

THRESHOLD REGIME SWITCHING: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES, AND PREEMPTIVE ACTIONS

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ABSTRACT. This paper makes changes in monetary policy rules (or regimes) endogenous. Changes are triggered when certain endogenous variables cross specified thresholds. The implications of threshold switching are examined in three models to illustrate that (i) cross-regime spillovers can be quantitatively important; (ii) symmetric shocks can have asymmetric effects; (iii) endogenous switching is a natural way to formally model preemptive policy actions. In a conventional calibrated model, preemptive policy reaps benefits by shifting agents' expectations, enhancing the effectiveness of policy and yielding a quantitatively significant "preemption dividend."

1. INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most important advance in the monetary policy literature over the past 20 years is the explicit recognition that policy behavior is purposeful and responds endogenously to the state of the economy. Substantial progress has been made by research that examines how various monetary policy rules perform in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. A prominent example of such a rule is Taylor's (1993) rule, which has the central bank adjust the short-term nominal interest rate in response to fluctuations in inflation and some measure of output. Rare is the paper now that posits an exogenous process for money growth and claims to offer practical policy advice.

A substantial line of empirical work finds that Taylor's or other simple rules describing purposeful behavior display important time variation in the United States [Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Favero and Monacelli (2005), Sims and Zha (2006)]. Although particulars vary, a common theme across much of the empirical work on time variation in policy behavior is that changes in policy behavior are exogenous. Recent work embeds Markov switching processes for

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policy in DSGE models to interpret these empirical findings [Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2004), Davig and Leeper (2006a,b)].¹

Because both the empirical and theoretical work on regime change treat the changes as exogenous, in an important sense the work is inconsistent with a central tenet underlying the Taylor rule: monetary policy behavior is purposeful and reacts systematically to changes in the macroeconomic environment. This paper makes regime change endogenous, taking a step toward resolving this inconsistency.²

The paper shows that even very simple threshold-style methods for endogenizing regime changes can generate rich dynamics. The rich dynamics allow models that are linear, except for policy behavior, to display three features that connect to theoretical and empirical work on the impacts of shocks and to observations about how central banks act:

- (1) Cross-regime spillovers can be quantitatively important.
- (2) Symmetric policy shocks can produce asymmetric effects.
- (3) Preemptive policy behavior enhances the effectiveness of policy actions and delivers a quantitatively significant “preemption dividend.”

Endogenous switching shares the feature of cross-regime spillovers with exogenous switching. Davig and Leeper (2006b) emphasize that if monetary policy switches exogenously between a more-active and a less-active reaction against inflation, agents’ expectations and, therefore, the equilibrium outcomes always reflect the possibility that regime can change in the future. For example, expectations of a more-active policy regime in the future diminish the impacts of shocks on current inflation, even when the current regime is less active.

Features (2) and (3) emerge with threshold endogenous switching, but are absent when regimes switch exogenously.

A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that typical macroeconomic shocks—such as oil prices, government spending, or nominal aggregate demand—have nonlinear effects on the economy [for example, DeLong and Summers (1988), Cover (1992), Hooker and Knetter (1996), Hooker (2002), Ravn and Sola (2004), Choi and Devereux (2005), Cologni and Manera (2006)]. Some asymmetric effects have been attributed to nonlinearities in the structure of the economy, such as real and nominal rigidities or changes in availability of financing over the business cycle [for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Ball and Romer (1990), Ball and Mankiw (1994), Bernanke and

¹There is also work that assumes that policy behavior switches exogenously among different exogenous rules for the evolution of policy variables [for example, Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Leeper and Zha (2003), Davig (2004), and Owyang and Ramey (2004)].

²Some work examines one-time, permanent endogenous regime changes [for example, Sims (1997), Daniel (2003), and Mackowiak (2006)].

Gertler (1989, 1995), Gertler (1992)]. In this paper, all asymmetries arise from nonlinearities in the monetary policy process. Nonlinearities stem from discrete shifts in policy rules that are triggered by changes in the state of the economy.

The third feature arises from the emphasis central bankers place on the intrinsic forward-looking nature of monetary policymaking [Bernanke (2004)]. Because of lags in when monetary policy actions affect real activity and inflation, central banks need to act before economic conditions deteriorate. A famous instance of forward-looking policy occurred in 1994 when the Federal Reserve moved preemptively against increases in inflation that had only begun to show up in long-term bond yields. Goodfriend (2005) concludes that the preemptive strike was successful, as inflation remained low and long rates declined. To our knowledge, preemptive actions of this sort, while playing a central role in central bank thinking, have not been formally modeled.

The paper applies a simple framework to implement endogenous monetary policy regime switching. When the central bank's target variables cross specified thresholds, the policy rule changes. One policy process that we use posits that if at date $t - 1$ inflation is less than some threshold, π^* , policy obeys a usual Taylor rule at t ; if inflation equals or exceeds π^* , the central bank implements a more aggressive stance at t .

