Job Market Paper

How Much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations

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Abstract

Ten of the fifteen seats on the UN Security Council are held by rotating members serving two-year terms. Using country-level panel data, we find that foreign aid receipts can substantially rise during a rotating member's tenure on the Security Council: US economic aid increases by 77 percent and UN development aid rises by 42 percent to countries that serve during a typical important year for the council. We find that the positive effect of the Security Council on aid is much greater during years when key diplomatic events take place. Further, the increase in aid is shown to disappear immediately after a rotating member's tenure ends. The aid increases are larger for small countries and non-democratic countries. The results are consistent with US and UN aid being used to influence the votes of rotating members. While German foreign aid displays remarkably similar patterns to that of the US and the UN, the aid outlays of other major donor nations seem unaffected by the Security Council status of recipients.

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I. Introduction

"Promises of rich rewards and hints of bruising punishment are flying as diplomats seek the support of Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan over a second United Nations resolution that would authorize military action against Saddam Hussein," reported the Associated Press on March 1, 2003. As the Bush Administration was trying to secure UN support for the invasion of Iraq, these six countries, which happened to be among the ten rotating members of the UN Security Council, were thrust into the international spotlight. The other members of the council had already made their positions clear, and the administration would need five out of the six swing votes in order to pass a resolution authorizing the invasion (Renfrew, 2003). While the resolution would never come to a vote, the world did get a plain view of the hardball politics used to secure votes on the Security Council. These tactics mirrored those used during the UN debates before the first Gulf War when Security Council members supporting the war experienced huge windfalls in aid whereas Yemen, the only country to withhold support, saw the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers from Kuwait's allies in the Gulf (Malone, 2000; Simmons, 1995: 64) as well as the termination of US military aid.

While the two Gulf Wars provide striking anecdotal evidence of the potential effect of Security Council membership on foreign aid receipts, it is not clear that such a relationship exists during more mundane periods. In this paper, we test whether there is a systematic relationship between aid payments and Security Council membership. That there may exist a link between membership on the Security Council and foreign aid is a serious charge. The UN endows the Security Council with special privileges: it is the only body of the UN with the legal mandate to authorize the use of force, it enjoys classified information not privy to other members, and other countries are expected to send troops and other military aid to carry out the council's decisions. As Article 24 of the UN Charter states, member nations "confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." Since the Security Council members are entrusted to act on behalf of all the United

Nations, council members are expected to advocate for the global good, not to extract rents from the great powers to line their own coffers.

There are several reasons why we might see a connection between aid payments and Security Council membership. First, as the anecdotes suggest, simple vote-buying may be taking place: countries might be able to trade their votes for cash. Second, and far less controversial, membership on the Security Council might enable a country to bring its issues to the attention of the world community. For example, perhaps Angola's aid rose while serving on the Security Council because prior to its tenure, US officials were only vaguely aware of the economic conditions in the country but now know of its dire need. If the economic needs of developing nations gain salience when they serve as rotating members, then aid and Security Council tenure could be positively correlated even if no bribery takes place. Third, a correlation between Security Council membership and aid might be driven by an omitted variable: a country's becoming more integrated in the world community might increase both its probability of serving on the Security Council and its annual aid receipts. Testing for a correlation between aid and council membership, and separating among these three hypotheses, will be the focus of the empirical work in this paper.

Using country-level panel data, we find a large positive effect of Security Council membership on foreign aid receipts. The typical country serving during a relatively important year for the council (when *New York Times* media coverage of the Security Council is one standard deviation above the mean number of articles) sees their US economic aid increase by 77 percent and their UN aid rise by 42 percent. The results lend strong support for the first hypothesis over the other two. First, we find that the aid Security Council countries are able to extract during their tenures is significantly larger during key diplomatic years (i.e., years when the UN receives an especially large amount of media coverage, or years when a major international event occurs). The variation used to identify this effect is plausibly exogenous; it is driven by the fact that some countries will serve on the Security Council during relatively calm years while some, by chance, will be fortunate enough to serve during a year in which a key resolution is debated and when their vote becomes more valuable. Though we focus on US and UN aid, we do briefly examine the aid patterns of other donor countries. Interestingly, Germany exhibits

similar financial aid patterns to the US and the UN, but there is no evidence that France, the UK, or Japan use foreign aid to influence rotating members of the Security Council.

Second, aid payments sharply increase in the year that a country is elected to the Security Council, remain high through the two-year term, and return to baseline levels almost immediately upon completion of the term. The sharp increase belies the notion that the correlation is being driven by an unobserved, secular change in a country's international influence or diplomatic *savoir-faire*. Similarly, the rapid return to baseline aid levels after a country has completed its tenure suggests that the aid is not a result of Security Council members bringing their concerns to the attention of the developed world, at least not in any manner that lasts beyond their actual tenure. Instead, the discontinuous pattern of aid suggests that Security Council countries experience a windfall of aid only during the period when they enjoy increased influence in the UN.

Finally, we consider which countries benefit the most from Security Council membership. The literature on coalition building suggests that, for each vote, agenda setters will want to form the cheapest winning coalition (Riker, 1962). On any given vote, an easily influenced country is more likely to be bribed—but will receive a smaller bribe—so the effect of being more cheaply bribed on aid summed over all votes is ambiguous. We hypothesize that smaller countries (who can distribute the bribe over a smaller population) and more dictatorial countries (who are not accountable to an electorate) are more easily bribed. We find that smaller and more dictatorial counties receive the largest increases in Security Council aid, suggesting that the greater number of votes on which they are bribed outweighs the smaller bribe price per vote.

The results of this paper are consistent with previous empirical work on the determinants of foreign aid that demonstrate a political component to the allocation of aid. Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that political and strategic variables explain a large amount of the direction of foreign aid flows. Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) contend that security issues were more important for US aid allocation during the Cold War than following it, and that democracy has risen in prominence with the end of the Cold War as a determinant of aid. There have also been studies on foreign aid and voting in the UN General Assembly, which find mixed results but do little to identify the direction of causality (Wittkopf, 1973; Rai, 1980; Kegley and Hook, 1991; Wang, 1999). In

systematically identifying a specific political use of development aid, this paper contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of aid (see Easterly, 2001) by offering a demand-side hypothesis: as donor countries use aid strategically, they may not be overly concerned with its developmental impact.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we relate this paper to the literature on US Congressional committees, noting that because of the highly discontinuous nature of Security Council membership, the UN setting provides econometrically cleaner tests of the hypothesis that committee membership confers actual benefits. In Section III we describe the data and our empirical strategy. In Section IV we report the results of the impact of Security Council membership on foreign aid receipts, focusing on US and UN aid, but briefly exploring the aid payments of other donor nations. In Section V we explore whether countries differentially benefit from serving on the council. In Section VI we conclude.

