

The Economics of Insurance Fraud Investigation: Evidence of a Nash Equilibrium

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Abstract

The behavior of insurance companies investigating insurance fraud follows one of several Nash Equilibria under which companies consider the cost savings on a portion, or all, of the total claim. This behavior can reduce the effectiveness of investigations and cost reductions if the suboptimal equilibrium prevails and can lead to higher insurance premiums. Alternative cooperative arrangements are examined that could reduce or eliminate this potential inefficiency. Empirically, Massachusetts no-fault auto data for independent medical examinations shows that (1) investigation produces a net savings of about eight percent and (2) the investigation frequency is likely in excess of the theoretical optimal.

Keywords: Insurance fraud, Nash equilibrium, Automobile medical payments, Liability Insurance, Independent Medical Examination.

A number of recent studies have examined claim settlement behavior by insurers as it relates to insurance fraud (Crocker and Tennyson (2002), Derrig (2002), Derrig and Weisberg (2004) and Dionne, Giuliano and Picard (2003)). In this paper, a model combining the cost of claims, the cost of investigating claims and the potential for reducing claim costs is developed and analyzed in a game theoretic approach. The presence of a Nash Equilibrium, in which no player in a simultaneous non-cooperative game can unilaterally improve its position by shifting its strategy for investigating claims, is observed under a variety of different market conditions. (For a more complete description of game theory economics and Nash Equilibrium, see Montet and Serra, 2003.) In most cases, the Nash Equilibrium is not at the globally optimal claim investigation strategy.

Claims presented to an insurance company for payment may include a variety of different components. One component is a valid expense that should be paid in full by the insurer, since both the amount is appropriate and the coverage is applicable. Another component could be an excessive charge on a claim that would otherwise be covered. A charge is considered excessive if it is judged by the insurer to be “unreasonable”; most insurance policies cover only “reasonable” charges with reasonability defined by context and ultimately determined by negotiation, arbitration or, if necessary, lawsuit. A third component could be a claim for a service that is not covered although other services would be covered. A final component could be for an incident that is not covered by the insurance policy. Sorting out the different components of a claim efficiently is a constant process within a claims department.

For automobile insurance coverage in the United States, bodily injury claims can consist of two different insurance coverages. Medical expenses incurred by the policyholder or anyone else insured under the policy (family members, anyone occupying the covered vehicle) as the result of an automobile accident are covered, subject to policy limits, by the insurance company providing medical payments or personal injury protection (PIP) coverage without regard to fault. If someone is injured as the result of the fault of another person, then that injured party could pursue a liability claim against the responsible party, depending on the tort threshold applicable under the policy (Insurance Research Council, 2003, Chapter 2). The insurance company of the responsible party would be liable for the damages incurred by the injured person, subject to policy limits and degree of fault, under the liability insurance policy. Bodily injury liability damages consist of such tangible expenses as medical expenses and loss of income, which are termed special damages, and intangible components such as pain-and-suffering, loss of consortium or hedonic damages, which are termed general damages. The insurer that paid the medical expenses under the medical payments or PIP policy may also be able to recoup its payments from the liability insurer under subrogation.

In some cases the same insurer is responsible for both the medical expenses and the bodily injury liability payment. This would occur when the driver is responsible for an injury to a passenger, or if the same insurer covered the injured person under medical payments coverage and the responsible party under a different liability insurance policy. When a single insurer is responsible for all payments, determining the appropriate level of fraud investigation considers the entire cost of the claim.

Claim Investigation

Several types of claim investigation are commonly used by automobile insurers in addition to the routine gathering and evaluation of the circumstances of the accident and the cost of the treatment for the injury. The most common method is an Independent Medical Examination (IME), in which a doctor selected by the insurer examines the injured claimant and develops an independent assessment of the injury and the appropriate treatment. If the IME indicates a different level of injury or treatment than the claimant has reported through his or her medical care provider, then the claims department has a stronger case for denying some or all of the medical expenses that have been, or are likely to be, submitted. Another type of investigation is a Medical Audit (MA), in which the medical expenses are reviewed by a specialist or an expert system. Unusual factors that appear in the medical audit may provide the claims department with justification to reduce the claim payment. A third alternative is to refer the claim to a Special Investigation Unit (SIU), where specifically trained personnel are assigned to investigate claims with unusual questions in order to determine whether, and how much of, the claim should be paid¹.

IMEs and MAs can be used to reduce the amount of claim payments for medical expenses. SIUs can also reduce these expenses, but can also impact other expenses or even determine if the claim is valid at all. One level of investigation would be to investigate each claim where the expected savings from the investigation exceed the cost of the investigation. We call that approach “tactically optimal.” Another level of investigation would vary according to the characteristics of the claim so that the savings net of costs for the entire portfolio of claims is optimal in some way. We call this approach “strategically optimal.” In order to measure the expected savings, the insurer needs to ascertain the chance of finding unreasonable or fraudulent activity and the potential savings if that activity is discovered. We now turn to a formalization of the cost/savings process when total claim payments consist of first party PIP and, when applicable, third party liability².

Savings versus Cost

The following notation will be used:

Cost of claim without any investigation:

PIP claim = P

Liability claim (excess of PIP) = L

Total Compensation = P+L

Subscripts on P and L:

First subscript indicates company responsible for PIP

¹ The Insurance Research Council provides countrywide claims handling outcome data for these three techniques for a sample of 2002 bodily injury claims (IRC, 2003, pp.92-104).

² The Insurance Research Council provides an analysis of their 2002 claim sample for four no-fault states, Colorado (now a full tort state), Florida, New York and Michigan (IRC, 2004)

Second subscript indicates company responsible for Liability (0 if no liability)

$P_{1,0}$ represents a PIP claim where company 1 has the PIP coverage and there is no liability claim

$P_{1,1}$ represents a PIP claim where company 1 has the PIP coverage and the liability coverage

$P_{1,2}$ represents a PIP claim where company 1 has the PIP coverage and company 2 has the liability coverage

$P_{1,\cdot}$ represents the sum of all PIP claims where company 1 has the PIP coverage

$L_{1,1}$ represents a liability claim where company 1 has the PIP coverage and the liability coverage

$L_{2,1}$ represents a liability claim where company 2 has the PIP coverage and company 1 has the liability coverage

$L_{\cdot,1}$ represents the sum of all liability claims where company 1 has the liability coverage

Savings from investigations:

Savings on PIP claims = SP

Savings on Liability claims = SL

Savings on Total claim = ST = SP + SL

Level of investigation:

