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ICE ARRESTS ACROSS TRUMP'S FIRST AND SECOND TERMS:
VARIATION IN TARGETING, METHOD, AND GEOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT

Deportation is often framed as a necessary tool to protect public safety by removing people who commit crimes. We use newly available, and externally validated, administrative data containing all US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrests from September 2015-October 2025. Beyond demonstrating national trends in immigration arrests by method and composition over time, we are also able to compare, for the first time, apprehensions spanning the start of the two Trump administrations, both of which focused on mass immigration enforcement. Our results reveal that the reality of immigration enforcement diverges sharply from the public narrative: while arrests spiked at the outset of both Trump presidencies, there were significant declines in the percentage of arrested individuals with criminal convictions, with especially marked declines in 2025. Examining potential mechanisms reveals that this is driven by a change in ICE tactics, but even conditional on tactic, as arrests rose, the percent with a criminal record declined. Moreover, we find substantial heterogeneity over time and across ICE Areas of Responsibility. Taken together, our results highlight a substantial gap between political rhetoric and reality.

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Introduction

The second Trump administration has promised the largest immigration enforcement effort in modern history. A key motivation cited for this effort is to improve public safety (The White House, 2026), despite the fact that a large and interdisciplinary literature finds that heightened immigration enforcement has no impact on crime (Miles and Cox, 2014; Hines and Peri, 2019; Treyger et al., 2014; Bedi et al., 2025). Reports throughout 2025 have documented that ICE activity reached strikingly high levels and that the majority of those arrested and detained by ICE in 2025 have no criminal record (Fadel, 2025; Bier, 2025a; Kocher, 2026; Bier, 2025b; Blair and Hausman, 2026).

In this paper, we provide new evidence on how interior ICE activity at the start of the second Trump administration compares to the previous decade, including the end of the second Obama administration, the first Trump administration, and the Biden administration. We begin by showing that, in 2025, average daily ICE arrests were higher than any time in the past 10 years. Moreover, we find that the accompanying percent of those arrested by ICE with a criminal conviction is at a nearly record low compared to the last 10 years, with lower rates observable only during the pandemic period.

We then exploit the richness of the data—which includes information on the method of arrests—to understand these trends. We document that ICE has ramped up its enforcement activity in 2025 largely through increases in Community Arrests, which include arrests of individuals on the street, at their workplaces, at courthouses, and at community sites such as parking lots and schools. We also show that in 2025, and historically, Community Arrests are much less likely to involve individuals with a criminal conviction, compared to arrests conducted through Law Enforcement Agreements (LEA), where the arrested individual is initially identified by a criminal law enforcement agency. We show that the recent, stark decline in the percent arrested with a criminal conviction is largely attributable to this change in ICE tactics. However, there are declines in the percent arrested with a criminal conviction even within those arrested through LEA methods.

Moreover, we explore how these changes in tactics differ by ICE Area of Responsibility (AOR). In 2025, there were distinct increases in Community Arrests in regions generally controlled by Democrats, which far exceed patterns observed during the first Trump Administration. Consistent with our national-level results, in these places, when Community Arrests spike, the percent arrested with a criminal conviction generally falls.

Our work complements a large and interdisciplinary literature on the relationship between immigration and public safety (Gonçalves et al., 2024; Jácome, 2022; Abramitzky et al., 2024; Miles and Cox, 2014; Hines and Peri, 2019; Treyger et al., 2014). This literature has consistently found that immigrants, including unauthorized immigrants, are less likely to commit crimes and that immigration enforcement does not meaningfully change crime rates. We bring new evidence to bear by examining the criminal record background of those arrested by ICE in 2025 compared to the last decade, by arrest method and geography. As ICE activity and funding continue to increase (Brennan Center for Justice, 2025; National Immigration Law Center, 2025), documenting this relationship in real-time is crucially important.