II. The Political Economy of the UN Security Council

Structure of the Security Council

The United Nations Security Council is the primary organ of the UN responsible for the maintenance of peace and security. Among all UN organs, the Security Council is the only one with the authority to take decisions which bind all member states of the UN and, to some extent, non-members (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 4). Among the powers of the Security Council are the ability to invoke sanctions, apply military action, and recommend the appointment of the UN Secretary-General. The council is made up of five permanent members, or the P5—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as well as ten non-permanent members. Nine votes cast in favor of a resolution are required for the resolution to pass (including the concurring votes of the P5 in substantive matters), and each of the P5 has the power to veto a resolution (Article 27 of the UN Charter).

Service on the council is by no means random. A Security Council member must first be nominated by its regional caucus and then approved by a two-thirds vote of the

General Assembly (GA). Each year, five non-permanent members join the Security Council and five members leave; retiring members are not eligible for immediate re-election (Article 23(2)). The elections occur approximately three months before the term starts on January 1, though countries may make their candidacy known well beforehand. Five of the ten non-permanent members are typically from Africa and Asia, one is from Eastern Europe, two are from Latin America and the Caribbean, and two are from Western Europe and Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Malone, 2000). According to the UN Charter, the GA is instructed to pay "due regard… to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization" (Article 23(1)). In practice this has meant that regional powers like Japan and Brazil tend to serve more frequently than less influential states such as Laos or Paraguay. Each regional caucus can devise its own procedure for deciding which nation(s) to nominate, but is still constrained to choose nations that will ultimately gain the two-thirds approval required in the GA and sometimes cannot even agree on a particular candidate to put forward. Appendix I lists the number of years that countries in our dataset have served on the Security Council, divided by the approximate caucuses that select nominees.

From the example of the two Gulf wars—with numerous newspaper articles describing the courting of non-permanent members to support the use of force against Iraq—it seems evident that countries sometimes get bribed when they serve on the Security Council. Moreover, there is extensive competition and jostling for the non-permanent seats, with some countries mounting expensive campaigns to get elected to the council (Malone, 2000). The observed campaigning suggests that these countries expect a net reward during their tenure.

However, there are several reasons to doubt that countries systematically get more aid while on the council. First, the United States already provides extensive aid to most poor countries, and certain packages may be "pitched" as conditional upon Security Council performance when they would have gone through anyhow, had the recipient country not been on the council. Second, countries may seek the non-financial benefits of council membership: for example, the presidency of the council is rotating, and the President has some leeway over the agenda and the order of voting over amendments on

the table (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 130-131); additionally, council members may gain access to privileged information. Third, non-permanent members of the council do not have veto power and consequently may not be worth bribing at all. O'Neill (1996) applies the Shapley-Shubik index to the Security Council, where the index measures the percentage of total power attributed to a member based on voting rules. He finds that each of the five permanent members, with their veto power, have 19.6 percent of the power, and that each of the ten non-permanent members, with no veto, have less than 0.2 percent. Finally, even if non-permanent members did have voting power, a strict realist interpretation of international organizations would argue that the Security Council merely reflects the balance of power in the international system and does not have any independent impact on world affairs.

Committee Membership and Political Spoils

Considering the connection between Security Council membership and foreign aid parallels existing work examining whether having a legislator serve on a powerful US Congressional committee confers monetary benefits to the legislator's state or district. There is a large literature in political science investigating whether representatives who sit on particular committees or subcommittees are able to "bring home the bacon," which appears to improve the incumbent's chance of reelection (Levitt and Snyder, 1997). In perhaps the classic work in this field, Ferejohn (1974) notes that members of the public works committees get more new projects for their constituencies than nonmembers do, and that this treatment is even better for appropriations subcommittee members and for committee leaders. This committee member effect has also been noted for military spending in states and districts that are represented on defense committees (Ray, 1981; Rundquist, Lee, and Rhee 1996; Carsey and Rundquist, 1999; Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). Given that legislators can extract constituency benefits from committee service, it follows that there will be competition for service on the most lucrative committees. Indeed, this appears to be the case. Groseclose and Stewart (1998; and Stewart and Groseclose, 1999) provide estimates of the most valuable committees, and find that the Ways and Means and Appropriations committees, and the Finance and Appropriations committees, were the most coveted in the House and the Senate respectively.

Surprisingly, there have been no studies posing similar questions in the international arena. In this paper, we seek to investigate whether service on the UN Security Council, arguably the world's most prominent international committee, confers economic benefits on a nation. Unlike the Appropriations committee, for example, the Security Council does not distribute funds per se. Thus, if countries were to receive extra funds from the United Nations, it could be through logrolling. If donor countries were to disburse extra bilateral aid, it could be with the intention to buy support to form winning or blocking coalitions. Both of these practices have also been modeled in the Congress, and appear to be important processes of legislative activity (Riker, 1962; Shepsle, 1974; Stratmann, 1992; Groseclose and Snyder, 1996). Nonetheless, it should be more difficult to find evidence of committee influence through an indirect channel (logrolling and vote-buying) than through a direct channel (budget writing).

Perhaps the largest challenge in the empirical literature on congressional committee influence is determining the direction of causality (Ray, 1981). After all, it may not be the membership on the defense committee that generates the allocation of district-level military spending, but rather the fact that congressmen who represent districts with defense spending are more likely to seek assignment to defense committees (Rundquist, Rhee, Fox, and Lee, 1997).

Several features of the Security Council offer advantages in estimating the relationship between membership and financial gain. Unlike in Congress, representatives cannot serve successive terms on the Security Council. Thus, even if admission to the council is not exogenous, exit from the council is. Moreover, given that serving on the council is a relatively rare event, we can track the changes in aid as they correspond to election to, and service on, the Security Council, to determine the direction of causality. Certainly, it is possible for governments to adjust their aid at short notice in order to influence other countries. The US government has funds that can be allocated at the discretion of the administration (even if many of them are earmarked for a specific developmental purpose, such as child health).[1] Moreover, Congress can stipulate in their annual recommendation that certain countries receive a minimum amount of aid, and that such amount be distributed within 30 days of the act's passage.

[1] See, for instance, United States Congress (2001).

Another feature of the Security Council that benefits this inquiry is that the value of serving on the council fluctuates from year to year. The Security Council has been relatively more prominent in years of importance to the international community, such as deciding whether to use force in Iraq, than in years when the order of business does not get beyond Western Sahara or Myanmar. The value of a vote on the council should fluctuate with the importance of the Security Council in world affairs. Thus, though a country's propensity to serve on the council is by no means random, its service during a particular year and set of world events is essentially an outcome of chance.

It is these discontinuities—in service, and in the importance of the Security Council in world affairs—that we will exploit in order to measure the value of serving as a non-permanent member.

III. Data and Specifications

Data

We construct two panel datasets to test the predictions and limit our analysis to developing countries (those not classified as high-income countries by the World Bank in 2003) who were members of the United Nations but not part of the P5 (China). The first dataset maximizes the number of years over which we have data, given that the Security Council began functioning in 1946 and had a special urgency in its early years. Foreign aid data from the United States are available from 1946 using the "Greenbook," the US Overseas Loans & Grants database from USAID. From the Greenbook, we extract two variables, Total Economic Assistance Loans and Grants, and Total Military Assistance Loans and Grants, and convert them to constant dollars using the urban CPI to reflect the price to the US of administering the aid. In foreign aid reporting, only positive values are reported, and we assign zero aid to non-reported flows.[2] Of the country-years in our sample, over three fourths received economic aid, and nearly one half received military aid.

