TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kaplow,Louis
AU  - Shavell,Steven
TI  - Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3868
PY  - 1992
Y2  - October 1992
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3868
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3868.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Louis Kaplow
Harvard University
Hauser 322
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-4101
Fax: 617/496-4880
E-Mail: meskridge@law.harvard.edu

Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Hauser Hall 508
Cambridge, MA  02138
Tel: 617/495-3668
Fax: 617/496-2256
E-Mail: shavell@law.harvard.edu
AB  - This article considers whether the demand for legal advice about potential liability for future acts is socially excessive. using the standard model of accidents, we find that the answer depends on the type of advice and the form of liability. When advice provides information about properly determined liability, the demand for advice is socially optimal under strict liability but is socially excessive under the negligence rule. When advice identifies errors the legal system is expected to make, the demand for advice is socially excessive under both liability rules.
ER  -