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PENSION REFORM AND LABOR SUPPLY:
RETENTION AND PRODUCTIVITY UNDER A PENSION CUT

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ABSTRACT

We examine the effect of a representative pension reform on the retention and productivity of workers. The reform cut pension annuities and early retirement benefits for public school teachers, projected to save eight percent of pension revenues. We leverage administrative records and a discontinuity in the reform to estimate its effect. Contrary to expectations, the cut increased retention by discouraging early retirement. Using idiosyncratic within-school variation in exposure, we find the reform somewhat increased student achievement by 0.01–0.03 standard deviations, partly through reduced turnover. The reform thus maintained or improved both teacher retention and productivity.

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1 Introduction

Pension debt poses a significant challenge across the modern world. In 20 OECD countries, these obligations now exceed official government debt (Mitchell, 2020; Hanif et al., 2016). And, according to the World Economic Forum, liabilities are projected to grow sixfold by 2050, to \$400 trillion (2017).

The challenge is especially pronounced in the United States, where governments have accrued the world’s largest shortfall (Hanif et al., 2016; Mitchell, 2020; Equable Institute, 2023).¹ The resulting fiscal pressure has prompted governments to cut education and infrastructure spending, arguably reducing economic growth and upward mobility (Anzia, 2017; Koedel, 2019; Barro, 1991; Duflo, 2001; Czernich et al., 2011; Chetty et al., 2014b).² To stabilize pensions and protect other public goods, policymakers across the country have introduced reforms that curb the cost of pensions (e.g., Goldhaber et al., 2015; Gohl et al., 2023). This paper examines the effect of one such reform.

Opposing these are advocates of the public workforce. They warn that pension cuts—now implemented in some form in all states—risk undermining, or even “crippling,” public services (Woods, 2010; Van Hollen, 2017; Sabatosa, 2021).³ They contend that pension cuts will reduce worker morale, output, and retention, which in turn harms frontline services and exacerbates staffing shortages in vital functions like education and public safety (Keefe, 2014; Kenneally and Bond, 2020; Early, 2023).

Given these competing concerns—with mounting debt on one side and vital services on the other—this paper examines the apparent tradeoff of reform. Namely, *how do pension cuts affect labor supply, worker output, and the quality of public services?* To address these questions, we use detailed administrative data and a discontinuity that allows us to estimate the effects of a representative reform.

¹American unfunded liabilities are expected to grow from \$28 trillion in 2015 to \$137 trillion in 2050, all in 2015 dollars (World Economic Forum, 2017).

²See also Illinois Policy Institute (2024).

³Critics of pension cuts sometimes use stark language to describe the potential impacts of reform. U.S. Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) writes, for instance, that a reform similar to the one we consider would “decimate” the public workforce, especially their ability to “retain the best and brightest” (Van Hollen, 2017). For their part, *HR Magazine* warns that cuts affecting government workers will “cripple front line services” and “decimate staff wellbeing” (Woods, 2010).

The reform we examine cut costs on two fronts. First, it reduced the annuities workers would receive in retirement by 3–11 percent, depending on a worker’s earning history. Second, the reform multiplied the penalties for retiring early. Before the reform, a worker could retire at age 55 with 90 percent of the benefits she would have received under the full-retirement formula. After the reform, her annuity would be cut to *half* that. The congressional budget office estimated the reform would save the state \$250 million each year, approximately 8 percent of yearly pension contributions (Legislative Budget Board, 2005).

The reform we examine has a few unique features that lend themselves to empirical insight. First, the reform’s cutoffs allow us to compare essentially identical workers who only differ in their reform exposure, providing for an especially careful comparison. Second, Texas’ early adoption allows us to observe the long-term impact of reform on retention. Third, unlike most pension reforms which only affect new hires, the reform we examine affected *current* workers, allowing us to avoid vexing selection issues.⁴ Fourth, since public schools employ over half of government workers, the setting provides substantial statistical power. And fifth, schools collect annual achievement records, offering psychometrically validated measures of output. Together, these features provide an exceptional setting for understanding the implications of reform.

Theory offers conflicting predictions on retention: On one side, reform may reduce retention by effectively cutting pay (Stock and Wise, 1990; Coile and Gruber, 2007); on the other, reform may increase retention by penalizing early retirement or through income effects (Lazear, 1986; Camerer et al., 1997).

To measure its empirical effect, we exploit sharp age and experience thresholds determining whether workers were *grandfathered* in the old pension scheme, or placed into the new one. A worker was grandfathered if, in the fall of 2005, she was at least 50 years old, had at least 25 years of experience, *or* the sum of her age and experience exceeded 70. These cutoffs enable a quasi-experimental discontinuity design comparing similar workers on either side of the thresholds.

⁴Almost every state since has reduced pension parameters for new hires while preserving benefits for existing workers (Brainard and Brown, 2018). Over half of all pension programs in the country raised retirement ages or vesting requirements. The vast majority only affected new hires (Quinby et al., 2018).

Rather than increase attrition, the reform slightly increased retention, extending the average career by 0.2 years around the cutoff. Examining the dynamics, we find that five years after implementation, the reform had increased retention by 2.9 percentage points, with positive effects persisting through the ten-year mark (both significant at the 0.001 level). Fifteen years post-reform, retention rates converged. Notably, the retention effects appeared in years the reform reduced early retirement benefits, suggesting it improved retention by discouraging early retirement.⁵

To further test our findings, we employ a difference-in-discontinuity design (DDRD), comparing the main discontinuity to a placebo that acts as if the reform took place five years earlier. This approach allows us to control for any pre-existing differences at the threshold, providing a more demanding test of the reform’s causal effect. These results confirm the robustness of our main findings and, if anything, suggest that the reform’s impact may be somewhat larger than our main estimates.

We next examine whether the reform affected teacher productivity, as measured by unexpected gains in math and reading skills. Theory again predicts conflicting effects. Gift-exchange models predict the reform will depress morale and in turn reduce output (Akerlof, 1982; Weakliem and Frenkel, 2006; Kube et al., 2013). Models by Becker and Lazear, however, predict workers increase effort when early retirement is less attractive (Lazear, 1979a; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). This is because a longer work horizon encourages skill investment and curbs shirking (Becker, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967; Lazear, 1979a).

To estimate the reform’s effect, we employ a difference-in-differences approach. Our identification strategy leverages both the timing of the reform and the variation in exposure across school-grade cells. The approach reveals that the reform increased math achievement by 0.03 student standard deviations (significant at 0.001) and reading achievement by 0.01 (significant at 0.010). To address potential endogeneity concerns, we also estimate models that instrument exposure with that predicted by teaching assignments before the reform. This approach generates similar, somewhat larger, estimates in both math and reading.