Materials and Methods

We use administrative data, gathered through FOIA litigation, on the complete universe of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) administrative arrests from October 2015 to October 2025 ($n=1,391,590$, the latest date for which data are currently available). We begin by focusing on the entire period and then zoom in on two distinct periods spanning the beginning of each Trump presidency: January 19, 2016–October 15, 2017 ($n=232,831$) and January 19, 2024–October 15, 2025 ($n=337,201$). Our datasets contain information about the location and method of each arrest, as well as whether the arrested individual had a criminal conviction of any kind. We focus on national trends, as well as differences in trends across the 23 ICE Areas of Responsibility (AORs), which can include substate or multi-state areas (see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (2023)). The Appendix provides further details of our data, measures, and analytic strategy.

We note two points relevant to understanding ICE’s definition of “criminal conviction.” First, many violations

of immigration law are civil, not criminal, and thus are not criminal convictions. Second, criminal convictions may include misdemeanors and felonies. Unfortunately, ICE did not consistently report conviction type throughout the period we analyze, so we are unable to disaggregate by severity of conviction. However, our analyses of more granular data available from January 2016–December 2017 indicate that 36% and 33% of convictions were for misdemeanors with sentences of one year or less (what ICE defines as “Level 3 crimes”) during the final year of the Obama administration and the first year of the first Trump administrations, respectively. Common misdemeanors are trespassing and shoplifting. The most common type of criminal conviction in this time period was a traffic violation, including DUIs.

Results

National Trends in ICE Arrests and Criminal Conviction Status of Those Arrested

Figure 1 plots national trends in total daily ICE arrests, as well the percent of those arrested with a criminal conviction, from October 2015 to October 2025.¹ Several important trends are evident from Figure 1. First, increases in arrests generally corresponded to decreases in the percent of arrested people with criminal convictions. Second, the beginning of the two Trump presidencies were characterized by marked increases in the number of arrests and much steeper decreases in the percent of those arrested with criminal convictions than during other periods. Third, these patterns are much more dramatic following Trump’s second inauguration.

Before further discussing arrest patterns during the two Trump presidencies, we briefly note the uniqueness of the Biden administration. When Biden assumed office, arrests were at a ten-year low, reflecting the substantial disruptions to the immigration system caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which shaped enforcement patterns during the end of the first Trump administration and the beginning of the Biden administration. The first few months of the Biden administration were characterized by a further decline in the number of arrests and an accompanying increase in the percent of arrested individuals with criminal convictions. However, the number of arrests quickly began to rise, and there was a stark decrease in the percent arrested with a criminal conviction. Some of the later changes likely reflects ICE’s new and temporary role aiding Customs and Border Protection in processing asylum-seekers at the Southern US border during this period (Kim, 2023). With the exception of the very beginning of the term, the percent with a criminal record arrested under Biden is much lower than during the second Obama and first Trump administrations.

Comparison of Arrests across the First and Second Trump Administrations

We now focus on the periods immediately before and after the first and second Trump inaugurations, respectively, up to and including the most recent available data (through October 15, 2025). Although both Trump administrations campaigned on promises of aggressive immigration enforcement, Figure 1 showed that enforcement outcomes differed markedly across the two terms. For example, in both administrations, average daily ICE apprehensions rose sharply at the outset, but the magnitude of the increase was substantially larger during the second term. In the one-year period prior to President Trump’s first inauguration (January 19, 2016–January 19, 2017), ICE conducted an average of 304 arrests per day; this figure increased to 435 average daily arrests between January 20 and October 15, 2017, representing a 43.1% increase. By contrast, in the one-year period preceding President Trump’s second inauguration (January 19, 2024–January 19, 2025), ICE again averaged 304 daily arrests, but arrests rose to 821 per day between January 20 and October 15, 2025—an increase of 170%.

