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ABSTRACT

We revisit the question of what determines the credibility of macroeconomic policies – here, of promises to repay public debt. Almost all thinking on the issue has focused on governments' strategic decision to default (or erode the value of outstanding debt via inflation/devaluation). But sometimes governments default not because they want to, but because they cannot avoid it: adverse shocks leave them no option. We build a model in which default/devaluation can occur deliberately (for strategic reasons) or unavoidably. If such unavoidable fiscal crises a) have pecuniary costs and b) occur with possible probability, much conventional wisdom on the determinantes of credibility need no longer hold. For instance, appointing a conservative policymaker or denominating public debt in foreign currency may reduce, not increase, credibility.

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1 Introduction

Credibility is the mother of good policy, or so claims much recent work in macroeconomics and international finance. If a government borrows in foreign currency, it has to show a credible commitment to repay. If it borrows in its own currency, it has to show a credible commitment not to devalue or inflate away the real value of the debt.

But *ex post*, a well-meaning government may find it optimal to partially default in order to raise spending or reduce the distortions caused by high tax rates. Understanding this temptation, lenders may charge exorbitant risk premia or refuse to extend credit altogether. This is arguably a key problem faced by emerging market economies in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe. And with external credit scarce and expensive, the tough job of investing and growing becomes harder still.

How to deal with this so-called time inconsistency problem?[1] The most common approach involves *invisible handcuffs*: tie the hands of the policy maker to prevent him from acting opportunistically. Monetary examples include rules that punish central bank officials for high inflation, delegation of policy to an anti-inflation conservative, currency boards that peg the value of the currency and make discretionary monetary policy almost impossible and, if all else fails, the adoption of a foreign currency such as the dollar. Handcuffs to eliminate sovereign risk in international lending are arguably harder to design and apply, but they do exist. IMF conditionality and international fines and sanctions on defaulting nations are meant to do precisely that job.

If eliminating opportunistic behavior is the name of the game, the tighter the handcuffs or the bigger the punishment, presumably the less likely the policymaker will misbehave. In the models of Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985) and Fischer and Summers (1989), among many others, tougher or more rigid policies lead to lower expectations of inflation/devaluation/default. This does not mean, of course, that the most rigid policy is necessarily welfare-maximizing, since in an uncertain economic environment there is a trade-off between the credibility and flexibility of policies. But it does mean that, the greater the temptation to act opportunistically, the stronger is the case for erring on the side of maximizing credibility, even if it means severely limiting flexibility. This is the main theoretical justification for super-rigid

[1] The concept dates back to the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1979).

systems like the currency board in force in Argentina in 1991-2001.

In this paper we argue that this approach to credibility is incomplete and therefore flawed. Two realistic features are missing from almost all work on the subject. The first is that sometimes governments devalue/default not because they *want to*, but because they *have to*. If expenditure is unexpectedly high (war calling for high defense expenditures, recession causing an increase in unemployment compensation payments) and tax revenues cannot be increased accordingly (either because of political constraints or because the economy is at the top of its Laffer curve), then default may be inevitable even for a non-opportunistic government.

A second crucial point is that the costs of misbehavior are *pecuniary* and involve more that a utility loss for the policymaker, as much of the literature assumes. Once Argentina abandoned its currency board in 2002, there was surely loss of face for the country vis a vis the rest of the world and much discomfort for policymakers, both present and past. But the currency board was so hard to leave behind precisely because its abandonment involved other very large pecuniary costs: the breaking or rewriting of contracts, massive redistributions of wealth between some borrowers and lenders, the paralysis of the financial system for months and, soon thereafter, a mega recession that decimated government revenue.

Putting these two factors together leads to a new and different view of the relationship between policy rules and credibility. Consider the following setup, which is a much simplified version of the model we study below. The government has debt outstanding, a share θ of which is indexed while a share $1-\theta$ is nominal and can be defaulted on via devaluation or inflation. What remains must be financed via conventional taxes. Government spending is stochastic. The policy rule in force allows for devaluations up to x percent, but calls for paying a pecuniary cost c if devaluation is ever above x. The amount c is paid by the government out of fiscal resources. The smaller is x or the larger is c, the tougher the policy. Social welfare is decreasing in the rates of devaluation and conventional taxation.

In low-spending states of the world, there is no crisis: the government meets its obligations through tax collection and a devaluation below x. But in high-spending states the economy is in a fiscal crisis: after raising all possible taxes, the government is forced to devalue more than x and incur additional costs equal to c. Notice that since this cost worsens the fiscal balance, the devaluation required to restore fiscal equilibrium after the crisis is increasing in c.

Such an economy behaves very differently than standard theory suggests:

- Expected devaluation (with the expectation computed across crisis and non-crisis states) can be decreasing in x. This is because the lower is x the more often crises occur, since large devaluations cannot be used to respond to shocks without violating the rule. And the more often crises occur, the more often c is paid. If one thinks of conservatives as choosing a lower x (as we do below), then appointing a more conservative policymaker can raise expectations of devaluation. This is exactly the opposite of what Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985), Fischer and Summers (1989) and others found.

- As long as expected devaluation is decreasing in x, there is no trade-off between credibility and flexibility of policy. On the contrary, making the policy more flexible by raising x also enhances credibility. In fact, in the range in which expected devaluation is decreasing in x, expected social welfare is maximized by choosing the highest x in that range.

- If again we think of policymaker preferences determining the chosen x, it is not necessarily the case that social welfare is maximized by choosing a policymaker who is more conservative (devaluation-averse) than society as a whole, as Rogoff (1985) argued. In fact, the welfare-maximizing policymaker may well be more liberal than society as a whole.

- Expected devaluation can be increasing in θ, the share of dollarized (indexed) debt in total public debt. This is because in an uncertain environment fiscal crises occur with positive probability, and the higher is the share of dollarized debt the larger is the devaluation required to restore fiscal solvency in crisis situations. This result is exactly the opposite of Calvo (1988) and Calvo and Guidotti (1990) and of much conventional wisdom, which argue for dollarizing or indexing debt as a way to enhance credibility.

- As long as expected devaluation is increasing in θ, there is no trade-off between credibility and flexibility of policy. On the contrary, making the policy more flexible by reducing θ also enhances credibility. In fact, in the range in which expected devaluation is increasing in θ, expected social welfare is maximized by choosing the lowest θ in that range.

- A higher cost c can cause self-fulfilling devaluation crises. Two equilibria with distinct expected rates of devaluation and expected social loss (which can be Pareto-ranked) obtain if c is above a certain level. The intuition is that expecting high devaluation raises interest rates and raises the fiscal burden, lowering the threshold between crisis and non-crisis states. This in turn increases the probability that the high cost c will be paid and a large devaluation will occur. This result is in contrast to the results in Obstfeld (1997) and Velasco (1996), where a sufficiently high cost of devaluing ensures low and unique expectations of devaluation.