No investigation = 0

Optimal investigation based on first party claims = A

Optimal investigation based on both first party and liability claims = B

Subscripts on SPA, SPB, SLA and SLB:

First subscript indicates company responsible for PIP

Second subscript indicates company responsible for Liability (0 if no liability claims)

$SPA_{1,0}$ represents the savings on PIP claims from an A level investigation where company 1 has the PIP coverage and there is no liability claim

$SPA_{1,1}$ represents the savings on PIP claims from an A level investigation where company 1 has the PIP coverage and the liability coverage

Investigation cost:

Cost of an A level investigation = IA

Cost of an B level investigation = IB

Subscripts on IA and IB:

First subscript indicates company responsible for PIP

Second subscript indicates company responsible for Liability (0 if no liability claims)

$IA_{1,0}$ represents the cost of an A level investigation where company 1 has the PIP coverage and there is no liability claim

$IA_{1,1}$ represents the cost of an A level investigation where company 1 has the PIP coverage and the liability coverage

$IA_{1,2}$ represents the cost of an A level investigation where company 1 has the PIP coverage and company 2 has the liability coverage


The relationships between the cost of investigation and expected savings, as well as the determination of the optimal levels of investigation under different circumstances, are illustrated in Figure 1. The x axis represents the number of claims. The y axis indicates dollar values. The claims are ordered in decreasing size of expected savings from claim investigations. The use of ex-ante expectations of savings from investigation is important and differs strongly from the ex-post ordering of claims with savings from investigation. In practice, actual investigations will be taken from a random or targeted draw of claims that yield the largest expected savings. The cost of investigations (I) function is a straight line under the assumption that each investigation has the same expected cost.³ Two convex functions represent the expected savings from an investigation. The lower curve, labeled SP, represents the savings on first party claims and the higher curve, labeled ST, represents the savings on the total claim including both PIP and Liability payments. ($SP', ST' > 0$ and $SP'', ST'' < 0$) A point will be reached where all the remaining claims are completely valid, so no additional savings are achieved by additional investigation.

The optimal level of investigation is determined when the slopes of the cost of investigation line and the savings are equal. The tactically optimal number of claims to investigate, based on first party claims, is A. The cost of this investigation is IA , the savings on first party claims is SPA , and the savings on total claims is $STA = SPA + SLA$.⁴ The strategically optimal number of first party claims to investigate, based on total claim savings is B, an amount in excess of A.

³ Insurers generally pay, for example, a fixed amount for an IME. If the claimant does not appear for the examination, the fee is reduced, but the insurer would not know, when requesting the IME, if the claimant will appear for it or not. SIU investigations cost more than IMEs and Medical audits cost less. The use of multiple techniques is relatively small. Thus, the assumption is made that the expected cost of an investigation is the same for each claim, and the function is linear.

⁴ Dionne et. al (2003) derive varying optimal levels of investigation depending on a (fraud) risk class partition of the set of claims.

Figure 1



Some of the relationships that develop from this approach are:

$$SPB > SPA$$

$$IB > IA$$

$$SPA > IA$$

$$SPB > IB$$

$$SPB - SPA < IB - IA$$

Single Insurer Case

When a single insurer writes the entire automobile insurance market, this company will be responsible for paying both the PIP expenses and the liability award resulting from every automobile accident. In this case, the company can weigh the potential cost savings on the total claim against the cost of this investigation. The optimal level of investigation would be to investigate all claims where the expected savings from the investigation exceed the cost of the investigation. This is the situation we will consider first.

The three choices a single insurer faces regarding the level of claim investigation are displayed in Table 1. The insurer can perform no investigations and simply pay the amount claimed. This situation is displayed in the first box. Alternatively, the insurer can investigate A claims. The additional cost is $IA_{1,0} + IA_{1,1}$ and the associated savings are $SPA_{1,0} + SPA_{1,1} + SLA_{1,1}$. Since the savings on the PIP claims alone, $SPA_{1,0} + SPA_{1,1}$ exceed the cost of the investigations, the insurer would prefer this option over the case of no investigations. The third choice, though, where the insurer investigates B claims, is the optimal choice. The cost of this additional investigation is $IB - IA$. The additional savings are $SPB + SLB - SPA - SLA$. Since the slope of the Total Savings curve exceeds the slope of the cost of investigations curve over the range

from A to B, then the savings exceed the costs, and the insurer would minimize net claim costs by investigating B claims.

This strategy will have the benefit of reducing the cost of unreasonable medical treatment to the lowest feasible level considering the cost to investigate claims. This strategy also reduces liability awards, and the cost of automobile insurance, to the lowest level feasible given the cost of investigating these claims and the ability to lower awards through negotiation. Additional reductions in claims costs could be obtained, but the additional investigation expenses would exceed the claim cost savings, so insurance premiums would actually increase.

The other expenses of the insurer, including underwriting expenses and normal loss adjustment expenses (other than investigating for fraud) are not included in this analysis, since they will be the same regardless of the level of investigation for claims fraud.

Two Insurer Case: No Subrogation

Assume the market consists of two competing insurers of equal size, with similar claim distributions (the SP and ST curves are the same for each insurer). Assume the claim settlement system does not permit the recovery of the PIP claim payment and adjustment expense from any at-fault party through subrogation. Then they would each face a decision about the appropriate level of investigation of claims fraud, but their net claim costs would depend both on their own investigation level decision and the decision of their competitor. The outcomes, in the case where there is no subrogation, are shown on Table 2. The upper segment of each cell denotes the position of insurer 1; the lower segment that of insurer 2.

If both insurers were to investigate optimally based on aggregate claim costs, then each insurer would bear the cost of investigating B claims, and benefit from the savings in claim costs on both PIP and Liability claims. This situation is represented in cell (B, B) and resembles the optimal position for the single insurer case. Unreasonable medical expenses are reduced to the lowest economically efficient level, liability costs are minimized and the total cost of auto insurance is kept at the lowest level.⁵

However, this is not a stable situation. Insurer 1 might be better off if it only investigated claims at the A level, which would lower its cost of investigations by $(IB - IA)$, and only increase claim costs by $(SPB_{1,\cdot} - SPA_{1,\cdot} + SLB_{1,1} - SPA_{1,1})$, which could be less than the costs. If insurer 2 were to continue to investigate claims at the B level, then insurer 1 would benefit on its liability claims on which insurer 2 had the PIP coverage ($SLB_{2,1}$). For the two insurer example, the lower investigation costs may or may not exceed the savings. Although by $(IB - IA) > (SPB_{1,\cdot} - SPA_{1,\cdot})$, whether it also exceeds $(SPB_{1,\cdot} - SPA_{1,\cdot} + SLB_{1,1} - SPA_{1,1})$ depends on the relationship between the SP and ST curves and the cost of the claims insurer 1 has both PIP and Liability.