As mentioned above, the start of both Trump administrations were also characterized by a substantial decline in the percentage of arrests of individuals with criminal convictions, with an especially sharp drop during the second term as arrests increased. From January 19, 2016 to January 19, 2017, 79% of average daily arrests included an

¹Data on daily arrests is available beginning in 2011, but information on the percent with a criminal conviction only begins in 2015; we include this earlier period in panel a of Appendix Figure A1. Additionally, we plot a version of that graph showing arrests rates per 100,000 non-citizens in panel b of Appendix Figure A1.

individual with a criminal conviction, which dropped nine percentage points (or 11.4%) to 70% after the inauguration. This decline was much sharper during the second administration; in the one-year period prior to the second term, 52% of arrests were of an individual with any criminal conviction, which dropped 15 percentage points (or 28.8%) to 37% after the inauguration.

What Explains These Changes

We take advantage of the detailed nature of our data to examine what mechanisms—including the method of arrest—might explain the results described above. Figure 2 plots the percent of arrests by arrest method—Community Arrests, Law Enforcement Agreement (LEA) Arrests, and Other, across the start of the first (panel a) and second (panel b) Trump presidencies. Community Arrests are arrests of those not already in law enforcement custody, that often take place at a workplace, home, courthouse, or on the street. In contrast, LEA Arrests include individuals who are already in law enforcement custody such as through the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) or 287(g) Agreements.²

Panel a shows that immediately prior to the first Trump Administration, in 2016, Community Arrests made up 19% of all ICE arrests, which increased three percentage points (15.8%) to 22% after Trump’s first inauguration. This increase in Community Arrests was accompanied by a decrease in the percent of LEA arrests, from 79% to 76%. The changes in the second Trump administration are much starker. Panel b reveals that in 2024, Community Arrests again made up 19% of ICE arrests, which more than doubled to 44% following the second Trump inauguration. The percent of LEA arrests decreased 23 percentage points from 77% prior to the inauguration to 54% after Trump assumed office for the second time. Additionally, the increases in Community Arrests observed during the second administration often occur as large and sudden peaks, likely reflecting large-scale targeted operations. For example, the large increases in Community Arrests in June, September, and October 2025, are likely driven by targeted enforcement initiatives in specific areas such as Los Angeles and Chicago, which we investigate more below.

Panels c and d of Figure 2 allow us to examine to what extent changes in arrest methods explain the change in the percent of those arrested with a criminal conviction across the two Trump administrations. To that end, we begin by exploring whether the different arrest methods generally result in a lower percent of arrested people with criminal convictions. Indeed, Community Arrests (dotted blue line) were less likely to result in an arrest of a person with a criminal conviction, relative to LEA Arrests (dashed pink line), in both the first and second Trump presidencies, though these percentages were generally much higher going into the first Trump administration.

Next, for each Trump presidency, we conduct a decomposition exercise in which we use the percent with a criminal conviction by method prior to each inauguration, to predict the expected percent with a criminal conviction following the inauguration, assuming the arrest methods change as they do in panels a and b, but with percent conviction fixed to the pre-inauguration level. This prediction is shown in the solid yellow line. If the prediction line tracks the true arrest line (shown in dashed green), then we can conclude that the changes in the actual percent with a conviction are largely driven by changes in arrest methods. On the other hand, if the yellow and green lines deviate from each other, this means the overall changes are driven by changes over time in the percent with a conviction *within* arrest methods.

Our decomposition reveals that following the first Trump election, the decline in the actual percent with a criminal conviction was not explained by changes in ICE’s methods (the yellow line is above the green line). Instead, it was explained by a decline in the percent convicted within both Community Arrests (dashed blue line) and Law Enforcement Agreement Arrest (dashed pink line) methods. In this first term, the percent with a conviction arrested under Community Arrests fell 18 percentage points from 77% prior to the inauguration to 59% following the inauguration, and under LEAs it fell 7 percentage points from 81% to 74%, from the pre- to post-inauguration periods.

