

Commodity Prices, Monetary Policy, and Currency Regimes

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Abstract

Commodity prices are back. This paper looks at connections between monetary policy, and agricultural and mineral commodities. We begin with the monetary influences on commodity prices, first for a large country such as the United States, then smaller countries. The claim is that low real interest rates lead to high real commodity prices. The theory is an analogy with Dornbusch overshooting. The relationship between real interest rates and real commodity prices is also supported empirically. One channel through which this effect is accomplished is a negative effect of interest rates on the desire to carry commodity inventories. The paper concludes with a consideration of the reverse causality: the possible influence of commodity prices on monetary policy, under alternative currency regimes. The new proposal for PEPI -- Peg the Export Price Index -- is compared (favorably) with -- the popular regime of CPI targeting -- by the criterion of robustness with respect to changes in the terms of trade such as oil price shocks.

Commodity Prices, Monetary Policy, and Currency Regimes

I. Introduction

Commodity prices are back, with a vengeance.

In the 1970s, macroeconomic discussions were dominated by the oil price shocks and other rises in agricultural and mineral products that were thought to play a big role in the stagflation of that decade.¹ In the early 1980s, any discussion of alternative monetary regimes was not complete without a consideration of the gold standard and proposals for other commodity-based standards.

Yet the topic of commodity prices fell out of favor in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Commodity prices generally declined during that period; it must be that declining commodity prices are not considered as interesting as rising prices. Nobody seemed to notice how many of the victims of emerging market crises in the 1990s were oil producers that were suffering, among other things, from low oil prices (Mexico, Indonesia, Russia) or others suffering from low agricultural prices (Brazil and Argentina). The favorable effect of low commodity prices on macroeconomic performance -- in the US in the 1990s -- delivering lower inflation than had been thought possible at such high rates of growth and employment, was occasionally remarked. But it was not usually described as a favorable supply shock, the mirror image of the adverse supply shocks of the 1970s. It always received far less attention than the influence of other factors, such as the declining prices of semi-conductors and other information technology and communication equipment. Indeed, anyone who talked about sectors where the product was clunky and mundane as copper, crude petroleum and soy beans was considered behind the times. Agriculture and mining no longer constituted a large share of the New Economy, and did not matter much in an age dominated by ethereal digital communication, evanescent dotcoms, and externally outsourced services.

Now oil prices and many broader indices of commodity prices are again at or near all-time highs in nominal terms (copper, platinum, nickel and zinc, for example, all hit record highs in 2006, in addition to crude oil), and are very high in real terms as well. As a result, commodities are once again hot. It turns out that mankind has to live in the physical world after all! Still, the initial reaction in 2003-04 was relaxed, on several grounds: (1) Oil was no longer a large share of the economy, it was said; (2) Futures markets showed that the "spike" in prices was expected to be only temporary; and (3) Monetary policy need focus only on the core CPI inflation rate and can safely ignore the volatile food and energy component, unless or until it starts to get passed through into the core rate. But by 2005-2006, the increase in prices had gone far enough to receive much more serious attention. This was especially true with regard to the perceived

¹ A small dissenting minority viewed the increases in prices of oil and other commodities in the 1970s as the *result* of overly expansionary US monetary policy, rather than as an exogenous inflationary supply shock (the result of the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the 1979 fall of the Shah of Iran). After all, was it just a coincidence that other commodity prices had gone up at the same time, or in the case of agricultural products, had actually preceded the oil shocks?

permanence of oil prices, largely because the futures price had gone from implying that the rise in the spot price was mostly temporary to implying that is mostly permanent.

Certain lessons of the past are well-remembered, such as the dangers of the Dutch Disease for countries undergoing a commodity export boom. But others have been forgotten, or were never properly absorbed.²

With regard to point (3), it is time to examine more carefully the claim that if an increase in energy or agricultural prices does not appear in the core CPI, then monetary policy can ignore it. The first half of the paper will argue that high real commodity prices can be a signal that monetary policy is loose. Thus they can be a useful monetary indicator (among many others).

The current fashion is inflation-targeting, by which is usually meant targeting the CPI.³ To be sure, the emphasis is on the core inflation rate “excluding the volatile food and energy sector.” The leadership of the Federal Reserve has indicated that the oil-shock component of recent inflation upticks should be ignored and accommodated. But just because agricultural and mineral product prices are volatile, does not mean that there is no useful information in them. The prices of gold and other minerals used to be considered useful leading indicators of inflationary expectations, precisely because they moved faster than the sluggish prices of manufactured goods and services. Nor does the volatility mean that excluding such products from the price index that guides monetary policy is necessarily the right thing to do.

In the first place, the “core CPI” is not a concept that is especially well understood among the general population. Thus the public will not necessarily be reassured when the central bank explains that they should not be worried about big increases in food and energy prices. Attempts to explain away high numbers for headline inflation make it sound like the authorities are granting themselves an ad hoc self-pardon – like a “dog ate my homework” excuse. This can undermine the public credibility of the central bank, which is the whole point of announcing an observable target in the first place. Thus targeting the core CPI may not buy as much credibility as targeting something more easily understood (even if with a wider band).

² One point in passing. With regard to conventional wisdom (2), it is curious that so many economists and central bankers are ready to accept that the futures price of oil is an unbiased forecast of the future spot price. This proposition of course would follow from the two propositions that the futures price is an accurate measure of expectations (no risk premium) and that expectations are rational. Both halves of the joint hypothesis are open to question. Few familiar with the statistics of forward exchange rates claim that they are an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate. Few familiar with the statistics of the interest rate term structure claim that the long-term interest rate contains an unbiased predictor of future short term interest rates. Why, then, should we think that the oil futures price is an unbiased predictor of the future spot price? So the backwardation (forward prices below spot) in oil prices in 2004 was not necessarily a reason to be complacent, and the flattening or contango (forward prices above spot) in 2005-06 was not necessarily a reason to worry. Nevertheless, the steepening of the futures yield curve during the period 2004-06, the same period that the Federal Reserve was steadily raising interest rates, is consistent with the theory of this paper, which says that the slope depends on the interest rate plus storage costs minus convenience yield, as noted in footnote 8 below.

³ Among many other references: Bernanke, et al (1999), Svensson (1995, 1999), and Truman (2003).

The many proponents of inflation targeting will argue that the regime, if properly instituted, makes clear from the beginning that it excludes volatile commodity prices, so that there is no loss in credibility. But, in the second place, let us ask *should* the inflation target exclude commodity prices? They may be important, on terms of trade grounds, especially in smaller countries. Stabilizing the traded goods sector is itself an important goal in a world where balance of payments deficits can lead to financial crises, in which the previously declared currency regime is often one among many subsequent casualties. Recent oil price increases have also illustrated the necessity to take into account terms of trade shocks that come on the import side as well as the export side. What is wanted for intermediate target is a price index that is more easily understood by the public than the core CPI, and also more robust with respect to terms of trade shocks than the overall CPI. Candidates include a producer price index and an export price index.

It is a tenet of international economics textbooks that a desirable property of a currency regime is that the exchange rate be allowed to vary with terms of trade shocks: that the currency automatically depreciates when world prices of the import commodity go up (say, oil for the US or Switzerland, or wheat for Japan or Saudi Arabia), and that it automatically depreciates when world prices of the export commodity go down (say oil for Saudi Arabia and wheat for Canada). Yet CPI targeting does not have this property. To keep the headline inflation rate constant one must respond to a rise on world markets in the dollar price of imported oil by tightening monetary policy and *appreciating* the currency against the dollar enough to prevent the domestic price of the importable from rising. This response is the opposite from accommodating the adverse terms of trade shock, which would require a depreciation. It is true that the core inflation rate does not share this unfortunate property with the headline rate (unless the price increase comes in non-energy commodities like semi-conductors that are in the core). But the other half of terms of trade shocks are declines on world markets in the price of a country's export commodity. Theory says that when the dollar price of oil goes down, Saudi Arabia or Norway ought to depreciate against the dollar. But inflation targeting – *either* the headline CPI variety *or* the core CPI variety -- does not allow this result. One would need to target a price index that specifically featured prominently the price of the exportable. The fundamental difficulty is that excluding the volatile food and energy components is not sufficient to accommodate the terms of trade, *either* if some imports lie outside those two sectors *or* if some exports lie within those two sectors.

Throughout this paper we will adopt the familiar assumption that all goods can be divided into homogeneous agricultural and mineral commodities, on the one hand, and differentiated manufactured goods and services on the other hand, and that the key distinction is that prices of the former are perfectly flexible, so that their markets always clear, and that prices of the latter are sticky in the short run, so that their markets do not.⁴ The plan is to look at connections between commodities and monetary policy. We begin with the monetary influences on commodity prices (first for a large country, then a small one). We conclude with a viewpoint based on reverse causality: the possible influence of commodity prices on monetary policy in a consideration of what price index should be

⁴ For young readers, I will record that these distinctions were originally due to Arthur Okun (1975), who called the two sectors auction goods vs. customer goods.

used as a nominal anchor. Even if one is wedded to, say, a Taylor rule, the question of what price index should be used merits discussion. The author proposes an export price index (or producer price index) in place of the CPI. If one is enamored of a simpler price-targeting regime, then the proposal is to Peg the Export Price Index (PEPI) in place of targeting the CPI.

II. The Effect of Monetary Policy on Real Commodity Prices

A central purpose of this paper is to assert the claim that monetary policy, as reflected in real interest rates, is an important – and usually under-appreciated -- determinant of the real prices of oil and other mineral and agricultural products, while far from the only determinant.

1. Effect of US short-term real interest rates on real US commodity prices

The argument can be stated in an intuitive way that might appeal to practitioners, as follows. High interest rates reduce the demand for storable commodities, or increase the supply, through a variety of channels:

- by increasing the incentive for extraction today rather than tomorrow (think of the rates at which oil is pumped, iron ore is mined, forests logged, or livestock herds culled)
- by decreasing firms' desire to carry inventories (think of oil inventories held in tanks)
- by encouraging speculators to shift out of commodity contracts (especially spot contracts), and into treasury bills.