⁵ This insurer might prefer to investigate the claims it knows it has the liability insurance coverage on up to the aggregate level, and only investigate the remaining claims on which there is either no liability coverage or coverage provided by the other insurer, if it could identify those claims. However, there are several problems with this strategy. First, an insurer may not know if another company will be liable for a claim or not early enough in the claim process to make this distinction. Second, adopting a claim process that requires claims adjusters to have different strategies for investigation can complicate the process and increase overall costs. Based on discussions with claims personnel, such differential strategies are not common.

However, if it is advantageous for insurer 1 to move to a lower level of investigation, then it would also benefit insurer 2 to move to that level, so the resulting position would be that displayed in cell (A, A).

If the insurers move to cell (A, A), that will prove to be a Nash Equilibrium. Neither insurer can move unilaterally to another position that benefits itself. Insurer A will not stop investigating claims at the A level and move to the no investigation level. If it were to do so, the savings would be IA and the cost would be $SPA_{1,1} + SLA_{1,1}$. Since $IA < SPA$ alone, this change would increase the net cost of claims. Although the overall optimal position would be cell (B, B), that is not a stable equilibrium since one company might benefit by reducing the level of investigations.

Table 3 describes the conditions that lead to each claim investigation strategy for the insurers. Cell (B, B) is a Nash Equilibrium if $IB_{1,1} - IA_{1,1} < SPB_{1,1} - SPA_{1,1} + SLB_{1,1} - SLA_{1,1}$. Since both insurers are assumed to be the same size and have the same distribution of claims and costs, then if this relationship holds for insurer 1, it should also apply to insurer 2. This equilibrium would apply if the cost savings for each insurer on claims where it had both the PIP and the liability coverage exceeded the additional cost of investigating claims at the B level. Each insurer would not be assured of receiving the savings of a B level investigation on its liability claims where the other insurer has the PIP claim, since that insurer might elect a lower level of investigation. Alternatively, cell (A, A) would be the Nash Equilibrium if $IB_{1,1} - IA_{1,1} > SPB_{1,1} - SPA_{1,1} + SLB_{1,1} - SLA_{1,1}$ and $IA_{1,1} < SPA_{1,1} + SLA_{1,1}$. Since $SPA_{1,1} > IA_{1,1}$ by itself, then cell (0, 0) will never be the Nash Equilibrium if there is no subrogation. Note also that the off-diagonal investigation levels in Table 3 exhibit elements of the free rider problem; namely, one insurer reaps the liability benefit of the higher PIP investigation level of the other insurer without the additional cost.

Two Insurer Case: Subrogation

This situation differs from the no subrogation case in several ways. First, note the each Liability insurer is responsible for paying the PIP claims of the other insurer when liability attaches and the PIP insurer and the Liability insurer are different ($P_{i,j}$ where $i \neq j$). Actual situations will be different depending on whether investigation and/or unallocated overhead expenses are also subject to subrogation. In the case that allocated investigation expenses are subrogated, if insurer 1 investigates claims at the A level but insurer 2 does not investigate, insurer 1 does not benefit from the (net) savings on the PIP claims where insurer 2 has the PIP claim but insurer 1 has the liability ($SPA_{2,1}$). Insurer 2 benefits from the (net) savings on PIP claims, however, where insurer 1 has the PIP claim and insurer 2 has the liability ($SPA_{1,2}$)⁶. Thus, the free rider problem may be more severe when subrogation is considered. In this situation, the Nash Equilibrium could be no claims investigation, since the insurer bears the cost of investigating its own PIP claims, but benefits only on those claims where there is no liability or if the same company has

⁶ In cases where the liability insurer negotiates an overall fair settlement independent of the PIP claim investigation result, and pays that settlement less the PIP payment to the claimant, there would be no effect from PIP levels of investigation on the liability insurer. Generally, however, a favorable PIP investigation may curtail treatment, limit both PIP and overall economic damages and, thus, lower the (total) liability settlement. The latter is the situation we assume.

the liability coverage, unless the other insurer investigates all its own PIP claims. The subrogation of allocated claim expense is an incentive to investigate PIP claims at a higher level since there is no added (allocated) cost to investigate PIP claims having liability with the other insurer. The outcomes, given subrogation, are shown in Table 4.

The situation may be changed in a jurisdiction where the liability insurer also has to pay a flat percentage of the claim cost, as opposed to a flat charge or no charge at all, as unallocated loss adjustment expense (ULAE). If a claim adjuster is considering investigating a claim in which the expected savings will exceed the cost of the investigation, but another company is likely to be liable for the loss, the insurer is saving the other insurer money and reducing its ULAE reimbursement. For example, assume a claim on which one insurer had the PIP coverage and the other insurer had the liability coverage generated \$2200 in claimed medical expenses. The PIP insurer could request an IME that is expected to cost \$300 and that would reduce the medical expenses by \$800, to \$1400. The PIP insurer may not do this investigation under a tactically optimal strategy. If the claim were to qualify for subrogation, then the reimbursement for unallocated LAE declines from \$220 (10 percent of \$2200) to \$140 (10 percent of \$1400) even though the claim department puts in more effort due to requesting and reviewing the IME and then negotiating with the claimant to reduce the claim payment. On the other hand, under a strategically optimal strategy, the PIP insurer may well investigate reimbursable PIP claims to reinforce a “hard-line” attitude on unreasonable medical charges in order to maximize savings on its own claims. We will assume here that the ULAE subrogation method is a flat fee or none at all.

Table 5 describes the conditions that lead to each claim investigation strategy for the two insurers when subrogation is introduced. In this case, cell (0, 0) may be a Nash Equilibrium, since each insurer only saves money on claims where there either is no liability or it has the liability claim as well. Insurers no longer save money on PIP claims if another insurer has the liability, since those payments and allocated costs would be reimbursed under subrogation. Thus, subrogation introduces a disincentive to investigating claims for fraud unless the cost of investigation is also subject to the subrogation recovery.

Multiple Insurer Case

The more typical situation is where there are many insurers in the market. Some insurers may write a major share of the market within an individual state, in some cases in excess of 30 percent, but in most states a large number of insurers compete and the market share of most companies represents a small share of the market. Thus, it is less likely for the same insurer to provide PIP coverage under one policy involved in a claim, and liability coverage under another policy. (In other words, with a smaller share of the market, the chance of an accident involving two cars covered by the same insurance company declines.)⁷ In this situation, the Nash Equilibrium is even more likely to be the no investigation level without introducing the complication of a repeating game with monitoring or learning, since most of the benefits of the investigations will accrue to other insurers. The simple relationships for a market with multiple insurers and subrogation are described in Table 6.

