@techreport{NBERw6740,
 title = "Beyond Becker:  Training in Imperfect Labor Markets",
 author = "Daron Acemoglu and Jorn-Steffen Pischke",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "6740",
 year = "1998",
 month = "September",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w6740",
 abstract = {In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon.  We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.},
}