The Latest NBER Working Papers http://www.nber.org/new.html The wave of crises that began in 2008 reheated the debate on market deregulation as a tool to improve economic performance. This paper addresses the consequences of increased flexibility in goods and labor markets for the conduct of monetary policy in a monetary union. We model a two-country monetary union with endogenous product creation, labor market frictions, and price and wage rigidities. Regulation affects producer entry costs, employment protection, and unemployment benefits. We first characterize optimal monetary policy when regulation is high in both countries and show that the Ramsey allocation requires significant departures from price stability both in the long run and over the business cycle. Welfare gains from the Ramsey-optimal policy are sizable. Second, we show that the adjustment to market reform requires expansionary policy to reduce transition costs. Third, deregulation reduces static and dynamic inefficiencies, making price stability more desirable. International synchronization of reforms can eliminate policy tradeoffs generated by asymmetric deregulation. http://papers.nber.org/papers/w19025#fromrss http://papers.nber.org/papers/w19025#fromrss The international gold standard of the late nineteenth century has been described as a system of 'spontaneous order', capturing the idea that its architects at the time were fashioning domestic monetary systems which created a system of fixed exchange rates almost as a by-product. In contrast the framers of the Bretton Woods System were intentional in building an international monetary system and so it is by advocates of designing an international monetary order. In this paper we examine the transition from spontaneous order circa 1850 to designed system and then back towards spontaneous order in the late twentieth century, arguing that it is an evolution with multiple stops and starts, and that the threads that underlie the general tendency through these hesitations are the interplay between monetary and fiscal factors and the evolution of the financial system. This transformation is embedded within deep evolving political fundamentals including the rise of democracy, nationalism, fascism and communism and two world wars. http://papers.nber.org/papers/w19026#fromrss http://papers.nber.org/papers/w19026#fromrss We show that Eurozone bank risks during 2007-2012 can be understood as a "carry trade" behavior. Bank equity returns load positively on peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, or GIPSI) bond returns and negatively on German government bond returns, a position that generated "carry" until the deteriorating GIPSI bond returns inflicted losses on banks. The positive GIPSI loadings correlate with banks' holdings of GIPSI bonds; and, the negative German loading with banks' short-term debt exposures. Consistent with moral hazard in the form of risk-taking by large, under-capitalized banks to exploit government guarantees, arbitrage regulatory risk weights, and access central-bank funding, we find that this carry-trade behavior is stronger for large banks, and banks with low Tier 1 ratios and high risk-weighted assets, in both GIPSI and non-GIPSI countries' banks, but not so for similar banks in other Western economies or for non-bank firms. http://papers.nber.org/papers/w19039#fromrss http://papers.nber.org/papers/w19039#fromrss