All three mechanisms work to reduce the market price of commodities, as happened when real interest rates were high in the early 1980s. A decrease in real interest rates has the opposite effect, lowering the cost of carrying inventories, and raising commodity prices, as happened during 2002-2004. Call it part of the "carry trade."⁵

a. Theory: The overshooting model

The theoretical model can be summarized as follows. A monetary contraction temporarily raises the real interest rate, whether via a rise in the nominal interest rate, a fall in expected inflation, or both. Real commodity prices fall. How far? Until commodities are widely considered "undervalued" -- so undervalued that there is an expectation of future appreciation (together with other advantages of holding inventories, namely the "convenience yield") that is sufficient to offset the higher interest rate (and other costs of carrying inventories: storage costs plus any risk premium). Only then,

⁵ "Why Are Oil and Metal Prices High? Don't Forget Low Interest Rates," Jeffrey Frankel (published as "Real Interest Rates Cast a Shadow Over Oil," *Financial Times*, April 15, 2005.

when expected returns are in balance, are firms willing to hold the inventories despite the high carrying cost. In the long run, the general price level adjusts to the change in the money supply. As a result, the real money supply, real interest rate, and real commodity price eventually return to where they were.

The theory is the same as Rudiger Dornbusch's (1976) famous theory of exchange rate overshooting, with the price of commodities substituted for the price of foreign exchange - and with convenience yield, minus storage costs, substituted for the foreign interest rate. The deep reason for the overshooting phenomenon is that prices for agricultural and mineral products adjust rapidly, while most other prices adjust slowly.⁶

The theory can be reduced to its simplest algebraic essence as a claimed relationship between the real interest rate and the spot price of a commodity relative to its expected long-run equilibrium price. This relationship can be derived from two simple assumptions. The first one governs expectations. Let

$s \equiv$ the spot price,

$\bar{s} \equiv$ its long run equilibrium,

$p \equiv$ the economy-wide price index,

$q \equiv s-p$, the real price of the commodity, and

$\bar{q} \equiv$ the long run equilibrium real price of the commodity,

all in log form. Market participants who observe the real price of the commodity today lying above or below its perceived long-run value, expect it in the future to regress back to equilibrium over time, at an annual rate that is proportionate to the gap:

$$E [\Delta (s - p)] \equiv E[\Delta q] = -\theta (q - \bar{q}). \quad (1)$$

Or
$$E (\Delta s) = -\theta (q - \bar{q}) + E(\Delta p). \quad (2)$$

Following the classic Dornbusch overshooting paper, we begin by simply asserting the reasonableness of the form of expectations in these equations: a tendency to regress back toward long run equilibrium. But, as in that paper, it can be shown that regressive expectations are also rational expectations, under certain assumptions regarding the

⁶ Frankel (1984).

stickiness of other goods prices (manufactures and services) and certain restrictions on parameter values.⁷

The second equation concerns the decision whether to hold the commodity for another period – either leaving it in the ground or on the trees or holding it in inventories – or to sell it at today’s price and deposit the proceeds in the bank to earn interest. The arbitrage condition is that the expected rate of return to these two alternative courses of action must be the same:

$$E \Delta s + c = i, \quad (3)$$

where

$$c \equiv cy - sc - rp$$

$cy \equiv$ convenience yield from holding the stock (e.g., the insurance value of having an assured supply of some critical input in the event of a disruption, or in the case of gold the psychic pleasure component)

$sc \equiv$ storage costs (e.g., costs of security to prevent plundering by others, rental rate on oil tanks or oil tankers, etc.),

$rp \equiv$ risk premium, which is positive if being long in commodities is risky, and

$i \equiv$ the interest rate.⁸

Combine equations (2) and (3):

$$-\theta (q - \bar{q}) + E(\Delta p) + c = i \quad \Rightarrow$$

$$q - \bar{q} = - (1/\theta) (i - E(\Delta p) - c) . \quad (4)$$

Equation (4) says that the real price of the commodity (measured relative to its long-run equilibrium) is inversely proportional to the real interest rate (measured relative to a constant term that depends on convenience yield). When the real interest rate is high, as in the 1980s, money flows out of commodities, just as it flows out of foreign currencies, emerging markets, and other securities. Only when the prices of these alternative assets are perceived to lie sufficiently below their future equilibria will the arbitrage condition be met. Conversely, when the real interest rate is low, as in 2001-05, money flows into commodities, just as it flows into foreign currencies, emerging markets, and other securities. Only when the prices of these alternative assets are perceived to lie sufficiently above their future equilibria will the arbitrage condition be met.

⁷ Frankel (1986).

⁸ Parenthetically, if one is interested in the derivatives markets, the forward discount or slope of the curve or forward discount, $f-s$ in log terms, is given by $i - cy + sc$, or equivalently by $E \Delta s - rp$.

b. The simplest test

One can imagine a number of ways of testing the theory.

One way of isolating the macroeconomic effects on commodity prices is to look at jumps in financial markets that occur in immediate response to government announcements that change perceptions of monetary policy, as was true of Fed money supply announcements in the early 1980s. Money announcements that caused interest rates to jump up would on average cause commodity prices to fall, and vice versa. The experiment is interesting, because news regarding supply disruptions and so forth is unlikely to have come out during the short time intervals in question.⁹

The relationship between the real commodity price and the real interest rate, equation (4), can also be tested more directly, because variables can be measured fairly easily.¹⁰ This is the test we pursue here.

We begin with a look at some plots. Three major price indices that have been available since 1950 -- from Dow Jones, Commodity Resources Board, and Moody's, are used in the first three figures. (In addition two others, which started later than 1950, are illustrated in an Appendix I). To compute the real commodity price we take the log of the commodity price index minus the log of the CPI. To compute the real interest rate, we take the one-year interest rate and subtract off the one year inflation rate observed over the preceding year. The negative relationship predicted by the theory seems to hold. We next apply OLS regression to these data.


We should not expect the relationship to hold precisely in practice. It would be foolish to think that the equation captures everything. In reality, a lot of other things beyond real interest rates influence commodity prices. There are bound to be fluctuations both in \bar{q} , the long-run equilibrium real price, and c , which includes convenience yield, storage costs, and risk premium. These fluctuations are not readily measurable. Such factors as weather, political vicissitudes in producing countries, and so forth, are likely to be very important when looking at individual commodities. Indeed analysts of oil or coffee or copper pay rather little attention to macroeconomic influences, and instead spend their time looking at microeconomic determinants. Oil prices have been high in 2004-06 in large part due to booming demand from China and feared supply disruptions in the Middle East, Russia, Nigeria and Venezuela. There may now be a premium built in to the convenience yield arising from the possibilities of supply disruption related to terrorism, uncertainty in the Persian Gulf, and related risks. Yet another factor concerns the proposition that the world supply of oil may be peaking in

⁹ Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985).

¹⁰ One precedent: Barsky and Summers (1988, Part III) established an inverse relationship between the real interest rate and the real prices of gold and nonferrous metals.

this decade, as new discoveries lag behind consumption (Hubbert's Peak¹¹). This would imply that \bar{q} , the world long run equilibrium real price of oil has shifted upward. Other factors apply to other commodities. In coffee, the large-scale entry of Vietnam into the market lowered prices sharply a few years ago. Corn, sugar, and cotton are heavily influenced by protectionist measures and subsidies in many countries. And so on.

Figure 1: US Real Commodity Prices and Real Interest Rates
CRB Commodity Price Index vs. Real
Interest Rate




Source: Global Financial Data Inc.

¹¹ Deffeyes (2005). Notwithstanding that such predictions have in the past been proven wrong.


Dow Jones Commodity Price Index vs. Real Interest Rate

Annual, 1950-2005



Source: Global Financial Data Inc.

Figure 1c



Such effects in individual commodities partially average out when looking at a basket average of commodity prices. This is one reason to use aggregate indices in the tests reported below.

Table 1 reports regressions of real commodity prices over the period 1950-2005. The results are statistically significant at the 5% level for all three of the major price indices that have been available since 1950 -- from Dow Jones, Commodity Resources Board, and Moody's -- and significant for one of the two with a shorter history (Goldman Sachs). All are of the hypothesized negative sign. The estimated coefficient for the CRB, $-.06$, is typical. It suggests that when the real interest rate goes up 1 percentage point (100 basis points), it lowers the real commodity price by $.06$, i.e. 6 per cent. It also suggests that the estimate for $1/\theta = 6$, so $\theta = .16$. In other words, the expected speed of adjustment per year is estimated at 16%. The expected half-life is about 4 years ($.84$ to the 4th power $\approx .5$).

Table 1: Regression of log real commodity prices on real interest rates over whole sample (1950-2005). Results by commodity indices, individual commodities and fixed-effects panel of commodities.

Log Real Commodity Prices and Interest Rates			
sample: 1950-2005 (56 annual observations)			
<i>real interest rate in % and real commodity prices in log units</i>			
	Coefficient	Std error	sig. 5%
Goldman Sachs (1969-)	-0.080	0.029	*
Dow Jones	-0.070	0.023	*
CRB	-0.060	0.024	*
Moodys	-0.058	0.014	*
Reuters (1959-)	-0.009	0.024	
COMMODITIES (by coefficient in ascending order)			
Sugar	-0.144	0.035	*
Soy bean oil	-0.096	0.030	*
Corn	-0.091	0.032	*
Rubber	-0.090	0.037	*
Wheat	-0.088	0.033	*
Lead	-0.071	0.022	*
Oats	-0.066	0.029	*
Soy beans	-0.064	0.027	*
Cocoa	-0.063	0.035	
Cotton	-0.061	0.030	*
Zinc	-0.050	0.018	*
Cattle	-0.048	0.016	*
FIXED-EFFECTS PANEL	-0.046	0.006	*
Nickel	-0.032	0.018	
Hogs	-0.031	0.022	
Copper	-0.026	0.028	
Tin	-0.026	0.032	
Aluminium	-0.022	0.017	
Coffee	-0.015	0.038	
Palladium	-0.012	0.025	
Silver	0.002	0.031	
Platinum	0.003	0.014	
Oil	0.009	0.028	
Gold	0.025	0.032	

Source: Global Financial Data

The table also reports results for 23 individual commodities, presented in order of the size of the estimated coefficient. Despite our fears that sector-specific microeconomic factors swamp the macroeconomic influences for individual commodities, the coefficient is of the hypothesized sign in 19 out of 22 cases and is statistically significant in half (11 out of 23). Interestingly oil and gold are the worst of the 22, showing (insignificant) positive coefficients ! A fixed effects panel incorporates the

information for all the individual commodities with the coefficient constrained to be the same. The coefficient is estimated at $-.046$ and is highly significant statistically.