- If the high cost c is needed to induce the policymakers to behave more conservatively than they would if left to their own devices –as in the case of IMF conditionality, for instance– then a tougher (higher c) IMF program may cause multiple equilibria with distinct expected devaluation and welfare levels. If the economy lands in the bad equilibrium, then the IMF program may achieve the opposite of what it aimed to.

There is a long and distinguished literature that studies the time inconsistency of fiscal and monetary policies, beginning with the classic papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Lucas and Stokey (1983). Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987) extend the Lucas and Stokey result to a monetary economy, while Chang (1998) characterizes time-consistent equilibria in the Calvo model. Calvo and Guidotti (1990) and Bohn (1990) study the optimal composition of government debt (between indexed and non-indexed securities) in the context of a flexibility-credibility trade-off. A recent analysis of the relationship between monetary regimes, sovereign risk and default is in Uribe (2002). But none of these papers considers the role of *crises*, defined above as random events that force the policymaker to deviate from her chosen policy rule.

Drazen and Masson (1994) make a point that is related to ours: if economic outcomes are persistent, then following tough policies in the short run may reduce the credibility of vows to follow tough policies in the future. Consider what happens if, other things equal, higher unemployment today means higher unemployment tomorrow. Then if a tough policy raises unemployment today (and therefore tomorrow), the cost of being tough again tomorrow goes up, and so does the likelihood that the policymaker will renege on its promises and choose not to act tough. It is in this sense that too

tough a policy can be counterproductive.[2] A related issue, stressed by Flood (1983) and Blanchard (1985), is that very tough policymakers can end up being removed from office and replaced by "softer" policymakers.

Analogous arguments can also be found in the corporate finance literature. An example is Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), who study the incentives to avoid default in a setup in which sometimes default is beyond a manager's control. The optimal contract has to trade-off the benefits of large default penalties (they deter strategic default) with the costs (such penalties may have to be paid if default happens in equilibrium even if the manager did not want to default). There are also similarities with poison pill strategies to prevent hostile takeovers: too poisonous a pill may lower the expected value of the firm.

Our paper also has antecedents in the financial crises literature. Self-fulfilling debt and currency crises –involving multiple equilibria– are studied by Calvo (1988), Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990), Cole and Kehoe (1996), Velasco (1996) and Obstfeld (1997) among many others. But in all those papers giving the government the power to precommit –or imposing sufficiently severe punishments to ensure discretionary policy mimics which would be chosen under commitment– is sufficient to rule out multiplicity. The opposite is true in this paper.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model, while sections 3 presents an example of equilibria under a uniform distribution of shocks. Section 4 analyzes the consequences of two policy alternatives (appointing conservative policymakers and indexing debt) under the simplifying assumptions of a constant and exogenous cost of misbehavior. Section 5 endogenizes this cost and analyzes policy options, while 6 concludes.

[2]Note that in Drazen and Masson (1994), the only kind of deviation is opportunistic: if things get sufficiently bad policymakers optimally choose to devalue. There are no crises which force the policymaker to devalue, as can happen in this paper. There are technical differences as well. Drazen and Masson work with a signaling model in which the public is uncertain about the policymaker's type. In our model there is full information about everything.

2 The model

The government budget constraint is

$$\theta b + (1-\theta)\, b\, (1+\delta^e) + g + z = \tau + (1-\theta) b\delta \tag{1}$$

where $b =$ inherited public debt coming due, $g =$ exogenous net expenditure, $\tau =$ policy-determined tax revenue, and $z =$ random fiscal shock, all denominated in terms of the economy's single tradeable good.[3] The variable δ is the actual devaluation/default rate applied by the government, while δ^e is the expected devaluation rate, which translates into the risk premium charged on the debt. Hence, on the LHS of (1)is the total fiscal burden, while the on RHS are total fiscal resources, which include tax revenue and proceeds from devaluation/default.

The budget shock may have to do with random fluctuations in expenditures (war, natural disasters calling for higher transfer payments, recessions requiring higher unemployment compensation) or random fluctuations in revenues (commodity price shocks affecting the profits of state enterprises, recessions causing lower value-added tax receipts). Assume that z has a p.d.f. $f(z)$ with mean zero, upper bound $\bar{z}$ and lower bound $\underline{z}$.

The parameter θ, which lies between 0 and 1, indicates how much of the total debt is denominated in foreign currency or indexed, while a fraction $1-\theta$ is denominated in domestic currency (or subjected to a possible default). If all debt is in domestic currency, for instance, $\theta = 0$, and a devaluation surprise of $(\delta^e - \delta)$ yields $b\,(\delta^e - \delta)$ net revenue (in units of output) for the government. If all debt is in foreign currency or indexed, by contrast, so that $\theta = 1$, a devaluation surprise yields no real net revenue. If outright default and not devaluation is involved, a low θ indicates that the fines and legal fees associated with unexpected default are small, so that a given rate of surprise default yields a relatively large amount of revenue. The opposite is true if θ is high. If the actual devaluation/default rate is fully anticipated, so that $\delta^e = \delta$, then government still has to pay all inherited public debt b. From now we will speak of devaluation only, but the reader should keep in mind our result can also be interpreted in terms of outright default. We will refer to δ^e as expected devaluation or the devaluation premium, but under the

[3]If this good has a price of one in foreign currency and the law of one price holds, then the domestic price level equals the nominal exchange rate, and inflation and devaluation become identical. Below we speak of devaluation, but all results can be reinterpreted in terms of inflation.

alternative interpretation it would be the country risk premium. The larger δ^e, the lower the credibility of policies.

We make two key assumptions, on which much of our story hangs:

1 *Upper bound on tax revenue*: $\tau \leq \bar{\tau}$. This limit can arise because of political constraints on further tax collection or because the economy finds itself at the top of the Laffer curve. If the government ever hits this constraint, it enters a *fiscal crisis*. In that case, it has no option but to devalue or default.

2 *Cost of crises*: a fiscal crisis increases the government's liabilities by an amount $c \geq 0$. In the next two sections we treat c as exogenous, but endogenize it later. One interpretation is that this c includes all those other liabilities that are easily and cheaply postponed or "rolled over" under normal circumstances, but not so under a fiscal crisis. An alternative is that the IMF or some external monitoring agency refuses to roll over short-term credits if the government violates fiscal conditionality. Or the surprise devaluation that comes with a fiscal crisis could cause losses in the domestic private sector (especially in local banks), which are soon transferred to the government because of political pressures or concerns over the health of the payments system.

