NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Scott A. Baker

Washington University in St. Louis
School of Law
One Brookings Drive
Saint Louis, MO 63130

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org

NBER Working Papers and Publications

May 2011Does Accuracy Improve the Information Value of Trials?
with Anup Malani: w17036
We develop a model where products liability trials provide information to consumers who are not parties to the litigation. Consumers use this information to take precautions against dangerous products. A critical assumption is that consumers cannot differentiate between firms that have never been sued and firms that have been sued but settled out of court. In this framework, we show that perfectly accurate courts do not maximize information to consumers and thus welfare, contrary to Kaplow and Shavell (1994). More accurate courts provide more information only if producers go to trial. Greater accuracy, however, encourages producers of dangerous products to settle and hide their type. When courts are perfectly accurate, all low quality producers settle. And given the lack of any informatio...
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us