TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kehoe,Patrick J.
AU  - Perri,Fabrizio
TI  - Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 9077
PY  - 2002
Y2  - July 2002
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9077
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9077.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Patrick Kehoe
Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN  55480-0291
Tel: 612/204-5525
Fax: 612/204-5515
E-Mail: pkehoe@res.mpls.frb.fed.us

Fabrizio Perri
University of Minnesota
Department of Economics
4-177 Hanson Hall
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Tel: 612/625-7504
Fax: 612/624-0209
E-Mail: fperri@umn.edu
AB  - This study demonstrates how constrained efficient allocations can arise endogenously as equilibria in an economy with a limited ability to enforce contracts and with private agents behaving competitively, taking a set of taxes as given. The taxes in this economy limit risk-sharing and arise in an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments of sovereign nations. The equilibrium allocations depend on governments choosing to tax both the repayment of international debt and the income from capital investment in their countries.
ER  -