On the surface, this setup may seem deterministic—given current inflation, next period's regime is known exactly. But threshold switching makes forming rational expectations of regimes two or more periods in the future nontrivial, as they depend on the joint distribution of all the exogenous disturbances and on the structure of the economy. Because expectations of all future regimes are updated each period to incorporate news about realizations of shocks, threshold switching is a special case of a Markov process with endogenous time-varying probabilities.

The examples of endogenous switching that we present connect well to the behavior of inflation targeting central banks. Strict inflation targeting, which is far more prominent in academic discussions than in actual central banking, lines up with a threshold inflation rate, π^* , that triggers shifts in the policy rule. Flexible inflation targeting, which many central banks claim to pursue, involves more complex triggers that involve both the threshold inflation rate and some measure of the output gap.

As applied to inflation targeting, endogenous switching departs from the usual linear-quadratic framework by embedding the possibility that the central bank has asymmetric preferences over its objectives. If central bankers would prefer to be 25 basis points below their inflation target than above it, this can create a right-skewed distribution of equilibrium inflation.

Section 2 briefly compares various specifications of monetary policy—fixed-regime, exogenous switching, and endogenous switching. Threshold switching in a flexible-price model of inflation determination is used in sections 3 and 4 to illustrate the cross-regime spillovers and asymmetric distributions the endogenous switching generates. Section 4 details how agents form rational expectations, developing a time-varying probabilities interpretation of regime change. Section 5 embeds threshold switching in the workhorse new Keynesian model and displays the impacts of aggregate supply shocks on inflation and output dynamics. The implications of a more plausible characterization of monetary policy behavior—in which both inflation and output thresholds determine the policy rule—are also laid out. Section 6 combines a dynamic threshold—involving past, current, and expected inflation—with a hybrid new Keynesian model to show how central banks might preemptively strike against inflation. In a calibrated version of the model, preemptive policy behavior is shown to enhance the effectiveness of policy actions, delivering a quantitatively significant “preemption dividend.”

2. QUICK OVERVIEW OF ENDOGENOUS REGIME CHANGE

Monetary policy rules, such as Taylor’s, are state-contingent in the sense that the policy interest rate adjusts to the state of the economy, where a fixed set of parameters govern the degree of adjustment. In an environment with endogenous regime-switching, the policy rule is state-contingent in this conventional sense, but also in a broader sense. Namely, the parameters governing the degree of adjustment of the interest rate to economic variables are themselves a function of the economic state. For example, high rates of inflation may be particularly alarming to policy makers and trigger a systematically more aggressive response to inflation than in states with more benign rates of inflation.

To understand endogenous switching, it is useful to review fixed-regime and exogenous switching specifications of policy behavior. Consider the simplified Taylor rule

$$i_t = \kappa + \alpha\pi_t + \varepsilon_t, \tag{1}$$

where i_t is the short-term nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank, π_t is the inflation rate, and $\varepsilon_t \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma^2)$ is an exogenous policy disturbance. This rule is state-contingent in the sense that the nominal interest rate adjusts to the inflation rate, which itself is a function of the underlying state vector describing the economy. However, the systematic component of policy, α , is constant. All deviations of i_t from $\kappa + \alpha\pi_t$ are folded into the exogenous shock.

An exogenously switching rule extends this framework to

$$i_t = \kappa(S_t) + \alpha(S_t)\pi_t + \varepsilon_t, \tag{2}$$

where S_t is a discrete-valued random variable that evolves stochastically and independently of the endogenous economic variables. Now monetary policy is a set of different rules of the form in (1), with a stochastic process governing the dynamic evolution of the rules. This makes the policy *rule* rather than just the policy instrument (the interest rate) state-contingent. In both (1) and (2), the parameters κ and α are given exogenously. The key difference between the two specifications is that (2) introduces a new source of disturbance to the economy, the process governing S_t , with important implications for expectations formation.

A simple example of endogenous switching makes the parameters of the monetary policy rule functions of lagged endogenous variables, as in

$$i_t = \kappa(\pi_{t-1}) + \alpha(\pi_{t-1})\pi_t + \varepsilon_t, \quad (3)$$

where the monetary rule again is state-contingent, except that the state is now a lagged endogenous variable. This paper specifies the functions in (3), $\kappa(\cdot)$ and $\alpha(\cdot)$, to be step functions. As implemented in this paper, endogenous switching can make the functions $\kappa(\cdot)$ and $\alpha(\cdot)$ either deterministic or stochastic functions of π_{t-1} .

Evidently, there is no sharp conceptual distinction between endogenous “regime change” and nonlinear policy rules. The former is a discrete approximation of the latter. Discreteness may have some practical advantages to a central bank that seeks to communicate clearly about its policy actions: it is far easier to inform the public about two distinct policy stances—“normal” and “tight,” for instance—than about the continuum of responses implied by a response to inflation that is a continuous function of the inflation rate. Discreteness also lends itself to sharper interpretations of the resulting equilibria.