The second term reveals a slightly different trend, at least at first. In the days immediately following the

²See the Appendix for detailed description of arrest methods.

beginning of the second term, the decline in the percent convicted was driven almost entirely by the increasing usage of Community Arrests (the yellow line falls below the green line). However, shortly thereafter, the decline is driven by a combination of increases in Community Arrests, and decreases in the percent convicted *among* those arrested via Community Arrest and LEA methods. Over the entire second Trump term, the percent of arrested individuals with a conviction fell 9 percentage points from 36% to 27% for Community Arrests, and 13 percentage points from 59% to 46% for LEA arrests.

Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 show that ICE is acting at a much larger scale in the second Trump administration than the first, and that as arrests spike, the percentage of those with criminal convictions falls. We also demonstrate that these spikes are largely driven by increases in the use of Community Arrests, which are less likely to result in the apprehension of individuals with criminal convictions, though the percentage of individuals with criminal convictions fell following both inaugurations, regardless of arrest method.

Regional Trends in ICE Arrest Methods

Our final set of analyses explore whether the changes in ICE methods of arrest are similar across ICE Areas of Responsibility (AOR). Figure 3 plots the total daily arrests by AOR and apprehension method for both time periods. We plot LEA arrests in pink (first term) and red (second term), and Community Arrests in light blue (first term) and dark blue (second term). We note that for ease of viewing, the vertical axes differ by area, given differences in scales of arrests.³

The results reveal several trends. First, during the first term, the increases in arrests were driven mainly by sustained increases in LEA arrests (pink line) immediately after the inauguration—this is most visible in AORs such as those headquartered in Atlanta, Chicago and Detroit. There were also several small increases in Community Arrests (light blue) in this period in areas headquartered in Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia AORs.

Second, the change in Community Arrests in the second term were dramatically larger than in the first term across most AORs. While all AORs experienced increases in Community Arrests, many AORs saw increases that occurred as distinct and short-run spikes, and that exceeded the increase in LEA arrests. This occurred in the Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Denver, Los Angeles, New York City, Newark, Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington D.C. AORs.⁴ We note that these AORs contain major cities or states that are Democratically controlled, consistent with the Trump administration’s promises to target such areas (Carrega, 2026). For example, the large-scale enforcement operations in Los Angeles in June 2025 stands out starkly for its size and scope, as does the September 2025 operation in Chicago, even when accounting for the fact that the Chicago AOR includes all of Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Wisconsin.

Third, several AORs also experienced spikes in LEA arrests following the second Trump inauguration (red lines), which were often much steeper than following the first inaugurations (pink lines); see, e.g., Atlanta, Chicago, El Paso, Miami, New Orleans, Phoenix, and San Antonio AORs.⁵ LEA arrests in these areas were also generally higher than Community Arrests. However, there is still generally a reduction in the percent of those arrested with a criminal conviction in these areas. Most of the AORs in which LEA arrests grew markedly contain jurisdictions controlled by Republicans.

On the whole, the percent with a criminal conviction in AORs falls in all areas after both inaugurations, regardless of whether the increase in arrests was driven by LEA or Community Arrests.⁶ And, in areas that experienced

³Appendix Figure A4 scales this data to the noncitizen population in each AOR).

⁴In Appendix Tables 1-2 we display the percentage change in arrests, and by arrest method, by AOR and by term;

⁵Between 2017 and 2023, ICE divided San Antonio and Houston AORs into three different AORs: Harlingen, Houston, and San Antonio; these AORs are therefore not directly comparable across the two time periods. We thus combine Houston and San Antonio in 2016-2017 and Harlingen, Houston, and San Antonio in 2024-2025. Both are labeled “San Antonio AOR.”

⁶The one exception to this is New York City in the second term, because this area was experiencing a surge in immigration enforcement activity *before* Trump took office.

large, sudden increases in Community Arrests in the second term, the drop in the percent with a criminal conviction fell especially dramatically, by over 50% in some areas.

