@techreport{NBERw8399,
 title = "Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethicsof Financial Regulation",
 author = "Edward J. Kane",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "8399",
 year = "2001",
 month = "July",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w8399",
 abstract = {Defects in the corporate governance of government-owned enterprises tempt opportunistic officials to breach duties of public stewardship.  Corporate-governance theory suggests that incentive-based deferred compensation could intensify the force that common-law duties actually exert on regulatory managers.  In principle, a forfeitable fund of deferred compensation could be combined with provisions for measuring, verifying, and rewarding multiperiod performance to make top regulators accountable for maximizing the long-run net social benefits their enterprise produces.  Because government deposit-insurance enterprises are purveyors of credit enhancements for which private substitute and reinsurance markets exist, their performance could be measured accurately enough to make employment contracts for deposit-insurance CEOs a promising place to experiment with this kind of accountability reform.},
}