3. THE MONETARY POLICY PROCESS

We assume that the monetary policy process permits the monetary authority to vary its response to contemporaneous inflation depending on the state of the economy. For example, a monetary authority may respond systematically more aggressively when inflation exceeds a particular threshold and less aggressively when inflation is below the threshold.³

When the threshold depends on lagged inflation, the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate using the rule⁴

$$i_t = \alpha_{S_t}\pi_t + \gamma_{S_t}x_t, \quad (4)$$

³The phrase “respond systematically more aggressively” may seem redundant. We use it to emphasize that the central bank is *not* raising the nominal interest rate because of the realization of an additive shock. Instead, it is changing the function that maps economic conditions into policy choices.

⁴To focus on endogenous policy actions, in what follows we dispense with the policy shock.

where x_t is a measure of the output gap. The intercepts and coefficients on inflation and the output gap are functions of the inflation threshold, π^* , and lagged inflation,

$$\alpha_{S_t} = (1 - I[\pi_{t-1} \geq \pi^*]) \alpha_0 + I[\pi_{t-1} \geq \pi^*] \alpha_1, \quad (5)$$

$$\gamma_{S_t} = (1 - I[\pi_{t-1} \geq \pi^*]) \gamma_0 + I[\pi_{t-1} \geq \pi^*] \gamma_1, \quad (6)$$

where $I[\cdot]$ is the indicator function. In sections 5 and 6, we consider specifications that incorporate the output gap into the threshold and thresholds that depend on expected inflation. In all cases, the monetary policy process incorporates a state-contingent systematic component of policy, so the interest rate rule used to implement policy varies with economic conditions. This represents the point of departure from simple instrument rules in which the systematic response of policy is invariant across time and states.

4. A FISHERIAN MODEL OF INFLATION

A simple model of inflation determination combines a standard Fisher equation with an interest rate rule for monetary policy. The Fisher equation can be derived from a perfectly competitive endowment economy with flexible prices and a one-period nominal bond. In this Fisherian model the linearized asset-pricing equation for the nominal bond is given by

$$i_t = E_t \pi_{t+1} + E_t r_{t+1}, \quad (7)$$

where r_t denotes the real rate at t . The real rate evolves exogenously according to

$$r_t = \rho r_{t-1} + v_t, \quad (8)$$

where $0 \leq \rho < 1$ and $v_t \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma_v^2)$.

In the special fixed-regime case where $\alpha_0 = \alpha_1 = \alpha > 1$ in (5), equilibrium inflation is uniquely determined by

$$\pi_t = \frac{\rho}{\alpha - \rho} r_t. \quad (9)$$

As α increases, the effect of real rate shocks on inflation declines and monetary policy increasingly offsets the influence of real rate shocks as $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$.

4.1. Threshold Switching Monetary Policy Regimes. The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate using

$$i_t = \begin{cases} \alpha_0 \pi_t & \text{if } \pi_{t-1} < \pi^* \text{ so } S_t = 0 \\ \alpha_1 \pi_t & \text{if } \pi_{t-1} \geq \pi^* \text{ so } S_t = 1 \end{cases}, \quad (10)$$

where $\alpha_1 > \alpha_0 > 1$. Monetary policy is active in both regimes and more active when $\pi_{t-1} \geq \pi^*$. We normalize the threshold to be $\pi^* = 0$. Monetary policy adopts a different rule with probability 1 every time lagged inflation crosses the inflation threshold. If lagged inflation doesn't cross the threshold, then the instrument rule

switches with probability 0. We refer to this monetary policy as “threshold switching,” based on the time series literature on self-exciting threshold autoregressive models, in which lagged values of a variable can induce a change in regime [Ghaddar and Tong (1981)]. Monetary policy self-excites in this sense by influencing inflation, which itself determines future policy regimes.

Regime change is endogenous under this policy specification because shocks can push inflation above or below the inflation threshold, leading the monetary authority to adopt a different reaction function. For example, a shock that pushes inflation above its threshold leads the central bank to adopt a reaction function where the systematic response to inflation is more aggressive in the following period. Conversely, a shock that pushes inflation below its threshold leads the central bank to adopt a reaction function that adjusts interest rates less aggressively in the following period. The adoption of a less-aggressive rule can reflect that the central bank views inflation as contained and shifts its concerns to some other objectives.

In this model and all subsequent variants, private agents form rational expectations based on complete information regarding the policy making process. At date t they observe all current and past variables; to form expectations, they incorporate the effects that shocks have on the probability distribution over the policy rules. As section 4.4 explains, although at date t agents know regime at $t + 1$ with certainty, this does *not* imply that they know all future regimes because the sequence of regimes that is realized depends on the sequence of realizations of exogenous shocks, v_t , and the serial correlation properties of the real interest rate process.

4.2. Equilibrium Characteristics. Let Θ_t denote the state at date t . The solution to the model is a function that maps the minimum set of state variables, $\Theta_t = (r_t, \pi_{t-1})$, into values for the endogenous variable, π_t .

With self-exciting regime change, a positive real rate shock raises inflation, as it does in a fixed regime, but the magnitude differs due to how agents formulate expectations of future inflation. With a fixed-regime, agents know that monetary policy will respond symmetrically next period to real rate shocks regardless of the sign of the shock. Self-exciting regime switching induces agents to expect a stronger monetary policy response next period whenever a positive real rate shock pushes inflation above its threshold.