To avoid considering uninteresting sub-cases, we make the following additional assumptions about the size of $\bar{\tau}$:

3 *No crises on average*: $\bar{\tau} > g + b$. This means that regular taxes are enough to pay for regular expenditure and service debt if no surprise takes place ($\delta^e = \delta$) and if the fiscal shock is no larger than it is on average.[4]

4 *Default always staves bankruptcy*: $\bar{\tau} > g + \theta b + \bar{z} + c$. This means that defaulting on all debt that can be defaulted allows government to finance its other expenditures, even if the fiscal shock is as adverse as can be.

Finally, we specify the preferences of local residents and of the government. Locals have the loss function

[4] If, conversely, $\bar{\tau} < g + b$, the fisc would be bankrupt in an expected value sense, even without crises.

$$L^s = \frac{\alpha^s}{2} (\delta b)^2 + \frac{1-\alpha^s}{2} \tau^2 \tag{2}$$

where $0 < \alpha^s < 1$. Quite naturally, loss is increasing in both devaluation and taxes. Note that devaluation is costly even if debt is owed to foreigners, because of standard cost-of-inflation (or devaluation) arguments, or because of the other distortions/costs a default might bring. The government has a loss function that is identical to (2) except that the weight α it places on devaluation need not equal α^s. A higher α^s implies a more conservative government.

The policy problem then boils down to minimizing (2) subject to the budget constraint, the upper bound on tax collection, and to private sector devaluation expectations. The timing of actions is as follows. The stock of debt b and the share $1-\theta$ of nominal debt are predetermined. Expectations are formed at the beginning of the period, before uncertainty is realized. Then the shock hits. After observing the shock, the policymaker chooses her preferred δ and τ. Notice that because he moves after expectations are set and cannot commit to a course of action, the policymaker's optimal plan will suffer from the adverse consequences of time inconsistency: more devaluation and higher social loss than under commitment. It is this problem that policies such as appointing a conservative central banker or dollarizing debt attempt to solve.

3 Computing equilibrium

Computing the policymaker's preferred strategy is simple. If not against the maximum tax constraint ($\tau < \bar{\tau}$), he chooses tax and devaluation rates according to

$$x = (1-\lambda)(b + x^e + g + z) \tag{3}$$

$$\tau = \lambda (b + x^e + g + z) \tag{4}$$

where $x \equiv (1-\theta)\delta b$ is actual revenue raised by devaluation and $x^e \equiv (1-\theta)\delta^e b$ is expected revenue raised by devaluation. Notice that $\lambda \equiv \frac{\alpha}{(1-\alpha)(1-\theta)^2+\alpha} < 1$ is increasing in θ and in α. These rules nest some intuitive and common examples. For instance, if $\alpha = 1$ (devaluation default very costly for the

policymaker) or if $\theta = 1$ (debt totally dollarized or indexed), the policy involves no devaluation whatsoever.

From now on we refer to (3) and (4) as the *policy rules*. Deviating from these rules will prompt a punishment or cost c. As discussed above, the idea is that both local residents and foreign creditors know (3) and (4) and can observe if they are being followed. If they are not, all kinds of undesirable economic consequences occur, which have a cost c for the government.

Define z^* as the realization of expenditure such that taxes are at their maximum level:

$$\bar{\tau} = \lambda \left(b + x^e + g + z^*\right) \tag{5}$$

This level z^* is a trigger or threshold. If $-\left(b + x^e + g\right) \leq z \leq z^*$, then the fiscal situation is strong and policy rules (4) and (3) determine τ and x.[5]

But if the shock is larger and $z > z^*$, then the economy is in a *fiscal crisis* and $\tau = \bar{\tau}$. In this case, the government cannot abide by (3) and (4) above. Actual devaluation is given by

$$x = b + x^e + g + c + z - \bar{\tau}, \tag{6}$$

where now c must be paid out of government resources.

Figure 1 shows x as a function of the shock z. The figure depicts two distinct regions. From now on we label the range $-\left(b + x^e + g\right) \leq z \leq z^*$ as the *no crisis region* and the range $z > z^*$ as the *crisis region*. Denote the probability of the former as p^{nc} and the probability of the later as p^c.[6]

Rational expectations dictate that

$$E(x|x^e) = \int_{-(b+g+x^e)}^{z^*} (1-\lambda)\,(b+g+z+x^e) f(z) dz + \int_{z^*}^{\bar{z}} (b+g+z+x^e+c-\bar{\tau}) f(z) dz, \tag{7}$$

where the threshold z^* is given by

$$z^* = -(b + g + x^e) + \frac{\bar{\tau}}{\lambda} \tag{8}$$

Using Leibnitz's rule one can calculate

$$\frac{\partial E(x|x^e)}{\partial x^e} = (1-\lambda)\, p^{nc} + p^c + c f(z^*) > 0, \tag{9}$$

[5] Note that $z < -(b + x^e + g)$ implies that the total fiscal burden is $b + x^e + g + z$. If $z < -\left(b + x^e + g\right)$, there is no need to default on debt or to raise any taxes.

[6] Note these probabilities need not add up to one, since there can be a portion of the support of the distribution in which the shock is so favorable that both taxes and devaluation are zero.

so that $E(x|x^e)$ is increasing in x^e. The second derivative of $E(x|x^e)$ is

$$\frac{\partial^2 E(x|x^e)}{\partial (x^e)^2} = (1-\lambda) f\left[-(b+g+x^e)\right] + \lambda f(z^*) - c f'(z^*). \tag{10}$$

From now on we assume that $f'(z) \leq 0$ (which is satisfied for many commonly used distributions: uniform and Poisson are two examples). With this assumption, $E(x|x^e)$ is convex in x^e as long as $z^* \geq \underline{z}$. As x^e grows, eventually $z^* < \underline{z}$; in that range, $E(x|x^e)$ is a straight line with slope equal to one (in other words, in that range $E(x|x^e) = b + g + x^e + c - \bar{\tau}$).

Finally, expectations are formed rationally. Equilibrium expected devaluation (x^e_{eq}) is given by

$$x^e_{eq} = E(x|x^e_{eq}) \tag{11}$$

There are three possible cases:

- Case 1: One equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 2.1. In this case, $0 < \frac{\partial E(x|x^e)}{\partial x^e} \leq 1$ at the equilibrium x^e. Therefore, shifting up the $E(x|x^e)$ curve (for instance by raising b or g) results in a larger x^e_{eq}. This case holds if and only if $c < \bar{\tau} - b - g$ (recall the quantity on the RHS is positive by assumption). In words, c has to be relatively small.

- Case 2: No equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 2.2. This is the case of a very large c.

- Case 3: Two equilibria, as depicted in Figure 2.3. In this case, $0 < \frac{\partial E(x|x^e)}{\partial x^e} \leq 1$ at the low equilibrium x^e_{eq1} and $\frac{\partial E(x|x^e)}{\partial x^e} > 1$ at the high equilibrium x^e_{eq2}. This case requires a larger c than in case 1 but a smaller one than in case 2. Shifting up the $E(x|x^e)$ curve results in a larger x^e_{eq1} and a smaller x^e_{eq2}.