⁷ In Massachusetts with only 18 active personal auto insurers, approximately 80 percent of liability claims have different PIP and liability insurers.

Example

This decision process facing each insurer can be illustrated by an example. A PIP claimant is visiting a physical therapist for treatment. The current cost of the claim is \$2000 for medical expenses. Another party is expected to be held liable for the accident. Based on past experience for that type of injury with that physical therapist, the PIP insurer expects the total claim for medical treatment will be \$2250. If the PIP insurer orders an IME, which costs \$300, the insurer expects to be able to determine that no additional physical therapy is needed, limiting medical expenses to \$2000. The liability award for non-economic losses (pain and suffering) is expected to be \$4000 if no additional treatment is received, but \$4300 if additional treatment is provided. The liability insurer is not in a position to undertake this investigation and reduce its costs, since, by the time a determination of liability is made the full treatment of physical therapy will be completed⁸.

The cost of the IME, \$300, exceeds the PIP savings of \$250 on this claim, but is less than the total of the PIP and liability savings (\$550). In the single insurer case, the insurer will request an IME on this claim and curtail the additional costs. In the two insurer case, if there is no subrogation, the PIP insurer spends \$300, saves \$250 on the PIP and has a 50% chance of saving \$300 more on the liability claim (with only two insurers, the PIP insurer has a 1 in 2 chance of writing the responsible party's liability insurance in simple two-car collisions). Therefore, the PIP insurer would also request the IME on this claim. In the two insurer case where there is subrogation, the PIP insurer faces a 50% chance of saving on the PIP claim and on the noneconomic losses (if it also has the liability), so the expected savings would be \$275 (half of the \$550 total savings). Thus, the PIP insurer would not investigate this claim unless the allocated LAE is reimbursable. If LAE is not reimbursable, the cost of investigating the claim is \$300. If LAE is reimbursable, then the expected cost of the IME is reduced to \$150, which would encourage the PIP insurer to undertake this investigation.

In the multiple insurer case, the PIP insurer will have a lower chance of providing the liability coverage on this claim. In this example, if this chance is less than 1 in 6, then the expected savings on the non-economic losses would not be enough to compensate the PIP insurer to undertake this investigation, unless allocated LAE is reimbursable. Thus, the incentive for insurers to be strategically optimal is much lower when a large number of insurers compete. Stated differently, there is more room for some insurers to exploit a free rider problem when more than two insurers are involved in splitting the costs of adjusting claims. This would be one disadvantage of having a no-fault-limited tort system rather than a simple tort or no-fault system of compensation⁹.

⁸ The liability insurer may not be able to reduce the *claimed* medical expenses but the negotiated award may be lower if the additional treatment is known or suspected of being unnecessary (Derrig and Weisberg, 2004).

⁹ IRC 2004A provides contrasting medical expense and total claim cost in four no-fault states, one of which (Colorado) has subsequently changed to a system of tort liability only.

Alternative Arrangements

Incentives to under-investigate claims can be addressed in several ways. If the claim investigation strategy is viewed as a repeated game, with each insurer monitoring the performance of the other insurers for free riding, then rules can be established to provide incentives to investigate claims more fully to the mutual benefit of all, leading to the optimal (B, B) equilibrium. The initial strategy described in this paper assumes that insurers make only one choice of investigation after considering the expected costs and savings. Alternatively insurers can switch levels of investigation depending on the behavior of the other insurer, making this situation a repeated non-cooperative game. In this situation, negotiation and monitoring might be able to move the equilibrium position back to cell (B, B). Liability insurers will know, when paying the claim and subrogation expense, whether the claim has been investigated, especially if ALAE investigation costs are subrogated. If a company is not investigating an appropriate proportion of claims (each insurer would know this, since the optimal level of investigation is assumed to be the same among all insurers), other insurers could retaliate against the offending insurer by treating that company's PIP claims differently or provoking regulatory oversight. Of course, in the case of an insurer going insolvent, there is no expectation of the repeated game and that insurer may revert to no investigation for at least those claims with savings accruing to the second insurer without fear of future retaliation¹⁰. Thus, observing an insurer's claim investigation pattern could prove to be an early warning sign of financial problems.

A second approach to addressing the under-investigation problem would be to develop a system under which the claim investigation costs are shared among all insurers. One method of doing this would be to handle claim investigations in a manner similar to a reinsurance pool, where bills are submitted to the pool and any market share adjustments necessary are made at the pool level. Each company is required to pay a proportionate cost of claim investigations, based on market share, regardless of their own investigation strategy. This strategy may introduce increased overall system costs over the market monitoring strategy and, thereby, be less efficient. Another (partial) method of doing this would be to establish a separate fraud investigation unit, with the costs shared by all insurers, that decide which claims to investigate based on the total cost savings impact, regardless of which insurer will benefit from these savings¹¹.

Empirical Evidence

There is evidence in Massachusetts auto injury claims (Derrig and Weisberg (2003)) that insurers follow the strategy of using independent medical examinations (IMEs) to investigate claims at least to the extent that they derive (1) positive savings net of investigation costs overall and (2) no net loss on PIP investigations.. Massachusetts is a no-fault state, with all auto insurance companies required to offer first-party PIP coverage to policyholders. This coverage provides

¹⁰ Additionally, a failing insurer will attempt to minimize the subrogation payments to other insurers giving yet another sign of financial weakness.

¹¹ Separate insurance fraud bureaus in the United States are, however, chiefly concerned with reducing criminal fraud with the savings accruing to the policyholders of all insurers just as the costs are shared among all policyholders.

\$8000 of coverage for economic losses such as medical expenses, loss of income, compensation for loss of services and other expenses related to an injury caused by an automobile accident. These are the expenses that typically serve as the *special damages* in a tort claim, the remainder being *general damages* or so-called pain and suffering. There is also a \$2000 medical expense tort threshold for liability claims¹². This threshold can be met by eligible medical expenses including ambulance, hospital, physician, chiropractor or physical therapy bills. An injured person can only recover non-economic losses if the accident is the fault of another party and medical expenses exceed \$2000. Since medical expenses are covered by the PIP insurance, there is an incentive for a claimant to incur at least this amount in medical bills (Weisberg, et al. (1994)).

