NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Lars Thiel

University of Wuppertal
Schumpeter School of Business and Economics
Rainer-Gruenter-Str. 21 [FN.01]
42119 Wuppertal
GERMANY

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

February 2016Healthy, Happy and Idle: Estimating the Health Capacity to Work at Older Ages in Germany
with Hendrik Jürges, Axel Börsch-Supan: w21972
After two decades of reforms that have tightened eligibility for early retirement and the generosity of social security payments, the German government has begun to turn back time and re-introduce more generous disability and early retirement benefits. Often, poor health is cited as the main reason why workers cannot work until the regular retirement age. In this chapter, we try to answer a seemingly simple question: what is the proportion of older individuals who could work in the labor market if they wanted to and if they were not limited by poor health? To answer this question, we follow two different empirical approaches with a similar logic: we estimate the link between health and labor force participation in a population whose employment patterns are or were hardly affected by the cu...

Published: Healthy, Happy, and Idle: Estimating the Health Capacity to Work at Older Ages in Germany, Hendrik Jürges, Lars Thiel, Axel Börsch-Supan. in Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: The Capacity to Work at Older Ages, Wise. 2017

January 2016Healthy, Happy, and Idle: Estimating the Health Capacity to Work at Older Ages in Germany
with Hendrik Jürges, Axel Börsch-Supan
in Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: The Capacity to Work at Older Ages, David A. Wise, editor
After two decades of reforms that have tightened eligibility for early retirement and the generosity of social security payments, the German government has begun to turn back time and re-introduce more generous disability and early retirement benefits. Often, poor health is cited as the main reason why workers cannot work until the regular retirement age. In this chapter, we try to answer a seemingly simple question: what is the proportion of older individuals who could work in the labor market if they wanted to and if they were not limited by poor health? To answer this question, we follow two different empirical approaches with a similar logic: we estimate the link between health and labor force participation in a population whose employment patterns are or were hardly affected by the cu...
April 2014Health, Financial Incentives, and Early Retirement: Microsimulation Evidence for Germany
with Hendrik Jürges, Tabea Bucher-Koenen, Johannes Rausch, Morten Schuth, Axel Börsch-Supan
in Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: Disability Insurance Programs and Retirement, David A. Wise, editor
About 20% of German workers retire on disability pensions. Disability pensions provide fairly generous benefits for those who are not already age-eligible for an old-age pension and who are deemed unable to work for health reasons. In this paper, we use two sets of individual survey data to study the role of health and financial incentives in early retirement decisions in Germany, in particular disability benefit uptake. We show that financial incentives to retire do affect sick individuals at least as much as healthy individuals. Based on 25 years of individual survey data and empirical models of retirement behavior, we then simulate changes in the generosity of disability pensions to understand how these changes would affect retirement behavior. Our results show that making the disabilit...
February 2014Health, Financial Incentives, and Early Retirement: Micro-Simulation Evidence for Germany
with Hendrik Juerges, Tabea Bucher-Koenen, Johannes Rausch, Morten Schuth, Axel Boersch-Supan: w19889
About 20% of German workers retire on disability pensions. Disability pensions provide fairly generous benefits for those who are not already age-eligible for an old-age pension and who are deemed unable to work for health reasons. In this paper, we use two sets of individual survey data to study the role of health and financial incentives in early retirement decisions in Germany, in particular disability benefit uptake. We show that financial incentives to retire do affect sick individuals at least as much as healthy individuals. Based on 25 years of individual survey data and empirical models of retirement behavior, we then simulate changes in the generosity of disability pensions to understand how these changes would affect retirement behavior. Our results show that making the disabilit...

Published: Health, Financial Incentives, and Early Retirement: Microsimulation Evidence for Germany, Hendrik Jürges, Lars Thiel, Tabea Bucher-Koenen, Johannes Rausch, Morten Schuth, Axel Börsch-Supan. in Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: Disability Insurance Programs and Retirement, Wise. 2016

 
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