	2.37	15.23	1.25	11.11	0.85	9.18	68.00
KOREA	4023	13.23	33.88	7.41	26.19	4.47	20.67	60.32
MEXICO	3016	17.64	38.13	11.60	32.03	5.50	22.81	47.41
NETHERLANDS	5523	4.15	19.94	3.58	18.59	0.3	5.70	8.38
NEW ZEALAND	3948	13.32	33.99	10.97	31.25	2.12	14.43	19.33
NORWAY	4910	6.92	25.39	5.78	23.34	0.30	5.52	5.19
POLAND	4000	5.60	22.99	3.00	17.06	2.32	15.07	77.33
PORTUGAL	2000	6.55	24.75	5.05	21.90	1.35	11.54	26.73
RUSSIA	4202	4.02	19.64	2.93	16.86	0.74	8.56	25.26
SINGAPORE	4009	5.81	23.40	4.69	21.14	0.97	9.82	20.68
SLOVENIA	2030	3.89	19.34	2.86	16.66	1.03	10.12	36.01
SOUTH AFRICA	12267	6.55	24.73	4.16	19.98	1.86	13.50	44.71
SPAIN	4016	4.83	21.44	3.33	17.96	1.12	10.52	33.63
SWEDEN	4055	4.24	20.15	3.48	18.32	0.62	7.83	17.82
SWITZERLAND	2001	6.50	24.65	5.55	22.89	0.75	8.63	13.51
TAIWAN	2236	3.89	19.34	3.08	17.29	0.06	7.88	1.95
THAILAND	1043	20.71	40.54	17.26	37.80	3.26	17.77	18.89
UK	21400	4.13	19.90	3.15	17.48	0.65	8.06	20.63
US	10013	8.63	28.08	7.45	26.26	1.08	10.33	14.50
ALL	186470	6.74	25.1	4.74	21.2	1.64	12.7	34.60
LOW INCOME	5058	13.46	34.14	7.59	26.49	5.52	22.81	72.66
MIDDLE LOW INC	7097	14.05	34.75	8.35	27.67	5.64	23.06	67.45
UPPER MIDDLE INC	35493	8.21	27.45	4.99	21.77	2.80	16.50	56.13
HIGH INCOME	138822	5.74	23.26	4.38	20.47	1.00	9.93	22.76
OECD	120465	5.63	23.1	4.41	20.5	0.89	9.41	20.18
EU	85191	4.67	21.1	3.56	18.5	0.78	8.80	21.91
ECA	16233	5.44	22.6	3.49	18.3	1.64	12.7	46.99
EAP	15365	9.1	28.6	5.98	23.7	2.60	15.9	43.48
LATIN AMERICA	13023	14.04	34.7	7.82	26.9	5.94	23.6	75.96
ENGLISH	78171	7.22	25.88	5.35	22.51	1.50	12.17	28.09
SOCIALIST	18287	6.24	24.20	3.89	19.34	2.08	14.27	53.37
FRENCH	38652	7.62	26.53	4.77	21.31	2.45	15.46	51.36
GERMAN	34358	5.54	22.88	3.82	19.16	1.41	11.79	36.92
SCANDINAVIAN	17002	5.46	22.72	4.57	20.88	0.41	6.40	9.01

Notes: TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Appendix I for the exact classification of countries in each group.