To build intuition, it is helpful to consider a policy process that makes the two regimes very different: $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and $\alpha_1 = 25$. This extreme example has policy adjusting the nominal rate very aggressively when inflation exceeds its threshold. In states where lagged inflation is below its threshold, the monetary authority still adjusts the nominal rate more than one-for-one with inflation, but to a degree more in line with conventional Taylor rule specifications.

Given the simple policy process in (10), regimes inherit their persistence from the real interest rate process. We make the real rate relatively serially correlated by setting $\rho = .9$.

Figure 1 gives the contemporaneous response surface for inflation as a function of the state—lagged inflation and the current real rate. States where lagged inflation exceeds its threshold trigger the more-aggressive policy that almost completely offsets the effect of a real rate shock on inflation. This is evident in the figure from the nearly flat portion of the shaded surface when $\pi_{t-1} \geq 0$. States where lagged inflation is below the threshold trigger the less-active policy and real rate shocks have larger impacts on inflation, as shown in the left panels of the figure.

Using more plausible values, consider $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and $\alpha_1 = 3$ a baseline policy. Figure 1 illustrates the response surface in comparison to the extreme example. The policy response when inflation exceeds its threshold is not as aggressive in the baseline policy, which allows real rates to have a larger impact on inflation. The figure also illustrates how expectations affect current inflation. When inflation is less than its threshold, the extreme and baseline policies both have $\alpha_1 = 1.5$. However, the response surfaces differ because in the extreme case agents incorporate the fact that a large real rate shock will cause inflation to exceed its threshold in the future and trigger the more-aggressive policy response. Thus, in the extreme case, positive real rate shocks have a smaller contemporaneous impact on inflation, even though both policies are responding with equal magnitude to current inflation. Much tighter future policy spills over to attenuate the increase in current inflation.

Figure 2 illustrates a slice of the response surface for given rates of lagged inflation. The northeast quadrant of figure 2 corresponds to the northwest section of figure 1. When lagged inflation is below its threshold ($\pi_{t-1} = -.2$), the less-active monetary policy is in place in the current period. A large positive real rate shock, however, can cause agents to expect more aggressive policy in the subsequent period. Consequently, the contemporaneous response of inflation has a kink at the point where a real rate shock triggers this shift in expectations. The positive real rate shock increases inflation, but by not as much as under the less-active fixed-regime policy, because future regimes spillover to affect the current equilibrium. Spillovers show up as the distance between the o 's—the fixed-regime model with $\alpha = 1.5$ —and the solid line—the switching model with $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ in place. This distance arises from the expectation of tighter policy next period, not from any difference between current policy stances.

Figure 3 corresponds to the impulse response evidence other studies have found for asymmetric impacts of macro shocks. The figure reports responses of inflation to one-time negative and positive real rate shocks of equal magnitude. For reference, it also reports responses for fixed regimes that are less active (dashed lines) and more

active (dotted-dashed lines). Monetary policy is initially in the more-active regime. Following the positive shock, inflation rises and the more-active regime stays in place. Since the more-active policy is in place for both the positive and negative shocks in period 1, the positive shock has a smaller absolute impact because agents expect to stay in the more-active regime in the future, owing to the fact that persistence in the shock is likely to keep inflation above threshold. The negative shock lowers inflation and causes policy to switch to the less-active regime in period 2; agents' expectations adjust to reflect the greater likelihood that this regime stays in place in future periods. The change in expectations and less-active policy do less to offset the negative shock, so inflation displays a more persistent deviation from its threshold than following a positive shock.

4.3. Asymmetric Distributions. As the impulse responses imply, threshold switching creates an asymmetric distribution of inflation. The fixed-regime model with normal shocks implies a symmetric normal distribution. Under exogenous regime-switching, the distribution for inflation is a mixture of the two conditional distributions in each regime, where each conditional distribution is normal. With endogenous switching, the distribution is skewed to reflect that low or negative inflation rates are more likely to occur than high inflation rates. For illustration, figure 4 reports three histograms for different values of the Taylor coefficient in the regime where inflation exceeds its threshold. A very aggressive response, $\alpha_1 = 25$ (top panel), produces a severely right-skewed distribution whose tail extends into rates of inflation far below threshold. Realizations of inflation above .1 % occur infrequently. As α_1 declines, the degree of skewness declines, but is still apparent in the case where $\alpha_1 = 3$. The skewness is eliminated as $\alpha_1 \rightarrow \alpha_0$.

Skewness arises from spillovers generated by the monetary policy process. The less-active monetary policy is relatively accommodating of shocks in states where inflation is below its threshold, so a negative shock to the real rate transmits through to inflation to a larger extent than when inflation is above its threshold. In contrast, a positive shock to the real rate that raises inflation above its threshold and triggers a switch to the more-active policy dampens of the effect on inflation.

4.4. Time-Varying Probabilities of Switching. Although the threshold switching setup we employ implies that agents know the regime one period in advance, agents' expectations formation is nontrivial because they do *not* know all future regimes. The sequence of regimes that is realized depends on the sequences of exogenous shocks that are realized and on the serial correlation properties of those shocks. This section describes in detail how agents form rational expectations in this environment, clarifying the nature of expectations formation in the face of threshold switching of policy regimes.