When we control for teacher experience, the effects attenuate up to 30 percent, sug-

⁵We calculate the total retention effect by estimating yearly retention effects from year 1 to year 15 and summing the retention effect across years.

gesting that some of the improvement is mediated by retention which extends teaching careers. We investigate whether the remaining achievement gains reflect changes in teacher composition, turnover-related disruption, or teacher effort. Though each may play a role, we show that teacher composition is unlikely to explain the lion’s share of the effect.⁶

The 2005 Texas reform previewed a wave of similar measures nationwide. Since 2009, all 50 states have implemented cost-saving measures in their pension programs—most sharing elements of the Texas model (Aubry and Crawford, 2017; Quinby et al., 2018). Mirroring Texas, nearly two-thirds of states reduced pension annuities by calculating final average salary over a longer period. And, like Texas, approximately 40 percent of states cut early-retirement benefits (Brainard and Brown, 2018). Consequently, our results may speak to a wider set of reforms across the country.

This paper contributes to a literature examining the influence of pensions on worker turnover and performance (Friedberg and Webb, 2005; Costrell and McGee, 2010; Goldhaber et al., 2017; Fitzpatrick, 2019; Ni et al., 2020).⁷ Brown (2013) uses a differencing-and-bunching approach to evaluate the effect of pensions on labor supply. Manoli and Weber (2016) use retirement-eligibility notches in Austria for the same purpose. Koedel and Xiang (2017) and Ni et al. (2021) examine the effect of a local pension enhancement on retention.

What is unique about this paper is its ability to examine the effect of reform on both the retention and the output of workers. In particular, the environment provides a rare opportunity to examine the consequences of pension structure on worker productivity, which is not normally observable. The cutoffs provide us with simple treatment-control comparisons, where similar workers employed in the exact same setting make choices under different pension regimes. We can thus shed light on the effect of reform on both the

⁶It is difficult to explain the achievement effect in whole or majority on teacher composition effects for three reasons. First, research shows teacher exit from early retirement is either uncorrelated with effectiveness (Koedel et al., 2013; Bates and Johnston, 2024) or disproportionately retires lower value-added teachers (Fitzpatrick and Lovenheim, 2014). This would make any composition effects null or negative, contrary to our positive finding. Second, given the small retention effects (1.9 percentage points), explaining the achievement gains through composition changes would require implausibly large mean value-added differences between retained and departing teachers—over thirty standard deviations, a difference so large we almost never see it empirically. Third, the achievement gains emerge immediately after reform, while retention effects only appear several years later, arguing against a primarily compositional explanation.

⁷A related literature carefully examines how workers value their retirement benefits (Fitzpatrick, 2015; Biasi, 2019; Fuchsman et al., 2020; Ni and Podgursky, 2016). See also Johnston (2024)

extensive and intensive margins of labor supply.

2 Background

2.1 The Texas Teacher Pension System

To understand the reform, we first explain the key features of the pension program. In Texas, workers become eligible for normal retirement if they are either 65 years old with at least 5 years of service, or the sum of their age and experience reaches 80 (e.g., age 50 with 30 years of experience).⁸ When a teacher meets one of these requirements, she is eligible to claim her pension and start receiving an annuity, which is calculated as follows:

$$A_i = YOS_i \times 2.3\% \times FAS_i \quad (1)$$

The annuity received by an eligible worker i is the product of three factors: (1) the worker’s years of service (YOS_i); (2) the state’s benefit multiplier (2.3% in Texas); and (3) the worker’s “final average salary” (FAS_i). The FAS_i is calculated as the average salary of the worker’s highest earning three years before the reform.⁹ A worker retiring with 30 years of credit and a final average salary of \$94,500 (the sample mean) would receive a yearly annuity of \$65,205 for the rest of her life, adjusted for inflation each year ($\$94,500 \times 30 \times 0.023 = \$65,205$).

A worker can retire early if she is at least 55 years old with at least five years of experience. Early retirement reduces her annuity for each year she falls short of normal retirement eligibility, whether in age or years of service ([Teacher Retirement System of Texas, 2022](#)).¹⁰

⁸Since 2005, the state pension has undergone further reform, but these reforms have not affected the cohorts we study since they grandfather essentially all incumbent workers.

⁹Despite its name, these highest earning years need not be the worker’s final years of service.

¹⁰To claim early retirement, one must either be at least 55 years old with five years of experience, or have 30 years of experience (regardless of age).

2.2 The Pension Reform

The Texas reform bill was introduced in March of 2005 by bipartisan coauthors, Craig Eiland (a House Democrat from Galveston) and Robert Duncan (a Senate Republican from Lubbock). It left its legislative committees without opposition, passed in the state House and Senate by wide margins in May, and was signed into law by the governor that June. The bill’s swift passage at the end of the school year is helpful for our empirical strategy.

The bill had two primary features affecting current workers. First, it expanded the basis for computing retirement annuities from the highest three years of salary to the highest five. In effect, this reduces a worker’s pension annuity by the equivalent of an experience step in the pay schedule for a typical teacher, usually a permanent three-percent reduction. For workers serving stints in leadership (or other highly paid, temporary roles), the cut was larger. For instance, a teacher serving three years as principal would see her annuity fall by 11 percent under the reform. This is because her high salary years would be diluted when calculating Final Average Salary (FAS) by the new rule.^{11,12} Second, the reform multiplied the penalties for retiring early, increasing them from approximately 2 percent per credit short of normal retirement to 10–12 percent. This meant annuities for those claiming early at age 60 would be cut by a third, and those claiming early at age 55 would be cut in half.¹³

Figure 1 illustrates pension annuity generosity before and after the reform. The x-axis represents years of service (0–40), the y-axis represents age (25–65), and the color intensity indicates the pension annuity as a share of final salary (0–89%) for each age-experience combination. Darker green areas represent age-experience combinations with higher re-

¹¹Calculating FAS based on more years mitigates the cost of pension “spiking.” Pension spiking is the practice of having a few years of very high salary to substantially alter a worker’s pension annuity (Fitzpatrick, 2017). The canonical example is for workers to strategically time leadership to maximize annuities. Incorporating more years to compute a worker’s final average salary (FAS) makes spiking harder and less effective at raising annuities above typical compensation.

¹²Leadership positions, which typically increase pay by 30 percent *ceteris paribus*, create discontinuities in career earnings trajectories. Under the five-year FAS calculation, these temporary pay increases are diluted more severely than under the three-year calculation, with the magnitude of dilution inversely related to the duration of the leadership position. This dilution effect is particularly pronounced for educators who serve brief administrative stints near retirement.

¹³Teachers could retire with 20 years of service at age 55 in the old regime and receive 90 percent of their full benefits. After the reform, the same person would receive 47 percent of their full benefits. A range is provided because the penalties aren’t strictly formulaic. They are encoded, not in a simple formula, but a complicated table whose penalties do not follow a simple pattern (Teacher Retirement System of Texas, 2019).

placement rates.¹⁴ The grey line represents the optimal retirement age that maximizes the pension’s lifetime present value, conditional on years of service.¹⁵ Pre-reform, teachers with 20–25 years of experience maximized benefits by claiming early at age 55. After the reform, they maximized by waiting until full-retirement.¹⁶

The bill’s sponsors argued that these cuts were a necessary response to ballooning liabilities and rising costs for schools and taxpayers. Rather than cuts, opponents of the bill proposed counter legislation *raising* annuities for current retirees and increasing taxpayer contributions from the legislature by 42 percent, from 6.0 percent of payroll to 8.5 ([Legislative Budget Board, 2005](#)). The legislature passed the cost-reducing measure rather than the cost-increasing one.