The results in Table 1 suggest that the significant negative relationship between commodity prices and interest rates is reasonably robust across commodity price measures. Is the result robust over time? It appears that the negative correlation is significant over 1950-1979 (Table 1a, reported in the appendix). However, since 1980, there does not appear to have been a stable relationship between log real commodity prices and the real interest rate (Table 1b). The same is true if the sample is divided at 1976 or 1982.

c. An Effect on Inventories?

Since one of the hypothesized mechanisms of transmission from real interest rates to real commodity prices runs via the demand for inventories, it may be instructive to look at inventory data. Appendices 2 and 3 report the results for oil inventories (Tables 4 and 5). The coefficient on the real interest rate is often negative, as hypothesized, and often statistically significant, especially when controlling for other determinants of inventory demand such as the spot-futures spread (representing convenience yield), political risk in the Mideast, and industrial production. But the results are by no means uniform or robust.

We have also looked at agricultural inventories, as reported in Appendix 4 (Table 6). Here there is strikingly little evidence of an effect of real interest rates.

2. The relationship in other countries

In the preceding analysis, we have expressed everything – nominal commodity prices, CPI, interest rates -- in dollars. But the US is not the whole world. It is less than 1/3 of Gross World Product, even if its importance in monetary and financial markets is evidently greater than that. In this section we consider other countries, concentrating on those that currently have floating exchange rates and thus are in need of a price target to anchor monetary policy. We will treat them as “small open economies,” meaning that they take the world price of commodities as given, even though they range in size up to the United Kingdom.

a. Adding exchange rate overshooting to commodity price overshooting

We could begin by redoing the previous econometrics with global measures of each of the variables, i.e., measuring the commodity price in a GDP-weighted averages of the dollar, euro, yen, etc., measuring the world interest rate as a weighted average of national interest rates, and measuring the CPI and inflation rates as the same-weighted average of national CPIs and inflation rates. But we leave this as a possible extension for future research. Instead we take the US variables to be the global variables, and we proceed directly to look at small countries that by definition take the US/global variables as given.

The log spot price of the commodity in terms of currency j is given by

$$s_j = s_{(j/\$)} + s_{(\$ / c)}, \quad (5)$$

where $s_{(j/\$)}$ is the spot exchange rate in units of currency j per \$ and $s_{(\$ / c)}$ is the spot price of commodity c in terms of \$, what has hitherto been called simply s for the dollar case. The real exchange rate between currency j and the dollar is governed by the direct application of the Dornbusch overshooting model.

$$(s_{(j/\$)} - \bar{s}_{(j/\$)}) - (p_j - \bar{p}_j) + (p_\$ - \bar{p}_\$) = - (1/v) (i_j - i_\$ - [E(\Delta p_j) - E(\Delta p_\$)]). \quad (6)$$

Combining with equations (4) and (5),

$$\begin{aligned} (s_{(j/c)} - \bar{s}_{(j/c)}) &= (s_{(j/\$)} - \bar{s}_{(j/\$)}) + (s_{(\$ / c)} - \bar{s}_{(\$ / c)}) \\ &= (p_j - \bar{p}_j) - (1/v) (i_j - i_\$ - [E(\Delta p_j) - E(\Delta p_\$)]) - (1/\theta) (i_\$ - E(\Delta p_\$) - c). \end{aligned}$$

$$(q_{(j/c)} - \bar{q}_{(j/c)}) = - (1/v) (r_j - r_\$) - (1/\theta) (r_\$ - c). \quad (7)$$

where

$r_\$$ is the US interest rate

r_j is the interest rate in country j .

Equation (7) says the real commodity price observed in country j will be high to the extent either that the local real interest rate is low relative to the US real rate, or to the extent that the US real interest rate is low. We tested this equation for 8 individual countries that currently have independently floating currencies (though they did not all have floating rates throughout the entire sample period).

We regressed the log of the real commodity price (converted to the currency of the small open economy and divided by the small open economy's price level) on the two variables on the right-hand side of equation (7), the US real interest rate and the real interest differential between the small open economy and the US:

$$\log \frac{CP^{US} \cdot S^{j/\$}}{P^j} = \alpha + \beta_1 [(i^j - \pi^j) - (i^{US} - \pi^{US})] + \beta_2 (i^{US} - \pi^{US}) + \varepsilon.$$

The results for the 8 floating countries are reported in Tables 2a through 2f. The tables use 6 different commodity price indices: CRB, Dow Jones, The Economist, Goldman Sachs, Moody's and Reuters. Monthly data were generally available for the developed countries from 1950.¹² To take full advantage of what data were available, the regressions were estimated separately for the 3-month interest rate (3 month Treasury notes or equivalent) and the long term interest rate with the largest sample (Australia: 10 year bond; Brazil: 30 year bond; Canada: 10+ year bond; Chile: 20 year bond; Mexico: 3 year bond; NZ: 10 year bond; Switzerland: 30 year bond; UK: 20 year bond). The US interest rate for each regression was chosen to match the maturity of the bond from the small open economy.

¹² For the three Latin American countries, however, it was difficult to find interest rate data preceding their hyperinflations.

Tables 2:
Regressions of log real commodity prices in local currency on real interest rates
(over largest possible sample of data since 1950)

2a. Log Real CRB Commodity Price Index in Local Currency and Real Interest Rates								
Monthly observations								
		Short rate			Long Rate			
	Sample	Real US rate	Real interest differential		Sample	Real US rate	Real interest differential	
Australia	1/1950-8/2005	-0.023 *	-0.076 *		1/1950-8/2005	-0.057 *	-0.067 *	
	s.e.	0.006	0.003			0.005	0.004	
Brazil	7/65-12/89 & 1/95-8/05	-0.024 *	-0.006 *		5/1994-9/2005	-0.161 *	-0.001	
	s.e.	0.007	0.002			0.019	0.001	
Canada	1/1950-9/2005	-0.047 *	-0.065 *		1/1950-9/2005	-0.073 *	-0.076 *	
	s.e.	0.005	0.005			0.004	0.006	
Chile	7/1997-9/2005	-0.063 *	-0.021 *		2/1993-2/2004	-0.092 *	-0.018 *	
	s.e.	0.006	0.004			0.014	0.003	
Mexico	1/1978-9/2005	0.055 *	-0.017 *		1/1995-9/2005	0.047 *	0.000	
	s.e.	0.013	0.002			0.011	0.003	
NZ	3/1978-8/2005	0.001	-0.067 *		1/1950-8/2005	-0.081 *	-0.075 *	
	s.e.	0.009	0.004			0.006	0.004	
Switzerland	1/1980-9/2005	0.034 *	-0.054 *		5/1953-9/2005	-0.171 *	-0.095 *	
	s.e.	0.016	0.009			0.013	0.012	
UK	1/1950-9/2005	-0.053 *	-0.086 *		1/1950-9/2005	-0.106 *	-0.023 *	
	s.e.	0.010	0.007			0.007	0.006	

* indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance. Robust standard errors are reported.

2b. Log Real Dow Jones Commodity Price Index in Local Currency and Real Interest Rates								
Monthly observations								
		Short rate			Long Rate			
	Sample	Real US rate	Real interest differential		Sample	Real US rate	Real interest differential	
Australia	1/1950-8/2005	-0.035 *	-0.071 *		1/1950-8/2005	-0.061 *	-0.064 *	
	s.e.	0.005	0.003			0.004	0.004	
Brazil	7/65-12/89 & 1/95-8/05	-0.036 *	-0.005 *		5/1994-9/2005	-0.197 *	0.000	
	s.e.	0.007	0.002			0.021	0.001	
Canada	1/1950-9/2005	-0.056 *	-0.059 *		1/1950-9/2005	-0.076 *	-0.074 *	
	s.e.	0.004	0.005			0.004	0.006	
Chile	7/1997-9/2005	-0.084 *	-0.027 *		2/1993-2/2004	-0.106 *	-0.004	
	s.e.	0.009	0.006			0.017	0.004	
Mexico	1/1978-9/2005	0.036 *	-0.017 *		1/1995-9/2005	0.015	-0.003	
	s.e.	0.012	0.002			0.012	0.003	
NZ	3/1978-8/2005	-0.015	-0.063 *		1/1950-8/2005	-0.085 *	-0.071 *	
	s.e.	0.008	0.004			0.005	0.004	
Switzerland	1/1980-9/2005	0.004	-0.065 *		5/1953-9/2005	-0.160 *	-0.076 *	
	s.e.	0.015	0.009			0.012	0.012	
UK	1/1950-9/2005	-0.063 *	-0.081 *		1/1950-9/2005	-0.108 *	-0.027 *	
	s.e.	0.009	0.007			0.007	0.006	

* indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance. Robust standard errors are reported.

2c. Log Real Economist Commodity Price Index in Local Currency and Real Interest Rates

Monthly observations

	Sample	Short rate		Long Rate		
		Real US rate	Real interest differential	Real US rate	Real interest differential	
Australia	1/1950-8/2005	-0.010 *	-0.027 *	1/1950-8/2005	-0.018 *	-0.031 *
	s.e.	0.005	0.002		0.004	0.002
Brazil	7/65-12/89 & 1/95-8/05	0.005	-0.006 *	5/1994-9/2005	-0.095 *	-0.002 *
	s.e.	0.007	0.001		0.018	0.001
Canada	1/1950-9/2005	-0.012 *	0.004	1/1950-9/2005	-0.018 *	-0.020 *
	s.e.	0.005	0.005		0.004	0.006
Chile	7/1997-9/2005	-0.049 *	-0.011 *	2/1993-2/2004	-0.020	-0.022 *
	s.e.	0.006	0.004		0.014	0.003
Mexico	1/1978-9/2005	0.056 *	-0.013 *	1/1995-9/2005	0.093 *	0.001
	s.e.	0.012	0.002		0.013	0.004
NZ	3/1978-8/2005	0.011	-0.042 *	1/1950-8/2005	-0.031 *	-0.042 *
	s.e.	0.008	0.003		0.005	0.002
Switzerland	1/1980-9/2005	0.061 *	-0.014	5/1953-9/2005	-0.086 *	-0.051 *
	s.e.	0.013	0.008		0.006	0.006
UK	1/1950-9/2005	-0.024 *	-0.045 *	1/1950-9/2005	-0.049 *	-0.021 *
	s.e.	0.007	0.004		0.005	0.004

* indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance. Robust standard errors are reported.