Table 2: Individual characteristics

	ALL	LOW INCOME	MIDDLE LOW INC	UPPER MIDDLE INC	HIGH INCOME
	(1)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
AGE	43.59 (16.8)	38.49 (11.33)	38.16 (13.21)	40.20 (16.11)	44.90 (17.05)
% MALE	47.5 (49.9)	51.44 (49.98)	50.30 (50.00)	47.52 (49.94)	47.21 (49.92)
% WORKING	56.9 (49.5)	55.00 (49.76)	63.36 (48.19)	49.89 (50.00)	58.28 (49.31)
% STUDENTS	4.98 (21.7)	5.07 (21.95)	4.86 (21.50)	8.21 (27.45)	4.27 (20.22)
% RETIRED AND DISABLES	13.9 (34.6)	0.70 (8.32)	13.86 (34.56)	15.43 (36.13)	13.80 (34.49)
% NOT WORKING	24.15 (42.8)	39.23 (48.84)	17.93 (38.36)	26.47 (44.12)	23.65 (42.49)
% SEC DEGREE	37.9 (48.5)	17.89 (38.33)	17.19 (37.73)	40.01 (48.99)	39.11 (48.80)
% POST SEC EDUC	27.9 (44.8)	14.16 (34.86)	16.05 (36.71)	21.62 (41.17)	30.23 (45.93)
% GRADUATE EXP	2.38 (15.2)	1.40 (11.77)	0.32 (5.60)	0.97 (9.78)	2.79 (16.46)
% LOW INCOME	31.7 (46.5)	45.60 (49.82)	37.97 (48.54)	34.93 (47.67)	30.33 (45.97)
% MIDDLE INCOME	39.6 (48.9)	39.96 (48.99)	36.22 (48.07)	38.75 (48.72)	39.87 (48.96)
% UPPER INCOME	28.7 (45.2)	14.44 (35.16)	25.81 (43.77)	26.32 (44.04)	29.80 (45.74)
% KNOWS ENTREPR	32.26 (46.7)	20.88 (40.65)	44.68 (49.72)	31.35 (46.39)	32.27 (46.75)
% HAS SKILLS	38.59 (48.7)	41.66 (49.30)	47.17 (49.92)	39.14 (48.81)	37.89 (48.51)
% FEAR OF FAILURE	32.49 (46.8)	25.87 (43.79)	36.62 (48.18)	29.77 (45.72)	33.18 (47.08)
N. OF OBSERVATIONS	186470	5058	7097	35493	138822

Notes: Standard deviation in parenthesis. AGE = age of the individual at the time of the interview; WORKING = individuals who work at the time of the interview; STUDENTS individuals who are students at the time of the interview; RETIRED AND DISABLES = individuals who are retired or disable at the time of the interview; NOT WORKING = individuals who do not work and are not students, retired, or disable at the time of the interview; SEC. DEGREE = individuals with a high school degree; POST SEC EDUC. = individuals with a college degree; GRADUATE EXP. = individuals with at least some graduate school education; LOW INCOME = individuals who report that their income is in the lowest 33rd income percentile of their country's income distribution; MIDDLE INCOME = individuals who report that their income is in the middle 33rd income percentile of their country's income distribution; UPPER INCOME = individuals who report that their income is in the upper 33rd income percentile of their country's income distribution; KNOWS ENTREPR = individuals who know someone who has started a business in the recent past; HAS SKILLS individuals who think they have the knowledge, skills and experience to start a new business; FEAR OF FAILURE = individuals who answer that fear of failing can prevent them to start a new business. See also Appendix I.

Table 4: Regulatory indices

	ENTRY	CONTRACT	LABOR
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ARGENTINA	0.468	0.581	0.583
AUSTRALIA	0.176	0.060	0.186
BELGIUM	0.392	0.155	0.356
BRAZIL	0.756	0.621	0.412
CANADA	0.088	0.036	0.121
CHILE	0.298	0.562	0.271
CHINA	0.593	0.592	0.318
CROATIA	0.574	0.402	0.631
DENMARK	0.123	0.012	0.317
FINLAND	0.253	0.165	0.565
FRANCE	0.287	0.094	0.484
GERMANY	0.383	0.190	0.507
HONG KONG	0.076	0.249	0.112
HUNGARY	0.492	0.204	0.440
INDIA	0.795	0.710	0.397
IRELAND	0.202	0.060	0.411
ISRAEL	0.212	0.265	0.369
ITALY	0.383	0.459	0.510
JAPAN	0.332	0.079	0.249
KOREA	0.450	0.333	0.389
MEXICO	0.542	0.629	0.467
NETHERLANDS	0.294	0.095	0.418
NEW ZEALAND	0.101	0.167	0.105
NORWAY	0.251	0.044	0.570
POLAND	0.448	0.528	0.330
PORTUGAL	0.500	0.345	0.633
RUSSIA	0.481	0.702	0.507
SINGAPORE	0.098	0.251	0.053
SLOVENIA	0.449	0.341	
SOUTH AFRICA	0.304	0.300	0.446
SPAIN	0.565	0.291	0.578
SWEDEN	0.210	0.060	0.563
SWITZERLAND	0.304	0.095	0.243
TAIWAN	0.289	0.322	0.609
THAILAND	0.349	0.354	0.211
UK	0.167	0.060	0.193
US	0.141	0.036	0.025
ALL	0.320	0.231	0.363
LOW INCOME	0.795	0.710	0.397
MIDDLE LOW INC	0.649	0.573	0.356
UPPER MIDDLE INC	0.416	0.443	0.457
HIGH INCOME	0.262	0.142	0.338
OECD	0.262	0.120	0.344
EU	0.295	0.143	0.409
ECA	0.483	0.455	0.456
EAP	0.298	0.335	0.276
LATIN AMERICA	0.547	0.601	0.455
ENGLISH	0.219	0.170	0.226
SOCIALIST	0.495	0.470	0.438
FRENCH	0.442	0.346	0.465
GERMAN	0.374	0.197	0.454
SCANDINAVIAN	0.212	0.069	0.507