An important implication of this is that a sufficiently large c can cause multiple equilibria, possibly shifting the economy from Case 1 to Case 2. The intuition is that starting from a position of equilibrium, expecting higher devaluation raises the fiscal burden, lowering the threshold between crisis and non-crisis states. This in turn increases the probability that the high cost c will be paid and a large devaluation will occur, thereby making the initial increase in expected devaluation self-validating.[7]

[7] This cannot happen if $c = 0$ because of the following. In non crisis states, $x =$

If a second equilibrium exists and bad "animal spirits" can cause a shift to it, self-fulfilling pessimism could cause crises.[8]. An announcement on the part of external creditors, for instance, that they would not reschedule loans coming due if the government devalues, could be enough to trigger an equilibrium shift and the very devaluation the creditors were presumably trying to avoid.

For future use, note that expected social loss is

$$\begin{aligned} E(L) \quad = \quad & \frac{\alpha^s}{2}\int_{-(b+g+x^e)}^{z^*}\left(\frac{1-\lambda}{1-\theta}\right)^2[b+g+x^e+z]^2 f(z)\,dz \\ & +\frac{\alpha^s}{2}\int_{z^*}^{\bar{z}}\frac{1}{(1-\theta)^2}[b+g+x^e+z+c-\bar{\tau}]^2 f(z)\,dz \\ & +\frac{1-\alpha^s}{2}\int_{-(b+g+x^e)}^{z^*}\lambda^2[b+g+x^e+z]^2 f(z)\,dz \\ & +\frac{1-\alpha^s}{2}\int_{z^*}^{\bar{z}}\bar{\tau}^2 f(z)\,dz, \end{aligned} \qquad (12)$$

which we write more compactly as

$$E(L) = \Lambda(\lambda, \theta, z^*, x^e, c) \qquad (13)$$

Recall z^* and x^e are also functions of λ. Expected loss depends on what share of the fiscal burden is financed by devaluation in non-crisis states, what the threshold is between crisis and non-crisis states, and what the expectation of devaluation is across all states.

4 Equilibria: an example

To gain more insight into the sources of multiplicity of equilibria, consider the following example. Suppose the distribution of z is uniform, with lower bound $-\bar{z}$ and upper bound $\bar{z}$. Country-risk equation (7) then implies

$(1-\lambda)(b+g+x^e+z)$, so that a given increase in x^e yields a less than one-for-one increase in x. In crisis states $x = b+g+x^e+z-\bar{\tau}$, so that x increases one-for-one with x^e. The rational expectation of x is the weighted average of these two cases, with the weights given by the relevant probabilities. But whatever the weights, the increase is always less than one-for-one, so an exogenous rise in x^e can never be self-validating.

[8]This is a static model, so we cannot say much about the stability properties of both equilibria. Arguably the lower or good equilibrium is stable under tatonment and the higher or bad one is not. But tatonment is surely not the only expectations-adjustment mechanism.

$$x^e = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2\bar{z}}\left[\frac{1}{2}\Delta_z^2 + \left(\frac{\lambda\bar{\tau}}{1-\lambda} + c\right)\Delta_z + \frac{\lambda\bar{\tau}^2}{2(1-\lambda)^2}\right] & if \quad \Delta_z \in \left(0, 2\bar{z} - \frac{\bar{\tau}}{1-\lambda}\right) \\ \frac{1-\lambda}{4\bar{z}}\Delta_z^2 + (\lambda + \frac{c}{2\bar{z}})\Delta_z + \lambda\left(\frac{\bar{\tau}}{1-\lambda} - \bar{z}\right) & if \quad \Delta_z \in \left(2\bar{z} - \frac{\bar{\tau}}{1-\lambda}, 2\bar{z}\right) \end{cases} \tag{14}$$

where $\Delta_z \equiv \bar{z} + z^*$ is the length of the interval in which no fiscal crises occur. At the same time, trigger equation (5) becomes

$$x^e_{eq} = -(b + g + z^*_{eq}) + \frac{\bar{\tau}}{1-\lambda}. \tag{15}$$

These equations are depicted in Figure 3. It is easy to prove that the function labeled DR (for expected *devaluation revenue*) is positive, decreasing, convex, continuous and differentiable in the interval $(0, 2\bar{z})$. These properties imply that a unique equilibrium exists as long as that DR crosses the vertical axis above the function labeled TR (for *trigger*). This last condition is equivalent to $\bar{\tau} > b + g + c$. This confirms for this example our earlier finding that uniqueness requires that the cost c be sufficiently small.[9]

5 The effects of policy

Policies affecting λ, c, b, g or $\bar{\tau}$ result in shifts of $E(x|x^e)$ and equilibrium expected devaluation and expected social loss. Next we examine the effects of some of these policies. In this section we assume away the issue of multiplicity of equilibria and focus on cases in which uniqueness obtains.

5.1 A conservative policymaker à la Rogoff

A conservative policymaker has a high α and therefore suffers big utility losses from devaluation. Plausibly, $\alpha > \alpha^s$, so that he suffers more from devaluation

[9] In this particularly simple case, the endogenous variables have closed-form solutions. If TR cuts DR to the left of $\tau(1-\lambda)^{-1}$ (this requires $4(1-\lambda)(\bar{\tau} - c - b - g) < \bar{z} - 2c$), we have:

$$z^*_{eq} = -\bar{z} + \frac{1}{1-\lambda}\left(c + \sqrt{c^2 + 4(1-\lambda)(\bar{\tau} - c - b - g)\bar{z}}\right). \tag{16}$$

Alternatively, if TR cuts DR to the right of $\tau(1-\lambda)^{-1}$, the solution is:

$$z^*_{eq} = -\bar{z} + \frac{1}{1-\lambda}\left(\lambda\bar{\tau} + (1-\lambda)c - \sqrt{(\lambda\bar{\tau} + (1-\lambda)c)^2 - 4\bar{z}(1-\lambda)^2(b + g + \bar{\tau} + c) - \lambda\bar{\tau}^2}\right)$$

With these results, expected devaluation can be computed using 15 in the text.

than does the population at large. What are the effects of delegating policy to someone with such preferences?

Notice that the conventional model is a special case of our model: the case in which $\bar{\tau}$ is sufficiently large, so that there are no fiscal crises. In that case *policy rule* (3) holds in all states. Taking expectations on both sides of that expression, using the definitions of λ and of x^e, and rearranging we have that:

$$\delta^e = (1-\theta)\left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\right)\left(\frac{b+g}{b}\right), \tag{17}$$

so that δ^e is unambiguously decreasing in α. A more conservative policy-maker is associated with lower expected devaluation. The intuition is obvious: the more the policymaker dislikes devaluation, the less of it he engineers in equilibrium.