In a state where the real rate shock is zero and inflation equals its threshold, agents know that the more-aggressive regime will be in place next period because $\pi_{t-1} \geq 0$. Forming expectations two periods ahead requires agents to compute the probability that in the following period a shock will hit that causes inflation to fall and policy authorities to adopt the less-active regime.

The probability of future regimes can be characterized precisely. Define the minimum set of state variables to be $\Theta_t = (r_t, \pi_{t-1})$. The solution for inflation as a function of Θ_t can be expressed as

$$\pi_t = h^\pi(r_t, \pi_{t-1}). \quad (11)$$

The minimum v_t , which is the innovation in the process for the real rate shock, necessary to induce $S_{t+1} = 1$ is given by the solution to

$$\min_{v_t} h^\pi(\rho r_{t-1} + v_t, h^\pi(r_{t-1}, \pi_{t-2})) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \pi_t \geq 0.$$

The objective function is $h^\pi(r_t, \pi_{t-1})$, which is increasing in v_t , so the minimization problem simply finds the minimum innovation to the shock process that creates non-negative inflation at time t .⁵ The probability of $S_{t+1} = 1$ is then

$$\Pr[S_{t+1} = 1 | \Theta_{t-1}] = \int_{v_t^*}^{\infty} \phi(v; \sigma_v^2) dv, \quad (12)$$

where Θ_{t-1} includes all information at time $t-1$, which includes π_{t-1} and, therefore, S_t . The integral in (12) gives the probability of realizing a shock at t , $v_t \geq v_t^*$, whose value is sufficiently large to induce $S_{t+1} = 1$.

To build intuition, consider an example. The economy is in its deterministic steady state at date $t-2$, so $\pi_{t-2} = r_{t-2} = 0$, which puts $S_{t-1} = 1$. Given the realization of v_{t-1} , regime at t is known and $\Pr[S_t = 1 | \Theta_{t-1}]$ is a step function: if $v_{t-1} \geq 0$, then $\pi_{t-1} > 0$ and $\Pr[S_t = 1 | \Theta_{t-1}] = 1$, whereas if $v_{t-1} < 0$, then $\pi_{t-1} < 0$ and $\Pr[S_t = 1 | \Theta_{t-1}] = 0$.

Regime at $t+1$, however, is not so easily deduced. Because the real rate shock is positively serially correlated, $v_{t-1} < 0$ creates low inflation at $t-1$ and at future dates. To trigger a regime change, the innovation at t must be both positive and large enough to offset the persistent negative effects on inflation of the previous shock. Evidently, the smaller the negative shock at $t-1$, the more likely it is that the shock at t will push inflation over the threshold and make $S_{t+1} = 1$.

The minimization problem for this example becomes

$$\min_{v_t} h^\pi(\rho v_{t-1} + v_t, h^\pi(v_{t-1}, 0)) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \pi_t \geq 0.$$

⁵The normal distribution for the innovations ensures that a minimum always exists.

Two parameters are critical to the solution of this minimization problem— ρ , which governs the degree of serial correlation of the real interest rate, and α_1 , the strength of the policy reaction to inflation in the more-active regime.⁶ Figure 5 plots $\Pr[S_{t+1}|\Theta_{t-1}]$ as a function of the innovation to the real rate at $t - 1$, for various degrees of serial correlation, ρ . The figure is drawn for $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and $\alpha_1 = 3$. When the shock is *i.i.d.* ($\rho = 0$), regime is also *i.i.d.*, changing each time a shock of a different sign is realized. Regardless of the realization of v_{t-1} , there is a 50-50 chance of either the less-active or the more-active regime at $t + 1$ (dotted line).⁷ As the real rate becomes more persistent, if $v_{t-1} > 0$, the probability of switching to the less-active regime declines because it is less likely that a shock at t will be sufficiently large and negative to offset the serially correlated increase in inflation from the date $t - 1$ positive shock. As the figure shows, for a given realization of v_{t-1} , the probability of staying in the more-active regime rises monotonically with ρ . This is a manifestation of the cross-regime spillovers.

Cross-regime spillovers also increase with the strength of the monetary policy reaction to inflation in the more-active regime. Figure 6 plots $\Pr[S_{t+1}|\Theta_{t-1}]$ as a function of the innovation to the real rate at $t - 1$, for various values of α_1 , the Taylor coefficient in the more-active regime. The figure is drawn for $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and $\rho = .9$. For a given realization of $v_{t-1} > 0$, the probability in staying in the more-active regime from period t to period $t + 1$ falls monotonically with α_1 . Put differently, as α_1 rises, monetary policy offsets real rate shocks to a larger extent in the more-active regime and raises the probability that future inflation will be below threshold, triggering the less-active policy. Consequently, larger real rate shocks are required to keep the probability of switching to the more active regime constant as α_1 rises. The presence of a more-active regime, and a threshold rule for switching to it, changes expectations so that the economy spends more time in the less-active regime. This spillover underlies the asymmetric distribution of inflation in figure 4.

