TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rebitzer,James B.
AU  - Taylor,Lowell J.
TI  - Work Incentives and the Demand for Primary and Contingent Labor
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 3647
PY  - 1991
Y2  - March 1991
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3647
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3647.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
James B. Rebitzer
Professor of Management, Economics, Public Policy
Markets, Public Policy and Law Department
Boston University School of Management
595 Commonwealth Ave.
Boston, MA 02215
Tel: 617-383-7356
Fax: NA
E-Mail: rebitzer@bu.edu

Lowell Taylor
The Heinz School
Carnegie Mellon University
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA  15213-3890
E-Mail: lt20@andrew.cmu.edu
AB  - This paper presents an incentive-based dual labor market model. Three implications of the model are emphasized. First, in equilibrium, there is an excess supply of workers to primary jobs. Second, when demand is uncertain, firms may choose a mix of primary and contingent workers to perform the same job, even when these workers are perfect substitutes in production. Third, firms prefer to hire into primary jobs workers with strong job attachment and workers whose preferences lead them to prefer long work hours. We argue that industries with high proportions of part-time workers will tend to have large concentrations of contingent workers. The empirical finding that the wages and benefits of full-time workers are significantly reduced in industries with large concentrations of part-time workers appears consistent with this hypothesis.
ER  -