The reform was extensively communicated to teachers. The union’s magazine, *Advocate*, featured the pension reform as its cover story with a fullpage picture of a browning apple core. Similarly, in her quarterly letter to members, the union president wrote of the recent legislation: “*Sine die*...it feels just that way—that someone or something has *died*. Could it be our hopes and dreams...? This was the most disappointing and disheartening legislative session we have ever seen” (emphasis original; [Haschke, 2005](#)).¹⁷ To its hundreds of thousands of members, the union provided detailed, accurate information about the reform and the grandfathering cutoff ([Texas State Teachers’ Association, 2005](#); [National Center for Education Statistics, 2008](#)).¹⁸

To soften the blow, the reform grandfathered workers nearer retirement, leaving their pension benefits unaffected. A worker would be grandfathered if, on Sept 1, 2005, she was at least 50 years old, had at least 25 years of experience, or had age and experience summing to at least 70. The age cutoff was the relevant threshold for just over half of workers, who typically began their careers in Texas public schools after age 30. The rule of 70 was the

¹⁴Before the reform, early retirement at age 55 with 20 years of experience faced minimal penalties. The reform introduced heavy penalties for early retirement, as evident from the lighter green areas.

¹⁵The optimal retirement age calculation is robust to different discount rate assumptions, yielding identical results for rates of 3, 5, and 7 percent.

¹⁶The upside-down pyramid shape of pension generosity results from the rule of 80, where age plus years of service must equal 80 for full retirement. This creates a diagonal boundary where more years of service reduce the required retirement age.

¹⁷*Sine die* has the same orthography as the English verb “to die,” but the two are unrelated. The Latin phrase adjourn a proceeding with no appointed date to resume. It translates to “without a date.”

¹⁸Texas had at the time 291,000 unionized teachers.

relevant threshold for most remaining workers, who had started their careers relatively early in life.¹⁹ Employees who hadn't met one of these thresholds were subject to the new regime while those meeting at least one were shielded from any change to their pension.

2.3 The Effect of Reform on Retirement Benefits

Using administrative records, we calculate each worker's final average salary (FAS) on both a three- and five-year basis. The five-year FAS averages 4 percent lower than the three-year measure, translating directly into a 4 percent reduction in retirement annuities for affected workers. This effect is most pronounced for workers who temporarily held higher-paying leadership positions, since the longer averaging period dampens the impact of these short-term salary increases.

To examine the effect of greater penalties for early retirement, we calculate the present value of retirement wealth under both regimes for different worker archetypes.²⁰ Our calculations assume workers have a final average salary of \$94,500 in 2021 dollars (the sample mean in 2005), live to age 84 (the mean for college-educated women), and discount future benefits at 4 percent annually (Ericson and Laibson, 2018; Johnston, 2024).

For workers with 10 years of experience at age 50, the only impact comes from the change in FAS calculation, reducing their annuity by 4 percent. The early-retirement provisions do not affect this group since they become eligible for full retirement before early retirement becomes a relevant option.

Before the reform, a worker with 20 years of experience at age 50 would maximize her pension wealth by claiming early at age 55, generating a benefit stream valued at \$1.2 million (approximately \$700,000 in present discounted value at age 55). Under the new regime, early retirement penalties halved the annuity stream for claims at age 55. This meant the value-maximizing choice was delaying retirement by five years, which reduces the present value of benefits by 18 percent compared to optimal claiming under the old regime. The perceived reduction in value from reform becomes smaller when assuming either a longer

¹⁹The experience cutoff was not relevant for most workers because a worker would have had to begin continuous employment before age 20 for experience to be the relevant cutoff.

²⁰We hold constant the years of service to show the effect of the reform on pension wealth.

life expectancy or a lower discount factor.²¹ For those already eligible for full retirement at age 50, the only reduction is the 4 percent decrease from the expanded FAS calculation base.

3 Data Description

Our analysis draws on two primary administrative datasets from the Texas Education Agency. The first consists of staffing records covering all public school employees from 2000 through 2021, encompassing 2,046,975 individual workers. Many are teachers (50 percent), but the data also include nurses, therapists, librarians, bus drivers, custodial staff, and other pension-eligible employees. We focus our analysis on teachers where we can estimate both retention and output effects.²² For each employee-year observation, the records provide the worker’s unique identifier, district, campus, age (measured on September 1), professional role, grade assignment, subject taught, years of experience, base pay, total pay, full-time status, and contract status.²³ These longitudinal records enable us to track when workers exit their school, district, or the state’s public education system entirely.

To examine productivity effects alongside retention, we use student achievement data in math and reading for grades three through eight from 2000 to 2011. While direct student-teacher matches are not available, we can identify the teachers instructing math and reading in each grade. This allows us to construct measures of reform exposure that vary across grades within schools, enabling precise within-school causal comparisons. However, because Texas did not collect student-teacher linkage data until several years after the reform, we cannot calculate teacher value-added measures for the pre-reform period. This data limitation prevents us from directly analyzing how the reform influenced selection into turnover.

²¹To demonstrate the size of the cut, these calculations fix years of service and FAS to compare the two regimes with the same inputs. If we allow years of service to respond endogenously to maximize the present value of retirement income, the effect of the reform actually raises pension value by 2 percent over the status quo, but it comes at the cost of working an additional five years. When we also account for changes in FAS due to extended years of service, the new regime’s present value is 6 percent greater than the old.

²²Although retention estimates for all workers are similar (see online Appendix), we focus on teachers as productivity measures are only available for this group.

²³The state does not provide exact dates of birth to protect employee privacy, precluding an alternative analysis using day-level age discontinuities around the 50-year threshold and September 1 cutoff date.

4 The Effect of Reform on Worker Retention

This section examines the effect of the 2005 Texas pension reform on worker retention, a central concern for policymakers and a fundamental justification for state pension systems.

We begin by explaining how we measure retention using our panel data. We then detail our methodological approach, including how we determine workers’ eligibility for grandfathering and our regression discontinuity design. Finally, we discuss our model specification and bandwidth selection when estimating the reform’s impact on worker retention.

One of the primary rationales for state pensions is to retain workers in the state’s public schools (Lazear, 1979a; Gustman et al., 1994). Policymakers’ focus on retention stems from several factors: teaching effectiveness improves with experience (Wiswall, 2013; Papay and Kraft, 2015), turnover disrupts school productivity (Ronfeldt et al., 2013), and the process of recruiting and onboarding new teachers consumes substantial time and financial resources (Barnes et al., 2007; Watlington et al., 2010). The panel dimension of our data enables us to observe when workers depart Texas public-school teaching—a key outcome of interest to policymakers.