[2] We set zero and negative aid flows to $1 for the log specification. Appendix II, discussed later, relaxes these assumptions.

We have two primary political controls. The first, representing major outlier political activity, is whether a war of at least 1000 battle deaths is occurring in the recipient country and is from the dataset compiled by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (Gleditsch et al, 2002); less than one tenth of the country-years in our sample were characterized by such conflict. The second, to capture ideological swings in a country, is the Polity2 dictatorship/democracy score from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002), where a score of 10 is a perfect democracy and a score of -10 is a perfect autocracy. The average score in our dataset is -1.88, indicating a country that is more autocratic than democratic. Both of these controls go back through 1946, though they are not available for all countries. The economic controls are from the Penn World Tables and begin in 1950 for a subset of the countries. The two controls we choose are the log of real GDP per capita using the Laspeyres weighting, and the log of population.

The second dataset maximizes the number of countries over which we have data and begins in 1960 along with the statistics for UN and bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA; the sum of grants and the grant component of loans excluding military aid) for countries other than the US. Foreign aid data are from the OECD. For UN aid, we sum ODA over all the UN agencies and convert to constant dollars using the ratio of the recipient country's real GDP to nominal GDP. Over 96 percent of the country-years in our sample received UN aid. For bilateral donors, we use the donor-specific price deflator provided by the OECD to weight the donations in constant dollars, again to reflect the cost to the donor of paying out aid.

While our political controls are the same as with the first dataset, our economic controls are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. Though the WDI data begin only in 1960, they cover more countries than the Penn World Tables. Again, the controls are the log of real per capita GDP and the log of population.

Empirical Strategy

Our basic empirical strategy is to look within countries across time and measure how their aid receipts change as a function of their Security Council status. This

estimation can be captured by the following equation, using the logarithmic specification following Alesina and Dollar (2000):

$$(1)\quad \ln(Aid_{irt}) = \alpha + \beta * SCMember_{it} + \gamma * \boldsymbol{X}_{it} + \boldsymbol{W}_{rt} + \boldsymbol{\eta}_t + \boldsymbol{\mu}_i + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where *i* indexes countries, *r* indexes regions, *t* indexes years, *SCMember* is a dummy variable coded as one if country *i* is serving on the Security Council in year *t*, $\boldsymbol{X}$ is a vector of time-varying political and economic controls for each country, $\boldsymbol{W}$ is a regional quartic time trend,[3] $\boldsymbol{\eta}$ is a vector of year fixed effects, and $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ is a vector of country fixed effects. In the results that follow, we usually set *Aid* to equal either US foreign aid or UN development aid, though we also review other donor countries' foreign aid activity.

Changes in the average level of foreign aid across time will be absorbed by the year fixed effects. Moreover, any omitted variable that affects a country's average aid level will be absorbed by the country fixed effects. However, if a country's propensity to serve on the Security Council changed during the time covered in our data and this change was correlated in some way to its pattern of aid receipts, then an OLS estimate of β would be biased. We address this concern in two ways. First, we interact the *SCMember* variables with a measure of how important that year happened to be in the Security Council. While, as discussed in Section 2, assignment to the Security Council is not strictly random, whether a country serves during an especially critical moment essentially is. As countries need to begin their campaigns for Security Council membership years before they actually serve, it would be nearly impossible for countries to "time" their campaigns to correspond with world events that might make their tenure especially lucrative. (Surely Cameroon and Angola had no way of knowing that they would serve during the Bush Administration's push for Gulf War II.) This estimation is specified by the following equation:

[3] The regions are Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Other. We include a linear time trend for Egypt, recognizing the dramatic increases in aid to Egypt following the Camp David Accord; Israel is not part of the dataset as it was a high-income country in 2003. Recognizing that Egypt should be treated as a special case in foreign aid estimations is consistent with major recent papers (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). In Appendix II we will test our main results using region-year dummies.

$$(2)\quad \ln(Aid_{irt}) = \alpha + \beta_1 * SCMember_{it} + \beta_2 * SCMEMBER_{it} * NYT_t + \gamma * \boldsymbol{X}_{it} + \boldsymbol{W}_{rt} + \boldsymbol{\eta}_t + \boldsymbol{\mu}_i + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where *NYT* is the total number of *New York Times* articles in year t with the words "Security Council" and "United Nations" in the article, searched through the ProQuest® historical database. A graph of the *NYT* variable since 1946 is provided in Figure 1. In our empirical work we recalibrate the NYT variable to units of 100 and subtract the mean number of articles for ease of interpretation, making the coefficient on β_1 comparable to β in equation (1). If the effect on aid of being on the Security Council is purely driven by countries exerting their influence in ways that are both correlated to gaining a seat on the council and in procuring more aid and not due to the true treatment effect captured by the interaction term, then we should see estimates of β_2 statistically indistinguishable from zero. If, instead, the effect on aid is being driven by the interaction term, then we can conclude that the Security Council effect on aid is likely causal and not driven by omitted variables.

One final check we perform is to examine the pattern of aid receipts not only during a country's tenure on the Security Council, but also during the years immediately before and after. We refer to this estimation as the "*NYT* event-time specification" and it is described by the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}(3)\qquad \ln(Aid_{irt}) = {} & \alpha + \beta_{-1} * T{-}1_{it} + \beta_0 * T0_{it} + \beta_1 * T1_{it} + \beta_2 * T2_{it} + \beta_3 * T3_{it} + \beta_4 * T4_{it} + \\ & \phi_{-1} * T{-}1_{it} * NYT_t + \phi_0 * T0_{it} * NYT_t + \phi_1 * T1_{it} * NYT_t + \phi_2 * T2_{it} * NYT_t + \phi_3 * T3_{it} * NYT_t \\ & + \phi_4 * T4_{it} * NYT_t + \gamma * \boldsymbol{X}_{it} + \boldsymbol{W}_{rt} + \boldsymbol{\eta}_t + \boldsymbol{\mu}_i + e_{it},\end{aligned}$$

where *T-1* is a dummy variable indicating the year before a country is elected to the Security Council (and two years before its terms actually starts), *T0* corresponds to the year of election, *T1* and *T2* correspond to the two years of service on the council, and *T3* and *T4* correspond to the two years immediately following the two-year term.

The coefficients β_{-1} through β_4 should capture the correlational relationship between serving on the council and receiving aid. Further, comparing the coefficients on the years directly following tenure (β_3 and β_4) with those during tenure would allow us to investigate whether countries on the Security Council are able to draw the world's

attention to their problems in a lasting manner, and thus be able to secure long-term aid packages that would last well beyond their actual tenure. However, to argue that the power of the council itself leads to more aid, we must turn to the interactions of the event time dummies with *NYT* articles. If, indeed, it is service on the council that leads to increased aid, then the interaction with *NYT* should only be positive and significant when a country serves on the council. Comparing the *NYT*-interacted coefficients on the year directly preceding tenure (ϕ_{-1}) and after tenure (ϕ_3 and ϕ_4) with those on the year of election (ϕ_0) and the years of actual tenure (ϕ_1 and ϕ_2) will allow us to investigate whether the change in aid corresponds to the actual service on the Security Council.

