TY  - JOUR
AU  - Svensson,Lars E.O.
AU  - Woodford,Michael
TI  - Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy under Asymmetric Information
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 8255
PY  - 2001
Y2  - April 2001
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8255
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8255.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Lars E.O. Svensson
Sveriges Riksbank
SE-103 37 Stockholm
SWEDEN
Tel: +46 8 787 0107
Fax: +46 8 21 0531
E-Mail: lars.svensson@iies.su.se

Michael Woodford
Department of Economics
Columbia University
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
Tel: 212/854-1094
Fax: 212-854-8059
E-Mail: mw2230@columbia.edu
AB  - The optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward-looking variables are derived and interpreted, both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment. The private sector is assumed to have information about the state of the economy that the policymaker does not possess. Certainty-equivalence is shown to apply, in the sense that optimal policy reactions to optimally estimated states of the economy are independent of the degree of uncertainty. The usual separation principle does not hold, since the estimation of the state of the economy is not independent of optimization and is in general quite complex. We present a general characterization of optimal filtering and control in settings of this kind, and discuss an application of our methods to the problem of the optimal use of 'real-time' macroeconomic data in the conduct of monetary policy.
ER  -