In general, a state where inflation is above threshold and the current real rate shock is positive results in agents placing little probability mass on the adoption of the less-active regime anytime in the near future. In such a state, expectations closely resemble those in a fixed-regime setting, where agents place zero probability on a change.

5. THRESHOLD SWITCHING IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

We now turn to assess the implications of endogenous regime-switching within a conventional new Keynesian model, as described in Woodford (2003). The log-linear

⁶The variance of the shock, σ_v^2 , is also important. For simplicity, we do not analyze this dimension.

⁷The graph is drawn for $\rho = .01$ because when $\rho = 0$ the model collapses to the trivial solution $\pi_t \equiv 0$.

consumption Euler equation and aggregate supply relations are

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - \sigma^{-1}(i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + g_t, \quad (13)$$

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + u_t, \quad (14)$$

where aggregate demand and supply shocks follow

$$g_t = \rho_g g_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{gt} \quad (15)$$

$$u_t = \rho_u u_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{ut} \quad (16)$$

with $0 \leq \rho_g < 1, 0 \leq \rho_u < 1, \varepsilon_{gt} \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma_g^2)$ and $\varepsilon_{ut} \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma_u^2)$.

5.1. Monetary Policy Specification. This section focuses on a monetary policy process where the current regime depends on lagged inflation and policy responds to contemporaneous inflation, as in the Fisherian model. The policy rule, in terms of deviations from the deterministic steady state, is

$$i_t = \alpha_{S_t} \pi_t. \quad (17)$$

The coefficient on inflation is a function of the inflation threshold and lagged inflation,

$$\alpha_{S_t} = (1 - I[\pi_{t-1} \geq \pi^*]) \alpha_0 + I[\pi_{t-1} \geq \pi^*] \alpha_1.$$

5.2. Supply Shocks. Figure 7 reports the contemporaneous response of inflation to supply shocks at t for two values of lagged inflation—one that is below the threshold and triggers less-active policy at t (solid line) and one that exceeds the threshold and triggers the more-active regime at t (dotted-dashed line). For contrast, the figure also plots the contemporaneous impacts of supply on inflation when regime is fixed and less active ($\alpha_0 = 1.5$, o 's) and when it is more active ($\alpha_1 = 3$, x 's). The inflation threshold is set to zero, which is consistent with the steady state inflation rate around which the model equations are linearized.

The figure highlights cross-regime spillovers that affect the equilibrium through expectations formation. Consider the solid line, which corresponds to below-threshold π_{t-1} , so policy is in the less-active regime at t . Positive supply shocks raise inflation but only slightly more than they would in a fixed, *more*-active regime, and raise it much less than in a fixed, less-active regime. The prospect that regime at $t + 1$ will switch to being more active spills over to dampen inflation even when the prevailing regime is less active. Parallel reasoning applies to states in which π_{t-1} is above threshold.

Asymmetry arising from endogenously switching policy is apparent in impulse responses. Figure 8 reports the responses for output, inflation and the nominal rate to one-standard deviation positive and negative supply shocks, starting from the more-active regime initially. In the figure, the positive supply shock's impact on inflation is

offset by monetary policy to a larger extent than is the negative supply shock. Positive shocks raise inflation and cause agents to increase the probability they attach to monetary policy remaining in the more-active regime.

The negative supply shock produces a kink in the period following the initial shock. Expectations prior to the supply shock were placing roughly equal weight on future monetary regimes. Following the negative supply shock, agents revise their expectations, placing more weight on the less-active monetary regime, since the probability of inflation exceeding its threshold in the near future is relatively low. The effects of the revisions of expectations towards the more accommodating monetary regime are realized the period following the shock, causing a further drop in inflation and the kink that is apparent in the figure.

5.3. Output and Inflation Thresholds. Flexible inflation targeting central banks operate under a legislative mandate that specifies multiple objectives—price stability, stable growth, high employment, safe payments systems, and so forth. The Swedish central bank, for example, is instructed that “without prejudice to the price stability target, [it] should furthermore support the goals of general economic policy with a view to maintaining a sustainable level of growth and high rate of employment” [Sveriges Riksbank (2006), p. 2].

Flexible inflation targeting can be modeled by extending the preceding analysis to make the switch in policy rules depend on both inflation and output gap thresholds. The second threshold builds additional nonlinearity into the response surfaces for inflation and output. The monetary rule is given by

$$i_t = \begin{cases} \alpha_0 \pi_t + \varepsilon_t & \text{if } \pi_{t-1} < \pi^* \text{ and } x_t \geq 0 \\ \alpha_0 \pi_t + \gamma_0 x_t + \varepsilon_t & \text{if } \pi_{t-1} < \pi^* \text{ and } x_t < 0 \\ \alpha_1 \pi_t + \varepsilon_t & \text{if } \pi_{t-1} \geq \pi^* \end{cases}, \quad (18)$$

where $\gamma_0 > 0$ and $\alpha_1 > \alpha_0 > 1$. If inflation exceeds its threshold, regardless of the level of output, the central bank responds aggressively to inflation and essentially disregards output gap fluctuations. (The “without prejudice to price stability” mandate.) In states when inflation is below its threshold, the monetary authority turns to output stabilization objectives, while still responding actively to inflation. (The “maintain growth” mandate.) When the output gap is negative, the monetary authority responds to the output gap by lowering rates; when it’s positive, the monetary authority does not respond to output fluctuations, reflecting a preference to let the boom continue, so long as inflation remains contained.