IV. Estimating the Value of a Seat

US Economic Aid

Table 2 shows the results from estimating variations of equations (1), (2), and (3) when US foreign aid serves as the dependent variable. Column 1 shows the results when only the *SCMember* dummy variable, year, and country fixed effects are included as explanatory variables. Column 2 adds the regional quartic time trends. The results suggest that Security Council membership is not associated with an increase in US foreign aid. In column 3, we add the *SCMember*NYT* interaction term and boldface the coefficient in the table. The results are very suggestive. The interaction term is positive and significant, indicating that countries serving on the council during years of heightened international activity receive more aid. During an "average" year where the annual number of *NYT* articles is 415, the increase in aid a country can expect from serving on the Security Council is essentially zero. Serving during an "important" year of 666 articles, one standard deviation above the mean, a country can expect an increase in aid of 77 percent. Average US aid receipts for developing countries between 1946 and 2001, measured in 1996 dollars, was $18.5 million. This means that service on the council during such a year translated to an average aid increase of $14.2 million for a developing country.

In the remaining columns, we check the robustness of the result in column 2.

Column 4 adds political controls and column 5 adds political and economic controls (which, given the incomplete coverage of these variables, results in significant losses in sample size). Though the statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term falls due to the decreased sample size, the point-estimates are nearly identical in columns 3 through 5, suggesting that the result is robust to the addition of further controls. In column 4, being democratic is associated with more foreign aid, but the magnitude and significance falls away once income per capita is controlled for in column 5.[4]

Column 6 is probably the most convincing check that the aid effect of being on the Security Council is indeed causal. In this specification, we interact the event-time dummy variables with the *NYT* variable. None of the main effects of the event-time variables are significant. However, the interaction terms display a pattern that is very suggestive of a discontinuous, positive effect of Security Council membership. The interaction term using the year before election has no significant effect, and neither do the interaction terms using the two years after the term has expired.[5] However, the interaction terms using the year of election and the two years of service on the Security Council all have positive, statistically significant coefficients that we boldface in the table.

We note that the main results of column 3 are robust to using an alternative measure of a year's diplomatic importance: whether interstate military conflict involving more than three states and more than 1,000 deaths began. They are also robust to simply choosing years that correspond to key events in the Security Council and international diplomacy more generally: 1946 (first year of the UN), 1950 (Korean War), 1956 (Suez crisis), 1960 (U2 spy plane; Congo) 1962 (Cuban Missile crisis), 1967 and 1973 (Israeli-Arab wars), 1982 (Falklands, Lebanon), 1991 (Gulf War I), and 1999 (Kosovo), a result highlighted in the first column of Table 6 and explained later in the paper. Moreover, fearing that the international coverage of the *New York Times* changed over time, we ran the regression with a weighted *NYT* variable that measured the number of Security

[4] We reran the specification of column 3 on the sample of column 5 and the coefficients on council membership look nearly identical to those reported in column 5; thus it appears that the reduced significance is being driven by the reduced sample and not by the additional control variables.

[5] This does not imply that all Security Council aid packages are short-term in length—certainly a 5-year project may be awarded to a country serving on the council. It does suggest that, on balance, the bonus in aid flows is short lived; other projects may dry up following tenure.

Council articles relative to a moving average of US Senate articles and the result held. Furthermore, concerned with omitted variable bias, we ran column 3 with the additional control of voting coincidence with the US in the General Assembly. Surely this is an endogenous outcome so we do not report the results, but the positive, significant impact of β_2 remains.

We vary the functional form of the model in Appendix II, columns 1-3. In column 1 we allow the *New York Times* interaction to take on a quadratic form given that the right-hand tail of the *NYT* variable is longer than the left-hand tail. The quadratic term is negative but not statistically significant, with coefficients implying that there are diminishing returns to the value of the seat as expressed in newspaper coverage, and that the value of a seat on the council continues to rise until around 700 articles above the mean. In column 2 we run a Tobit specification that recognizes the discontinuity in the dependent variable (with a mass of values at zero) and the results on the interaction term are highly significant and essentially identical to the OLS specification. Column 3 presents a probit estimation where the dependent variable is whether a country received positive economic aid from the US. Being on the council during a normal year has no effect on getting some aid from the US, but as the seat rises in value, a country is more likely to be a recipient of American economic aid.

The results are robust to a number of manipulations to the treatment of zeroes and regional trends which we report in Appendix III, columns 1-4: (1) limiting the regression to positive aid values, (2) resetting the log of non-positive aid from zero to ten,[6] (3) inserting a dummy variable for zero aid for the particular country-year, and (4) substituting region year dummies for the region quartics. In other words, the log specification's built-in sensitivity to small changes in absolute magnitude that are close to zero is not driving the results. They are also robust to changing the sample selection rule from countries not classified as high-income countries in 2003 by the World Bank that were members of the UN. In Appendix IV, columns 1-4, we find that the main results are robust to: (1) dropping countries that never served on the Security Council from 1946-2004, (2) not excluding high-income countries, (3) excluding country-years with real GDP per capita greater than $10,000 in the particular year of the observation rather than

[6] The smallest positive value of the log of aid is approximately 9.5, or $13,000.

in 2003,[7] and (4) dropping the Gulf War and surrounding years, 1990-93, from the analysis.

US Military Aid

Table 3 shows parallel specifications to those in Table 2, but with US military aid serving as the dependent variable. The result in column 1 of Table 3 is strikingly different from that in Table 2: Security Council membership is associated with a more than doubling of US military aid. This does not change considerably when the region quartics are introduced in column 2. However, unlike US economic aid, the effect does not seem responsive to the political climate: column 3 shows that the *SCMember*NYT* interaction term is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Column 6 shows the effect on aid of the years surrounding a country's Security Council tenure. Unlike the results in Table 2, the pattern of aid across these years does not suggest the contained, discontinuous effect of tenure.

The robustness checks on functional form in Appendix II, columns 4-6, are consistent with our basic specifications in Table 3. In column 4, a quadratic form of the *NYT* interaction remains statistically insignificant. In column 5, a Tobit specification confirms that the action is on the main Security Council effect rather than the interaction (though the standard errors are undefined). Finally, in column 6, a probit specification indicates that countries are more likely to receive some military aid when they are on the council, but this probability does not change as the importance of the council changes.

The interpretation of the military aid results is not as straightforward as that of the economic aid results. In the latter case, we feel confident that there is a treatment effect of Security Council membership. With military aid, we believe that one of three hypotheses may explain the pattern of results. First, the US may be offering *long*-term military aid packages in return for cooperation, which would explain why the increases in aid last beyond Security Council tenure. Second, there could be an omitted-variables explanation: when countries are especially agreeable to US interests, they are both more likely to get additional military aid and more likely to get on the Security Council.