To implement our analysis, we first determine each worker’s eligibility for grandfathering. Using each worker’s age and experience as of September 1, 2005, we calculate their distance to the grandfathering cutoff as the maximum of three values:

- distance beyond the age cutoff (age minus 50)
- distance beyond the experience cutoff (years of service minus 25)
- distance beyond the rule-of-70 cutoff (age plus years of service minus 70).

A worker need only meet one of these criteria to be grandfathered. Her effective distance to grandfathering, therefore, is the most positive distance beyond any cutoff. Those with a maximum distance greater than or equal to zero are grandfathered and those with negative values are subject to the reform.

We model the outcome variable R_i (usually retention for y years) as a continuous function of a worker’s distance to the grandfathering cutoff ($x_i - x'$), estimating a local

linear specification that allows for different slopes on either side of the threshold:

$$R_i = \beta T_i + \gamma_1(x_i - x') + \gamma_2 T_i(x_i - x') + u_i \quad (2)$$

Here, T_i equals one if worker i was subject to the reform (i.e., below the cutoff), and zero if not. For grandfathered workers, the coefficient γ_1 captures how retention varies with distance from the cutoff. For non-grandfathered workers, this relationship is captured by $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2$. We estimate the specification using a triangular kernel, placing greater emphasis on observations close to the cutoff. This approach approximates the experimental ideal where assignment to treatment is as good as random near the threshold, allowing us to interpret β as the causal effect of the reform on retention. Local linear specifications are typically preferred because it provides optimal boundary estimates, is less sensitive to observations far from the cutoff, avoids problems with overfitting using higher-order polynomials, and performs better in finite samples (Fan and Gijbels, 1994; Gelman and Imbens, 2019). We also estimate quadratic models as a robustness check, though the estimates from these two approaches are never statistically distinguishable.

We use a triangular kernel and calculate Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidths to balance the tradeoff between bias and precision (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012).²⁴ Our estimates are robust to a wide range of alternative bandwidths.²⁵

This design allows us to carefully estimate the causal effect of the pension reform on worker retention, addressing a key question in our study: How do pension cuts affect labor supply on the extensive margin?

4.1 Evaluating the Regression Discontinuity

The regression discontinuity design produces an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of reform, if two assumptions hold. First, the assignment variable (distance to the threshold)

²⁴Because quadratic specifications require additional degrees of freedom, we sometimes have too few observations to estimate standard errors within the optimal bandwidth. We therefore use twice the IK bandwidth when estimating quadratic models.

²⁵At much larger bandwidths, linear models produce very large estimates suggesting the reform substantially improved retention. Though these are directionally in line with the main estimates, we view their size as the result of specification error, rather than capturing the true effect.

must have a continuous effect on the outcome at the cutoff. This assumption ensures that any discontinuities in the outcome can be attributed to discontinuous treatment rather than to inherent characteristics of the assignment variable. While not directly testable, this assumption is supported in our case by the fact that outcomes evolve smoothly along the assignment variable away from the cutoff.

The second assumption is that no other determinants of the outcome are discontinuous at the cutoff. This assumption guarantees that the treatment is the only factor affecting outcomes at the threshold. In examining education and pension legislation in Texas, we find no other laws or reforms that rely on the same or similar cutoff rules (i.e., age 50, 25 years of service, or the rule of 70) to determine benefits during work or in retirement. The primary remaining concern in this context is the possibility that workers manipulate their placement around the threshold. Manipulation of the assignment variable can threaten the validity of the design because it introduces a discontinuity in *unobservable* characteristics driven by selection at the cutoff.

But manipulation in our setting is especially unlikely. First, it would represent deliberate and discoverable fraud. Age and year of experience are easily verifiable through records already available to the employer, making falsification both difficult and risky for workers. Second, we find empirical evidence against manipulation. If workers were able to manipulate their assignment variable to avoid the reform, we would expect to see an excess mass of workers on the favorable side of the threshold, and a deficit on the unfavorable side (McCrary, 2008).²⁶ We present the density of workers around the cutoff in Figure 2. The distribution is smooth, including at the threshold, suggesting there was no measurable manipulation of the running variable into treatment or control.

Together, these facts imply our setting can produce unbiased estimates of the reform’s effect.

²⁶Alternatively, the Texas legislature could have chosen the exact cutoffs to benefit particular sub-populations of education workers. The fact that they simply chose round numbers (50, 25, 70) suggests this was not the case.

4.2 Retention Estimates from the Discontinuity

This subsection presents our estimates of the reform’s effect on worker retention, leveraging the regression discontinuity design. We begin by visualizing retention rates around the cutoff, then provide formal estimates for various retention horizons, and conclude with robustness checks.

Figure 3 presents worker retention as a function of a worker’s distance to the threshold. We observe small retention increases on the reform side of the cutoff.

To quantify the effects and assess their statistical significance, we turn to formal RDD estimation in Table 2. Our analysis considers multiple measures of retention: whether a worker is retained for at least 1 year, at least 5 years, at least 10 years, and at least 15 years (the longest period allowed by the time elapsed since the reform). To generate a cumulative measure of retention rates, we calculate the *mean* retention rate over 15 years for each worker we observe in the reform year.²⁷ These varied measures allow us to examine both short- and long-term effects of the reform on worker retention.

The discontinuity estimates reflect the effect of the reform for workers near the cutoff. The point estimates are positive, suggesting the reform increased retention rates. Local linear estimates suggest that the reform increased five-year retention by 2.9 percentage points (3.4 percent of the local retention rate) and ten-year retention by 1.9 percentage points (3.6 percent), both significant at the 0.001 level.

To explore the sensitivity of our results to bandwidth selection, we present estimates at a range of bandwidths—from two to twenty around the threshold—in Appendix Figures A.4 and A.5. The linear estimates are robust to reductions or expansions in bandwidth. The optimal bandwidth tends to be conservative, with larger estimates at both narrower and broader bandwidths. For all bandwidth selections, estimates are positive and highly significant in the linear model. For quadratic models, the estimates are also stable across a range of bandwidths, with each estimate being small. In the sample of teachers, quadratic estimates are usually not significant. In the sample of all workers, quadratic estimates are

²⁷Specifically, we count how many years they work after the reform and divide by the number of possible years they could have worked, which is 15.

all positive and half are significant at the five percent level, presumably from additional power.

To further explore the dynamics of the impact, we examine year-by-year retention effects in Appendix Figure A.3 where we present estimated retention effects each year after the reform. Effects are close to zero in the first few years, after which the reform increases retention and the effect remains at about 2 percentage points from five to eleven years post reform.