Discussion


Taken together, our results reveal a mismatch between the justifications for deportation policy and how policy is actually implemented. If the goal of immigration law enforcement is to apprehend individuals with criminal convictions, we find that increases in arrests generally result in a decline in the percentage of those with criminal convictions. Or, conversely, we find that ICE is arresting individuals with no criminal convictions at very high rates and is increasingly likely to do so the more people it arrests. We also highlight an important mechanism for this mismatch—increases in Community Arrests. Though, even increases in LEA arrests generally correspond to decreases in the percentage of arrested people with criminal records. Additionally, the shift in methods of arrest is not uniform across locations or over time, with AORs containing Democratic strongholds much more likely to see dramatic spikes in Community Arrests in 2025, and AORs containing Republican strongholds more likely to see increases in LEA arrests. Overall, our analyses provide important new evidence that can help explain why heightened immigration law enforcement is unlikely to improve public safety.

We continue to build on this work in several ways. We are currently analyzing how AOR characteristics relate to ICE activity, as well as changes in ICE activity and methods in the Biden and Obama administrations. Finally, we will continue to update results as new ICE arrest data becomes available.

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
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Figure 1: Total Arrests and Criminal Conviction Status 2015-2025




Notes: Uses ICE arrest data from the Deportation Data Project covering October 2015 through October 2025, the most comprehensive period for which data contain information on both arrests and criminal convictions. Data on criminal convictions is unavailable prior to October 2015 and data on total arrests is unavailable prior to October 2011. Vertical red lines show inauguration dates.

Figure 2: ICE Arrests by Apprehension Method and Percent with Convictions



Notes: Uses ICE ERO administrative arrest data from 2016, 2017, 2024, and 2025. Panels (c) and (d) show the percent of all arrests with a conviction, the percent of LEA and community arrests with a conviction, and the predicted percent with convictions if the composition with convictions had stayed the same after inauguration. Vertical red lines show the dates of Trump's first and second inaugurations.

Figure 3: Total Daily Arrests by Area of Responsibility and Apprehension Method, Days Relative to Inauguration



Notes: Uses ICE ERO administrative arrest data from 2016, 2017, 2024, and 2025. Vertical red lines show the dates of Trump's first and second inaugurations.

A Appendix

Data

This analysis uses administrative data, gathered through FOIA litigation, on the complete universe of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) administrative arrests spanning the end of the Obama and Biden presidencies and the beginning of both Trump presidencies.⁷ Administrative arrests refer to arrests made for civil violations of US immigration law, which can include, e.g., unlawful presence and criminal convictions, including many misdemeanors (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2019).⁸

All ICE arrest data were obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and associated litigation for the period 2011 to 2025. Below we include information on each data set:

1. Data from October 1, 2015 and August 31, 2023 were obtained by Professor César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández (1,014,601 arrests) and hosted by the Data Deportation Project (DDP) (César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, 2025; Deportation Data Project, 2025). We use this data in Figure 1.
2. Data from September 1, 2023 to October 15, 2025 was obtained and hosted by the DDP (376,989 arrests). We use this data in all results Figures and Tables.
3. Data from October 1, 2014 to May 31, 2018 (480,987 arrests) was obtained from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. We use this data in all results Figures and Tables aside from Figures 1 and A1.
4. Data from October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2015 (783,561 arrests) was obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (American Civil Liberties Union, 2025) and hosted by the DDP. This data is used in Appendix Figure 1 because it does not contain information on the criminal conviction status of those arrested.

The first three data sets listed above contain information about the date and method of the arrest, whether the arrested individual had any kind of criminal conviction, and the ICE Area of Responsibility where the arrest occurred (detailed further below). The fourth data set contains all this information except whether the arrested individual had any kind of criminal conviction.

To calculate the total daily arrests per 100,000 noncitizens at the country and AOR levels, we rely on the 2011-2023 American Community Survey five-year estimates.

Measures

Date of arrest

The data include the date of each arrest. We observe 1,391,590 total arrests between October 1, 2015 and October 15, 2025 (Figure 1) and 2,175,151 arrests from October 1, 2011 to October 15, 2015 (Figure A1). The first Trump inauguration took place on January 20, 2017 and the second inauguration occurred on January 20, 2025. The last date for which data are available is October 15, 2025 (268 days after the second inauguration). To compare across the two periods, we thus limit our final analytical sample to the 232,831 arrests from January 1, 2016-October 15, 2017 and 337,201 arrests from January 1, 2024-October 15, 2025.