[7] This is less significant at the p=0.101 level due to losing country-years not covered in the PWT, but the coefficient is unchanged.

Finally, military aid may be more highly monitored by the press and Congressional authorities, which could limit its use for political purposes. Oversight could also explain why the Security Council effect is not a function of the political climate: it would be exactly when the political situation heats up that the press and others would be most vigilant in documenting attempted bribery through military aid.

UN Results

Table 4 shows results parallel to those in Tables 2 and 3, but with total UN development aid serving as the dependent variable. The similarity between Tables 2 and 4 is striking, especially given the relatively low correlation of 0.45 between US and UN aid after 1960. Columns 1 and 2 indicate that Security Council membership is not associated with a significant increase in UN development aid. When the *SCMember* variable is interacted with the *NYT* measure, we see increases in aid corresponding to important years. The point estimates in column 3 suggest that, in the average year of 373 *NYT* articles, a country on the Security Council received an 8 percent increase to their UN development aid. During an important year of 553 articles (one standard deviation above the mean), UN aid to non-permanent Security Council members went up by 42 percent. Given that the average amount of UN development aid to developing countries in our database between 1960 and 2001, measured in 1995 dollars, was $16.1 million, this implies that the average developing country serving on the Security Council during an important year would receive an additional $6.8 million in development aid from various agencies of the United Nations. Columns 4 and 5 show that this result is extremely robust to adding political and economic controls. Interestingly, UN aid is not sensitive to the level of democracy, though it does decrease to countries when they are at war and when their income per capita rises.

Finally, column 6 shows the results when we interact the NYT measure with the event-time dummy variables. Like the results in Table 2, the coefficients on the interaction terms are highly significant. The two years of service on the Security Council and the year following have large, positive coefficients, while the years before election and the second year following tenure all have small and insignificant effects on aid. This suggests that UN aid is more sluggish in its administration: while US aid appears in the

year the country was elected and vanishes immediately following tenure, UN aid appears during the first year on the council and does not dry up until the second year following service. The results in Table 4 suggest that Security Council countries are able to use their influence to increase their aid from UN agencies.[8]

Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of UN aid to nonpermanent members in event time, for each of a normal year (NYT = 373, mean value), an important year (NYT = 553, one standard deviation above the mean), and a very important year (NYT = 733, two standard deviations above the mean). We scale the y-axis by normalizing a normal year prior to being elected to 100. From the figure one can see the importance of international activity for the Security Council in generating the discontinuities in aid. Countries serving during normal council sessions do not experience any substantial changes to their UN aid receipts, but when there is a lot of action in the international arena, countries receive large aid windfalls while they are on the council that drop away by the second year after service.

Other Donor Nations

In Table 5, we examine whether other donor nations exhibit foreign aid patterns consistent with buying the votes of Security Council members. To answer this question, we turn to the OECD data on ODA. Column 1 replicates the result from the third column of Table 2, using this different measure of US aid. As before, we see that there is an overall positive effect of serving on the Security Council during important years on US aid receipts. (Though we do not report the regressions, we can effectively replicate the results in Table 2 using the US OECD data.) This same specification is estimated in the remaining columns, using the foreign-aid outlays of other donor countries as the dependent variable. The striking finding is that no other country except Germany

[8] The results of column 2 are also robust to the alternate measure of *NYT* as well as including voting coincidence with the US in the GA. In addition, we repeat the robustness checks of US economic aid in columns 5-8 of Appendices II and III. The UN aid increases to non-permanent members of the Security Council appear robust to changes in the treatment of zeroes, regional trends, and in the sample selection rule. We do not report the results on changes to the functional form as we do for US aid in Appendix II, largely because these are uninteresting. The *NYT* interaction for UN aid appears to be linear; the Tobit's standard errors are undefined though the coefficients are consistent with the results of Table 4; and the probit drops many observations given that most developing countries get aid from the UN during most years, but for those 200 observations that remain, the *NYT* interaction is positive and statistically significant.

exhibits results similar to those of the US and the UN. Though we do not show the results here, when the other regressions from Table 2 are replicated using German aid data, the coefficients are remarkably similar, suggesting that Germany attempts to purchase influence on the Security Council. A country serving during an important year of 553 articles would see a doubling of their aid from Germany, a bonus worth an average of $16 million. (In these specifications, the US bonus is 135 percent, or $25.5 million.)

These results are not driven merely by correlation. While it is true that the log of German aid has the highest correlation with the log of US aid of 0.42 (the next largest is Britain, at 0.35), the correlation between the logs of German and Japanese, and German and French, are much higher, at 0.54 and 0.52 respectively, yet French and Japanese aid do not respond to Security Council membership.

One reason we might expect different results from Germany, on the one hand, and France and the UK, on the other, is that Germany does not have a permanent seat on the Security Council. France and the UK have the ability to put items on the agenda, and thus do not rely on other counties on the Security Council for this service. Further, they may feel that bribing fellow members of the Security Council is ineffective for two reasons: first, they could probably never out-bid the US; second, the Franco-American tension during Gulf War II notwithstanding, their interests were largely aligned with those of the US anyhow, so they would be more than happy to let the US pay to build the needed coalition.

Of course, Japan, like Germany, is not a permanent member and might therefore have an incentive to purchase influence. Perhaps the reason the specifications in Table 5 do not detect this behavior is that the *NYT* variable is not a good measure of an important year with respect to Japanese diplomacy, as the newspaper would tend to cover issues more salient to the US and Western Europe. We reran Japanese aid using alternate measures of important year, matching "United Nations" and "Security Council" with "Pacific" or "Korea" on the *New York Times* ProQuest® search and did not find similar patterns.

V. Heterogeneous Treatment: Forming the Cheapest Coalition

Economic intuition suggests that the market for votes in the Security Council will be subject to price discrimination, as rotating members engage in one-on-one negotiations with the vote buyer. Coalition builders will want to assemble the cheapest winning coalition (Riker, 1962). Frances Lee (2000) notes that in the Senate, small states may require less total federal funding to join a particular coalition, so long as their federal funding per capita is still attractive. She finds that coalition builders seek out less costly members, and that the corresponding policies more closely reflect the preferences of small-state senators than large-state senators.

A similar phenomenon could very easily characterize the Security Council. Smaller and poorer countries may be cheaper to buy in absolute dollars—imagine India versus Honduras. Indeed, Malone notes that "small countries are sometimes easily influenced and co-opted" (2000) and thus would be attractive candidates for coalition-builders. Likewise, dictatorships, who can divide bribes among a small ruling elite, may be easier to buy than democracies, who are accountable to their voters at home. In addition, political allies of the coalition builder probably need less convincing to vote a particular way than do traditional foes.

Unfortunately, these hypotheses have ambiguous predictions regarding the amount of aid received by a non-permanent member. On the one hand, we would expect smaller, allied, and less democratic nations to receive larger bumps in aid when they serve on the council, as they are more likely to be chosen as part of the winning coalition. On the other hand, we would expect them to receive smaller bumps in aid, given that their votes are cheaper to buy. Which effect—frequency versus price—dominates, then, is an empirical question.

