TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bebchuk,Lucian Arye
TI  - Chapter 11
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 6473
PY  - 1998
Y2  - March 1998
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6473
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6473.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School
1545 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-3138
Fax: 617/812-0554
E-Mail: bebchuk@law.harvard.edu
AB  - This essay surveys the literature on Chapter 11.  I start by discussing the objectives by which the performance of corporate reorganization rules is to be judged and then consider the fundamental problem of valuation that arises in corporate reorganization.  I next turn to examine the performance of the prevailing bargaining-based approach to reorganization, both in terms of its effect on total reorganization value and in terms of its effect on the division of this value.  Finally, I examine the two alternative approaches that have been put forward to the approach of existing rules -- that of auctioning the reorganized company's asset (put forward by Baird (1986) and Jensen (1991)) and that of using options to reorganize the company's ownership (put forward by Bebchuk (1988)).
ER  -