If the PIP insurer can contain the medical expenses below \$2000, not only will the PIP claim be lower but lower (or no) payments will be made for any non-economic losses. Even if medical expenses exceed the threshold, limiting the total claimed medical expenses can have an additional impact on the liability claim, since the non-economic losses included in liability settlements are directly related to medical expenses. Although demonstrating that the total liability settlement is not simply a multiple of the medical expenses, Derrig and Weisberg (2004) found that the settlements for non-economic losses do increase with the cost of the medical expenses incurred but are reduced in other circumstances (such as high suspicion of fraud or positive findings from a BI IME) by negotiation. Thus, any impact the PIP insurer can have to restrain medical expenses will have an additional cost savings on the non-economic losses and level B investigation may raise the return to investigation for all insurers.

Massachusetts Independent Medical Examinations

The Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts has conducted a study of three data sets of claims involving IMEs, the primary tool used by insurers to control auto injury costs (Derrig and Weisberg, 2003). The methodology is a “tabular” analysis that simply compares the mean payments for four subgroups of claims:

- IME not requested
- IME requested but not completed (No-show)
- IME completed and positive outcome (Positive IME)
- IME completed and negative outcome (Negative IME)

The estimated gross savings for each of the first three subgroups above is the difference between the average payment for that category and the average for the fourth subgroup (completed with negative outcome). An average IME cost is then subtracted to obtain an estimate of net savings. The following results are taken from the AIB Derrig-Weisberg (2003) report.

Table 7 displays the results for the three sets of tabular analyses:

- 1993 AIB Sample (Claims from a prior AIB study)

¹² There is also a verbal threshold listing particular injuries that can be compensated by general damages but those injuries generally incur medical expenses in excess of \$2,000 as well.

- 1996 DCD Sample (Claims from AY 1996 in the AIB Detailed Claim Database of all auto injury claims¹³)
- 1996 CSE Sample(Claims from AY 1996 in the Claim Screen Experiment ¹⁴)

Results are shown for both the PIP payment and for the total payment (PIP + BI). The results suggest that IMEs as currently employed represented roughly a break-even proposition on PIP, although for the CSE sample, the cost of IMEs slightly out-weighing their benefit.

The bottom half, however, tells a different story. Here the overall net savings for BI and PIP payments are combined. These savings are based on the outcome for the “best” IME, whether carried out on the PIP or BI claim. The average gross savings for the CSE sample was 9.2%, with a net savings of 8.7%. Nearly half of the gross savings (4.3%) is attributable to IMEs requested but not actually completed. That is, the claimant fails to show for the exam. Savings can result either if a potential BI claim is never made, or if the BI settlement is reduced through negotiation.

Somewhat more than half (4.9%) results from a positive IME outcome (reduction of medical expenses or curtailment of medical treatment) on the PIP or BI IME. In the case of a BI IME or a PIP IME used in the BI settlement, it may be too late to have a meaningful impact on any ongoing treatment. However, evidence of excess treatment uncovered during the IME may provide leverage to the adjuster in negotiating a lower settlement.

¹³ A random sample of all reported claims.

¹⁴ The Claim Screen Experiment (CSE) tracked about 3,000 PIP claims arising at four large carriers during May-September, 1996. Each carrier tracked the arrival of a preset collection of “red flags” which in turn generated a running suspicion score for the adjusters and their supervisors. Outcomes were recorded for all PIP claims and for any associated BI tort liability claim.

Figure 2




Figure 2 illustrates the placement of the Massachusetts IME investigations relative to the theoretically optimal levels of Figure 1. PIP savings equal to the costs, as shown in Table 7, would place the Massachusetts investigation level to the right of both the A and B optimal levels. In general, this would imply that Massachusetts carriers were investigating more claims than the B optimal level. As we will see next, the judicious use of the suspicion score could have resulted in fewer IMEs by limiting investigations to only claims with moderate scores¹⁵.

Net Savings by Suspicion Level

The CSE PIP adjusters collected data that was used to calculate and feed back a suspicion score on a 10-point scale. The suspicion score was based on a linear regression analysis (Weisberg and Derrig, 1998). The net savings effects of the IMEs are analyzed separately by the level of suspicion in Table 8. A positive net saving on PIP occurred only for claims with a moderate level of suspicion (4-6). The results of the PIP IMEs are shown in the top line of Table 8. These results, based on the all PIP claims with IMEs indicate a modest 3% net savings for moderately suspicious claims, and a net negative for other categories.

A subset of the PIP claims was found to result in BI claims. When attention is restricted to these BI-bound PIP claims, we obtain the results in line 3 (highlighted). For moderately suspicious

¹⁵ This, of course, is easier said from hindsight than done in real time. The complication in making the decision to investigate is the tension between the timing of the arrival of the red flags that determine the risk class and the ongoing treatment.

claims, the estimated savings remains unchanged at 3%. The other categories appear to change, but it should be noted that the numbers of claims with zero suspicion or high suspicion are fairly small in the BI sample. So, these changes might in part be attributable to random variation.

The bottom part of the table is similar, except that the suspicion breakdown is based on a different measure of suspicion. Since there was no suspicion score model for BI claims within the CSE, an external scoring product originally developed by Correlation Research Inc., but then owned by National Healthcare Resources, Inc. (NHR), which subsequently became part of Concentra, Inc. This NHR model was used to obtain a suspicion score for the BI claims, based on the data extracted by coders from the BI claim files.

The critical line is the last in Table 8, which is highlighted. This line presents results for the best outcome (PIP or BI) for the matched sample. In effect, this analysis attempts to estimate the overall impact of IMEs, taking into account both the PIP payment and BI settlement. For moderately suspicious claims, there is a 14% net savings, which accounts for most of the total savings. For claims with slight suspicion, IMEs represent effectively a break-even proposition, and for the very low or very high suspicion a negative impact. It might appear counter-intuitive that IMEs do not have a positive value for claims with high suspicion. Our explanation is that such claims are not very amenable to reduction through negotiation based on IME results. IMEs are used primarily to constrain the total amount of medical treatment, not to question the validity of the injury itself or the circumstances of the accident. To deal with “hard fraud” requires the techniques of special investigation (e.g., examination under oath (EUO), accident reconstruction, surveillance).

Comparison across Samples

Table 7 showed an overall 8.7% net savings for the 1996 CSE claims, taking into account both BI and PIP payments and IMEs. This outcome is higher than the 5.7% for all claims (DCD) in 1996, which is in turn higher than the 3.8% registered in 1993. We now turn to the factors that produce the IME savings.