2d. Log Real Goldman Sachs Commodity Price Index in Local Currency and Real Interest Rates

Monthly observations

	Sample	Short rate		Long Rate		
		Real US rate	Real interest differential	Real US rate	Real interest differential	
Australia	12/1969-8/2005	-0.054 *	-0.063 *	12/1969-8/2005	-0.064 *	-0.074 *
	s.e.	0.006	0.004		0.005	0.004
Brazil	12/69-12/89 & 1/95-8/05	-0.058 *	-0.004 *	5/1994-9/2005	-0.296 *	-0.001
	s.e.	0.009	0.002		0.025	0.001
Canada	12/1969-9/2005	-0.077 *	-0.060 *	12/1969-9/2005	-0.096 *	-0.091 *
	s.e.	0.007	0.007		0.006	0.006
Chile	7/1997-9/2005	-0.098 *	-0.048 *	2/1993-2/2004	-0.178 *	-0.007
	s.e.	0.014	0.009		0.021	0.005
Mexico	1/1978-9/2005	0.026 *	-0.015 *	1/1995-9/2005	-0.035 *	-0.002
	s.e.	0.011	0.002		0.013	0.004
NZ	3/1978-8/2005	-0.030 *	-0.067 *	12/1969-8/2005	-0.076 *	-0.080 *
	s.e.	0.008	0.003		0.007	0.003
Switzerland	1/1980-9/2005	-0.025	-0.077 *	12/1969-9/2005	-0.219 *	-0.172 *
	s.e.	0.015	0.009		0.009	0.012
UK	12/1969-9/2005	-0.051 *	-0.089 *	12/1969-9/2005	-0.094 *	-0.039 *
	s.e.	0.009	0.005		0.009	0.007

* indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance. Robust standard errors are reported.

2e. Log Real Moody's Commodity Price Index in Local Currency and Real Interest Rates
Monthly observations

	Sample	Short rate		Long Rate		
		Real US rate	Real interest differential	Real US rate	Real interest differential	
Australia	1/1950-8/2005	-0.031 *	-0.052 *	1/1950-8/2005	-0.050 *	-0.045 *
s.e.		0.004	0.002		0.003	0.003
Brazil	7/65-12/89 & 1/95-8/05	-0.022 *	-0.001	5/1994-9/2005	-0.180 *	-0.001
s.e.		0.006	0.001		0.023	0.001
Canada	1/1950-9/2005	-0.044 *	-0.040 *	1/1950-9/2005	-0.056 *	-0.040 *
s.e.		0.003	0.004		0.003	0.004
Chile	7/1997-9/2005	-0.096 *	-0.021 *	2/1993-2/2004	-0.055 *	0.004
s.e.		0.007	0.005		0.020	0.004
Mexico	1/1978-9/2005	0.029 *	-0.011 *	1/1995-9/2005	0.017	0.000
s.e.		0.008	0.002		0.012	0.004
NZ	3/1978-8/2005	-0.021 *	-0.044 *	1/1950-8/2005	-0.067 *	-0.045 *
s.e.		0.005	0.002		0.004	0.003
Switzerland	1/1980-9/2005	-0.030 *	-0.071 *	5/1953-9/2005	-0.117 *	-0.046 *
s.e.		0.010	0.006		0.009	0.009
UK	1/1950-9/2005	-0.054 *	-0.059 *	1/1950-9/2005	-0.084 *	-0.017 *
s.e.		0.007	0.005		0.005	0.005

* indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance. Robust standard errors are reported.

2f. Log Real Reuters Commodity Price Index in Local Currency and Real Interest Rates
Monthly observations

	Sample	Short rate		Long Rate		
		Real US rate	Real interest differential	Real US rate	Real interest differential	
Australia	11/1959-8/2005	0.009	-0.042 *	11/1959-8/2005	-0.008	-0.045 *
s.e.		0.006	0.004		0.005	0.004
Brazil	7/65-12/89 & 1/95-8/05	0.003	-0.007 *	5/1994-9/2005	-0.060 *	-0.003 *
s.e.		0.008	0.001		0.015	0.000
Canada	11/1959-9/2005	-0.004	-0.004	11/1959-9/2005	-0.024 *	-0.041 *
s.e.		0.007	0.006		0.006	0.007
Chile	7/1997-9/2005	-0.029 *	-0.007	2/1993-2/2004	-0.029 *	-0.043 *
s.e.		0.007	0.004		0.013	0.003
Mexico	1/1978-9/2005	0.088 *	-0.014 *	1/1995-9/2005	0.128 *	0.002
s.e.		0.014	0.002		0.014	0.005
NZ	3/1978-8/2005	0.041 *	-0.048 *	11/1959-8/2005	-0.020 *	-0.064 *
s.e.		0.011	0.004		0.006	0.003
Switzerland	1/1980-9/2005	0.102 *	-0.011	11/1959-9/2005	-0.125 *	-0.107 *
s.e.		0.015	0.009		0.008	0.009
UK	11/1959-9/2005	0.010	-0.070 *	11/1959-9/2005	-0.037 *	-0.018 *
s.e.		0.009	0.005		0.008	0.006

* indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance. Robust standard errors are reported.

In general, the evidence appears to support the hypothesis regarding the determination of the log real local-currency index of commodity prices. The estimates show a significant negative coefficient on the real US interest rate, representing global monetary policy, as well as on the real interest differential between the national economy and the US, representing local variations in monetary stance. Often significance levels are high. In the case of the three major English-speaking countries, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, both the coefficient on the US real interest rate and the coefficient on the real interest differential are statistically significant and of the hypothesized negative sign in almost every one of the 12 cases, regardless which of the 6 commodity price indices are used and regardless whether short-term or long-term interest rates are used. The results for New Zealand and Switzerland are almost as strong but for the effect of the short-term US rate; as are the results for Brazil and Chile, except that the coefficient on the long-term real interest differential is not always significant. The only disappointing country is Mexico, where even though the short-term real interest differential always appears significantly less than zero, the US interest rate appears significantly greater than zero rather than less.

This seems impressive evidence for what has been the central theme of this paper so far. The hypothesized effect of the real interest rate on real commodity prices works not only at the US level, but also at the level of local variation among open economies above and beyond the global phenomenon.

III. The Choice of Monetary Regime

The remainder of the paper deals with the reverse direction of causality, from commodity prices to monetary policy. Of course an increase in the world price of a commodity such as oil will affect very differently countries that import the commodity and those that export it. Less obviously, precisely how fluctuations in world commodity markets impact individual countries macroeconomically depends on what regime or targeting rule governs their monetary policy.

1. “But Target *Which* Price?”

The current fashion in monetary policy regimes is inflation targeting. Such countries as the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, Brazil, Norway, Korea, and South Africa have adopted it, and many monetary economists approve. In part this is a consequence of the disillusionment with exchange rate targets that arose in the course of ten years of currency crises (from the speculative attack that forced the UK to drop out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 to the Argentina crisis of 2001). Proponents of inflation targeting point out that if the exchange rate is not to be the anchor for monetary policy, then the ultimate objective of price stability requires that some new nominal variable must be chosen as the anchor. Two old favorite candidates for nominal anchor, the price of gold and the money supply, have long since been discredited in the eyes of many. So that seems to leave inflation targeting. A more general form of inflation targeting is a Taylor rule, which puts weight

on output in addition to inflation. But whether it is simple inflation targeting or a Taylor rule, what price index should be used?

Of the possible price indices that a central bank could target, the CPI is the usual choice. Indeed the CPI (whether core or overall CPI) seems to be virtually the only choice that central banks and economists have even considered. But this may not be the best choice. I want to argue for targeting an index of export prices.

This idea is a much moderate version of a more exotic-sounding proposed monetary regime that I have written about elsewhere, called Peg the Export Price – or PEP, for short. I have proposed PEP explicitly for those countries that happen to be heavily specialized in the production of a particular mineral or agricultural export commodity. The proposal is to fix the price of that commodity in terms of domestic currency, or, equivalently, set the value of domestic currency in terms of that commodity. For example, African gold producers would peg their currency to gold – in effect returning to the long-abandoned gold standard. Canada and Australia would peg to wheat. Norway would peg to oil. Chile would peg to copper, and so forth. One can even think of exporters of manufactured goods that qualify: standardized semi-conductors (that is, commodity chips) are sufficiently important exports in Korea that one could imagine it pegging the won to the price of chips.

How would this work operationally? Conceptually, one can imagine the government holding reserves of gold or oil, and intervening whenever necessary to keep the price fixed in terms of local currency. Operationally, a more practical method would be for the central bank each day to announce an exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, following the rule that the day's exchange rate target (dollars per local currency unit) moves precisely in proportion to the day's price of gold or oil on the London market or New York market (dollars per commodity). Then the central bank could intervene via the foreign exchange market to achieve the day's target. Either way, the effect would be to stabilize the price of the commodity in terms of local currency. Or perhaps, since these commodity prices are determined on world markets, a better way to express the same policy is “stabilizing the price of local currency in terms of the commodity.”¹³

The PEP proposal can be made more moderate, and more appropriate for diversified economies, in a number of ways.¹⁴ One is to interpret it as targeting a broad index of all export prices, rather than the price of only one or a few export commodities. This part of the paper proposes targeting just such an export price index. This moderate form of the proposal is abbreviated PEPI, for Peg the Export Price *Index*.¹⁵

The argument for the export price targeting proposal, in any of its forms, can be stated succinctly: It delivers one of the main advantages that a simple exchange rate peg promises, namely a nominal anchor, while simultaneously delivering one of the main advantages that a floating regime promises, namely automatic adjustment in the face of

¹³ Frankel (2002, 2003) and Frankel and Saiki (2002).