Matters are very different when crises are positive. Recall that λ is increasing in α and that $x^e = (1-\theta)\delta^e b$. Therefore, for a given θ, the change in δ^e with respect to α is proportional to the change in x^e with respect to λ:

$$\frac{d\delta^e}{d\alpha} = \frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}\left(\frac{1-\theta}{b}\frac{\lambda^2}{\alpha^2}\right) \tag{18}$$

In what follows we focus on $\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}$ for simplicity. From equation (7) we can compute

$$\frac{\partial E(x|x^e)}{\partial \lambda} = -E\left[(b+g+z+x^e) \mid nocrisis\right] p^{nc} + cf(z^*)\frac{\bar{\tau}}{\lambda^2} \tag{19}$$

For small values of c this derivative is negative, and we have the standard case: a conservative central banker delivers lower expected devaluation.[10] But the opposite case is also possible. If c is large enough, the derivative is positive. That means that an increase in α, with the consequent increase in λ, shifts up $E(x|x^e)$ and therefore increases x^e. The appointment of a more conservative policy-maker will reduce expected devaluation if c is small enough, but increase it otherwise.

The intuition is as follows. Comparing two economies under different policy regimes, one with a conservative policy maker (high α) and another

[10]Note the term $b+g+z+x^e$ is always non-negative by construction, since we are integrating over the interval where $-(b+g+x^e) \leq z \leq z^*$.

with a lax policymaker (low α), we see three possible outcomes depending on the realization of z:

- If the shock z is small enough, neither economy is in a fiscal crisis. In this case, the economy with the more conservative policymaker has less devaluation.
- If the shock z is large enough, both economies are in a fiscal crisis. In this case, both economies have the same amount of devaluation.
- If the shock is of intermediate size, then the economy with the lax policymaker is not in crisis, but that with the conservative policymaker is. In this case, the latter economy has higher expected devaluation if c is large.

In computing expectations, agents average across these three possible situations. With sufficiently large costs c, the relatively high devaluation suffered by conservative policymakers when in the third situation more than offsets the relatively low devaluation they enjoy when in the first situation, so that "on average" conservatives engineer more devaluation, and this is rationally anticipated by the public. This line of reasoning also makes clear why, if $c = 0$, conservatives always deliver lower expected devaluation.

This can also be seen by writing the condition for $\frac{\partial E(x|x^e)}{\partial \lambda} > 0$ (equation (19)) as

$$E\left[(b + g + z + x^e) \mid nocrisis\right] p^{nc} < -cf(z^*)\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial \lambda} \tag{20}$$

using the fact that, for a given x^e, $\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial \lambda} = -\frac{\bar{\tau}}{\lambda^2}$. The LHS is the marginal *reduction* in expected devaluation when λ increases and no crisis takes place. It is positive, for more conservative (higher λ) policymakers default less when there is no crisis. The RHS is the marginal increase in expected costs (financed via devaluation) associated to a marginally more conservative government. It is also a positive number, since $\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial \lambda} < 0$. In words, more conservative policymakers are in crisis more often. If the latter effect exceeds the former, then a more conservative policy maker delivers higher expected devaluation.

The upper panels in figures 4 and 5 illustrate both possible cases. Again we use a uniform distribution with support $[-\bar{z}, \bar{z}]$. In 4 we depict a case with relatively high $\bar{\tau}$ and $c = 0$. This means that, for a given $\bar{z}$ (recall the standard deviation of the shock is proportional to $\bar{z}$), crises do not happen often,

and when they do they involve zero costs. As the figure shows, expected devaluation is always decreasing in α.

The example in Figure 5 has the same parameters as Figure 4, except for a lower maximum tax revenue $\bar{\tau}$ and a large c. For low α's the traditional result holds and a more conservative policymaker delivers lower expected devaluation. But for α's larger than 0.41 the opposite happens and a more conservative policy maker delivers higher expected devaluation.

What about the consequences for welfare? Recall Rogoff showed that, in the presence of time inconsistency, the policymaker that delivers the highest social welfare is one who has more conservative preferences than society as a whole. That celebrated result need not hold here. We can compute the effects of policy on welfare using (13) above. Denote by $\Lambda_y(.)$ the partial derivative of Λ with respect to y. Some tedious computations reveal that

$$\Lambda_\lambda = \frac{1-\alpha^s}{\lambda}\left[1-\left(\frac{\alpha^s}{1-\alpha^s}\right)\left(\frac{1-\alpha^g}{\alpha^g}\right)\right] E\left[\tau^2 \mid nocrisis\right] p^{nc} \qquad (21)$$

so that $\Lambda_\lambda = 0$ when $\alpha^g = \alpha^s$, as it must be since the chosen λ is, for a given x^e, the optimum for both the government and for society. Clearly Λ_λ is negative (positive) if α is smaller (larger) than α^s.

One can also show that

$$\Lambda_{z^*} = -\frac{1-\alpha^s}{(1-\theta)^2}\left(\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda}\bar{\tau}c + \frac{c^2}{2}\right) f(z^*) \leq 0, \qquad (22)$$

so that expected loss is decreasing in the threshold z^* whenever the cost c is positive. Intuitively, as z^* rises and the economy spends less time in crises, the cost has to be paid less often, and this reduces expected loss.

Finally, it is easy to check that $\Lambda_{x^e} > 0$ everywhere: higher expected devaluation raises the fiscal burden and therefore expected loss.

With this information in hand we can now say something about the effect of policymaker preferences on social welfare. Note that

$$\frac{dE(L)}{d\lambda} = \Lambda_\lambda + \Lambda_{z^*}\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial \lambda} + \left(\Lambda_{x^e} - \Lambda_{z^*}\right)\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}, \qquad (23)$$

where we have used the fact that $\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial x^e} = -1$. The first term on the RHS of this expression is positive for $\alpha \geq \alpha^s$. So is the second term, since $\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial \lambda} = -\frac{\bar{\tau}}{\lambda^2} < 0$. In the third term, the expression in parentheses is always positive, so the sign of the third term depends on whether $\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}$ is positive or negative.

To make progress consider a special point along (23), and evaluate $\frac{dE(L)}{d\lambda}$ in the neighborhood of $\alpha = \alpha^s$. We then have

$$\left.\frac{dE(L)}{d\lambda}\right|_{\alpha=\alpha^s} = \Lambda_{z^*} \left.\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial \lambda}\right|_{\alpha=\alpha^s} + \left(\Lambda_{x^e} - \Lambda_{z^*}\right) \left.\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}\right|_{\alpha=\alpha^s}, \tag{24}$$

Note that the celebrated Rogoff result is a special case that holds when $c = 0$. In that situation, $\Lambda_{z^*} = 0$ and $\left.\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}\right|_{\alpha=\alpha^s} < 0$, so the RHS of (24) is unambiguously negative. Social loss falls as the policymaker becomes marginally more conservative than society as a whole. This situation is illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 4, where we have assumed $\alpha^s = 0.5$, and where the socially optimal level of α is equal to 0.65.