In general, there are two factors that determine the savings:

- Percent of claims on which an IME was requested
- Percent of completed IMEs with a positive outcome

Table 9 displays these percentages for each of the three cohorts. Comparing first the 1993 sample versus the 1996 DCD, we find the total number of IME requests has remained essentially constant. However, the apparent effectiveness of the IMEs performed has increased dramatically. While this may be an artifact of the different coding patterns in the two samples, it could reflect increased sophistication on the part of adjusters regarding the selection and/or utilization of the performed IMEs.

The results for the 1996 CSE claims pinpoint where additional savings above the DCD estimates were being derived. During the CSE, IMEs were requested on a much higher percentage of those PIP claims destined to result in BI claims. For example, 40% of the DCD BI claims had

either a PIP or BI IME requested, compared with 57% of the CSE sample. Since this increase occurred regardless of experimental or control status, the feedback of suspicion scores to the experimental group cannot explain this increase. Rather, we suspect that a “Hawthorne effect” may have resulted from the awareness by adjusters that a study was happening¹⁶.

Interestingly, the increased IMEs did not result in a diminution of IME effectiveness. The IMEs still produced positive outcomes at effectively the same rate, or perhaps somewhat higher. So the adjusters may have been quite discriminating in their selection of claims. In any event, it is encouraging that the CSE intervention may have in some manner generated an improvement in performance.

Table 9 also shows an IME requested (audit) ratio for strains and sprains of 32%, more than twice the 14% ratio for the remaining injuries. This large difference is indicative of a general strategy of auditing riskier (for fraud and buildup) classes of claims more often than less risky claims (Dionne et.al, 2005). The similarity of positive outcome percentages for the two classes (59%, 55%) indicates that this differential auditing strategy is playing a role in deterring fraudulent and build-up claims as well as detecting them (Tennyson and Salsas-Forn, 2002, p304-306).

A comparison with the national data on IME use in auto injury coverages is instructive. The IRC (2004B, pp 93-98) study of 2002 claims countrywide shows that IMEs are used on about 40 percent of the less than 20 percent of PIP claims with an appearance of fraud or build-up or about 10 percent overall. By way of contrast, the Massachusetts claims in the IRC sample had about 50 percent more PIP claims (29%) with the appearance of fraud or buildup than the overall sample, suggesting an IME rate between 15 and 20 percent overall. The CSE analysis of Massachusetts PIP claims in Table 9 indicates a somewhat higher 1996 IME rate of 26 percent. For BI claims, the countrywide rate of IME use is less than 10 percent overall consistent with the approximate 4-8 percent use of BI IMEs in table 9 (compare upper table rows 2 and 3). As noted previously, the IMEs on PIP claims in Massachusetts produce a positive outcome (favorable to the insurer) slightly less than 60 percent of the time. Countrywide, over 80 percent of PIP claims are mitigated by the use of an IME, 90 percent on claims with the appearance of fraud or buildup. These comparative data reinforce the observation that Massachusetts insurers may be conducting IMEs at a rate in excess of the desired near-optimal level, perhaps because of the high levels of suspicious auto injury claims, and that a more judicious choice of claims, based upon a suspicion scoring methods, would produce more cost efficient results.

Conclusion

Viewing claim investigation strategy in a game theoretic framework demonstrates the incentives and disincentives to investigate automobile insurance claims for excessive claim behavior that currently exist. A framework for establishing Nash equilibriums was developed for the monopoly and two-insurer cases. When insurers can choose two levels of investigation or none

¹⁶ “Paying attention to people, which occurs in placing them in an experiment, changes their behavior. This rather unpredictable change is called the Hawthorne effect.”, (Kruskal, W.H. and Tanur, J.M., International Encyclopedia of Statistics, The Free Press, New York, Vol. 4, p210, 1978)

at all, the equilibriums are established by the relationship of the savings to the cost of investigation. Circumstances are identified for the case where a Nash equilibrium may be unstable. In no-fault systems, when subrogation of PIP claims exists, subrogation of allocated expense provides an incentive for investigation but percentage reimbursement for unallocated expense provides a disincentive.

Empirical results from Massachusetts personal auto injury claims were examined. Analyses of three data sets show that carriers are generating substantial net savings from IME investigations but those savings accrue mostly to the tort carrier indicating the workings of a non-cooperative game near equilibrium. A closer look at the suspicion of fraud levels of the Massachusetts claims shows that (1) insurers may have been conducting too many IMEs and (2) that a better selection (more toward the optimal equilibrium) could be obtained with the use of a suspicion scoring model.

Based on this analysis, additional cooperative behavior should be encouraged in order to more effectively reduce excessive medical treatment and overall insurance costs. Methods to encourage insurers to engage in strategically optimal approaches to investigating claims should be developed.

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Table 1
 Single Insurer Case
 Net Cost of Claim and Investigations

Level of Claim Investigation		
None (0)	PIP Based (A)	Total Claim Based (B)
$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + L_{1,1}$	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + L_{1,1} - SPA_{1,0} - SPA_{1,1} - SLA_{1,1} + IA_{1,0} + IA_{1,1}$	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + L_{1,1} - SPB_{1,0} - SPB_{1,1} - SLB_{1,1} + IB_{1,0} + IB_{1,1}$

Table 2
Two Insurer Case
Net Cost of Claim and Investigations
No Subrogation

		Insurer 1 Level of Claim Investigation		
		None (0)	PIP Based (A)	Total Claim Based (B)
Insurer 2 Level of Claim Investigation	0	$P_{1,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,1}$	$P_{1,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,1} - SPA_{1,\bullet} - SLA_{1,1} + IA_{1,\bullet}$	$P_{1,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,1} - SPB_{1,\bullet} - SLB_{1,1} + IB_{1,\bullet}$
		$P_{2,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,2}$	$P_{2,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,2} - SLA_{1,2}$	$P_{2,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,2} - SLB_{1,2}$
	A	$P_{1,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,1} - SLA_{2,1}$	$P_{1,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,1} - SPA_{1,\bullet} - SLA_{\bullet,1} + IA_{1,\bullet}$	$P_{1,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,1} - SPB_{1,\bullet} - SLB_{1,1} - SLA_{2,1} + IB_{1,\bullet}$
		$P_{2,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,2} - SPA_{2,\bullet} - SLA_{2,2} + IA_{2,\bullet}$	$P_{2,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,2} - SPA_{2,\bullet} - SLA_{\bullet,2} + IA_{2,\bullet}$	$P_{2,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,2} - SPA_{2,\bullet} - SLB_{1,2} - SLA_{2,2} + IA_{2,\bullet}$
	B	$P_{1,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,1} - SLB_{2,1}$	$P_{1,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,1} - SPA_{1,\bullet} - SLA_{1,1} - SLB_{2,1} + IA_{1,\bullet}$	$P_{1,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,1} - SPB_{1,\bullet} - SLB_{\bullet,1} + IB_{1,\bullet}$
		$P_{2,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,2} - SPB_{2,\bullet} - SLB_{2,2} + IB_{2,\bullet}$	$P_{2,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,2} - SPB_{2,\bullet} - SLA_{2,1} - SLB_{2,2} + IB_{2,\bullet}$	$P_{2,\bullet} + L_{\bullet,2} - SPB_{2,\bullet} - SLB_{\bullet,2} + IB_{2,\bullet}$