NOTES: ENTRY measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + regulation (IEF))/4. CONTRACT measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of bureaucracy)/2. LABOR measures the difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. LABOR = (hiring index + firing index + firing costs + rigidity of labor contracts + union density)/5. See also Appendix I.

Table 5: Correlation among regulatory indices

REGULATION	ENTRY	CONTRACT	LABOR		
ENTRY	1				
CONTRACT	0.75	1			
LABOR	0.50	0.27	1		
ENTRY REGULATION	PROCEDURES	TIME	COST	REGUL. (IEF)	
PROCEDURES	1				
TIME	0.70	1			
COST	0.46	0.49	1		
REGULATION (IEF)	0.38	0.47	0.52	1	
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT REG.	PROCEDURES	QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY			
PROCEDURES	1				
QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY	0.50	1			
LABOR MARKET REG.	HIRING INDEX	FIRING INDEX	FIRING COST	RIGIDITY LABOR CONTRACTS	UNION DENSITY
HIRING INDEX	1				
FIRING INDEX	0.47	1			
FIRING COST	0.28	0.23	1		
RIGIDITY LABOR CONTRACTS	0.39	0.33	0.18	1	
UNION DENSITY	0.01	0.11	-0.16	0.38	1

Notes: ENTRY measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; $ENTRY = (\text{procedures} + \text{time} + \text{cost} + \text{regulation (IEF)})/4$. CONTRACT measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; $CONTRACT = (\text{procedures} + \text{quality of bureaucracy})/2$. LABOR measures the difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. $LABOR = (\text{hiring index} + \text{firing index} + \text{firing costs} + \text{rigidity of labor contracts} + \text{union density})/5$. See also Appendix I.

Table 6: Entrepreneurship and personal characteristics

	TEA=1	TEA=0	ST. ERR. OF DIFF	TEANEC=1	TEAOPP=1	ST. ERR. OF DIFF
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
AGE	38.7	43.9	0.16**	39.3	38.3	0.26**
% MALE	62.9	46.4	0.46**	59.1	64.5	1.01**
% WORKING	82.9	55.1	0.48**	76.8	85.1	0.85**
% STUDENTS	2.32	5.17	0.22**	2.19	2.33	0.34
% RETIRED AND DISABLED	2.38	14.7	0.34**	2.58	2.21	0.34
% NOT WORKING	12.3	25.0	0.42**	18.4	10.3	0.75**
% SEC DEGREE	35.2	38.1	0.48**	36.1	34.4	1.09
% POST SEC EDUC	35.9	27.4	0.45**	24.2	39.8	1.08**
% GRADUATE EXP	3.67	2.29	0.15**	1.93	4.30	0.43**
% LOW INCOME	24.0	32.3	0.53**	36.14	20.12	1.11**
% MIDDLE INCOME	36.3	39.8	0.56**	38.1	35.8	1.26*
% UPPER INCOME	39.6	27.9	0.52**	25.7	44.0	1.27**
% KNOWS ENTREPR	62.7	30.0	0.43**	53.2	66.4	1.01**
% HAS SKILLS	81.6	35.4	0.44**	75.1	84.4	0.81**
% FEAR OF FAILURE	21.5	33.3	0.44**	29.6	18.7	0.87**

Notes: Difference in mean statistically different from zero at 5% (**) / 10% (*). TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the exact definition of the variables.