To verify arrests are equivalent across data sources, we analyze the time periods in which these datasets overlap. Namely, we compare the number of arrests from the TRAC data (data set #3 above) and Hernández' data (data set #1 above) from October 2016 through September of 2017, the Hernández and DDP data (data sets #2 above) in September of 2023, and the ACLU (data set #4 above) and TRAC datasets from October of 2014 to October of 2015. We find that these datasets are nearly identical in the number of arrests they report in these overlapping periods.

Location of Arrest

ICE ERO operations are conducted out of ERO field offices, whose jurisdiction is defined as the Area of Responsibility (AOR). There are 25 AORs as of 2023 (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 2023); for a map, see: ICE (2024). We use the AOR of arrest to examine trends in arrests by geography.

Arrest method

Arrest method refers to how the individual was identified for arrest. We categorize arrest method into three groups: Law Enforcement Agency collaborative arrests (LEA), Community Arrests, and Other arrests. LEA arrests include

⁷U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) can also make arrests at the border. However, CBP doesn't have a comparable dataset covering arrests with a similar level of detail over a similar length of time.

⁸For a detailed overview of ICE ERO arrests, see Kocher (2025a).

arrests conducted through the Criminal Alien Program (CAP)⁹, 287(g) agreements¹⁰, Anti-Smuggling, ERO Reprocessed Arrests, Law Enforcement Agency Response Units, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, Other Agencies (turned over to INS), Other Task Forces, Probation and Parole, border patrol, interior patrol, and Custodial Arrests. Community Arrests include arrests conducted through located, non-custodial arrests, and worksite raids.¹¹ Other arrests include boat patrol, crewman/stowaway, inspections, presented during inspection, traffic check, aircraft transportation check, bus transportation check, passenger train transportation check, and other efforts.

Criminal Record Status

The ICE arrest data indicate whether an individual has a criminal history. The Hernández data set covering 2015-2023 includes an indicator for whether an individual has a criminal conviction or no conviction. The 2016-2017 dataset includes an indicator for the level of seriousness of the crime (level 1, level 2, or level 3), as well as if they had no criminal conviction (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2010; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, 2025). The 2024-2025 data include an indicator for whether an individual has a criminal conviction (of any level), pending charges, or no charges.¹² To standardize across periods, we code individuals as having a criminal conviction if they have a level 1, 2, or 3 criminal conviction (in 2016-2017) or if they have a conviction of any level (in 2024-2025).

To verify these definitions of criminal conviction are equivalent over time and across datasets, we compare the number of arrests with convictions from the TRAC data and the García Hernández data from October 2016 through September of 2017, and the García Hernández and DDP data in September of 2023. We do not do this exercise using the ACLU data since criminal status is not available. We find that the number of convicted arrests match across these datasets, confirming that our measure of the percent convicted is equivalent over time.

Analytical Strategy

Our analysis proceeds in several steps. We begin by calculating the total number of arrests from 2015 to 2025 using a 15-day moving average to reduce noise. We then calculate the percentage of arrests that included individuals with a criminal record, as defined above (Figure 1). To compare the start of the two Trump Administrations for the entire country, we then calculated the percentage of arrests by each method of apprehension (LEA, Community, or Other arrest; Figure 2, panels a and b).

Finally, to create a predicted percentage of arrests of individuals with criminal records, as defined above, we ran a decomposition analysis (Figure 2, panels c and d). For each time period we calculate a fixed percentage of arrests with a criminal conviction by apprehension method, which is calculated over January and February of the year prior to the respective inauguration. Predicted percent convicted is then calculated separately for each term using the actual number of arrests and the fixed percent convicted rate by apprehension method using the formula

$$\text{Predicted}\%withConviction = (\#CA \times \text{Fixed}\%CA \text{ withConvictions} + \#LEA \times \text{Fixed}\%LEA \text{ withConviction}) / (\#TotalArrests) \quad (1)$$

where *CA* is community arrests.