Figure 9 plots two response surfaces for inflation against lagged inflation and the contemporaneous supply shock. The shaded response surface is for states with $x_{t-1} < 0$ and the solid white surface is for states with $x_{t-1} \geq 0$. In the state with the negative output gap, the monetary authority adjusts the nominal rate to stabilize

output (a positive coefficient on the output gap term in the policy rule). In states when inflation is below its threshold, the shaded surface indicates that policy does not aggressively offset supply shocks to stabilize inflation; this appears in the steep portion of the surface in this state. When inflation exceeds its threshold, the two response surfaces connect, since the rules in this state are the same. If inflation is below its threshold and output is above its threshold, then the monetary authority does less to stabilize output. In this state a positive supply shock drives up inflation and drives down output, but the monetary authority responds only to inflation, not output. In contrast to the case when output is below threshold, a positive supply shock drives up inflation and drives output down further down; but there is a more aggressive interest rate response that stabilizes output.

6. THRESHOLD SWITCHING AND THE ‘PREEMPTION DIVIDEND’

Central banks aim to strike preemptively by aggressively increasing interest rates in response to latent future inflation. Federal Reserve behavior in 1994 is an example of such a strike: rapid increases in long-term bond yields were viewed as reflecting expectations of higher future inflation, despite relatively docile contemporaneous inflation. Goodfriend (2005) describes this episode as an “inflation scare” and argues it is an illustration of a successful preemptive strike against inflation, based on subsequent realizations of low inflation and a halt in the rise of expected inflation.

Establishing and maintaining the central bank’s credibility as an inflation fighter is central to Goodfriend’s argument that preemption is good policy. By demonstrating its willingness to act boldly to combat inflation even before it shows up in headline measures, a central bank can anchor inflation expectations. As Bernanke (2004) emphasizes, preemption was a hallmark of Federal Reserve policy under Alan Greenspan.

While it is possible to model preemptive actions in fixed-regime models as an intervention on exogenous “shocks” to the monetary policy rule, as Leeper and Zha (2003) do, it is difficult to see how that approach can have the lasting effects on expectation formation that Goodfriend emphasizes lie at the heart of combating inflation scares. Interventions on shocks can shift conditional expectations, but they cannot affect expectations functions. Discrete shifts in policy seem to be an integral part of Goodfriend’s story.

To model a preemptive strike, we need an environment in which expected inflation can rise in response to a shock. The canonical new Keynesian model of the previous sections produces rapid adjustments to shocks, so any persistence in output and inflation arises from serial correlation in the exogenous shock process. The hybrid new Keynesian model, employed by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) or Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), introduces backward-looking elements to behavior that permit inflation and output to exhibit the hump-shaped dynamics often found

in VAR studies. When shocks generate a steadily increasing path of inflation, the monetary authority is presented with the opportunity to respond more aggressively than normal to rising forecasts of inflation.

The Phillips curve from the hybrid new Keynesian model is

$$\pi_t = (1 - \omega_\pi) \pi_{t-1} + \omega_\pi E_t \pi_{t+1} + \lambda x_t + u_t, \quad (19)$$

where $u_t \sim i.i.d N(0, \sigma^2)$ and π_{t-1} enters due to the assumption that firms that cannot reoptimize their pricing decisions simply index their nominal prices to past inflation. The consumption Euler equation is

$$x_t = (1 - \omega_x) x_{t-1} + \omega_x E_t x_{t+1} - \sigma^{-1} (R_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + g_t, \quad (20)$$

where $g_t \sim i.i.d N(0, \sigma^2)$. The parameter ω_x is an index of internal habit formation. The state vector for these two behavioral equations is $\Omega_t = \{\pi_{t-1}, x_{t-1}, g_t\}$.

A preemptive strike calls for a different rule in certain states. States that imply high current and rising future inflation will trigger a more aggressive monetary policy rule. Specifically,

$$i_t = \begin{cases} \alpha_0 \pi_t & \Omega_t \notin \Upsilon_t \\ \alpha_1 \pi_t & \Omega_t \in \Upsilon_t \end{cases}, \quad (21)$$

where $\alpha_1 > \alpha_0 > 1$ and Υ_t is the state that generates an inflation scare,

$$\Upsilon_t = \{ \Omega_t | \pi_t \geq 0, \pi_t > \pi_{t-1}, E_t \pi_{t+1} > \pi_t \}. \quad (22)$$

Expressions (21) and (22) combine a simple feedback rule with forward-looking threshold switching criteria to produce a forecast-based policy process. In practice, most central banks follow forecast-based policies [Bernanke (2004) and Svensson (2005)], so the specification in (21) and (22) brings the paper's analysis closer in line with actual policy behavior than does the unidimensional inflation threshold considered above.