Table 7: Entrepreneurship and individual characteristics

	TEA (1)	TEAOPP (2)	TEANEC (3)	TEA (4)	TEAOPP (5)	TEANEC (6)
AGE	0.001359 (2.77)***	0.000643 (1.86)*	0.000537 (3.70)***	0.001298 (2.40)**	0.000568 (1.49)	0.000559 (2.66)***
AGE SQUARE	-0.000022 (3.66)***	-0.000012 (2.70)***	-0.000007 (4.67)***	-0.000022 (3.40)***	-0.000012 (2.37)**	-0.000007 (3.39)***
MALE	0.009276 (8.35)***	0.006338 (7.45)***	0.001850 (3.93)***	0.009989 (7.84)***	0.006765 (6.02)***	0.001825 (3.06)***
NOT WORKING	-0.017577 (6.10)***	-0.011889 (7.53)***	-0.002678 (2.18)**	-0.017343 (4.63)***	-0.011030 (5.63)***	-0.003444 (2.28)**
STUDENTS	-0.022875 (8.10)***	-0.013595 (10.44)***	-0.004976 (3.68)***	-0.023389 (5.90)***	-0.013230 (6.08)***	-0.005842 (4.02)***
RETIRED DISABLES	-0.026329 (6.14)***	-0.015661 (4.56)***	-0.006017 (5.96)***	-0.026311 (4.76)***	-0.015066 (3.50)***	-0.006665 (4.15)***
HIGHSCHOOL	0.002310 (1.90)*	0.004324 (4.23)***	-0.001549 (2.61)***	0.003923 (2.75)***	0.004955 (3.84)***	-0.000828 (1.21)
COLLEGE	0.003391 (2.02)**	0.008129 (8.29)***	-0.004076 (5.84)***	0.003074 (1.59)	0.007061 (5.58)***	-0.003535 (4.10)***
KNOWENT	0.033149 (14.72)***	0.023277 (17.96)***	0.004330 (5.94)***	0.034152 (13.80)***	0.023249 (17.10)***	0.005101 (5.65)***
SKILLS	0.066059 (37.15)***	0.045700 (32.39)***	0.011399 (17.21)***	0.068872 (30.99)***	0.047812 (28.38)***	0.012351 (15.07)***
FEARFAIL	-0.015058 (8.72)***	-0.011324 (9.31)***	-0.000790 (1.35)	-0.015774 (7.20)***	-0.011549 (7.94)***	-0.001192 (1.68)*
LOWESTINC				0.005035 (2.27)**	-0.000310 (0.22)	0.003416 (3.50)***
UPPERINC				0.004819 (2.08)**	0.004479 (2.77)***	-0.001729 (2.22)**
OBSERVATIONS	141111	141111	141111	97384	97384	97384

Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and a time dummy for 2001. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Marginal effects (not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the exact definition of the variables.

