NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Louphou Coulibaly

Département de sciences économiques
Université de Montréal
C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville
Montréal QC H3C 3J7
Canada

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

September 2016Financial Safety Nets
with Julien Bengui, Javier Bianchi: w22594
In this paper, we study the optimal design of financial safety nets under limited private credit. We ask when it is optimal to restrict ex ante the set of investors that can receive public liquidity support ex post. When the government can commit, the optimal safety net covers all investors. Introducing a wedge between identical investors is inefficient. Without commitment, an optimally designed financial safety net covers only a subset of investors. Compared to an economy where all investors are protected, this results in more liquid portfolios, better social insurance, and higher ex ante welfare. Our result can rationalize the prevalent limited coverage of safety nets, such as the lender of last resort facilities.
 
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