These are also the years in which early retirement was heavily penalized for teachers near the threshold. The average worker at the cutoff was 49.4 years old when the reform took place. Thus, five to eleven years after the reform, these workers were between 54.4 and 60.4 years old—ages when early retirement was attractive in the old regime but heavily penalized under the new one. The reform’s effects fade after eleven years, becoming insignificant at the longest durations. Over the full 15-year window, the reform increased retention by an average of 1.2 percentage points (2.2 percent), significant at the 0.001 level, implying careers extended by 2.4 months on average.²⁸ In the quadratic specification, estimates suggest the reform increased five-year retention by 2.4 percentage points, with 95-percent confidence intervals ruling out any attrition effects at five years.

It is suggestive that the retention effects appear in exactly those years early retirement is cut. We would ideally test this explanation further by comparing teachers who qualified for early retirement to those who did not, but this comparison is not possible in our setting. Teachers qualify for early retirement at age 55 with just 5 years of experience, meaning virtually everyone around our threshold qualifies for early retirement five years later.

To further assess the validity of our results, we conduct placebo tests and use them to estimate a difference-in-discontinuity design. The placebo estimates help evaluate whether unobservables may introduce bias in the design. We estimate the RDD as if the reform took place in 2000, five years before its actual implementation. These placebo estimates reveal that unobservables or specification error tend to bias the estimates *against* our findings, with opposite-signed retention estimates at 5 and 10 years. The opposite sign estimates

²⁸We find the same number when calculating the effect year by year and summing across years.

indicate that any bias would lead us to underestimate the true positive effect of the reform on retention, making our main results somewhat conservative.

The difference-in-discontinuity estimates (DDRD), present the difference between the baseline estimates and the placebos, presented in Appendix Table A1. They indicate that our baseline estimates are robust, and if anything the true effect may be also larger than found in the RDD. The estimates from the DDRD at 5 years are larger than the baseline estimates (7.7 percentage points instead of 2.9), and the effects at 10 years are also larger than baseline (2.5 percentage points instead of 1.9). Notably, our baseline estimates showed an initial reduction in retention associated with the reform. This also appears in the placebo, suggesting that the initial decrease is an artifact of specification error rather than the true effect.

5 The Effect of Reform on Worker Output

We next examine the reform’s effect on worker output, measured as unexpected gains in student achievement.²⁹ Understanding the impact of pension reform on worker output is helpful for policymakers who are attempting to balance fiscal health with the quality of public services. This is especially true in schools where teacher performance significantly affects human capital formation in children, with far-reaching consequences (Chetty et al., 2011; Petek and Pope, 2023).

Theory offers conflicting predictions on how such a reform will affect worker performance. Two models predict that pay cuts will reduce effort. First, the classic Akerlof model proposes that the labor markets can be understood as a system of gift exchange between employers and employees (Akerlof, 1982). Because of reciprocity motives or notions of fairness, workers respond to compensation with proportional effort. Morale models have the same basic prediction. Generous payments improve worker morale which in turn elicits greater effort and dedication. The inverse is that, when compensation is cut for any reason, workers are predicted to scale back their effort accordingly (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Fehr et al.,

²⁹That is, gains not predicted by past performance and demographics. This approach allows us to isolate the impact of the reform from other factors that influence student performance.

1993; Mas, 2006). In fact, fear of damaging morale is the most commonly cited rationale for nominal wage rigidity (Campbell III and Kamlani, 1997; Bewley, 1998).

Conversely, some models predict the reform may increase effort in schools by penalizing early retirement. First, the human capital investment model suggests that workers facing a longer career horizon may invest more in their skills and knowledge, leading to increased productivity (Becker, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967). Second, shirking models argue that by increasing the cost of job loss or workplace conflict, the reform may reduce shirking and encourage greater effort (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Lazear, 1979b; Stock and Wise, 1990; Coile and Gruber, 2007). These two models suggest that, despite effectively reducing compensation, the pension reform could counterintuitively increase worker effort and improve outcomes. Unrelated to effort, the reform could improve output by increasing teacher retention which builds the stock of experience (Wiswall, 2013; Papay and Kraft, 2015), and by reducing the organizational disruption and instability that turnover itself creates in schools (Ronfeldt et al., 2013).

To test these competing theoretical predictions empirically and estimate the impact of the pension reform on worker output, we employ a quasi-experimental research design that leverages variation in reform exposure across grades within a school.

5.1 Exploiting Idiosyncratic Variation in Reform Exposure

Our identification strategy leverages quasi-experimental variation in student exposure to reform-affected teachers. We exploit idiosyncratic differences in exposure across grades within the same school, which naturally arise from the distribution of teacher age and experience across grades. This variation is plausibly exogenous, as it is unlikely that students sort into specific grades within a school based on teachers' reform exposure, age, or experience. This allows us to compare the performance of grades with different exposures to the reform in the same school, using a difference-in-differences design.

Our approach enables causal inference of the reform's effect while controlling for various potential confounding factors. Leveraging variation across schools, grades, and time, we implement an exacting triple-difference specification. This method allows for precise within-

school comparisons while carefully controlling for secular trends that differ by school and grade. We formalize this approach in equation 3:

$$A_{isgt} = \pi T_{sgt} + \beta(T_{sgt} \times post) + g(A_{isg,t-1}) + \Gamma X_{isgt} + \alpha_{st} + \gamma_{gt} + \delta_{gs} + \varepsilon_{sgt} \quad (3)$$

In this equation, A_{isgt} represents the achievement of student i in school s and grade g at time t . We normalize A_{isgt} to have mean zero and standard deviation one, allowing coefficients to describe effects in easily interpretable student standard deviations. The treatment exposure, measured by T_{sgt} , ranges from 0 to 1 and reflects the proportion of teachers in each school-grade cell exposed to the reform. A value of 0 indicates all the teachers in the cell were grandfathered (not subject to the reform), while 1 indicates all teachers were exposed to the reform.

While recent literature has highlighted challenges with staggered difference-in-differences designs (Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2021), our setting does not face these concerns because all treatment occurs at a single point in time. The reform was implemented simultaneously across all affected teachers in 2005, meaning there is no dynamic treatment timing where earlier-treated units serve as controls for later-treated units. This allows us to use a standard difference-in-differences framework without the complications that arise in settings with staggered exposure.

To calculate this exposure measure, we use detailed staffing data that capture the time allocation of teachers across different grades and subjects. This granular approach is necessary because teaching assignments vary: some teachers specialize in math or reading, while others cover both subjects or spread their time across multiple grades. We first compute the reform exposure for each individual teacher. We then aggregate teacher exposure to the school-grade level, weighting each teacher by the proportion of time she spends in that specific grade and subject.³⁰ In our analytic sample, the average student has a reform exposure of 53 percent in math (standard deviation: 37 percent) and 49 percent in reading

³⁰For instance, a full-time third-grade math teacher exposed to the reform contributes more to the cell’s treatment intensity than a math teacher who splits her time evenly between two grades or one who also teaches reading.

(standard deviation: 36 percent). The support in each ranges from 0 percent to 100 percent.