Table 8: Entrepreneurship and regulation

	R = ENTRY TEA (1)	R = ENTRY TEAOPP (2)	R = ENTRY TEANEC (3)	R = CONTRACT TEA (4)	R = CONTRACT TEAOPP (5)	R = CONTRACT TEANEC (6)	R = LABOR TEA (7)	R = LABOR TEAOPP (8)	R = LABOR TEANEC (9)
AGE	0.001611 (4.41)***	0.000850 (3.44)***	0.000591 (5.11)***	0.001470 (3.15)***	0.000715 (2.09)**	0.000602 (5.23)***	0.001765 (4.42)***	0.000910 (3.69)***	0.000622 (4.52)***
AGE SQUARE	-0.000022 (4.32)***	-0.000012 (3.28)***	-0.000007 (5.46)***	-0.000022 (3.87)***	-0.000012 (2.79)***	-0.000007 (5.72)***	-0.000022 (4.43)***	-0.000012 (3.43)***	-0.000007 (4.60)***
MALE	0.011305 (5.03)***	0.005687 (3.34)***	0.003929 (5.22)***	0.010468 (7.37)***	0.005819 (5.00)***	0.003428 (5.45)***	0.009052 (3.85)***	0.004252 (2.65)***	0.003650 (4.62)***
NOT WORKING	-0.004205 (0.72)	-0.006088 (1.74)*	0.003635 (1.42)	-0.010076 (2.41)**	-0.008233 (3.62)***	0.000963 (0.49)	-0.008625 (1.20)	-0.006153 (1.89)*	-0.000670 (0.17)
STUDENTS	-0.013626 (2.19)**	-0.008869 (2.71)***	-0.000559 (0.15)	-0.017777 (4.11)***	-0.011747 (5.73)***	-0.002003 (0.72)	-0.017980 (2.03)**	-0.011806 (2.80)***	-0.000996 (0.21)
RETIRED DISABLES	-0.025529 (3.29)***	-0.015692 (2.63)***	-0.005246 (3.25)***	-0.024275 (3.97)***	-0.015086 (3.34)***	-0.004762 (3.28)***	-0.027279 (3.08)***	-0.016065 (2.47)**	-0.006099 (3.64)***
HIGHSCHOOL	0.000625 (0.22)	0.002917 (1.32)	-0.002820 (2.55)**	0.002279 (1.35)	0.003105 (2.00)**	-0.001918 (2.06)**	0.001062 (0.43)	0.004320 (1.95)*	-0.002764 (2.43)**
COLLEGE	0.005128 (1.46)	0.006291 (2.74)***	-0.004155 (3.73)***	0.005330 (2.50)**	0.006643 (4.53)***	-0.003698 (4.12)***	0.004940 (1.67)*	0.008696 (4.75)***	-0.004776 (5.13)***
KNOWENT	0.048508 (14.45)***	0.031393 (15.44)***	0.007203 (5.52)***	0.042945 (18.35)***	0.027858 (18.87)***	0.007529 (8.63)***	0.049504 (15.58)***	0.033102 (16.12)***	0.007071 (5.44)***
SKILLS	0.072656 (22.48)***	0.052682 (23.64)***	0.010306 (9.54)***	0.070298 (31.44)***	0.050825 (31.52)***	0.010391 (10.76)***	0.068896 (19.55)***	0.048588 (23.92)***	0.010546 (7.89)***
FEARFAIL	-0.012754 (4.37)***	-0.009552 (4.69)***	0.001184 (1.14)	-0.013613 (5.28)***	-0.010651 (5.79)***	0.001024 (1.21)	-0.007342 (3.10)***	-0.006830 (3.82)***	0.003052 (4.25)***
R*AGE	-0.000780 (1.44)	-0.000597 (1.53)	-0.000115 (0.70)	-0.000339 (1.09)	-0.000232 (1.65)*	-0.000082 (0.62)	-0.001053 (1.77)*	-0.000677 (1.76)*	-0.000240 (2.05)**
R*MALE	-0.007420 (1.26)	0.001693 (0.36)	-0.006159 (3.02)***	-0.006916 (1.65)*	0.001453 (0.36)	-0.005892 (3.43)***	0.000452 (0.08)	0.005930 (1.36)	-0.004896 (2.52)**
R*NOT WORKING	-0.047194 (3.12)***	-0.022591 (2.36)**	-0.017041 (3.16)***	-0.035547 (3.02)***	-0.019081 (2.67)***	-0.012774 (2.91)***	-0.030139 (1.75)*	-0.020448 (2.27)**	-0.005911 (0.69)
R*STUDENTS	-0.055094 (2.62)***	-0.030643 (2.64)***	-0.019123 (2.13)**	-0.038623 (2.61)***	-0.016425 (2.37)**	-0.016054 (2.16)**	-0.031046 (0.94)	-0.012349 (0.78)	-0.017039 (1.19)
R*RETIRED DISABLES	-0.003310 (0.15)	0.001560 (0.09)	-0.003981 (0.61)	-0.016080 (0.96)	-0.004745 (0.43)	-0.007716 (1.21)	0.007530 (0.26)	0.004189 (0.20)	0.001014 (0.16)
R*HIGHSCHOOL	0.005460 (0.66)	0.004032 (0.59)	0.003815 (1.55)	0.001092 (0.15)	0.004755 (0.88)	0.001540 (0.68)	0.002610 (0.41)	-0.000581 (0.10)	0.003173 (1.03)
R*COLLEGE	-0.005954 (0.53)	0.004761 (0.68)	0.000104 (0.03)	-0.007833 (0.92)	0.005128 (1.03)	-0.001588 (0.48)	-0.005526 (0.73)	-0.002087 (0.45)	0.002035 (0.70)
R*KNOWENT	-0.034869 (4.43)***	-0.018118 (3.83)***	-0.006270 (2.45)**	-0.031085 (4.95)***	-0.014727 (3.72)***	-0.008493 (4.56)***	-0.033110 (4.02)***	-0.019278 (4.07)***	-0.005898 (1.66)*
R*SKILLS	-0.013711 (1.73)*	-0.013379 (2.15)**	0.002097 (0.91)	-0.012059 (1.52)	-0.013626 (2.09)**	0.002453 (1.18)	-0.005085 (0.75)	-0.004971 (1.11)	0.001344 (0.52)
R*FEARFAIL	-0.007760 (0.83)	-0.006375 (1.00)	-0.005460 (1.91)*	-0.005311 (0.62)	-0.002507 (0.46)	-0.005967 (2.48)**	-0.024554 (3.20)***	-0.015012 (2.59)***	-0.010005 (5.55)***
OBSERVATIONS	141111	141111	141111	141111	141111	141111	139260	139260	139260

Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and a time dummy for 2001. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Marginal effects (not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise; ENTRY measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + regulation (IEF))/4. CONTRACT measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of bureaucracy)/2. LABOR measures the difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. LABOR = (hiring index + firing index + firing costs + rigidity of labor contracts + union density)/5. See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the exact definition of the variables.

Table 9: Entrepreneurship and regulation – Instrumental variables estimation

	R = ENTRY TEA (1)	R = ENTRY TEAOPP (2)	R = ENTRY TEANEC (3)	R = CONTRACT TEA (4)	R = CONTRACT TEAOPP (5)	R = CONTRACT TEANEC (6)	R = LABOR TEA (7)	R = LABOR TEAOPP (8)	R = LABOR TEANEC (9)
AGE	0.023566 (7.65)***	0.021523 (6.07)***	0.026250 (5.30)***	0.020677 (6.80)***	0.018289 (5.22)***	0.025457 (5.24)***	0.023604 (7.80)***	0.021164 (6.10)***	0.025567 (5.23)***
AGE SQUARE	-0.000323 (-10.4)***	-0.000289 (-8.06)***	-0.000374 (-7.4)***	-0.000319 (-10.11)***	-0.000290 (-7.98)***	-0.000364 (-7.17)***	-0.000316 (-10.1)***	-0.000284 (-7.86)***	-0.000350 (-6.8)***
MALE	0.162854 (4.89)***	0.107008 (2.88)***	0.232339 (4.12)***	0.149314 (5.69)***	0.114304 (3.90)***	0.204504 (4.60)***	0.163856 (4.71)***	0.106674 (2.77)***	0.233558 (3.92)***
NOT WORKING	-0.076856 (-1.39)	-0.137815 (-2.10)**	0.149557 (1.81)*	-0.219501 (-4.97)***	-0.198542 (-3.76)***	-0.090959 (-1.37)	-0.076373 (-1.38)	-0.170701 (-2.64)***	0.149491 (1.74)*
STUDENTS	-0.230389 (-2.43)**	-0.261995 (-2.47)**	0.129146 (0.77)	-0.329000 (-4.19)***	-0.343535 (-3.89)***	0.001931 (0.01)	-0.326892 (-2.37)**	-0.329896 (-2.14)**	-0.119456 (-0.50)
RETIRED DISABLES	-0.487408 (-6.95)***	-0.530260 (-6.55)***	-0.160398 (-1.33)	-0.491855 (-8.48)***	-0.503047 (-7.63)***	-0.224876 (-2.20)**	-0.552985 (-7.19)***	-0.597996 (-6.75)***	-0.234529 (-1.74)*
HIGHSCHOOL	0.067774 (1.38)	0.141503 (2.47)**	-0.143703 (-1.93)*	0.081351 (2.10)**	0.124647 (2.77)***	-0.083974 (-1.43)	0.018416 (0.36)	0.132814 (2.29)**	-0.195310 (-2.50)**
COLLEGE	0.111237 (2.29)**	0.173146 (3.13)***	-0.224132 (-2.9)***	0.111096 (2.88)***	0.167223 (3.80)***	-0.181249 (-2.88)***	0.067763 (1.39)	0.185019 (3.34)***	-0.317767 (-4.0)***