We choose parameters in line with estimates from the literature in order to gauge the quantitative impact of preemptive action on inflation and output. Parameter values for the Phillips curve are consistent with estimates in Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2005), where $\omega_\pi = .65$ and $\lambda = .03$. For the consumption Euler equation we use $\sigma^{-1} = .16$ (from table 5.1 in Woodford (2003)) and $\omega_y = .52$, a value from Dennis (2005) that indicates a substantial degree of habit persistence. To generate hump-shaped responses, we focus on the demand shock, u_t . In this exercise, "normal" policy sets $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and the preemptive policy sets $\alpha_1 = 5$.

Using the baseline parameter values, figure 10 shows impulse responses to a demand shock under the endogenously switching preemptive policy (solid line), and compares them to the fixed-regime policy (dashed line). The fixed-regime policy uses α_0 . The demand shock generates a delayed rise in inflation, where the peak occurs the period following the shock under both policies. Under the preemptive policy, the shock

raises inflation and creates an expectation of higher future inflation. This triggers a preemptive rise in rates that partially offsets the subsequent rise in inflation and reduces output.

What does implementing a preemptive, threshold-switching policy buy the monetary authority? We answer this question by isolating the expectations formation effects that arise under the preemptive policy, but are absent from the fixed-regime. Figure 11 mimics the shock intervention exercises in Leeper and Zha (2003) to create a sequence of *i.i.d.* policy shocks that allows the fixed-regime policy to exactly reproduce the interest rate path that the preemptive switching policy implements. The two policies produce identical interest rate paths following the demand shock (bottom panel). In the first two panels we see that under preemptive, threshold-switching policy (solid lines), monetary policy is more effective than fixed-regime policy (dashed lines): inflation rises by much less. The figure also makes apparent the cost of this preemption dividend: output rises by less.⁸

Figure 11 is produced using a conventional calibration. Preemptive switching reduces inflation by almost 0.1 percentage points each quarter for about a year and by 0.05 percentage points for another year. These numbers suggest that the preemption dividend might be substantial. This dividend springs entirely from the expectations formation mechanism created when the central bank adopts the preemptive switching process. Evidently, “managing expectations” can be quantitatively important.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

[To be written.]

⁸A more sophisticated preemptive switching policy that considers both inflation and output thresholds might attenuate the output effects.

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


FIGURE 1. Contemporaneous response surface for inflation as a function of past inflation and current real rate shock in Fisherian model. Less-active regime is $\alpha_0 = 1.5$; more-active regime is $\alpha_1 = 3$ (white surface) or $\alpha_1 = 25$ (shaded surface)




FIGURE 2. Contemporaneous inflation response to a real rate shock in Fisherian model: Threshold switching, $\pi_{t-1} = -0.2$ (solid line) and $\pi_{t-1} = 0.2$ (dotted-dashed line) and fixed-regime with less-active ($\alpha_0 = 1.5$) and more-active ($\alpha_1 = 3$)




FIGURE 3. Responses of inflation to positive and negative real rate shocks in Fisherian model: Threshold switching (solid lines) and fixed regime less-active (dashed lines) and fixed regime more-active (dotted-dashed lines)




FIGURE 4. Distribution of inflation in Fisherian model: Threshold switching with less-active regime $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and various settings of more-active regime




FIGURE 5. Probability of $S_{t+1} = 1$ conditional on information at $t - 1$, $\Theta_{t-1} = (r_{t-1}, \pi_{t-2})$, as function of the real interest rate shock at $t - 1$, for various values of the serial correlation of the exogenous shock, ρ . Drawn for $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and $\alpha_1 = 3$.




FIGURE 6. Probability of $S_{t+1} = 1$ conditional on information at $t - 1$, $\Theta_{t-1} = (r_{t-1}, \pi_{t-2})$, as function of the real interest rate shock at $t - 1$, for various values of the Taylor parameter in the more-active regime, α_1 . Drawn for $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and $\rho = .9$.




FIGURE 7. Contemporaneous response of inflation to supply shocks in the new Keynesian model: Threshold switching and fixed regime with less-active ($\alpha_0 = 1.5$) and more-active ($\alpha_1 = 3$)




FIGURE 8. Responses to positive and negative supply shocks in new Keynesian model with threshold switching




FIGURE 9. Contemporaneous response surface for inflation as function of past inflation and current supply shock: inflation and output gap thresholds. White surface is states with $x_{t-1} \geq 0$; shaded surface is states with $x_{t-1} < 0$




FIGURE 10. Preemptive policy strike against inflation in the hybrid new Keynesian model. Fixed regime sets $\alpha = 1.5$; preemptive switching policy sets $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and $\alpha_1 = 5$.




FIGURE 11. Modeling preemptive policy in fixed- and in threshold-switching regimes. Figure feeds *i.i.d.* policy shocks into the fixed-regime policy rule to reproduce the interest rate path in the switching model. Fixed regime sets $\alpha = 1.5$; preemptive switching policy sets $\alpha_0 = 1.5$ and $\alpha_1 = 5$.