E. Ray Dorsey
Johns Hopkins University
Department of Neurology
Meyer Bldg, Room 6-181
600 N. Wolfe Street
Baltimore, MD 21287
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|March 2012||Limited Life Expectancy, Human Capital and Health Investments: Evidence from Huntington Disease|
with Emily Oster, Ira Shoulson: w17931
One of the most basic predictions of human capital theory is that life expectancy should impact human capital investment. Limited exogenous variation in life expectancy makes this difficult to test, especially in the contexts most relevant to the macroeconomic applications. We estimate the relationship between life expectancy and human capital investments using genetic variation in life expectancy driven by Huntington disease (HD), an inherited degenerative neurological disorder with large impacts on mortality. We compare investment levels for individuals who have ex ante identical risks of HD but learn (through early symptom development or genetic testing) that they do or do not carry the genetic mutation which causes the disease. We find strong qualitative support: individuals with more ...
Published: “Limited Life Expectancy, Human Capital and Health Investments” (with E. Ray Dorsey and Ira Shoulson). American Economic Review, 103 (5): p. 1977-2002 (August 2013).
|December 2011||Optimal Expectations and Limited Medical Testing: Evidence from Huntington Disease|
with Emily Oster, Ira Shoulson: w17629
We use novel data to study the decision to undergo genetic testing by individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD), a hereditary neurological disorder that reduces healthy life expectancy to about age 50. Although genetic testing is perfectly predictive and carries little financial or time cost, less than 10 percent of at-risk individuals are tested prior to the onset of symptoms. Testing rates are higher for individuals with higher ex ante risk of carrying the genetic expansion for HD. Untested individuals express optimistic beliefs about their probability of having HD and make fertility, savings, labor supply, and other decisions as if they do not have HD, even though individuals with confirmed HD behave quite differently. We show that these facts are qualitatively consistent with a m...
Published: “Optimal Expectations and Limited Medical Testing: Evidence from Huntington's Disease” (with E. Ray Dorsey and Ira Shoulson). American Economic Review, 103 (2): p. 804-830 (April 2013). citation courtesy of
|September 2009||Genetic Adverse Selection: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance and Huntington Disease|
with Emily Oster, Ira Shoulson, Kimberly Quaid: w15326
Individual, personalized genetic information is increasingly available, leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time, particularly in individual-payer insurance markets; this selection could impact the viability of these markets. We use data on individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD), a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity, to estimate adverse selection in long-term care insurance. We find strong evidence of adverse selection: individuals who carry the HD genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term care insurance. We use these estimates to make predictions about the future of this market as genetic information increases. We argue that even relatively limited increases in genetic ...
Published: Genetic Adverse Selection: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance and Huntington Disease (with Ray Dorsey et al) Journal of Public Economics, December 2010. citation courtesy of