The coefficient of interest is β , which captures the effect of the reform on student achievement in terms of student standard deviations. The coefficient π tests for parallel pre-trends by measuring whether eventual reform exposure predicts achievement trends before the reform was enacted. We find π is statistically and economically insignificant, indicating that treatment and control groups followed parallel trends prior to reform. This supports the key identifying assumption that the control group provides a valid counterfactual.

The equation includes several other components. The term $g(A_{isg,t-1})$ represents a cubic polynomial of students' prior achievement, which explains a substantial share of the variation in current achievement and significantly improves the precision of our estimates. The component X_{isgt} is a vector of student-level controls, including indicators for sex, ethnicity, ESL (English as a Second Language), and low-income status, all interacted with grade. We also incorporate a comprehensive set of fixed effects: α_{st} , γ_{gt} , and δ_{gs} represent school-year, grade-year, and grade-school fixed effects, respectively. These allow us to account not just for differences across schools, grades, and years individually, but also for the unique combinations of school-year, school-grade, and grade-year (see [Hendricks, 2014](#)).

Our approach allows us to control for stable unobservable differences across treatment groups while simultaneously adjusting for changes in common unobservable factors over time. We achieve this by using control cells—those completely shielded from the reform—as a benchmark. The coefficient β thus captures the differential change in achievement post-reform between treatment and control cells. Essentially, it quantifies how much more (or less) achievement changed in reform-exposed cells compared to unexposed ones.

The treatment share of a cell T_{sgt} may change endogenously over time due to teacher turnover or strategic staffing decisions in response to the reform. To address this potential endogeneity, we instrument the post-reform exposure share with the predicted exposure share based on teacher compositions in 2004, the year before the reform was announced and implemented. We denote this instrument as $T_{sg,2004}$. Intuitively, the policy was not known in 2004, making the allocation of reform exposure across school-grade cells based on 2004 staffing plausibly exogenous. This method isolates the exogenous portion of the variation

in post-reform exposure.

Our instrument demonstrates considerable strength in the first stage. When predicting reform exposure post-reform, we observe F-statistics of 2,488 for math and 1,702 for reading, both well above the conventional threshold of 10 or 20 (Stock and Yogo, 2005). We implement the instrument using two approaches: a reduced form, to estimate an intent-to-treat effect of the reform on student achievement, and a two-stage least squares approach to estimate the local average treatment effect.

The reduced form is estimated:

$$A_{isgt} = \beta(T_{sg,2004} \times post) + g(A_{isg,t-1}) + \Gamma X_{isgt} + \alpha_{st} + \gamma_{gt} + \delta_{gs} + \varepsilon_{sgt} \quad (4)$$

In this equation, $T_{sg,2004}$ represents the school-grade's exposure to the reform based on its teacher composition in 2004. The coefficient β captures the intent-to-treat effect, measuring the impact of being assigned treatment in 2004. It's important to note that because the instrument doesn't vary over time, we cannot estimate the placebo effect of the reform prior to its implementation when using school-grade fixed effects. All other components of the equation remain as previously defined.

We also implement the instrument using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. The first and second stages are represented by the following equations:

$$\widehat{T_{sgt} \times post} = \rho T_{sg,2004} + \theta(T_{sg,2004} \times post) + f(A_{isg,t-1}) + \Lambda X_{isgt} + \mu_{st} + \nu_{gt} + \xi_{gs} + \eta_{sgt} \quad (5)$$

$$A_{isgt} = \pi T_{sgt} + \beta(\widehat{T_{sgt} \times post}) + g(A_{isg,t-1}) + \Gamma X_{isgt} + \alpha_{st} + \gamma_{gt} + \delta_{gs} + \varepsilon_{sgt} \quad (6)$$

Equations 5 and 6 formalize our two-stage least squares approach. In the first stage, we use exposure share in 2004 interacted with the post-reform indicator as an instrument for the potentially endogenous treatment shares observed after the reform. The second stage then uses these predicted values to estimate the causal effect of treatment shares. In this framework, the coefficient β captures the local average treatment effect (LATE) of reform exposure, providing a causal estimate of the reform's impact on student achievement. This

approach allows us to address potential endogeneity concerns and isolate the causal effect of reform.

5.2 Estimated Effect on Output

In Table 4, we present the resulting estimates of how reform affected math achievement, where math achievement is usually found to be more responsive to intervention and more predictive of adult outcomes. We present results from three estimation strategies: Ordinary least squares (OLS, equation 3); reduced form (RF, equation 4); and two-stage least squares (2SLS, equations 5 and 6)

5.2.1 OLS Estimates:

Columns (1) and (2) present OLS estimates based on equation (3). Full exposure to the reform is associated with an increase in student math achievement of 0.033 student standard deviations, significant at the 0.001 level. Importantly, the relationship between reform exposure and achievement gains *before* the reform is small, insignificant, and of the opposite sign. This implies that reform exposure is not correlated with unobserved factors before the reform and the parallel trends assumption likely holds. When controlling for experience, the estimate decreases by 30% to 0.024 (still significant at 0.001), suggesting that up to 30 percent of the OLS estimate is mediated by changes in teacher experience.

5.2.2 Reduced Form Estimates:

Columns (3) and (4) present the intent-to-treat estimates from the reduced form. Full treatment of a grade is associated with an improvement in math achievement of 0.014 student standard deviations after the reform (significant at 0.010). Here, we cannot estimate the relationship between the instrument and the outcome before the reform because the instrument is constant over time. When we control for experience, the estimate falls by 7 percent, indicating that changes in experience composition mediate a small portion of the reduced form effect.

5.2.3 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates:

Columns (5) and (6) present the 2SLS estimates. The first stage shows that a fully treated school-grade would have, on average, 23 percentage points more treatment exposure in the post-reform period. The 2SLS estimates indicate that full treatment would improve math achievement by 0.043 student standard deviations after the reform (significant at 0.001), an effect about as large as removing a low performing teacher from a school-grade (Chetty et al., 2014a). These estimates are not statistically different from the OLS estimates. Reassuringly, we find small, opposite signed “effects” of the reform before it is implemented, implying that the reform was orthogonal to unobserved factors affecting achievement. Controlling for experience reduces the estimated effect by about 10 percent.

Across specifications, we find consistent evidence that the reform positively impacted math achievement, with experience playing a small role in mediating the effect.

We next examine its effect on reading achievement. The estimated effects of the reform on reading skills can be found in table A4. These estimates follow a similar pattern to those for math—they are consistently positive—but they are smaller in magnitude. OLS implies a 0.013 student standard deviation effect in reading (significant at the 1 percent level). The RF estimates generate a similar 0.010 student standard deviation effect (also significant at 1 percent); 2SLS yields a larger but less precise estimate than OLS. These results align with prior work finding that math achievement is more sensitive to school interventions than reading (Rivkin et al., 2005; Chetty et al., 2014a).