If $c > 0$, on the other hand, we have two subcases. If $\left.\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}\right|_{\alpha=\alpha^s} < 0$, so that the conventional link between expected devaluation and policymaker preferences obtains, the RHS has an ambiguous sign. It pays off to be more conservative than society if and only if the cost c is small (so that Λ_{z^*} is close to zero) while $-\left.\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}\right|_{\alpha=\alpha^s}$ is large (a more conservative policymaker sharply reduces expected devaluation).

The other subcase obtains when $\left.\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}\right|_{\alpha=\alpha^s} > 0$, so that we have the non-conventional result that greater liberalism causes expected devaluation to fall. In that case, the RHS of (24) is unambiguously positive. The social optimum involves a policymaker who is more liberal than society as a whole. This case is illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 5, where we again assumed $\alpha^s = 0.5$, and where the socially optimal level of α is equal to 0.41.

5.2 Dollarization and indexation

We saw above that one interpretation of the parameter θ is the share of debt that is denominated in foreign currency or indexed (for instance to the price level). A common policy is to increase θ, so that a devaluation/inflation surprise yields little real revenue. Understanding this, the logic goes, governments will devalue/inflate less in equilibrium.[11] The currently fashionable policy of "dollarization," for instance (applied in Ecuador and El Salvador and hotly discussed in Argentina) consists in this context of driving θ all the way to one.

What effects does this policy have? Note first that the standard model without crises –for instance Fischer and Summers (1989)– would yield a

[11] See for instance Calvo (1988) and Fischer and Summers (1989).

monotonically decreasing relationship between expected devaluation and the share θ of dollarized debt. The intuition is that since as θ rises devaluation becomes less productive (it yields less revenue for the same devaluation rate), it is used less in equilibrium. That happens here if the maximum tax $\bar{\tau}$ is never binding, so that there are no crises and policy rule (3) holds in all states. As we saw in the previous subsection (see equation (17)), in that case δ^e is unambiguously decreasing in θ, so that a higher share of dollarized debt means less expected devaluation.

Here matters are again different because of the possibility of crises. We know that θ affects x^eonly through λ and that $\delta^e = \frac{x^e}{(1-\theta)b}$. This implies that

$$\frac{d\delta^e}{d\theta}\frac{1-\theta}{\delta^e} = 2\frac{1-\lambda}{1-\alpha}\left(\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}\frac{\lambda}{x^e}\right) + 1, \tag{25}$$

where we used the fact that

$$\frac{d\lambda}{d\theta}\frac{1-\theta}{\lambda} = 2\frac{1-\lambda}{1-\alpha} > 0. \tag{26}$$

Hence, greater dollarization reduces devaluation expectations if and only if the elasticity of x^e with respect to λ is smaller than $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1-\alpha}{1-\lambda}$. This means that even if c is zero, so that $\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}$ is unambiguously negative, greater dollarization will decrease expected revenues from devaluation but may increase expected devaluation.

The intuition is that now changing θ not only alters λ, and therefore the share of government obligations that is financed via default. Changing θ also changes the stock of debt that can be defaulted on, so that for every dollar of revenue the government hopes to get from default, higher dollarization (raising θ) requires a higher default rate.

In a crisis the default rate is not for the policymaker to choose, but given by revenue needs. It follows that, for a given amount of required revenue, the default rate in crises is higher the larger is the share θ of nominal debt. In addition, a larger θ means that the threshold z^* falls, so that the economy is in crises more often. Either or both of these effects can offset the standard Fischer-Summers type of result, causing expected devaluation to rise as the share of dollarized debt increases. An example of this can be seen in the top panel of Figure 6, where the schedule has an upward-sloping portion.[12]

[12]Note however that if $c = 0$ changing the threshold has no impact on δ^e, so that in Figure 6 the upward-sloping portion comes exclusively from the first effect.

What about the welfare implications of dollarization/indexation of liabilities? The expression in (13) can now be totally differentiated to yield

$$\frac{dE\left(L\right)}{d\theta}=\left\{\Lambda_{\lambda}+\Lambda_{z^*}\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial\lambda}+\left(\Lambda_{x^e}-\Lambda_{z^*}\right)\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}\right\}\frac{d\lambda}{d\theta}+\Lambda_{\theta} \tag{27}$$

where recall $\frac{d\lambda}{d\theta}=2\left(\frac{1-\lambda}{1-\alpha}\right)\left(\frac{\lambda}{1-\theta}\right)>0$. The last term in (27) can be easily computed from (12):

$$\Lambda_{\theta}=\frac{\alpha^s}{1-\theta}E\left(\delta b\right)^2>0 \tag{28}$$

It follows that the welfare analysis of indexation/dollarization is the same as the welfare analysis of policymaker conservatism, but with a twist. There is now an additional effect: for a given λ, decreasing θ (indexing/dollarizing more) always increases social loss, since it is the attempted devaluation (δb) not its actual yield ($\theta\delta b$) that enters social loss.

Other things equal, then, trying to lower expected devaluation and increase welfare via greater indexation-dollarization is a trickier business than doing so via a more conservative policymaker. Consider for simplicity the case in which $\alpha=\alpha^s$ (in that case, as we saw above, $\Lambda_{\lambda}=0$).

$$\left.\frac{dE\left(L\right)}{d\theta}\right|_{\alpha=\alpha^s}=\left\{\Lambda_{z^*}\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial\lambda}+\left(\Lambda_{x^e}-\Lambda_{z^*}\right)\frac{dx^e}{d\lambda}\right\}\frac{2\lambda(1-\lambda)}{(1-\theta)(1-\alpha)}+\frac{\alpha^s}{1-\theta}E\left(\delta b\right)^2, \tag{29}$$

Therefore, whenever expected devaluation is increasing in λ and therefore in θ, expected social loss is increasing in θ. In other words, in the range of θ for which $\frac{\partial x^e}{\partial\lambda}$ is positive, it pays off to have as little indexation-dollarization as possible.

Notice that if $c=0$, so that there is no cost of crises, this last expression becomes

$$\left.\frac{dE\left(L\right)}{d\theta}\right|_{\alpha=\alpha^s}=\Lambda_{x^e}\frac{\partial x^e}{\partial\lambda}\frac{2\lambda(1-\lambda)}{(1-\theta)(1-\alpha)}+\frac{\alpha^s}{1-\theta}E\left(\delta b\right)^2. \tag{30}$$

We know the first term on the RHS is in this case negative, and the second term on the RHS is always positive. It follows the net effect can have either sign, and greater indexation/dollarization can be bad for welfare even if crises are costless. This case is depicted in the lower panel of Figure 6, in which expected social loss is decreasing in θ until this share hits 0.48, and increases thereafter.