¹⁴ One possible margin of moderation is the width of the band: one can define a broad band as a target around the central parity, rather than seeking to fix the price perfectly. Another way to go is to define as the parity a basket that includes the export commodity as well as a weighted average of currencies of major trading partners – e.g., 1/3 dollars, 1/3 euros, and 1/3 oil, as the author has proposed for Persian Gulf states.

¹⁵ Frankel (2005).

fluctuations in the prices of the countries' exports on world markets. Textbook theory says that when there is an adverse movement in the terms of trade, it is desirable to accommodate it via a depreciation of the currency. When the dollar price of exports rises, under PEP or PEPI the currency per force appreciates in terms of dollars. When the dollar price of exports falls, the currency depreciates in terms of dollars. Such accommodation of terms of trade shocks is precisely what is wanted. In recent currency crises, countries that suffered a sharp deterioration in their export markets were often eventually forced to give up their exchange rate targets and devalue anyway; but the adjustment was far more painful -- in terms of lost reserves, lost credibility, and lost output -- than if the depreciation had happened automatically.

But the proposal is not just for countries with volatile commodity exports. The desirability of accommodating terms of trade shocks is a particularly good way to summarize the attractiveness of export price targeting relative to the reigning champion, CPI targeting.¹⁶ Consider the two categories of adverse terms of trade shocks: a fall in the dollar price of the export in world markets and a rise in the dollar price of the import on world markets. In the first case, a fall in the export price, you want the local currency to depreciate against the dollar. As already noted, PEP or PEPI deliver that result automatically; CPI targeting does not. In the second case, a rise in the import price, the terms-of-trade criterion suggests that you again want the local currency to depreciate.¹⁷ CPI targeting actually has the implication that you tighten monetary policy so as to *appreciate* the currency against the dollar, by enough to prevent the local-currency price of imports from rising. This implication -- reacting to an adverse terms of trade shock by appreciating the currency -- seems perverse. It could be expected to exacerbate swings in the trade balance, and output.

Few believe that the proper response for an oil-importing country in the event of a large increase in world oil prices is to tighten monetary policy and thereby appreciate the currency sufficiently to prevent an increase in the price of oil in terms of domestic currency. The usual defense of inflation targeting offered by its many proponents is that in the event of such a shock, the central bank should deviate from the CPI target and explain the circumstances to the public. But what can be the argument for making such derogations on an ad hoc basis, when it is possible to build them into a simple target rule in the first place? Certainly not a gain in transparency and credibility.

CPI targeting is not unique in having an Achilles heel, in the form of import price shocks. Other standard candidates for nominal anchor have their own problems.

2. Each Candidate for Nominal Anchor has its Own Vulnerability

Each of the variables that are candidates for nominal anchor has its own characteristic sort of extraneous fluctuations that can wreck havoc on a country's monetary system.

¹⁶ Among many possible references are Bernanke, et al. (1999), Mankiw and Reis (2003), Svensson (1995, 1999), Svensson and Woodward (2005), and Truman (2003).

¹⁷ Neither regime delivers that result. There is a reason for this. In addition to the goal of accommodating terms of trade shocks, there is also the goal of resisting inflation; but to depreciate in the face of an increase in import prices would exacerbate price instability.

- A *monetarist* rule would specify a fixed rate of growth in the money supply. But fluctuations in the public's demand for money or in the behavior of the banking system can directly produce gratuitous fluctuations in velocity and the interest rate, and thereby in the real economy. For example, in the United States, a large upward shift in the demand for money around 1982 convinced the Federal Reserve Board that it had better abandon the money growth rule it had adopted two years earlier, or else face a prolonged and severe recession.
- Under a *gold standard*, the economy is hostage to the vagaries of the world gold market. For example, when much of the world was on the gold standard in the 19th century, global monetary conditions depended on the output of the world's gold mines. The California gold rush from 1849 was associated with a mid-century increase in liquidity and a resulting increase in the global price level. The absence of major discoveries of gold between 1873 and 1896 helps explain why price levels fell dramatically over this period. In the late 1890s, the gold rushes in Alaska and South Africa were each again followed by new upswings in the price level. Thus the system did not in fact guarantee stability.¹⁸
- One proposal is that monetary policy should *target a basket of basic mineral and agricultural commodities*. The idea is that a broad-based commodity standard of this sort would not be subject to the vicissitudes of a single commodity such as gold, because fluctuations of its components would average out somewhat.¹⁹ The proposal might work if the basket reflected the commodities produced and exported by the country in question. But for a country that is a net importer of oil, wheat, and other mineral and agricultural commodities, such a peg gives precisely the wrong answer in a year when the prices of these import commodities go up. Just when the domestic currency should be depreciating to accommodate an adverse movement in the terms of trade, it appreciates instead. Switzerland should not peg to oil, and Norway should not peg to wheat.
- The need for robustness with respect to import price shocks argues for the superiority of *nominal income targeting* over inflation targeting.²⁰ A practical argument against nominal income targeting is the difficulty of timely measurement, and subsequent revisions.

¹⁸ Cooper (1985). On the classical gold standard, see also papers in Eichengreen (1985).

¹⁹ A "commodity standard" was proposed in the 1930s – by B. Graham (1937) – and subsequently discussed by Keynes (1938), and others. It was revived in the 1980s: e.g., Hall (1982).

²⁰ Velocity shocks argue for the superiority of nominal income targeting over a monetarist rule. Frankel (1995) demonstrates the point mathematically, using the framework of Rogoff (1985), and gives other references on nominal income targeting.

- Under a *fixed exchange rate*, fluctuations in the value of the particular currency to which the home country is pegged can produce needless volatility in the country's international price competitiveness. For example, the appreciation of the dollar from 1995 and 2001 was also an appreciation for whatever currencies were linked to the dollar. Regardless the extent to which one considers the late-1990s dollar appreciation to have been based in the fundamentals of the US economy, there was no necessary connection to the fundamentals of smaller dollar-linked economies. The problem was particularly severe for some far-flung economies that had adopted currency boards over the preceding decade: Hong Kong, Argentina, and Lithuania.
- This brings us back to the current fashion of *targeting the inflation rate* or CPI. To some, PEP may sound similar to inflation targeting. But, as already noted, a key difference between the CPI and the export price is the terms of trade. When there is an adverse movement in the terms of trade, one would like the currency to depreciate, while price level targeting can have the opposite implication. If the central bank has been constrained to hit an inflation target, oil price shocks (as in 1973-74, 1979-80, and 2000-06), for example, will require an oil-importing country to tighten monetary policy. The result can be sharp falls in national output. Thus under rigid inflation targeting, supply or terms-of-trade shocks can produce unnecessary and excessive fluctuations in the level of economic activity.

Table 7 reports the correlation between changes in import prices in world markets (expressed in dollars/import), and changes in the exchange rate (expressed in dollars/local currency). The countries represented are major countries who today target inflation. In each case, the correlation is positive. In other words these countries respond to increases in world prices of their imports by appreciating their currencies rather than depreciating them. This is consistent with CPI-targeting, but seems to fly in the face of the textbook principle of floating exchange rates that a country's monetary policy should respond to an adverse shift in the terms of trade so as to depreciate the currency rather than appreciate it.

Consider the recent history. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK each after 2002 experienced increases in the prices of their imports on world markets, expressed in dollars. (See the time series graphs in Figure 7, in the Appendix.) The textbook theory says that their currencies should have been allowed to depreciate to accommodate this adverse shift in their terms of trade, to give resources the incentive to shift out of the production of importables. But this did not happen, as Figure 7 illustrates.²¹ In each case, one could say that monetary policy was sufficiently tight, relative to the United States, that their currencies appreciated against the dollar. In each case, the observable result was that an index of import prices in local currency did not rise, but if anything actually fell. Why? Inflation-targeting is the obvious culprit. The implication is that this regime obligated them to tighten sufficiently to prevent a large increase in local currency import prices and therefore in the CPI.²²

²¹ In addition to the 7 countries included in the table and figures here, results for other countries are reported in Frankel (2005) and the working paper version of that article: Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, Norway and Turkey.

²² Presumably the import price indices in terms of dollars rose in 2003 not just because of tight world markets for oil and other commodities, but also because of the depreciating dollar.

**Table 7:
Correlation of Changes in Exchange Rate (\$/local currency)
and Changes in Dollar Price of Imports for 11 Floaters (1970-2003)**

Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.

	Correlation
AUSTRALIA	0.493
CANADA	0.249
KOREA	0.359
NEW ZEALAND	0.836
NORWAY	0.546
SINGAPORE	0.639
SOUTH AFRICA	0.846
SWEDEN	0.745
SWITZERLAND	0.850
THAILAND	0.299
UNITED KINGDOM	0.525

By contrast, in 1974 and 1980, large increases in these countries' import prices on world markets were reflected as large increases in domestic currency import prices as well, also shown in Figure 7. This was before these countries switched to inflation targeting. Future research could compute correlations as in Table 7 that isolate periods when the country was targeting the CPI.

To recap, each of the most popular variables that have been proposed as candidates for nominal anchors is subject to fluctuations that will add an element of unnecessary monetary volatility to a country that has pegged its money to that variable: velocity shocks in the case of M1, supply shocks in the case of inflation targeting, measurement errors in the case of nominal GDP targeting, fluctuations in world gold markets in the case of the gold standard, and fluctuations in the anchor currency in the case of exchange rate pegs. PEPI does not have these vulnerabilities.

The argument for PEPI over CPI targeting is two-fold. First, as just demonstrated, CPI targeting requires tightening in the face of an increase in the world price of import commodities, such as oil for an oil importer, while PEPI does not. Second, PEPI allows accommodation of fluctuations in the world price of the export commodities, while CPI targeting does not. But, wait, isn't accommodation of terms of

trade shocks supposed to be the selling point of floating exchange rates? We turn to the question whether floating rates deliver on this promise, before summing up the case.

