TY  - JOUR
AU  - Polinsky,A. Mitchell
AU  - Shavell,Steven
TI  - The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 6993
PY  - 1999
Y2  - March 1999
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6993
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6993.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Stanford University
Stanford, CA  94305
Tel: 650/723-0886
Fax: 650/723-3557
E-Mail: polinsky@stanford.edu

Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Hauser Hall 508
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-3668
Fax: 617/496-2256
E-Mail: shavell@law.harvard.edu
AB  - This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law -- the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability.  We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation.
ER  -