5.3 Discussion of Achievement Mechanisms

While some of the achievement increase is explained by retention, most stems from other channels—potentially increased effort, reduced turnover disruptions, or favorable composition effects. We consider each. Composition effects through selective retention are unlikely to explain the bulk of achievement gains for three reasons.

First, since the retention effect is quite small (1.2 percentage points over fifteen years), the rise in achievement would require extremely large value-add (VA) differences between

staying and leaving teachers. For instance, for composition to explain the increase in achievement, a 1.2 point retention effect would need to change *average* teacher VA by 40 percent of a standard deviation.³¹ This would require teachers retained by the reform to be an implausible 30+ standard deviations more effective than those who would have otherwise left.³²

Second, when estimating dynamic effects, we observe the increase in achievement immediately, before the retention effects appear and before substantial changes in teacher composition are possible (see Appendix Table A5). Third, prior work suggests that early retirement tends to induce retirement among similar or *less* effective teachers, which would predict either no composition effect or one opposite to the effect we find (Koedel et al., 2013; Bates and Johnston, 2024; Fitzpatrick and Lovenheim, 2014). Ideally, we would examine selection directly using value-added measures. Unfortunately, Texas began tracking student-teacher assignments only several years after the reform, making value-added estimation impossible to calculate for leaving teachers. This limitation prevents us from directly examining heterogeneous retention effects by teacher effectiveness.

We turn to increased effort and reduced disruption from turnover as potential channels explaining the achievement increase. Prior work shows that turnover itself can harm student achievement by disrupting school operations and teacher collaboration (Ronfeldt et al., 2013). Lower rates of turnover in reform-affected cells may thus contribute to greater student gains. An additional mechanism operates through teacher effort: the reform’s longer work horizons increased teachers’ incentives to invest in their skills (Becker, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Lazear, 1979b; Stock and Wise, 1990; Coile and Gruber, 2007). While we lack direct effort measures like teacher absences, the effort-based explanation is especially plausible since it only requires small increases in effort across the entire population of reform-affected teachers.

³¹This calculation assumes that a 1 standard deviation increase in teacher value added causes a 0.1 student standard deviation in achievement (Chetty et al., 2014a).

³²This is a gap so large that finding even one such teacher 30 SDs from the mean would require a sample many times larger than the number of people who have ever lived. To spell out the math, a 1.2 percentage point increase in retention would need to retain teachers who are $0.4 \div .012 \approx 33.3$ standard deviations more effective than those who leave to generate the needed 0.4 SD increase in average teacher value-added. This calculation actually understates the implausibility, since the retention effects are concentrated among retirement-eligible teachers, making the total effect on workforce composition even smaller.

6 Conclusion

In response to mounting pension liabilities, every state in the U.S. has implemented pension reforms to reduce costs by cutting benefits. We examine the effect of a representative reform on worker retention and output. This reform grandfathered some workers based on their age and experience, while subjecting others to a new regime that cut annuities and heavily penalized early retirement. Our study leverages the threshold determining reform exposure to provide careful treatment and control comparisons. Our setting and empirical design offer several advantages.

First, the variation in pension regimes is credibly exogenous, as the policy altered workers' pension based on attributes they could not control. Second, the setting provides a tidy comparison group of similar workers unaffected by the reform, allowing us to compare workers where the only difference is their pension scheme.³³ Third, the public-school context provides large administrative data on retention through staffing records. Fourth, unlike many settings where worker productivity is difficult to observe, schools offer some of the best large-scale productivity measures available in any profession.

Theory offers mixed predictions for both the effect of the reform on retention and output. The reform reduces the continuation value of employment, potentially decreasing retention, but also penalizes early retirement, encouraging retention. Our discontinuity estimates reveal small positive effects on worker retention, particularly in years when the reform penalizes early retirement.

Theoretical predictions about the reform's effect on worker output are similarly ambiguous. While classic predictions suggest that pay cuts harm morale and depresses effort, other theories propose three mechanisms for *increased* worker output. One, the reform extends the expected career horizon by making early retirement less attractive, encouraging greater investment in workplace skills. Two, the reform reduces the outside options for teachers, which discourages shirking. Third, the reform may improve productivity by reducing disruptions from turnover.

³³We would encourage future work to examine how pension reforms, like the one considered here, affect the choice of individuals to enter the teaching profession.

We measure the empirical effect by exploiting variation in reform exposure across grades within a school. Students in grades with higher reform exposure show better performance, with fully-exposed grades scoring 0.03 student standard deviations higher in math and 0.01 student standard deviations higher in reading. Controlling for changes in teacher experience accounts for up to 30 percent of the effect, and we argue that effort and reduced turnover disruption likely contribute much to the remainder.

The results offer a rare opportunity to examine similar workers working in the same setting who yet were part of different pension regimes. They suggest that carefully designed pension reforms can maintain or potentially improve both retention and productivity.

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
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
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Figure 1: Pension Generosity by Age and Years of Service, Pre- and Post-Reform




(a) Pension Generosity Pre-Reform



(b) Pension Generosity Post-Reform


Notes: These heat maps illustrate pension annuity generosity before and after the reform. The x-axis represents years of service (0-40), the y-axis represents age (25-65), and the color intensity indicates the pension annuity generosity as a share of final salary (0-89%). Darker green areas represent age-experience combinations with higher pension annuities. Before the reform, early retirement was generous with minimal penalties for claiming early at age 55 with 20 years of experience. After the reform, early retirements were heavily penalized, as evident from the lighter green. The grey line represents the optimal retirement age to maximize the present value of the lifetime pension, conditional on years of service. The grey line is actually three identical lines calculated using discount rates of 3, 5, and 7 percent. The optimal retirement age is identical across all three discount rates. Pre-reform, teachers with 20–25 years of experience maximized benefits by claiming at age 55. After, they maximized by waiting until full-retirement. The upside-down pyramid shape of pension generosity results from the rule of 80, where age plus years of service must equal 80 for full retirement. This creates a diagonal boundary where more years of service reduce the required retirement age.

Figure 2: Teacher Density around the Pension Grandfathering Cutoff




Note: This figure presents the density of teachers around the grandfathering cutoff for the pension reform. The x-axis represents the distance from the cutoff in years, with negative values indicating teachers below the cutoff (not grandfathered) and positive values above (grandfathered). The y-axis shows the density of teachers at each point. An excess mass on the favorable side of the discontinuity would signal manipulation of the running variable, potentially compromising the validity of the regression discontinuity design. We detect no such manipulation, as evidenced by the smooth distribution around the cutoff. Source: Administrative data from Texas Education Agency.

Figure 3: Regression Discontinuity Plots of Teacher Retention Rates



(a) Five-Year Retention



(b) Ten-Year Retention

Notes: These figures show the results of a regression discontinuity design (RDD) analysis examining teacher retention rates 5 and 10 years after the reform. The x-axis represents the distance to the grandfathering cutoff, with negative values indicating teachers below the cutoff (not grandfathered) and positive values above (grandfathered). The vertical dashed line at zero marks the cutoff point. The y-axis shows the share of teachers retained at different time intervals. Panel A shows five-year retention rates around the grandfathering cutoff, and Panel B shows the same for ten-year retention.