To identify this heterogeneity cleanly, we need to interact our clean measure of the value of a seat on the Security Council with the population, level of democracy, and friendliness of the recipient country. Given that we already identify the value of the seat through an interaction term (serving during an exogenous increase in the importance of the Security Council), the interpretations of coefficients becomes confusing. For this reason, we use a dummy variable for whether it was an important year in international

relations, according to the list in Section IV, and run the following regression:

$$(4)\ \ln(Aid_{irt}) = \alpha + \beta_1 * SCMember_{it} + \beta_2 * SCMEMBER_{it} * ImptYear_t + \beta_3 * SCMEMBER_{it} * ImptYear_t * ln(population)_{it} + \beta_4 * ImptYear_t * ln(population)_{it} + \beta_5 * SCMEMBER_{it} * ln(population)_{it} + \beta_6 * ln(population)_{it} + \gamma * \boldsymbol{X}_{it} + \boldsymbol{W}_{rt} + \boldsymbol{\eta}_t + \boldsymbol{\mu}_i + \varepsilon_{it},$$

Our interest is whether the exogenous Security Council aid from serving during an important year goes disproportionately to smaller countries. Since the variables *SCMember* and *ImptYear* are both dummy variables, this becomes quite simple. The Security Council bonus is β_2 plus β_3 times the log of the country's population. The interaction term of $ImptYear_t * ln(population)_{it}$ controls for any changes in aid that may correspond to larger or smaller countries during major diplomatic events independent of their being on the Security Council. Similarly, $SCMEMBER_{it} * ln(population)_{it}$ controls for aid patterns to large or small council members that are not associated with the expanded influence of serving during a time of increased importance.

To measure whether democracies or dictatorships get a larger increase in aid, specification (4) can be repeated substituting the Polity2 autocracy/democracy scale for the log of population. And in order to measure whether allies of the US disproportionately benefit, we use the recipient country's voting in the UN General Assembly from Gartzke and Jo (2002) and create a variable that expresses the fraction of votes that were identical to the US in roll call votes in the GA, then substitute that measure for log of population. The results are in Table 6.

Column 1 reproduces the result of column 3 in Table 2: aid rises to countries serving as non-permanent members during an important year of international relations by 133 log points, or 174 percent. Translated to the specification of Table 2, this is equivalent to a year of 1000 *New York Times* articles on the Security Council, a number in between the 1960 U2 Spy Plane and Congo events (926 articles) and the 1950 Korean War (1062 articles). We can see from the first coefficient that American economic aid to non-permanent members who serve during an unimportant year does not change significantly.

The second column allows for heterogeneous treatment according to population.

In this case, β_2 is 6.967 and β_3 is -0.67, and both are significantly different from zero. This implies that smaller countries receive a larger percentage increase in their foreign aid when they serve on the council during an important year. For example, a country whose population is 1,043,000, similar to Swaziland (one standard deviation below the mean of the log of population) would receive a 210 percent bonus in aid during an important year serving on the council. A larger country with a population of 34,544,000, similar to Tanzania (one standard deviation above the mean of the log of population) would receive no change in its aid during the same stint.

The third column allows for variation according to the Polity2 score, which varies from -10 (perfect autocracy) to 10 (perfect democracy). Now β_2 is 0.953 and β_3 is -0.159; again, both are significantly different from zero. These figures imply that less democratic countries receive larger increases in their foreign aid when they serve during important years. An autocratic country with a Polity2 score of -9, the same as that of North Korea or Turkmenistan in 2001 (one standard deviation below the mean of -2) would receive an increase of 213 percent serving during an important year. On the other hand, a relatively democratic country with a Polity2 score of 5, the score of Fiji or Malawi in 2001 (and one standard deviation above the mean), would only see an 11 percent increase.

In the fourth column we investigate the relationship between the friendliness of the country to the United States, as measured by their vote similarity in the GA, and the aid that they get when serving on the Security Council. Interestingly, neither β_2 nor β_3 is significant, though the sign of β_3 suggests that countries that are more aligned with the United States may receive more aid from serving on the council. It is important to note that these variables are endogenous so long as countries vote consistently across the various UN committees—if they are being bought off in the Security Council, most likely their General Assembly voting coincidence will rise as well. Moreover, the size and dictatorship results should not be interpreted as causal; there may be some underlying "bribability" that is negatively correlated with population and democracy. Regardless, the apparent favorable treatment to smaller and less democratic Security Council members is suggestive that agenda setters such as the United States attempt to build the cheapest winning coalition.

VI. Conclusion

Thus far, we have argued that non-permanent members of the UN Security Council who serve during important years of world events receive extra foreign aid from the United States, the United Nations, and Germany. Our identification strategy is highly suggestive that the council membership itself, and not simply some omitted variable, drives the aid increases. The typical developing country serving during an important year—one in which the number of *New York Times* articles on the Security Council is one standard deviation above the mean—might expect to receive an additional $14-25 million from the US, $7 million from the UN, and as much as $16 million from Germany. Smaller countries and dictatorships can expect to see larger increases in their aid than larger countries and democracies. These results are consistent with the additional aid being used to buy votes; also, the UN aid is potentially evidence of logrolling activity among UN member nations.

Ideally, a paper on vote-buying in the UN would test for the ability of Security Council aid to influence actual voting. Unfortunately, this is problematic for two reasons. One, we cannot observe the counter-factual: how the country would have voted in the absence of vote-buying activity. Two, votes themselves are strategic. Agenda setters typically know the voting preference of each member before putting a resolution up for a vote. Perhaps this is why most Security Council resolutions are passed unanimously, and failed resolutions are rare—recall that the 2003 resolution to authorize the invasion of Iraq never actually came to a vote. Due to these identification problems, we believe that actual outlays of aid are the most trustworthy evidence for the presence of manipulation in the Security Council. By providing extra aid to non-permanent members of the council during important years for international events, agenda setters have implicitly revealed their faith in the Security Council's relevance in world affairs.

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Table 1: Data, Means, and Variances

Dataset 1: 1946-2001

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation
SC Member	5631	0.06	0.24
NYT articles	5631	415.15	250.91
War occurring (>1000 deaths)	5344	0.09	0.28
Polity2 Score	5080	-1.88	6.63
ln(GDP per capita, $1996)	3904	7.80	0.81
ln(population)	3905	8.70	1.75
ln(Economic aid and loans from US, $1996)	5422	11.86	6.56
ln(Military aid and loans from US, $1996)	5425	6.51	6.88
Economic aid and loans from US, $1996 million	5425	18.48	61.50
Military aid and loans from US, $1996 million	5425	7.97	73.72
Fraction of votes in GA like US	4759	0.28	0.18