3. Do Floating Rates Accommodate Export Price Shocks?

It was noted above that one of PEPI's advantages is also an advantage that floating promises: automatic adjustment to terms of trade shocks. Why not then just move to floating rates without a price target (beyond the obvious possibility of inflationary bias arising from loss of a nominal anchor for expectations)? Do floating rates really deliver on this promise? Australia is sometimes given as an example of a country where the currency has been allowed to depreciate automatically when its export commodities face weak world markets, and vice versa. One can calculate for Australia what was the path followed historically by an index of export prices expressed in terms of domestic currency, versus what would have been the path of the same export basket if the currency had been rigidly pegged to the dollar, under the assumption that the prices of these commodities are determined exogenously on world markets. See Table 8 and figure 8 in the Appendix.

In nominal terms, export prices rose rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s, in line with general Australian inflation (which would not have been as high in the 1980s if the currency had been rigidly pegged to the dollar). The real price of exports, obtained by deflating by the local CPI, is a more relevant measure, as it indicates the incentive for resources to shift into or out of the export sector.²³ Historically, over the period 1970-2001, real export prices show a standard deviation of .18, less than the .30 that would have prevailed under a dollar peg, and also less than .50 under a yen peg or .29 under a mark/euro peg. (The price indices are expressed in logs, so .18 is 18 percent.) 19% of deviations were larger in magnitude than .25, a "misalignment" that might generate balance of payments difficulties, as compared to 47 % under a dollar peg. In other words, the float did succeed in reducing the variability of real export prices a bit, but the remaining variability was still substantial.

The same calculation for other floaters also shows small reductions in volatility relative to their hypothetical pegs. Canada's float reduced the standard deviation of its real export prices only to .14 over the last three decades, from .18 under a hypothetical dollar peg. 6% of deviations were less than .25 under its actual float, as compared to 19% under a dollar peg. The United Kingdom's float produced a historical standard deviation of .16, which is the same as it would have been under a dollar peg, and slightly larger than it would have been if pegged rigidly to the DM/euro (.15). 13% of its deviations were greater than .25, less than would have happened under a dollar peg (16%) but greater than under a euro peg (9%).

In short, exchange rate flexibility allowed a partial accommodation of fluctuations in world prices for these countries' export goods, so that real export prices did not move as much as they would have if the country had been rigidly pegged to a major currency.

However, the floats came with three drawbacks:

(1) this offset was only partial;

²³ Under the hypothetical rigid peg to the dollar, mark or yen, it is assumed that the local CPI would be the same as the CPI of the United States, Germany, or Japan, respectively.

(2) it required giving up benefits of a nominal anchor, which may be why nominal prices in every case were substantially more variable, usually due to an upward trend, than they would have been under a peg;

(3) extraneous volatility was also introduced by exchange rate fluctuations.

In the case of countries like Australia or the United Kingdom, one might suspect that the extraneous volatility came from speculative bubbles or Dornbusch overshooting. But the problem is potentially worse in the case of countries that attempt exchange rate targets and are then subject to speculative attacks. Consider Korea, which during much of this period was classified *de jure* as floating but *de facto* intervening in pursuit of a dollar exchange rate target. Its export prices fell sharply in terms of local goods during 1995-97, in part due to a strong dollar, and rose sharply during 1997-98 due to a collapsing won. The result was a standard deviation of real export prices of .23, over the three decades, almost as great as if it had been rigidly pegged to the dollar (.28). 23% of deviations were greater than .25 (as compared to .29 under a hypothetical dollar peg or 74% under a yen peg). South Africa was more successful in reducing its real export price variability, to .11, as compared to .21 under a hypothetical dollar peg and .22 under a hypothetical mark/euro peg. It managed to eliminate altogether deviations above .25.

4. Peg the Export Price Index

The argument for the PEPI proposal is that if any of these countries had adopted this regime, it would have eliminated their export price variability altogether.²⁴ That is the definition of PEPI. In Figure 8, the graph of the nominal export price would have been a horizontal line, and a graph of the real export price would not have been much different (because prices of nontraded goods tend to be sticky in terms of domestic currency anyway). The stability in export prices, in turn, would probably have helped stabilize the balance of payments. It would, for example, have allowed the Korean won to depreciate automatically in the late 1990s, without the need for a costly failed attempt to defend an exchange rate target before the devaluation.²⁵ It would have allowed the Malaysian ringgit to appreciate automatically in the early 2000s, without the need for the monetary authorities to abandon their nominal anchor, as they did in 2005.

How would PEPI be implemented operationally? That is, how would an *index* of export prices be stabilized? As noted at the outset, in the simple version of the PEP proposal, there is nothing to prevent a central bank from intervening to fix the price of a single agricultural or mineral product perfectly on a day-to-day basis. Such perfect price fixing is not possible in the case of a broad basket of exports, as called for by PEPI,

²⁴ This is half the argument. Recall that the other half of the argument for PEPI, as compared to CPI targeting, is that it does not require tightening in the face of increases in the world price of imports.

²⁵ Earlier research reported simulations of the path of exports over the last three decades if countries had followed the PEP proposal, as compared to hypothetical rigid pegs to a major currency, or as compared to whatever policy the country in fact followed historically: Frankel (2002) focuses primarily on producers of gold, Frankel (2003) on oil exporters, and Frankel and Saiki (2002) on various other agricultural and mineral producers. A typical finding was that developing countries that suffered a deterioration in export markets in the late 1990s, often contributing to a financial crisis, would have adjusted automatically under the PEP regime.

even if it were desirable. For one thing, such price indices are not even computed on a daily basis. So it would be, rather, a matter of setting a target zone for the year, with monthly realizations, much as a range for the CPI is declared under the most standard interpretation of inflation targeting.

The declared band could be wide if desired, just as with the targeting of the CPI, money supply, exchange rate, or other nominal variables. Open market operations to keep the export price index inside the band if it threatens to stray outside could be conducted in terms either of foreign exchange or in terms of domestic securities. For some countries, it might help to monitor on a daily or weekly basis the price of a basket of agricultural and mineral commodities that is as highly correlated as possible with the country's overall price index, but whose components are observable on a daily or weekly basis in well-organized markets. The central bank could even announce what the value of the basket index would be one week at a time, by analogy with the Fed funds target in the United States. The weekly targets could be set so as to achieve the medium-term goal of keeping the comprehensive price index inside the pre-announced bands; and yet the central bank could hit the weekly targets very closely, if it wanted, for example, by intervening in the foreign exchange market.

A first step for any central bank wishing to dip its toe in these waters would be to compute a monthly index of export prices and publish it. A second step would be to announce that it was "monitoring" the index. The data requirements for computing such an index would not be great. Every country's customs services gathers data on trade volumes and prices; indeed they tend to do so at earlier stages of development than they gather data on national income or the CPI. For countries that lack fully credible institutions, an added advantage of the PEP proposal is transparency: the components tend to be more readily observable than components of the CPI such as prices of housing or other nontraded services.

A still more moderate, still less exotic-sounding, version of the PEPI proposal would be to target a producer price index (PPI). In practice, it can be difficult to separate production cleanly into the two sectors, nontraded goods and exportables, in which case the two versions of the proposal – targeting an export price index or a producer price index -- come down to the same thing. The key point of the PEP proposal is to exclude import prices from the index, and to include export prices (as the PPI also does). The problem with CPI targeting is that it does it the other way around.

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Appendix I


to "Commodity Prices, Monetary Policy, and Currency Regimes," Research Asst.: Ellis Connolly

Figure 1: US Real Commodity Prices and Real Interest Rates

Figures 1c and 1d (with shorter time period sample)

Goldman Sachs' Commodity Price Index vs. Real Interest Rate


Annual, 1969-2005



Source: Global Financial Data Inc.

Reuters Commodity Price Index vs. Real Interest Rate

Annual, 1959-2005



Source: Global Financial Data Inc.

Table 1a: Regression of log real commodity prices on real interest rates over 1950-1979. Results by commodity indices, individual commodities and fixed-effects panel of commodities.

Log Real Commodity Prices and Interest Rates			
sample: 1950-1979 (30 annual observations)			
<i>real interest rate in % and real commodity prices in log units</i>			
	Coefficient	Std error	sig. 5%
Reuters (1959-)	-0.080	0.023	*
Goldman Sachs (1969-)	-0.078	0.028	*
Dow Jones	-0.060	0.015	*
Moodys	-0.052	0.013	*
CRB	-0.044	0.012	*
COMMODITIES (by coefficient in ascending order)			
Sugar	-0.173	0.040	*
Gold	-0.117	0.036	*
Soy bean oil	-0.093	0.021	*
Zinc	-0.090	0.025	*
Oil	-0.085	0.032	*
Corn	-0.071	0.017	*
Cocoa	-0.070	0.037	
Silver	-0.068	0.044	
Palladium	-0.067	0.023	*
Wheat	-0.061	0.024	*
Rubber	-0.058	0.041	
FIXED-EFFECTS PANEL	-0.056	0.006	*
Coffee	-0.055	0.028	
Oats	-0.053	0.015	*
Soy beans	-0.048	0.014	*
Tin	-0.048	0.027	
Lead	-0.042	0.018	*
Cotton	-0.034	0.025	
Platinum	-0.030	0.015	*
Cattle	-0.026	0.014	
Hogs	-0.020	0.024	
Nickel	-0.014	0.017	
Aluminium	0.000	0.011	
Copper	0.029	0.021	

Source: Global Financial Data

Table 1b: Regression of log real commodity prices on real interest rates over 1980-2005. Results by commodity indices, individual commodities and fixed-effects panel of commodities.



Log Real Commodity Prices and Interest Rates			
sample: 1980-2005 (26 annual observations)			
<i>real interest rate in % and real commodity prices in log units</i>			
	Coefficient	Std error	sig. 5%
Moodys	0.014	0.018	
Goldman Sachs	0.033	0.030	
Dow Jones	0.056	0.026	*
CRB	0.076	0.026	*
Reuters	0.108	0.024	*
COMMODITIES (by coefficient in ascending order)			
Nickel	-0.036	0.038	
Palladium	0.012	0.051	
Lead	0.016	0.029	
Cattle	0.020	0.015	
Sugar	0.026	0.049	
Platinum	0.031	0.029	
Oil	0.039	0.044	
Zinc	0.044	0.022	*
Aluminium	0.049	0.022	*
Hogs	0.061	0.030	*
Copper	0.068	0.036	
Rubber	0.069	0.038	
FIXED-EFFECTS PANEL	0.072	0.008	*
Gold	0.078	0.037	*
Soy bean oil	0.079	0.031	*
Wheat	0.081	0.034	*
Cotton	0.084	0.030	*
Corn	0.086	0.034	*
Soy beans	0.087	0.032	*
Oats	0.090	0.040	*
Cocoa	0.120	0.039	*
Silver	0.126	0.045	*
Tin	0.163	0.045	*
Coffee	0.253	0.036	*

Source: Global Financial Data

Appendix 2: Relationship between de-trended oil inventories and interest rates

We have used various methods to detrend the inventories series: linear, quadratic and the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. To maximize smoothness, the largest possible smoothness parameter was chosen for the HP filter (1 billion). At this level of smoothness, the HP filter series resembled those generated using the linear or quadratic method.