We then repeated our analyses by AOR to understand whether enforcement is occurring evenly across geography. We also calculate arrest rates/100,000 noncitizens for each time period at the national and AOR levels.


⁹Criminal Alien Program arrests generally originate with ICE agents visiting and screening inmates at incarceration facilities for removable persons (at federal, state, or local facilities).

¹⁰The 287(g) program delegates federal immigration authority to non-federal law enforcement agencies (Kocher, 2025b)


¹¹Non-custodial arrests and located arrests both include arrests of individuals who are not already in custody. These include individuals who ICE has pre-identified and is intending to arrest and persons who they identify as likely unauthorized while they are in the field. A review of these arrests over multiple AORs seems to indicate that there are regional differences in the way non-custodial and located arrests are coded, and in some cases this might even be left up to the discretion of the arresting agent. For this reason, we do not attempt to distinguish these arrests from one another.

¹²The 2023-2025 data include an indicator for whether an individual has pending charges. This information was collected beginning in 2017 and is therefore not available in our analysis of Trump's first term; we thus code individuals with pending charges not having been convicted of a crime.

Figure A1: Total Arrests, Arrests per 100,000 Non-Citizens, and Criminal Conviction Status 2011-2025




(a) Total Arrests



(b) Total Arrests per 100k Non-Citizens


Notes: Uses ICE arrest data from the Deportation Data Project covering October 2011 through October 2025. Data on criminal status is unavailable prior to October 2015 and data on total arrests is unavailable prior to October 2011. Vertical red lines show the inauguration dates. To obtain a rate arrests are divided by the number of non-citizens in one year prior in the ACS, and multiplied by 100,000.

Figure A2: Total Daily Arrests per 100,000 Non-Citizens by Area of Responsibility and Apprehension Method, Days Relative to Inauguration




Notes: Uses ICE ERO administrative arrest data from 2016, 2017, 2024, and 2025. Vertical red lines show the dates of Trump's first and second inaugurations. To obtain a rate arrests are divided by the number of non-citizens in the AOR (from the 2015 ACS for term 1 and the 2023 ACS for term 2), and multiplied by 100,000.

Figure A3: Total Daily Arrests and Percent of Arrested People with Criminal Convictions



Notes: Uses ICE ERO administrative arrest data from 2016, 2017, 2024, and 2025. Vertical red lines show the dates of Trump's first and second inaugurations.

Figure A4: Map of Area of Responsibility Boundaries



Notes: Area of Responsibility boundaries are from ICE ERO (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 2023). We define San Antonio to include Harlingen, Houston, and San Antonio AORs.

Table 1: Term 1 Pre-Post Percent Change in Arrest Levels and Percent Convicted

	% Change in Daily Arrests	% Change in LEA Arrests	% Change in Community Arrests	% Change in % w/ Conviction
Atlanta	95.16	105.21	70.97	-25.73
Baltimore	31.30	9.41	50.34	-17.02
Boston	45.88	6.74	79.75	-30.29
Buffalo	29.83	10.00	44.47	-18.77
Chicago	32.44	28.68	35.44	-5.84
Dallas	39.16	48.79	-20.57	-8.38
Denver	30.17	19.51	42.70	-12.70
Detroit	58.63	43.05	61.79	-14.28
El Paso	21.81	17.84	6.80	-9.79
Los Angeles	22.56	6.63	33.78	-8.03
Miami	58.52	62.78	66.32	-20.45
New Orleans	64.22	63.42	62.96	-25.80
New York City	57.76	73.90	43.84	-16.90
Newark	44.39	44.41	50.36	-27.25
Philadelphia	42.84	7.47	140.76	-29.16
Phoenix	28.06	18.46	84.86	-0.33
Salt Lake City	14.28	11.63	25.62	-15.45
San Antonio	10.10	9.26	22.28	-5.53
San Diego	37.59	9.08	84.34	-18.90
San Francisco	5.74	-0.09	18.21	-10.85
Seattle	27.59	28.93	26.24	-19.41
St. Paul	47.86	46.35	52.94	-16.43
Washington	36.63	32.69	47.83	-20.41
National	43.01	37.80	53.63	-11.70