KNOWENT	0.584793 (17.66)***	0.590114 (16.01)***	0.256190 (4.55)***	0.527684 (19.94)***	0.536309 (18.17)***	0.256727 (5.69)***	0.611149 (17.73)***	0.618220 (16.24)***	0.257310 (4.34)***
SKILLS	0.825786 (21.61)***	0.850867 (19.16)***	0.431131 (6.86)***	0.814521 (27.23)***	0.845651 (24.35)***	0.430705 (8.72)***	0.825498 (20.87)***	0.838725 (18.41)***	0.509168 (7.79)***
FEARFAIL	-0.143895 (-3.78)***	-0.200350 (-4.60)***	0.163158 (2.72)***	-0.182572 (-6.01)***	-0.251606 (-7.19)***	0.124313 (2.61)***	-0.115454 (-2.88)***	-0.170162 (-3.74)***	0.177777 (2.81)***
R*AGE	-0.009908 (-2.37)**	-0.019115 (-3.96)***	0.010611 (1.61)	-0.002283 (-0.46)	-0.011666 (-2.02)**	0.016630 (2.20)**	-0.010727 (-3.07)***	-0.016494 (-4.18)***	0.004843 (0.82)
R*MALE	-0.098577 (-0.95)	0.117594 (0.99)	-0.428758 (-2.6)***	-0.068391 (-0.60)	0.128675 (0.98)	-0.436885 (-2.48)**	-0.084673 (-0.90)	0.105049 (0.99)	-0.383753 (-2.42)**
R*NOT WORKING	-0.652213 (-4.00)***	-0.548608 (-2.78)***	-0.812101 (-3.5)***	-0.248892 (-1.42)	-0.473583 (-2.19)**	0.005718 (0.02)	-0.606476 (-4.21)***	-0.414520 (-2.45)**	-0.823087 (-3.7)***
R*STUDENTS	-0.846983 (-2.98)***	-0.665698 (-2.08)**	-1.462232 (-2.9)***	-0.626432 (-2.23)**	-0.522561 (-1.64)*	-1.194870 (-2.43)**	-0.521084 (-1.42)	-0.416656 (-1.01)	-0.582524 (-0.92)
R*RETIRED DISABLES	-0.218978 (-0.94)	0.089498 (0.32)	-0.968315 (-2.7)***	-0.276994 (-1.10)	-0.030889 (-0.10)	-0.895082 (-2.30)**	0.028680 (0.12)	0.287741 (1.06)	-0.630600 (-1.59)
R*HIGHSCHOOL	-0.117523 (-0.79)	-0.167208 (-0.95)	0.172982 (0.81)	-0.223998 (-1.39)	-0.176361 (-0.91)	-0.005785 (-0.03)	0.032428 (0.25)	-0.116004 (-0.76)	0.300194 (1.48)
R*COLLEGE	-0.208893 (-1.40)	-0.011058 (-0.06)	-0.022585 (-0.10)	-0.269755 (-1.68)*	0.007840 (0.04)	-0.183089 (-0.73)	-0.067987 (-0.52)	-0.046028 (-0.31)	0.235891 (1.13)
R*KNOWENT	-0.535620 (-5.23)***	-0.503023 (-4.31)***	-0.114271 (-0.70)	-0.472689 (-4.25)***	-0.450753 (-3.55)***	-0.076114 (-0.43)	-0.559742 (-5.98)***	-0.528303 (-5.06)***	-0.140378 (-0.89)
R*SKILLS	-0.117482 (-1.01)	-0.150889 (-1.10)	0.183862 (1.02)	-0.086408 (-0.68)	-0.165202 (-1.09)	0.284223 (1.44)	-0.112300 (-1.07)	-0.096955 (-0.80)	-0.061533 (-0.36)
R*FEARFAIL	-0.309382 (-2.66)***	-0.266926 (-1.96)**	-0.631576 (3.64)***	-0.247254 (1.95)*	-0.125984 (0.84)	-0.681438 (3.65)***	-0.353986 (3.31)***	-0.329829 (2.69)***	-0.606136 (-3.6)***
OBSERVATIONS	141111	141111	140767	141111	141111	140767	139260	139260	138916