Here are the linear and quadratic detrended series:



Regressions

Six regressions have been estimated to explore this relationship.

- In regression 1, there is no detrending.
- In regressions 2 & 3, linear (αt) or quadratic trends ($\alpha t + \beta t^2$) are included as extra regressors.
- In regressions 4 - 6, I use a two step procedure, first detrending the inventories series and then estimating the relationship.

When the linear detrending method is used, there is a significant negative relationship between the real rate and inventories. However, this result is not particularly robust to the use of alternative detrending methods:

Table 4: Relationship between oil inventories and interest rates

Regressand	Regressors	Real rate coefficient	Standard error	Sig. at 10%
1. Inventories	Real rate	5.96	0.29	*
2. Inventories	Real rate & linear trend	-0.69	0.35	*
3. Inventories	Real rate & quadratic trend	-0.36	0.35	
4. Linear detrended inventories	Real rate	-0.31	0.23	
5. Quadratic detrended inventories	Real rate	-0.17	0.23	
6. HP detrended inventories	Real rate	0.04	0.22	

Appendix 3:

Relationship between Inventories and Real Interest Rates using Detrended Inventories: Controlling for Additional Regressors


This appendix presents the results of a model of oil inventories, using the following regressors:

- **Risk in oil exporting countries** (used as a measure of risk of supply disruptions)

We obtained monthly data from the PRS Group on the “composite risk” for each of the top 12 oil exporting countries. The composite risk ratings cover political risk, economic risk and financial risk. We have constructed a single measure for the top 12 oil exporters by arithmetically weighting the composite risk rating for each country by the country’s share of world oil exports in 2003 and 2004. The countries included are (in descending order of importance): Saudi Arabia, Russia/USSR, Norway, Iran, Venezuela, UAE, Kuwait, Nigeria, Mexico, Algeria, Libya and Iraq. A fall in the index represents an increase in risk. Since the series trends up over time, we have made the series stationary by detrending or differencing. When differencing, we use a relatively tight 12 week change so there is not a large phase shift.

Risk in top 12 Oil Exporters

Monthly, weighted by 2003-04 oil exports




- **Industrial Countries Industrial Production** (used as a measure of sudden changes in demand)

A monthly series of Industrial Production in Industrial Countries has been obtained from the IMF IFS database. Since the data were not seasonally adjusted and displayed a strong seasonal pattern, we seasonally adjusted the data using the X-12-ARIMA algorithm provided in the software Demetra. The series trended up, so detrending or differencing have been used to make the series stationary:

Log Industrial Countries IP

Monthly




- **Spot – futures price spread**

The spot – futures price spread has been calculated by taking the percentage difference between the first futures contract (which is close to the spot rate) and the third futures contract ($s + i - f$), adjusting for the three month Treasury rate over the two month period between the contracts (the maturity is not matched perfectly). There is quite a high correlation between this spread and movements in US oil inventories:

Inventories and futures prices

Weekly



Regression results

The relationship between weekly oil inventories and real interest rates is estimated controlling for the three regressors described above. When included individually, the **spot-futures price spread** is significant with the expected sign (when the spot price rises relative to the futures price, oil inventories fall). The 12-week change in **oil exporter risk** is also significant with the expected sign (a negative change in the risk rating leads to an increase in oil inventories). However, **Industrial production** is not significant. The real interest rate coefficient is negative in all these regressions, but is not significant.

When all the regressors are included simultaneously (either in levels OR in changes), the spot-futures spread and risk are significant with the expected sign, but IP is significant with a counterintuitive sign (increase in oil demand leads to an increase in inventories). The real rate coefficient is negative and significant. When **lagged inventories** are added, the real rate coefficient is no longer significant. When the spot-futures spread is assumed to be endogenous and IP and risk are used as instruments, the real rate coefficient is not significant.

Table 5a: Relationship between inventories and interest rates -- Weekly data
(1114-1190 observations depending on data availability)

Non-stationary variables detrended by including quadratic terms in each regression

	Real rate	Spot- futures	IP	Δ IP	Risk	Δ risk	Inventories (t-1)
Real rate only	-0.064 0.097						
Spot-futures spread	-0.093 0.077	-0.760* 0.039					
IP	-0.057 0.101		0.008 0.059				
12 week Δ IP	-0.014 0.103			-0.178 0.136			
oil exporter risk	-0.095 0.103				0.000 0.001		
12 week Δ oil exporter risk	-0.192 0.100					-0.009* 0.001	
Spot-futures, IP, risk	-0.394* 0.089	-0.821* 0.041	0.397* 0.062		-0.002* 0.001		
Spot-futures, IP, risk and lagged inventories	-0.056 0.032	-0.079* 0.013	0.052* 0.020		0.000 0.000		0.931* 0.009
Spot-futures, Δ IP, Δ risk	-0.211* 0.085	-0.727* 0.040		0.131 0.126		-0.005* 0.001	
Spot-futures, Δ IP, Δ risk and lagged inventories	-0.017 0.032	-0.071* 0.012		0.009 0.045		0.000 0.000	0.937* 0.009
<u>Instrumental Variables</u>							
Spot-futures; instruments: IP and risk	-0.068 0.124	0.343 0.178					
Spot-futures; instruments: Δ IP and Δ risk	-0.159 0.102	-1.313* 0.212					

Asterisks indicate significance at the 5% level of significance.

The results are reasonably similar when the data are detrended by including quadratic terms in each regression or through a first stage regression of each non-stationary regressor on a quadratic trend, with the residuals used in the second stage regression where inventories is the regressand.

Table 5b: Relationship between inventories and interest rates -- Weekly data
Inventories, IP and oil exporter risk detrended using first stage regressions with quadratic trends

	Real rate	Spot-futures	IP	Δ IP	Risk	Δ risk	Inventories (t-1)
Real rate only	-0.031 0.065						
Spot-futures spread	0.021 0.053	-0.754* 0.039					
IP	0.011 0.065		-0.003 0.058				
12 week Δ IP	0.043 0.070			-0.200 0.133			
oil exporter risk	-0.154* 0.076				0.000 0.001		
12 week Δ oil exporter risk	-0.226* 0.077					-0.009* 0.001	
Spot-futures, IP, risk	-0.131* 0.067	-0.806* 0.042	0.304* 0.062		-0.002* 0.001		
Spot-futures, IP, risk and lagged inventories	-0.027 0.023	-0.076* 0.013	0.044* 0.019		0.000 0.000		0.933* 0.009
Spot-futures, Δ IP, Δ risk	-0.066 0.065	-0.723* 0.041		0.089 0.127		-0.005* 0.001	
Spot-futures, Δ IP, Δ risk and lagged inventories	-0.003 0.024	-0.070* 0.012		0.006 0.044		0.000 0.000	0.937* 0.009
<u>Instrumental Variables</u>							
Spot-futures; instruments: IP and risk	-0.145 0.086	0.282 0.179					
Spot-futures; instruments: Δ IP and Δ risk	0.076 0.072	-1.368* 0.231					

Asterisks indicate significance at the 5% level of significance.

Appendix 4 Relationship between Agricultural Inventories and Real Interest Rates, using Detrended Inventories

Annual inventories data were obtained from the US Department of Agriculture for 12 agricultural commodities. For comparative purposes, we also include results using a series for petroleum inventories from the Energy Department. To make the results easier to compare across commodities, we logged the inventories series, so the coefficients are semi-elasticities. Quarterly inventories data are available for some commodities, but the seasonal patterns are extremely strong, so we converted all the commodities to a common annual frequency.

- Five regressions have been estimated to explore this relationship for each commodity:
- In regression 1, there is no detrending.
 - In regressions 2 & 3, linear (α) or quadratic trends ($\alpha + \beta t^2$) are included as extra regressors.

- Regressions 4 & 5 use a two step procedure, first detrending the inventories series and then estimating the relationship.

The data suggest no systematic negative relationship between real interest rates and agricultural inventories. The different specifications do not appear to have a significant effect on the results. The relationship has also been estimated for the fixed effects panel of the nine commodities with data available from 1950-2004. This sample is broken in 1982 to test for any effect from the change in monetary policy regime. The results suggest there is a spurious positive relationship between interest rates and inventories.


Table 6: Relationship between agricultural inventories & interest rates --Annual data

		1. Log inventories	2. Log inventories with linear trend	3. Log inventories with quadratic trend	4. Linear Detrended Log inventories	5. Quadratic detrended log inventories
hay	1950- 2004	0.023 *	0.008	0.005	0.007	0.004
		0.008	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004
rice	1956- 2004	0.050	0.029 *	0.019 *	0.029 *	0.018 *
		0.027	0.013	0.010	0.013	0.009
barley	1950- 2005	0.050 *	0.048 *	0.026	0.045 *	0.023
		0.019	0.020	0.020	0.019	0.018
sheep	1950- 2005	-0.045	0.016 *	0.016 *	0.015 *	0.014 *
		0.026	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.006
hogs	1950- 2004	-0.006	-0.009	-0.010	-0.008	-0.008
		0.004	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.004
cattle	1950- 2005	0.007	0.006	-0.008	0.006	-0.007
		0.010	0.010	0.004	0.010	0.004
wheat	1950- 2004	0.074 *	0.069 *	0.063 *	0.065 *	0.053 *
		0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.009
soybeans	1950- 2004	0.100 *	0.023	-0.011	0.021	-0.010
		0.041	0.016	0.009	0.015	0.008
oats	1950- 2005	-0.031	0.014	-0.013	0.013	-0.011
		0.020	0.015	0.011	0.014	0.009
corn	1950- 2004	0.070 *	0.033 *	0.027 *	0.031 *	0.023
		0.021	0.011	0.013	0.011	0.012
wool	1976- 2003	0.020	0.018	-0.013	0.018	-0.008
		0.014	0.016	0.028	0.015	0.016
cotton	1965- 2004	0.004	0.010	0.045	0.010	0.039
		0.029	0.032	0.032	0.030	0.030
petroleum	1973- 2004	0.029 *	0.024 *	0.001	0.024 *	0.000
		0.010	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.003
Panel	1950- 2004	0.029 *			0.025 *	0.010 *
		0.009			0.004	0.003
Panel	1950- 1981	0.028 *			0.027 *	0.016 *
		0.010			0.007	0.005
Panel	1982- 2004	0.038 *			0.041 *	0.004
		0.008			0.007	0.006

Asterisks indicate significance at the 5% level of significance.