Dataset 2: 1960-2001

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation
SC Member	4921	0.06	0.24
NYT articles	4921	373.25	179.69
War occurring (>1000 deaths)	4577	0.09	0.29
Polity2 Score	4335	-1.97	6.69
ln(GDP per capita, $1995)	4029	6.82	1.08
ln(population)	4911	15.44	1.78
ln(Net ODA from UN, $1995)	4041	15.18	3.42
ln(Net bilateral ODA, $2000) from USA	4711	11.32	7.10
ln(Net bilateral ODA, $2000) from France	4711	10.33	7.30
ln(Net bilateral ODA, $2000) from Germany	4711	13.05	5.12
ln(Net bilateral ODA, $2000) from Japan	4711	11.19	6.30
ln(Net bilateral ODA, $2000) from UK	4711	10.68	5.76
Net ODA from UN, $1995 million	4041	16.12	26.31
Net bilateral ODA, $2000 million, from USA	4711	18.89	76.97
Net bilateral ODA, $2000 million, from France	4711	14.86	45.95
Net bilateral ODA, $2000 million, from Germany	4711	15.35	67.34
Net bilateral ODA, $2000 million, from Japan	4711	20.45	79.82
Net bilateral ODA, $2000 million, from UK	4711	4.78	15.48

Table 2: Economic Aid from the US, 1946-2001

	dependent variable: ln(Economic aid and loans from US, $1996)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SC Member	0.142	0.033	0.001	0.048	0.174	
	[0.316]	[0.292]	[0.279]	[0.282]	[0.251]	
SC Member * 100 NYT articles above mean (AOM)			**0.227**	**0.214**	**0.183**	
			[0.100]**	**[0.108]****	**[0.145]**	
One year before election to SC						-0.25
						[0.641]
Year of election to SC						0.355
						[0.354]
First year of serving on SC						0.076
						[0.382]
Second year of serving on SC						0.005
						[0.381]
First year after finishing SC term						-0.038
						[0.412]
Second year after finishing SC term						-0.082
						[0.358]
One year before election to SC * 100 NYT AOM						0.085
						[0.132]
Year of election to SC * 100 NYT AOM						0.248
						[0.133]*
First year of serving on SC * 100 NYT AOM						**0.237**
						[0.123]*
Second year of serving on SC * 100 NYT AOM						**0.296**
						[0.131]**
First year after finishing SC term * 100 NYT AOM						0.05
						[0.111]
Second year after finishing SC term * 100 NYT AOM						0.222
						[0.163]
War occurring (>1000 deaths)				-0.285	-0.137	
				[0.525]	[0.634]	
Polity2 Score				0.102	0.046	
				[0.037]***	[0.032]	
ln(GDP per capita, $1996)					-1.241	
					[0.950]	
ln(population)					-1.792	
					[2.888]	
Country and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Quartics	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5422	5422	5422	4899	3616	5422
R-squared	0.56	0.62	0.62	0.59	0.57	0.62

Robust standard errors in brackets clustered on country. Egypt time trend included in all regressions.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 3: Military Aid from the US, 1946-2001

	dependent variable: ln(Military aid and loans from US, $1996)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SC Member	0.725 [0.321]**	0.681 [0.309]**	0.682 [0.310]**	0.657 [0.311]**	0.537 [0.375]	
SC Member * 100 NYT articles above mean (AOM)			**-0.004 [0.102]**	**-0.03 [0.107]**	**-0.046 [0.228]**	
One year before election to SC						-0.553 [0.719]
Year of election to SC						0.672 [0.362]*
First year of serving on SC						0.742 [0.380]*
Second year of serving on SC						0.95 [0.437]**
First year after finishing SC term						0.527 [0.439]
Second year after finishing SC term						0.706 [0.442]
One year before election to SC * 100 NYT AOM						0.225 [0.124]*
Year of election to SC * 100 NYT AOM						0.057 [0.142]
First year of serving on SC * 100 NYT AOM						**-0.013 [0.134]**
Second year of serving on SC * 100 NYT AOM						**0.046 [0.124]**
First year after finishing SC term * 100 NYT AOM						-0.115 [0.138]
Second year after finishing SC term * 100 NYT AOM						-0.199 [0.182]
War occurring (>1000 deaths)				-0.754 [0.944]	-1.033 [1.053]	
Polity2 Score				0.138 [0.055]**	0.066 [0.058]	
ln(GDP per capita, $1996)					0.825 [1.288]	
ln(population)					-4.605 [3.488]	
Country and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Quartics	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5425	5425	5425	4902	3616	5425
R-squared	0.44	0.5	0.5	0.49	0.55	0.5

Robust standard errors in brackets clustered on country. Egypt time trend included in all regressions.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4: Aid from the UN, 1960-2001

	dependent variable: ln(Net ODA from UN, $1995)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SC Member	0.07 [0.084]	0.066 [0.085]	0.077 [0.082]	0.089 [0.080]	0.118 [0.076]	
SC Member * 100 NYT articles above mean (AOM)			**0.153 [0.049]*** **	**0.147 [0.052]*** **	**0.141 [0.047]*** **	
One year before election to SC						-0.043 [0.118]
Year of election to SC						0.035 [0.130]
First year of serving on SC						0.039 [0.140]
Second year of serving on SC						0.123 [0.086]
First year after finishing SC term						0.079 [0.068]
Second year after finishing SC term						0.002 [0.074]
One year before election to SC * 100 NYT AOM						-0.045 [0.137]
Year of election to SC * 100 NYT AOM						0.039 [0.139]
First year of serving on SC * 100 NYT AOM						**0.172 [0.066]*** **
Second year of serving on SC * 100 NYT AOM						**0.148 [0.048]*** **
First year after finishing SC term * 100 NYT AOM						0.118 [0.062]*
Second year after finishing SC term * 100 NYT AOM						0.06 [0.056]
War occurring (>1000 deaths)				-0.612 [0.233]***	-0.572 [0.217]***	
Polity2 Score				0.026 [0.028]	0.005 [0.016]	
ln(GDP per capita, $1996)					-1.108 [0.316]***	
ln(population)					-2.043 [0.955]**	
Country and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Quartics	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4041	4041	4041	3583	3490	4041
R-squared	0.72	0.75	0.75	0.77	0.66	0.75

Robust standard errors in brackets clustered on country. Egypt time trend included in all regressions.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5: Bilateral Aid, 1960-2001

	dependent variable: ln(Net bilateral ODA, $2000) from:				
	USA	France	Germany	Japan	UK
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SC Member	0.068	0.108	0.175	0.105	-0.449
	[0.313]	[0.305]	[0.193]	[0.229]	[0.243]*
SC Member * 100 NYT articles above mean number	**0.438**	**0.134**	**0.298**	**-0.12**	**-0.167**
	[0.216]**	**[0.158]**	**[0.133]****	**[0.143]**	**[0.153]**
Country and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Quartics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4711	4711	4711	4711	4711
R-squared	0.52	0.73	0.61	0.69	0.6