Table 3
Two Insurer Case
No Subrogation

Nash Equilibrium		
	Insurer 1	Insurer 2
(0, 0)	$IA_{1,\bullet} > SPA_{1,\bullet} + SLA_{1,1}$	$IA_{2,\bullet} > SPA_{2,\bullet} + SLA_{2,2}$
(A, A)	$IA_{1,\bullet} < SPA_{1,\bullet} + SLA_{1,1}$	$IA_{2,\bullet} < SPA_{2,\bullet} + SLA_{2,2}$
	$IB_{1,\bullet} - IA_{1,\bullet} > SPB_{1,\bullet} - SPA_{1,\bullet} + SLB_{1,1} - SLA_{1,1}$	$IB_{2,\bullet} - IA_{2,\bullet} > SPB_{2,\bullet} - SPA_{2,\bullet} + SLB_{2,2} - SLA_{2,2}$
(B, B)	$IB_{1,\bullet} - IA_{1,\bullet} < SPB_{1,\bullet} - SPA_{1,\bullet} + SLB_{1,1} - SLA_{1,1}$	$IB_{2,\bullet} - IA_{2,\bullet} < SPB_{2,\bullet} - SPA_{2,\bullet} + SLB_{2,2} - SLA_{2,2}$

Table 4
Two Insurer Case
Net Cost of Claim and Investigations
Subrogation

		Insurer 1 Level of Claim Investigation		
		None (0)	PIP Based (A)	Total Claim Based (B)
Insurer 2 Level of Claim Investigation	0	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + P_{2,1} + L_{1,1} + L_{2,1}$ $P_{2,0} + P_{1,2} + P_{2,2} + L_{1,2} + L_{2,2}$	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + P_{2,1} + L_{1,1} + L_{2,1} - SPA_{1,0}$ $- SPA_{1,1} - SLA_{1,1} + IA_{1,\bullet}$ $P_{2,0} + P_{1,2} + P_{2,2}$ $+ L_{1,2} + L_{2,2} - SPA_{1,2} - SLA_{1,2}$	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + P_{2,1} + L_{1,1} + L_{2,1} - SPB_{1,0}$ $- SPB_{1,1} - SLB_{1,1} + IB_{1,\bullet}$ $P_{2,0} + P_{1,2} + P_{2,2}$ $+ L_{1,2} + L_{2,2} - SPB_{1,2} - SLB_{1,2}$
	A	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + P_{2,1} + L_{1,1} + L_{2,1}$ $- SPA_{2,1} - SLA_{2,1}$ $P_{2,0} + P_{1,2} + P_{2,2}$ $+ L_{1,2} + L_{2,2} - SPA_{2,0}$ $- SPA_{2,2} - SLA_{2,2} + IA_{2,\bullet}$	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + P_{2,1} + L_{1,1} + L_{2,1} - SPA_{1,0} - SPA_{1,1}$ $- SPA_{2,1} - SLA_{1,1} - SLA_{2,1} + IA_{1,\bullet}$ $P_{2,0} + P_{1,2} + P_{2,2}$ $+ L_{1,2} + L_{2,2} - SPA_{2,0} - SPA_{1,2}$ $- SPA_{2,2} - SLA_{1,2} - SLA_{2,2} + IA_{2,\bullet}$	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + P_{2,1} + L_{1,1} + L_{2,1} - SPB_{1,0} - SPB_{1,1}$ $- SPA_{2,1} - SLB_{1,1} - SLA_{2,1} + IB_{1,\bullet}$ $P_{2,0} + P_{1,2} + P_{2,2}$ $+ L_{1,2} + L_{2,2} - SPA_{2,0} - SPB_{1,2}$ $- SPA_{2,2} - SLB_{1,2} - SLA_{2,2} + IA_{2,\bullet}$
	B	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + P_{2,1} + L_{1,1} + L_{2,1} - SPB_{2,1} - SLB_{2,1}$ $P_{2,0} + P_{1,2} + P_{2,2} + L_{1,2} + L_{2,2}$ $- SPB_{2,0} - SPB_{2,2} - SLB_{2,2} + IB_{2,\bullet}$	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + P_{2,1} + L_{1,1} + L_{2,1} - SPA_{1,0} - SPA_{1,1}$ $- SPB_{2,1} - SLA_{1,1} - SLB_{2,1} + IA_{1,\bullet}$ $P_{2,0} + P_{1,2} + P_{2,2}$ $+ L_{1,2} + L_{2,2} - SPB_{2,0} - SPA_{1,2}$ $- SPB_{2,2} - SLA_{1,2} - SLB_{2,2} + IB_{2,\bullet}$	$P_{1,0} + P_{1,1} + P_{2,1} + L_{1,1} + L_{2,1} - SPB_{1,0}$ $- SPB_{\bullet,1} - SLB_{\bullet,1} + IB_{1,\bullet}$ $P_{2,0} + P_{1,2} + P_{2,2} + L_{1,2} + L_{2,2}$ $- SPB_{2,0} - SPB_{\bullet,2} - SLB_{\bullet,2} + IB_{2,\bullet}$

