Maryam Farboodi

26 Prospect Ave
Bendheim Center for Finance
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08540

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

April 2018Big Data in Finance and the Growth of Large Firms
with Juliane Begenau, Laura Veldkamp: w24550
One of the most important trends in modern macroeconomics is the shift from small firms to large firms. At the same time, financial markets have been transformed by advances in information technology. We explore the hypothesis that the use of big data in financial markets has lowered the cost of capital for large firms, relative to small ones, enabling large firms to grow larger. Large firms, with more economic activity and a longer firm history offer more data to process. As faster processors crunch ever more data – macro announcements, earnings statements, competitors' performance metrics, export demand, etc. – large firms become more valuable targets for this data analysis. Once processed, that data can better forecast firm value, reduce the risk of equity investment, and thus reduce th...

Published: Juliane Begenau & Maryam Farboodi & Laura Veldkamp, 2018. "Big Data in Finance and the Growth of Large Firms," Journal of Monetary Economics, .

December 2017Intermediation as Rent Extraction
with Gregor Jarosch, Guido Menzio: w24171
We propose a theory of intermediation as rent extraction, and explore its implications for the extent of intermediation, welfare and policy. A frictional asset market is populated by agents who are heterogeneous with respect to their bargaining skills, as some can commit to take-it-or-leave-it offers and others cannot. In equilibrium, agents with commitment power act as intermediaries and those without act as final users. Agents with commitment trade on behalf of agents without commitment to extract more rents from third parties. If agents can invest in a commitment technology, there are multiple equilibria differing in the fraction of intermediaries. Equilibria with more intermediaries have lower welfare and any equilibrium with intermediation is inefficient. Intermediation grows as tradi...
May 2017Long Run Growth of Financial Technology
with Laura Veldkamp: w23457
In most sectors, technological progress boosts efficiency. But financial technology and the associated data-intensive trading strategies have been blamed for market inefficiency. A key cause for concern is that better technology might induce traders to extract other's information from order flow data mining, rather than produce information themselves. Defenders of these new trading strategies argue that they provide liquidity by identifying uninformed orders and taking the other side of their trades. We adopt the lens of long-run growth to understand how improvements in financial technology shape information choices, trading strategies and market efficiency, as measured by price informativeness and market liquidity. We find that unbiased technological change can explain a market-wide shif...
March 2017The Emergence of Market Structure
with Gregor Jarosch, Robert Shimer: w23234
What market structure emerges when market participants can choose the rate at which they contact others? We show that traders who choose a higher contact rate emerge as intermediaries, earning profits by taking asset positions that are misaligned with their preferences. Some of them, middlemen, are in constant contact with other traders and so pass on their position immediately. As search costs vanish, traders still make dispersed investments and trade occurs in intermediation chains, so the economy does not converge to a centralized market. When search costs are a differentiable function of the contact rate, the endogenous distribution of contact rates has no mass points. When the function is weakly convex, faster traders are misaligned more frequently than slower traders. When the func...
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