6 Endogenizing the cost of default

So far we have treated the cost c of a crisis as exogenous. But it can easily be endogenized by appealing to incentive effects.

It is not always feasible to find a tough central banker or finance minister who has a strong dislike of devaluation or default. That person may not exist, or he may be inevitably changed once in power. An external agency, such as the IMF, may attempt to commit the government to a low devaluation rate by imposing a penalty for c for deviations.

Suppose that the IMF wants to induce the government to follow a given policy rule, characterized by a given α (call it α^f) and its associated λ (call it λ^f). If the government ever deviates from this policy, then it must pay the cost c. Naturally, the IMF will wish to impose the smallest c that ensures the rule is followed as long as possible.[13] The appendix shows that for each chosen λ^f there is a c^* equal to

$$c^* = \bar{\tau}\omega\left(\lambda^f, \lambda\right), \tag{31}$$

where $\omega\left(\lambda^f, \lambda\right) > 0$ is a function of λ^f and λ. As long as the cost of deviating is no smaller than c^*, the government will always attempt to stick to the policy dictated by the IMF. From the definition of $\omega\left(\lambda^f, \lambda\right)$ in the appendix it follows that this function is increasing in λ^f if and only if $\lambda^f > \lambda$. Hence, if the IMF wants to raise λ^f above λ, it must also increase c^*.

What is the effect of a higher λ^f on expectations of devaluation? Consider the total derivative of $E(x|x^e)$ with respect to λ^f, which is now

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dE(x|x^e)}{d\lambda^f} &= \frac{\partial E(x|x^e)}{\partial\lambda^f} + \frac{\partial E(x|x^e)}{\partial c^*}\frac{\partial c^*}{\partial\lambda^f} \\ &= -E\left[(b+g+z+x^e) \mid nocrisis\right]p^{nc} + c^* f(z^*)\frac{\bar{\tau}}{\lambda^{f2}} + p^c\bar{\tau}\omega_{\lambda^f}, \end{aligned} \tag{32}$$

The sign of this derivative depends on λ^f itself. A more ambitious target (a higher α^f, meaning a higher λ^f) may cause expectations of default to fall or rise. Evaluating (32) in the extremes ($\lambda^f = \lambda$ and $\lambda^f = 0$) one obtains

[13] By as long as possible we mean that if it hits the maximum-tax constraint, the government will have to deviate from the IMF-imposed policy even if it does not want to. The cost c^* below is constructed to reflect this. For details, see the appendix.

$$\left.\frac{dE(x|x^e)}{d\lambda^f}\right|_{\lambda^f=\lambda} = -E\left[(b+g+z+x^e) \mid nocrisis\right] p^{nc} \tag{33}$$

$$\left.\frac{dE(x|x^e)}{d\lambda^f}\right|_{\lambda^f=0} = -E\left[(b+g+z+x^e) \mid nocrisis\right] p^{nc} + \bar{\tau}\left[c^* f(z^*) + p^c\right]. \tag{34}$$

The right hand side of (33) is always negative; imposing a tighter policy starting from $\lambda^f = \lambda$ reduces $E(x|x^e)$. This is because the required marginal increase in c^*, starting from $\lambda^f = \lambda$, is zero. But a 'zero tolerance' policy of $\lambda^f = 1$ can backfire: the RHS of (34) may be positive, in which case a *decrease* in λ^f is required to reduce expectations of devaluation. An example appears in the top panel of Figure 7, where expected devaluation first falls and then rises as α^f (and therefore λ^f) increases.

What are the implications for welfare? Should the IMF force the local policymaker to act more conservatively than the policymaker naturally would? We can use the same technique as in earlier sections, calculating

$$\frac{dE\left(L\right)}{d\lambda^f} = \Lambda_{\lambda^f} + \Lambda_{z^*}\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial \lambda^f} + \left(\Lambda_{x^e} - \Lambda_{z^*}\right)\frac{\partial x^e}{\partial \lambda^f} + \Lambda_c \frac{\partial c}{\partial \lambda^f} \tag{35}$$

where it is easy to check from (12) that

$$\Lambda_c = \frac{\alpha^s}{\theta^2} E\left(x \mid crisis\right) p^c > 0 \tag{36}$$

Focus first on the case with $\alpha = \alpha^s$, so that the government has the same preferences as society. Given that the marginal increase in the cost needed to implement a slightly higher λ is zero, (35) becomes

$$\left.\frac{dE\left(L\right)}{d\lambda^f}\right|_{\alpha^f=\alpha=\alpha^s} = \Lambda_{x^e}\frac{\partial x^e}{\partial \lambda^f}, \tag{37}$$

which is negative since $\frac{\partial x^e}{\partial \lambda^f} < 0$ for $c = 0$. Therefore, having the IMF induce a policy that is more conservative than both society and the government is optimal. That is, if $\alpha = \alpha^s$, the best α^f is $\alpha^f > \alpha$. The intuition is that raising the policymakers α to $\alpha^f > \alpha$ has marginal benefits and costs. The marginal benefit is that in non-crisis situations, a more conservative policymaker ameliorates the time inconsistency problem.[14] The marginal cost

[14] And starting from $\alpha^s = \alpha^g$, making the policy maker marginally more conservative increases welfare, as Rogoff proved, since the gain from enhanced credibility more than offsets the loss from less flexibility in responding to shocks.

is that in crisis situations a cost c has to be paid, and the more conservative the policymaker is, the more often crises happen. But starting at $\alpha^f = \alpha$ this marginal cost is zero, since the marginal increase in c required to make that α^f sustainable is zero.[15] This case appears in the lower panel of Figure 7.

If the government is naturally more liberal than society, so that $\alpha < \alpha^s$, then we have

$$\left.\frac{dE(L)}{d\lambda^f}\right|_{\alpha^f=\alpha^s>\alpha} = \Lambda_{z^*}\frac{\partial z^*}{\partial \lambda^f} + (\Lambda_{x^e} - \Lambda_{z^*})\frac{\partial x^e}{\partial \lambda^f} + \Lambda_c\frac{\partial c}{\partial \lambda^f}, \tag{38}$$

which may be positive or negative, since the sum of the first two terms, as we know, is of ambiguous sign, and $\Lambda_c > 0$. That is, having the IMF induce a policy that is more conservative than society could be welfare decreasing if the government is sufficiently liberal, so that the c needed to sustain the IMF policy is large.

