TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alesina,Alberto
AU  - Wagner,Alexander
TI  - Choosing (and reneging on) exchange rate regimes
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 9809
PY  - 2003
Y2  - June 2003
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9809
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9809.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

Alexander Wagner
Harvard University
Department of Economics
Littauer Center, Room 200
Cambridge, MA  02138
E-Mail: awagner@fas.harvard.edu
AB  - We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it more often. In contrast, countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, i.e. they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability.
ER  -