Robust standard errors in brackets clustered on country. Egypt time trend included in all regressions.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 6: Economic Aid from the US and Heterogeneous Treatment, 1946-2001

	dependent variable: ln(Economic aid and loans from US, $1996)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SC Member	-0.183	-1.445	-0.244	-0.416
	[0.293]	[1.233]	[0.304]	[0.556]
SC Member * Important year	1.33	6.967	0.953	1.103
	[0.576]**	[2.883]**	[0.545]*	[0.935]
SC Member * Important year * ln(pop)		-0.67		
		[0.318]**		
Important year * ln(pop)		0.155		
		[0.074]**		
SC Member * ln(pop)		0.152		
		[0.132]		
ln(population)		-0.322		
		[2.633]		
SC Member * Important year * Polity2			-0.159	
			[0.096]*	
Important year * Polity2			-0.02	
			[0.019]	
SC Member * Polity2			-0.069	
			[0.044]	
Polity2 Score			0.113	
			[0.037]***	
SC Member * Important year * Fraction of votes in GA like US				2.19
				[2.425]
Important year * Fraction of votes in GA like US				-3.023
				[1.108]***
SC Member * Fraction of votes in GA like US				0.968
				[1.283]
Fraction of votes in GA like US				6.051
				[1.546]***
Country and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Quartics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5422	3825	4899	4593
R-squared	0.62	0.59	0.59	0.66

Robust standard errors in brackets clustered on country. Egypt time trend included in all regressions.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Figure 1: The *New York Times* Variable



Figure 2: UN Development Aid to Non-Permanent Security Council Members in Event Time by Relevance of Year, 1960-2001



Appendix I: Who Serves on the Security Council

Country	Years on Security Council, 1946-2001	Country	Years on Security Council, 1946-2001
Africa		**Asia**	
Egypt, Arab Rep.	9	Japan	16
Nigeria	6	India	12
Tunisia	6	Pakistan	10
Zambia	6	Malaysia	5
Algeria	4	Turkey	5
Congo, Dem. Rep.	4	Bangladesh	4
Cote d'Ivoire	4	Indonesia	4
Ethiopia	4	Iraq	4
Gabon	4	Jordan	4
Ghana	4	Nepal	4
Kenya	4	Philippines	4
Mali	4	Syrian Arab Republic	4
Morocco	4	Bahrain	2
Senegal	4	Iran, Islamic Rep.	2
Zimbabwe	4	Korea, Rep.	2
Mauritius	3	Kuwait	2
Uganda	3	Lebanon	2
Benin	2	Oman	2
Botswana	2	Sri Lanka	2
Burkina Faso	2	Thailand	2
Burundi	2	United Arab Emirates	2
Cameroon	2	Yemen, Rep.	2
Cape Verde	2	Singapore	1
Congo, Rep.	2		
Djibouti	2	**Eastern Europe**	
Gambia, The	2	Poland	9
Guinea	2	Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.	7
Guinea-Bissau	2	Ukraine	6
Libya	2	Romania	5
Madagascar	2	Bulgaria	4
Mauritania	2	Hungary	4
Namibia	2	Belarus	2
Niger	2	Czech Republic	2
Rwanda	2	Slovenia	2
Sierra Leone	2		
Somalia	2	**Latin America and the Caribbean**	
Sudan	2	Brazil	16
Tanzania	2	Argentina	14
Togo	2	Colombia	11
Liberia	1	Panama	8
		Venezuela, RB	8
Western Europe and Other		Chile	6
Canada	12	Cuba	6
Italy	10	Ecuador	6
Netherlands	9	Peru	6
Australia	8	Bolivia	4
Belgium	8	Costa Rica	4
Norway	7	Guyana	4
Denmark	6	Jamaica	4
Germany	6	Nicaragua	4
Spain	6	Mexico	3
Sweden	6	Honduras	2
New Zealand	5	Paraguay	2
Austria	4	Trinidad and Tobago	2
Finland	4	Uruguay	2
Ireland	4		
Portugal	4		
Greece	2		
Malta	2		

Appendix II: Robustness Checks on Functional Form

	dependent variable: ln(Economic aid and loans from US, $1996)			ln(Military aid and loans from US, $1996)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SC Member	0.196	-0.038	-0.05	0.746	1.054	0.204
	[0.268]	[0.295]	[0.138]	[0.387]*	.	[0.106]*
SC Member * 100 NYT articles above mean number	0.419	0.229	0.82	0.141	0.056	0.002
	[0.151]***	[0.107]**	[0.044]*	[0.205]	.	[0.062]
SC Member * (100 NYT AOM)^2	-0.029			-0.008		
	[0.021]			[0.025]		
Specification	OLS	Tobit	Probit†	OLS	Tobit	Probit†
Country and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Quartics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5422	5422	3867	5425	5425	5147
R-squared	0.61	0.16	0.5	0.49	0.15	0.41

Robust standard errors in brackets clustered on country except in Tobit specification. Egypt time trend included in all regressions.

High-income countries excluded in 2003 based on World Bank classification. Excluded with annual data if real GDP per capita greater than $10,000.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

† Dependent variable is whether aid flows are positive.

Appendix III: Robustness Checks on Treatment of Zeroes and Regional Trends

	dependent variable: ln(Economic aid and loans from US, $1996)				ln(Net ODA from UN, $1995)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
SC Member	0.116	0.088	0.125	-0.015	0.031	0.046	0.032	0.028
	[0.088]	[0.119]	[0.078]	[0.279]	[0.039]	[0.047]	[0.038]	[0.102]
SC Member * 100 NYT articles above mean number	0.097	0.145	0.11	0.221	0.056	0.084	0.052	0.165
	[0.038]**	[0.043]***	[0.034]***	[0.099]**	[0.025]**	[0.029]***	[0.025]**	[0.060]***
Did not receive any aid			-14.219				-14.743	
			[0.175]***				[0.238]***	
Country and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Quartics	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Region Year Interactions	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Log of nonpositive aid values set to	Dropped	10	0	0	Dropped	10	0	0
Observations	4237	5422	5422	5422	3876	4041	4041	4041
R-squared	0.71	0.68	0.97	0.65	0.82	0.8	0.97	0.77

Robust standard errors in brackets clustered on country. Egypt time trend included in all regressions.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Appendix IV: Robustness Checks on Sample Selection

	dependent variable: ln(Economic aid and loans from US, $1996)				ln(Net ODA from UN, $1995)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
SC Member	0.038	0.051	-0.087	-0.088	0.073	0.112	0.079	0.006
	[0.263]	[0.250]	[0.260]	[0.290]	[0.077]	[0.086]	[0.080]	[0.087]
SC Member * 100 NYT articles above mean number	0.201	0.26	0.209	0.207	0.118	0.163	0.142	0.137
	[0.097]**	[0.096]***	[0.128]	[0.105]**	[0.045]***	[0.054]***	[0.049]***	[0.059]**
Country and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Quartics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Criteria								
Method of excluding high income countries	2003 GDP	Not excl	Annual GDP	2003 GDP	2003 GDP	Not excl	Annual GDP	2003 GDP
Never served on the Security Council excluded?	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Gulf War period (1990-93) excluded?	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	3906	6605	4061	4902	2735	4299	4003	3534
R-squared	0.61	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.83	0.71	0.64	0.79

Robust standard errors in brackets clustered on country. Egypt time trend included in all regressions.

High-income countries excluded in 2003 based on World Bank classification. Excluded with annual data if real GDP per capita greater than $10,000.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%