Notes: IV Probit regressions including country fixed effects and a time dummy for 2001. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Instruments for the regulatory variable R are dummy variables measuring English (common law), French (civil law), Socialist, German and Scandinavian legal origin. Coefficients and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the exact definition of the variables.

Table 10: Entrepreneurship and perceived regulation – Expert Survey database

	\tilde{R} = ENTRY TIME	\tilde{R} = ENTRY COST	\tilde{R} = REGULATION ENFORCEMENT
	TEA (1)	TEA (2)	TEA (3)
AGE	-0.020235 (-1.27)	-0.015732 (-1.07)	-0.017156 (-1.18)
AGE SQUARE	0.000190 (1.12)	0.000153 (0.97)	0.000149 (0.96)
MALE	0.027453 (0.50)	0.057962 (1.16)	-0.005793 (-0.10)
COLLEGE	-0.083754 (-0.83)	-0.043153 (-0.45)	-0.051964 (-0.50)
YEARS OF WORK IN CURRENT ORGANIZATION	-0.004322 (-1.57)	-0.004213 (-1.61)	-0.007991 (-2.70)***
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP	-0.000506 (-0.20)	-0.002157 (-0.85)	-0.001737 (-0.58)
KNOWENT	0.060685 (0.54)	-0.044659 (-0.41)	-0.016087 (-0.15)
SKILLS	0.200877 (3.77)***	0.216907 (4.01)***	0.175402 (3.13)***
FEARFAIL	-0.127724 (-2.75)***	-0.094270 (-2.16)**	-0.047700 (-0.95)
\tilde{R} *AGE	0.001562 (0.26)	0.003551 (0.61)	-0.002463 (-0.45)
\tilde{R} *MALE	0.003405 (0.03)	0.015867 (0.13)	0.021976 (0.22)
\tilde{R} *COLLEGE	-0.093873 (-0.50)	0.039303 (0.31)	0.093813 (0.91)
\tilde{R} *YEARS OF WORK IN CURRENT ORGANIZATION	0.006995 (0.87)	0.005107 (0.76)	-0.010654 (-2.14)**
\tilde{R} *YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP	-0.002508 (-0.35)	-0.011499 (-2.13)**	-0.006800 (-1.45)
\tilde{R} *KNOWENT	0.109198 (0.60)	-0.967862 (-4.27)***	-0.991846 (-4.81)***
\tilde{R} *SKILLS	0.048382 (0.25)	0.145195 (1.12)	-0.033727 (-0.21)
\tilde{R} *FEARFAIL	-0.278726 (-1.53)	-0.077500 (-0.44)	0.107990 (1.15)
\tilde{R}	-0.178273 (-0.38)	0.453437 (0.0001)	0.778789 (0.0001)
Observations	529	540	507

Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects. Standard errors are robust. Marginal effects (not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the exact definition of the variables. See also Appendix IV.

Figure 1: Entrepreneurship across the world



Notes: see Appendix I.

Figure 2: Entrepreneurship and regulation – high income countries









Figure 3: Entrepreneurship and regulation – middle and low income countries

