TY  - JOUR
AU  - Coate,Stephen
AU  - Besley,Timothy
TI  - Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 7579
PY  - 2000
Y2  - March 2000
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7579
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7579.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Stephen Coate
Department of Economics
Cornell University
Uris Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-7601
Tel: 607/255-1912
Fax: 215/573-2057
E-Mail: sc163@cornell.edu
AB  - This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators.  When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for.  Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party elites and special interests.  Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the salience of regulatory issues.  Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.
ER  -