Notes: Uses ICE ERO administrative arrest data from 2016, 2017, 2024, and 2025. The pre-period for term 1 includes January 19, 2016-January 19, 2017 and the post-period includes January 20, 2017-October 15, 2017.

Table 2: Term 2 Pre-Post Percent Change in Arrest Levels and Percent Convicted

	% Change in Daily Arrests	% Change in LEA Arrests	% Change in Community Arrests	% Change in % w/ Conviction
Atlanta	228.60	151.65	312.27	-40.03
Baltimore	114.02	55.44	103.98	-31.90
Boston	224.39	-3.25	376.27	-32.47
Buffalo	166.25	-1.94	270.65	-57.03
Chicago	89.62	115.49	176.51	-10.99
Dallas	127.59	58.14	355.29	-36.99
Denver	211.36	81.39	264.58	-33.93
Detroit	176.05	131.77	160.58	-38.96
El Paso	283.58	253.95	353.14	-21.98
Los Angeles	163.12	62.18	203.91	-28.72
Miami	197.15	189.24	177.58	-27.08
New Orleans	109.25	74.53	212.23	-28.58
New York City	75.61	89.34	60.08	33.24
Newark	84.99	18.05	163.90	-14.30
Philadelphia	190.25	20.80	413.48	-47.35
Phoenix	154.78	95.87	256.73	-19.43
Salt Lake City	123.34	124.79	82.77	-30.40
San Antonio	137.68	62.14	687.78	-30.58
San Diego	530.35	110.71	663.88	-35.05
San Francisco	115.61	5.91	329.77	-37.49
Seattle	79.76	14.06	139.64	-3.36
St. Paul	123.34	132.08	93.29	-10.77
Washington	312.20	85.55	815.71	-57.60
National	170.61	97.67	399.62	-27.86

Notes: Uses ICE ERO administrative arrest data from 2016, 2017, 2024, and 2025. The pre-period for term 2 includes January 19, 2024-January 19, 2025 and the post-period includes January 20, 2024-October 15, 2025.

Table 3: Term Difference Summary

	Term 1 % Change in Daily Arrests	Term 2 % Change in Daily Arrests	Two-sample T-test p-value
Atlanta	95.16	228.60	0.00***
Baltimore	31.30	114.02	0.00***
Boston	45.88	224.39	0.00***
Buffalo	29.83	166.25	0.00***
Chicago	32.44	89.62	0.00***
Dallas	39.16	127.59	0.00***
Denver	30.17	211.36	0.00***
Detroit	58.63	176.05	0.00***
El Paso	21.81	283.58	0.00***
Los Angeles	22.56	163.12	0.00***
Miami	58.52	197.15	0.00***
New Orleans	64.22	109.25	0.00***
New York City	57.76	75.61	0.00***
Newark	44.39	84.99	0.00***
Philadelphia	42.84	190.25	0.00***
Phoenix	28.06	154.78	0.00***
Salt Lake City	14.28	123.34	0.00***
San Antonio	10.10	137.68	0.00***
San Diego	37.59	530.35	0.00***
San Francisco	5.74	115.61	0.00***
Seattle	27.59	79.76	0.00***
St. Paul	47.86	123.34	0.00***
Washington	36.63	312.20	0.00***

Notes: Uses ICE ERO administrative arrest data from 2016, 2017, 2024, and 2025. The pre-period for term 1 includes January 19, 2016-January 19, 2017 and the post-period includes January 20, 2017-October 15, 2017. The pre-period for term 2 includes January 19, 2024-January 19, 2025 and the post-period includes January 20, 2024-October 15, 2025.