Table 5
Two Insurer Case
Subrogation

Nash Equilibrium		
	Insurer 1	Insurer 2
(0, 0)	$IA_{1,0} + IA_{1,1} > SPA_{1,0} + SPA_{1,1} + SLA_{1,1}$	$IA_{2,0} + IA_{2,2} > SPA_{2,0} + SPA_{2,2} + SLA_{2,2}$
(A, A)	$IA_{1,0} + IA_{1,1} < SPA_{1,0} + SPA_{1,1} + SLA_{1,1}$	$IA_{2,0} + IA_{2,2} < SPA_{2,0} + SPA_{2,2} + SLA_{2,2}$
	$IB_{1,0} + IB_{1,1} - IA_{1,0} - IA_{1,1} > SPB_{1,0} - SPA_{1,0} + SPB_{1,1} - SPA_{1,1} + SLB_{1,1} - SLA_{1,1}$	$IB_{2,0} + IB_{2,2} - IA_{2,0} - IA_{2,2} > SPB_{2,0} - SPA_{2,0} + SPB_{2,2} - SPA_{2,2} + SLB_{2,2} - SLA_{2,2}$
(B, B)	$IB_{1,0} + IB_{1,1} - IA_{1,0} - IA_{1,1} < SPB_{1,0} - SPA_{1,0} + SPB_{1,1} - SPA_{1,1} + SLB_{1,1} - SLA_{1,1}$	$IB_{2,0} + IB_{2,2} - IA_{2,0} - IA_{2,2} < SPB_{2,0} - SPA_{2,0} + SPB_{2,2} - SPA_{2,2} + SLB_{2,2} - SLA_{2,2}$

Table 6
Multiple Insurer Case
Subrogation

Nash Equilibrium	
	Insurer k
(0, 0)	$IA_{k,\bullet} > SPA_{k,0} + SPA_{k,k} + SLA_{k,k}$
(A, A)	$IA_{k,\bullet} < SPA_{k,0} + SPA_{k,k} + SLA_{k,k}$
(B, B)	$IB_{k,\bullet} - IA_{k,\bullet} > SPB_{k,0} - SPA_{k,0} + SPB_{k,k} - SPA_{k,k} + SLB_{k,k} - SLA_{k,k}$
(B, B)	$IB_{k,\bullet} - IA_{k,\bullet} < SPB_{k,0} - SPA_{k,0} + SPB_{k,k} - SPA_{k,k} + SLB_{k,k} - SLA_{k,k}$

When the number of insurers, n, increases:

The total investigation cost is $IA_{k,\bullet} = \sum_{j=1}^n IA_{k,j} + IA_{k,k} + IA_{k,0} (k \neq j)$. The share of efficient part ($IA_{k,k} + IA_{k,0}$) in the investigation, which is spent on

$SPA_{k,0} + SPA_{k,k} + SLA_{k,k}$, is $\frac{IA_{k,k} + IA_{k,0}}{IA_{k,\bullet}}$. When $n \rightarrow \infty$, $\frac{\sum_{j=1}^n IA_{k,j}}{IA_{k,\bullet}} \rightarrow 1$, $\frac{IA_{k,k} + IA_{k,0}}{IA_{k,\bullet}} \rightarrow 0$. That means that little of the investigation cost is spent to improve savings from $SPA_{k,0} + SPA_{k,k} + SLA_{k,k}$. Thus, no insurer would be likely to investigate claims for fraud. The Nash Equilibrium would tend to be (0, 0).

Table 7

SUMMARY OF TABULAR RESULTS			
	PIP		
Sample:	1993 AIB	1996 DCD	1996 CSE
Net Savings (PIP)	0.2%	-0.2%	-0.8%
Savings from IME Requested but not Completed	0.7%	0.3%	0.7%
Savings from Positive IMEs	0.7%	0.4%	-0.4%
Cost of Negative IMEs	-1.3%	-0.9%	-1.1%
	PIP+BI		
Sample:	1993 AIB	1996 DCD	1996 CSE
Net Savings (PIP+BI)	3.8%	5.7%	8.7%
Savings from IME Requested but not Completed*	4.4%	2.8%	4.3%
Savings from Positive IMEs	0.1%	3.2%	4.9%
Cost of Negative IMEs	-0.7%	-0.3%	-0.5%
* Inclusion of All PIP claims with IME requested but not completed. 4.2% of savings for 1993 AIB comes from PIPs with no matching BIs where IME requested but not completed. 2.1% savings for 1996 DCD. 2.7% savings for 1996 CSE.			

Table 8
Net Savings By Suspicion Level

Claim Payment	IME Type	Claims	Suspicion Level				
			None (0)	Low (1-3)	Mod (4-6)	High (7-10)	ALL
			PIP Suspicion Score (CSE Model)				
PIP	PIP	All PIPS	-3.4%	-1.3%	2.6%	-13.8%	-1.5%
PIP	PIP	PIPs with no BIs	-2.0%	0.1%	1.7%	-29.0%	-1.9%
PIP	PIP	PIP & BI matching	-8.1%	-2.9%	3.4%	-1.6%	-0.8%
BI	BI	PIP & BI matching	6.7%	6.3%	7.3%	11.2%	6.1%
PIP+BI	PIP	PIP & BI matching	3.0%	3.0%	-2.0%	1.5%	2.9%
PIP+BI	Best	PIP & BI matching	5.3%	6.3%	3.3%	-5.5%	6.2%
			BI Suspicion Score (NHR Model)				
PIP	PIP	PIP & BI matching	6.2%	-4.2%	-1.9%	0.2%	-0.8%
BI	BI	PIP & BI matching	-0.8%	0.2%	13.1%	2.4%	6.1%
PIP+BI	PIP	PIP & BI matching	-6.7%	4.1%	5.2%	-1.5%	2.9%
PIP+BI	Best	PIP & BI matching	-8.0%	0.5%	14.4%	-4.5%	6.2%

Source: 1996 CSE claims

Note: Some PIP claims with IME Requested but not Completed have no matching BI claims and can be assumed to save an average BI claim payment. Those savings are not included in this table. If included, the overall savings would increase by the following percentage:

PIP	PIP	PIP & BI matching	1.6%
BI	BI	PIP & BI matching	3.8%
PIP+BI	PIP	PIP & BI matching	2.6%
PIP+BI	Best	PIP & BI matching	2.5%

Table 9

IME PERFORMANCE DATA					
	% of Claims with IME Requested				
				Strain/Sprain	Other Injury
	1993 AIB	1996 DCD	1996 CSE	1996 CSE	1996 CSE
PIP IME (PIP Claims)	18%	23%	26%	32%	14%
PIP IME (BI Claims)	34%	35%	52%	54%	47%
PIP or BI IME (BI Claims)	41%	40%	57%	58%	53%
	% of Completed IMEs with Positive Outcomes				
				Strain/Sprain	Other Injury
	1993 AIB	1996 DCD	1996 CSE	1996 CSE	1996 CSE
PIP IME (PIP Claims)	34%	59%	58%	59%	55%
PIP IME (BI Claims)	32%	60%	59%	59%	57%
PIP or BI IME (BI Claims)	36%	60%	70%	71%	62%