What is the connection between how tough an IMF program is and uniqueness of equilibria? It turns out that a sufficiently tough or ambitious program –that is, one with a high α^f– can cause multiple equilibria. The intuition is that forcing a government to behave much more conservatively than it would if left to its own devices calls for a large cost c. And, as we saw in sections 2 and 3 above, a large enough c can generate multiple equilibria. As in those sections, the intuition is that expectations of high devaluation raise the fiscal burden, shifting the threshold between crisis and non crisis states. A large c is then paid with higher probability, worsening the expected fiscal burden and potentially rendering the pessimistic expectations self-confirming.

This result stands in contrast with those of Obstfeld (1997). In that paper, escape clauses with exogenous costs can involve self-fulfilling attacks on fixed exchange rates if those costs are sufficiently small. In Obstfeld's paper escape costs are non-pecuniary and affect the policymaker's utility only. The higher the cost, the less willing is the policymaker to validate high devaluation expectations. Here escape costs are pecuniary and they affect the government's budget constraint. This is precisely why these high costs allow pessimistic expectations to be self-validating.

An example of this phenomenon appears in Figure 8. As α^f (and therefore λ^f) increase expected devaluation falls, but for very high α^f (very con-

[15] That is, $\left.\frac{\partial\omega(\lambda^f,\lambda^g)}{\partial\lambda^f}\right|_{\lambda^f=\lambda^g} = 0.$

servative IMF programs) the equilibrium is no longer unique. There is an alternative outcome that yields higher expected devaluation and expected social loss. In that range, which equilibrium obtains depends exclusively on animal spirits. By being more ambitious, the IMF may end up increasing the very expected devaluation it was attempting to reduce.

7 Conclusions

Do tougher policies deliver higher credibility, lower expectations of devaluation and default, and possibly higher welfare? Conventional wisdom typically says yes. The model in this paper suggests otherwise. In an uncertain environment in which fiscal crises are both possible and costly, tough policies such as greater policymaker conservatism and rising dollarization/indexation of government debt can easily backfire, causing higher expected devaluation and lower welfare.

This does not mean that any toughening of policies is counterproductive. On the contrary, we have shown that the relationship between expected devaluation and expected social loss, on the one hand, and the toughness of policies, on the other, can be non-monotonic and quite sensitive to changes in underlying parameters. But our results do suggest that toughness beyond a certain point may be welfare reducing, and that this threshold may be different from what conventional theory suggests. For instance, the well-known result that it is welfare-improving to appoint a conservative policy-maker need not hold here.

Not all tough policies are created equal. The paper also suggests that indexing or dollarizing debt may be particularly tricky. Appointing a conservative policymaker may cause crises to occur more often, but has no implications for the ability of the government to default/devalue as needed in times of crisis. That is why conservatism may be welfare-improving if the fiscal costs of crisis are small, as we show in sections 4 and 5. Dollarization of debts, on the other hand, or measures such as facilitating the imposition of sanctions or penalties on defaulting nations, reduce the revenue collected by governments for every possible devaluation rate. This means that, other things equal, default rates are higher at times of crisis, and expected devaluation and expected social loss may well be higher.[16]

[16]Fischer and Summers (1989) make a related point, arguing that what they term policies of inflation protection, may be welfare improving when inflation is imperfectly con-

We have developed the argument in terms of a fiscal problem, but the same logic could be applied more broadly. For instance, it could be applied to the inflation-unemployment trade-off for which the idea of time inconsistency was originally developed. If the expectations-augmented Phillips curve is subject to shocks and if there is a politically-dictated upper bound to the rate of unemployment (as their arguably is in the real world), then a very similar story applies. Often-advocated policies, such as indexing wages to insulate them from inflation, thereby making inflation surprises useless in terms of employment, could also have counter-productive effects.

trolled by the policymaker.

A Appendix

For any given λ^f, if there is no fiscal crisis the instantaneous loss is

$$L^f = \left(\frac{1-\alpha^g}{2}\right)\left[\left(\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda}\right)\left(\lambda^f\right)^2 + \left(1-\lambda^f\right)^2\right](b+g+z+x^e)^2 \qquad (39)$$

But if against the maximum tax constraint, the government has to deviate from the IMF policy even if it does not want to. This means that the worst realization of z for which (39) is relevant turn out to be z^*, which is given here by $(b+g+z^*+x^e) = \left(1-\lambda^f\right)\bar{\tau}$. In that case (39) can be written as

$$L^f = \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{2}\right)\left[1+\left(\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda}\right)\left(\frac{\lambda^f}{1-\lambda^f}\right)^2\right]\bar{\tau}^2 \qquad (40)$$

By contrast, if the government deviates from the IMF prescription and applies its preferred rule λ, the resulting loss is

$$L^g = \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{2}\right)(1-\lambda)\left(b+g+z+x^e+c\right)^2, \qquad (41)$$

which evaluated at the same z^* as above equals

$$L^g = \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{2}\right)\left(\frac{1-\lambda}{(1-\lambda^f)^2}\right)\left[\bar{\tau}+\left(1-\lambda^f\right)c\right]^2. \qquad (42)$$

The government will not deviate for any $z \leq z^*$ as long as (39) is no larger than (41), implying

$$c \geq \bar{\tau}\left(\frac{\psi-1}{1-\lambda^f}\right) \equiv \bar{\tau}\omega\left(\lambda^f,\lambda\right) \qquad (43)$$

where

$$\psi \equiv \sqrt{\frac{(\lambda^f)^2}{\lambda}+\frac{(1-\lambda^f)^2}{1-\lambda}} \geq 1$$

Equation (43) defines the lowest feasible c, which we call c^*. Note that if $\lambda^f = \lambda$, $\psi = 1$, so deviation is never preferred (given that c is non-negative). It is straightforward to show that, given the definition of ψ, the function $\omega\left(\lambda^f,\lambda\right)$ is decreasing in λ^f if and only if $\lambda^f < \lambda$.

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

Figure 1: Crisis and no-crisis regions



Figure 2.1



Figure 2.2



Figure 2.3

Figure 2: Equilibria



Figure 3: Equilibrium with uniform distribution



Figure 4: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with costs $c = 0$.
$(\bar{z} = 10, \theta = 1, b = 10, \bar{\tau} = 10, g = -10, c = 0)$





Figure 5: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with costs $c = 4$.
$(\bar{z} = 10, \theta = 1, b = 10, \bar{\tau} = 5, g = -10, c = 4)$



Figure 6: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with costs $c = 0$.
$(\bar{z} = 8, \alpha = .5, b = 16, \bar{\tau} = 10, g = -10, c = 0)$





Figure 7: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with endogenous costs. $(\bar{z} = 8, \theta = 1, b = 12, \bar{\tau} = 5, g = -10, \alpha = 0.5)$



Figure 8: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with endogenous costs. $(\bar{z} = 1.5, \theta = 1, b = 12, \bar{\tau} = 5, g = -8.5, \alpha = 0.5)$