Figure 7: Dollar Price of Imports, Local Price of Imports and the Exchange Rate (\$/local) (1970-2003)

Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF











Table 8: Variability of export price index (nominal and real) under alternative currency regime assumptions: actual local currency policy, vs. peg

Nominal									Real								
ARGENTINA									ARGENTINA								
	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.27	4	1	1	9	44.4%	11.1%	11.1%	LC	0.20	5	1	0	9	55.6%	11.1%	0.0%
JPY	0.11	3	0	0	9	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	JPY	0.13	3	0	0	9	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Euro	0.07	1	0	0	9	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	Euro	0.05	1	0	0	9	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%
USD	0.06	1	0	0	9	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	US\$	0.05	1	0	0	9	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%
AUSTRALIA									AUSTRALIA								
	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.53	29	24	7	32	90.6%	75.0%	21.9%	LC	0.18	23	6	0	32	71.9%	18.8%	0.0%
JPY	0.30	27	18	0	32	84.4%	56.3%	0.0%	JPY	0.50	31	26	14	32	96.9%	81.3%	43.8%
Euro	0.20	14	8	0	32	43.8%	25.0%	0.0%	Euro	0.29	28	19	0	32	87.5%	59.4%	0.0%
USD	0.33	24	10	3	32	75.0%	31.3%	9.4%	US\$	0.30	24	15	3	32	75.0%	46.9%	9.4%
BRAZIL									BRAZIL								
	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	2.28	10	10	9	10	100.0%	100.0%	90.0%	LC	0.18	8	1	0	10	80.0%	10.0%	0.0%
JPY	0.22	23	9	0	32	71.9%	28.1%	0.0%	JPY	0.40	32	27	7	32	100.0%	84.4%	21.9%
Euro	0.23	20	10	0	32	62.5%	31.3%	0.0%	Euro	0.21	20	10	0	32	62.5%	31.3%	0.0%
USD	0.37	27	17	5	32	84.4%	53.1%	15.6%	US\$	0.18	21	7	0	32	65.6%	21.9%	0.0%
CANADA									CANADA								
	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.52	32	21	8	32	100.0%	65.6%	25.0%	LC	0.14	14	2	0	32	43.8%	6.3%	0.0%
JPY	0.26	22	12	1	32	68.8%	37.5%	3.1%	JPY	0.39	31	25	6	32	96.9%	78.1%	18.8%
Euro	0.27	21	12	1	32	65.6%	37.5%	3.1%	Euro	0.22	21	11	0	32	65.6%	34.4%	0.0%
USD	0.41	30	18	4	32	93.8%	56.3%	12.5%	US\$	0.18	20	6	0	32	62.5%	18.8%	0.0%

to yen, euro or dollar

Nominal									Real								
KOREA									KOREA								
	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.66	30	27	11	31	96.8%	87.1%	35.5%	LC	0.23	23	7	1	31	74.2%	22.6%	3.2%
JPY	0.28	23	14	2	31	74.2%	45.2%	21.4%	JPY	0.47	31	23	10	31	100.0%	74.2%	32.3%
Euro	0.21	19	8	0	31	61.3%	25.8%	0.0%	Euro	0.28	23	13	2	31	74.2%	41.9%	6.5%
USD	0.35	24	16	4	31	77.4%	51.6%	12.9%	US\$	0.28	17	9	3	31	54.8%	29.0%	9.7%
MALAYSIA									MALAYSIA								
	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.40	24	12	4	28	85.7%	42.9%	14.3%	LC	0.21	22	5	0	28	78.6%	17.9%	0.0%
JPY	0.42	28	23	6	28	100.0%	82.1%	21.4%	JPY	0.51	27	26	14	28	96.4%	92.9%	50.0%
Euro	0.35	18	10	5	28	64.3%	35.7%	17.9%	Euro	0.36	25	22	2	28	89.3%	78.6%	7.1%
USD	0.45	20	14	4	28	71.4%	50.0%	14.3%	US\$	0.33	26	20	3	28	92.9%	71.4%	10.7%
NEW ZEALAND									NEW ZEALAND								
	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.67	29	27	19	31	93.5%	87.1%	61.3%	LC	0.19	26	5	0	31	83.9%	16.1%	0.0%
JPY	0.21	21	9	0	31	67.7%	29.0%	0.0%	JPY	0.39	29	23	8	31	93.5%	74.2%	25.8%
Euro	0.20	19	6	0	31	61.3%	19.4%	0.0%	Euro	0.19	21	7	0	31	67.7%	22.6%	0.0%
USD	0.39	25	18	3	31	80.6%	58.1%	9.7%	US\$	0.20	20	7	0	31	64.5%	22.6%	0.0%
NORWAY									NORWAY								
	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.45	31	21	7	32	96.9%	65.6%	21.9%	LC	0.27	27	15	0	32	84.4%	46.9%	0.0%
JPY	0.34	26	16	4	32	81.3%	50.0%	12.5%	JPY	0.47	31	27	12	32	96.9%	84.4%	37.5%
Euro	0.29	18	11	3	32	56.3%	34.4%	9.4%	Euro	0.30	23	14	1	32	71.9%	43.8%	3.1%
USD	0.40	27	14	4	32	84.4%	43.8%	12.5%	US\$	0.27	23	16	2	32	71.9%	50.0%	6.3%

Nominal

SINGAPORE		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.17	15	3	0	23	65.2%	13.0%	0.0%	
JPY	0.36	20	14	5	23	87.0%	60.9%	21.7%	
Euro	0.22	16	5	0	23	69.6%	21.7%	0.0%	
USD	0.10	8	0	0	23	34.8%	0.0%	0.0%	

Real

SINGAPORE		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.30	18	14	0	23	78.3%	60.9%	0.0%	
JPY	0.45	19	16	9	23	82.6%	69.6%	39.1%	
Euro	0.33	19	13	4	23	82.6%	56.5%	17.4%	
US\$	0.29	16	9	2	23	69.6%	39.1%	8.7%	

SOUTH AFRICA

	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.98	28	25	21	29	96.6%	86.2%	72.4%
JPY	0.24	25	9	0	29	86.2%	31.0%	0.0%
Euro	0.19	13	8	0	29	44.8%	27.6%	0.0%
USD	0.36	26	15	4	29	89.7%	51.7%	13.8%

SOUTH AFRICA

	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.11	14	0	0	29	48.3%	0.0%	0.0%
JPY	0.42	27	24	7	29	93.1%	82.8%	24.1%
Euro	0.22	22	10	0	29	75.9%	34.5%	0.0%
US\$	0.21	20	7	0	29	69.0%	24.1%	0.0%

SWITZERLAND

	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.16	10	2	0	18	55.6%	11.1%	0.0%
JPY	0.28	13	6	1	18	72.2%	33.3%	5.6%
Euro	0.31	14	10	1	18	77.8%	55.6%	5.6%
USD	0.46	16	12	4	18	88.9%	66.7%	22.2%

SWITZERLAND

	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.07	3	0	0	18	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
JPY	0.14	10	1	0	18	55.6%	5.6%	0.0%
Euro	0.08	3	0	0	18	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
US\$	0.19	12	6	0	18	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%

THAILAND

	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.53	24	19	9	32	75.0%	59.4%	28.1%
JPY	0.25	25	14	0	32	78.1%	43.8%	0.0%
Euro	0.21	20	5	1	32	62.5%	15.6%	3.1%
USD	0.38	24	11	3	32	75.0%	34.4%	9.4%

THAILAND

	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.12	13	1	0	32	40.6%	3.1%	0.0%
JPY	0.42	31	26	8	32	96.9%	81.3%	25.0%
Euro	0.21	25	6	0	32	78.1%	18.8%	0.0%
US\$	0.23	23	10	1	32	71.9%	31.3%	3.1%

Nominal

TURKEY		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	3.96	26	26	26	26	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
JPY	1.25	19	15	10	26	73.1%	57.7%	38.5%	
Euro	1.23	21	16	11	26	80.8%	61.5%	42.3%	
USD	1.32	22	19	13	26	84.6%	73.1%	50.0%	

Real

TURKEY		Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	1.26	20	14	9	26	76.9%	53.8%	34.6%	
JPY	1.28	22	17	11	26	84.6%	65.4%	42.3%	
Euro	1.24	15	10	10	26	57.7%	38.5%	38.5%	
US\$	1.26	20	12	9	26	76.9%	46.2%	34.6%	

UNITED KINGDOM

	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.61	30	25	12	32	93.8%	78.1%	37.5%
JPY	0.23	19	10	0	32	59.4%	31.3%	0.0%
Euro	0.28	24	14	2	32	75.0%	43.8%	6.3%
USD	0.46	27	22	5	32	84.4%	68.8%	15.6%

UNITED KINGDOM

	Stdev	+0.1	+0.25	+0.5	Out of	% of +0.1	% of +0.25	% of +0.5
LC	0.16	20	4	0	32	62.5%	12.5%	0.0%
JPY	0.33	30	17	0	32	93.8%	53.1%	0.0%
Euro	0.15	14	3	0	32	43.8%	9.4%	0.0%
US\$	0.16	13	5	0	32	40.6%	15.6%	0.0%

Figure 8:
Export index expressed in local currency – historical versus hypothetical peg
of currency to dollar or other major currencies