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Teacher-Level Variables for Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Teacher Retention

	(1) Mean	(2) SD	(3) N
Age	42.19	11.19	309,853
Experience	11.45	9.663	309,853
Here in 1yr	0.907	0.291	309,853
Here in 5yrs	0.746	0.435	309,853
Here in 10yrs	0.565	0.496	309,853
Here in 15yrs	0.439	0.496	309,853
Distance	-6.596	10.69	309,853
Grandfathered	0.327	0.469	309,853
Teacher	1.000	0.000	309,853
Base Pay	\$41,503	\$8,433	309,853
Other Pay	\$1,366	\$2,510	309,853
Bachelors	0.942	0.234	309,853
Masters	0.232	0.422	309,853

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the analytic sample, focusing on public school teachers in Texas observed in the year of the pension reform. Column (1) shows the mean values, column (2) the standard deviations, and column (3) the number of observations. The sample includes 309,853 teachers, with variables covering demographics, retention rates over various time horizons, pension reform status, and educational qualifications. “Distance” refers to the teacher’s position relative to the grandfathering cutoff, with negative values indicating teachers not grandfathered into the old pension system. Source: Administrative data from Texas Education Agency.

Table 2: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Retention Effects among Teachers

	(1) Retained ≥1 year	(2) Retained ≥5 years	(3) Retained ≥10 years	(4) Retained ≥15 years	(5) Average Ret. Rate
<i>Linear Controls</i>					
Reform (RDD)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.019** (0.006)	0.004 (0.004)	0.0102*** (0.0014)
Bandwidth	2.76	3.72	3.67	3.91	3.43
<i>Quadratic Controls</i>					
Reform (RDD)	0.001 (0.006)	0.024* (0.008)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.0034 (0.0060)
Bandwidth	5.52	7.44	7.33	7.83	6.86
Mean DV (at cutoff)	0.953	0.859	0.513	0.211	0.623
Observations	309,860	309,860	309,860	309,860	309,860

Notes: This table presents the regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates of the effect of pension reform on teacher retention. The analysis examines retention rates for periods of ≥ 1 , ≥ 5 , ≥ 10 , and ≥ 15 years, as well as the average retention rate overall. We use a triangular kernel. Results are shown for both linear and quadratic control functions, using IK-optimal bandwidth for linear and twice-optimal for quadratic specifications. We present the constant (Mean DV at cutoff) so that the reader can gauge the size of each effect relative to the counterfactual. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: Summary Statistics of Student-Level Variables for Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Teacher Productivity

Variable	Mean	SD	N
observation year	2006.6	3.335	11,300,719
math percentile	50.87	28.54	11,300,719
read percentile	49.64	28.76	8,199,421
math percentile, z-score	0.000	1.000	11,300,719
read percentile, z-score	-0.00	1.000	8,199,421
reform exposure - math	0.530	0.331	11,300,719
reform exposure - reading	0.518	0.314	8,199,421
exposure instrument - math	0.530	0.369	11,300,719
exposure instrument - reading	0.489	0.356	8,199,421
student grade	6.421	1.369	11,300,719
female student share	0.503	0.500	11,300,719
black student share	0.140	0.347	11,300,719
white student share	0.392	0.488	11,300,719
Hispanic student share	0.429	0.495	11,300,719
low-income share	0.592	0.492	11,300,719
English as a Second Language share	0.054	0.226	11,300,719

Note: This table presents summary statistics for student-level variables used in the difference-in-differences analysis of teacher productivity following the 2005 Texas pension reform. “Reform exposure” refers to the share teachers in a student’s school-grade affected by the reform. “Exposure instrument” is based on pre-reform staff compositions in the student’s school-grade. Percentile scores are within-grade ranks based on state-wide test performance. Z-scores are standardized versions of these percentiles. Demographic variables refer to individual student characteristics. N represents the number of student-year observations. The smaller sample size for reading scores is due to some grades not administering standardized reading tests.


Table 4: Triple-Difference Estimates of Worker Output – Math Achievement

	Math achievement (student standard deviations)					
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	RF (3)	RF (4)	2SLS (5)	2SLS (6)
Reform exposure x post	0.033*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.005)			0.043*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.010)
Reform exposure	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)			-0.011 (0.006)	-0.014* (0.007)
Instrument x post			0.014** (0.005)	0.014** (0.005)		
First stage					0.232*** (0.0004)	0.227*** (0.0004)
Adjusted R-squared	0.658	0.658	0.658	0.658	0.658	0.658
Observations	11,300,719	11,300,719	11,300,719	11,300,719	11,300,719	11,300,719
Lag-score polynomial	X	X	X	X	X	X
School-year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
School-grade FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Grade-year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Experience controls		X		X		X


Notes: This table presents triple-difference estimates of the pension reform's effect on worker output, measured by student gains in math achievement. (Estimates for reading can be found in Appendix Table A4.) The outcome variable is normalized student math scores (mean zero, standard deviation one), and the treatment variable describes what share of a school-grade cell was exposed to the reform. The controls in these specifications include a cubic polynomial of the student's past math scores and demanding triple-difference controls (school-year FE, school-grade FE, and grade-year FE). We also present estimates controlling for experience, to show how much of the output effect is explained by retention. Columns (1) and (2) show OLS estimates, regressing student achievement on student's reform exposure $\times$ post. Due to potential endogeneity in teacher grade assignments and retention, we instrument exposure using each school-grade's exposure in 2004-2005, the year before the reform's announcement and implementation. Columns (3) and (4) present reduced form estimates, using the instrument as the treatment measure, providing intent-to-treat estimates. Columns (5) and (6) present two-stage least squares estimates, instrumenting post-reform exposure with pre-reform exposure. Columns (2), (4), and (6) additionally control for experience shares in each school-grade cell over time to investigate the role of retention in mediating achievement effects. These experience controls indicate what fraction of the school-grade's teachers are in each experience decile each year. Standard errors are clustered by school-grade cells. The results suggest positive effects of the reform on math achievement, with the 2SLS estimates showing a significant increase of 0.039–0.043 student standard deviations in student math scores post-reform. These effects persist after controlling for teacher experience, indicating that improved retention does not explain most of the positive impact. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.010$, *** $p < 0.001$.

A Additional Exhibits

Figure A.1: Pension Wealth Returns to an Additional Year of Service, Pre- and Post-Reform




(a) Pension Wealth Returns to Employment Pre-Reform



(b) Pension Wealth Returns to Employment Post-Reform


Notes: These figures illustrate the incremental pension wealth accrual for workers from an additional year of service, before and after the pension reform. The x-axis represents years of service (0-40), while the y-axis shows the percentage increase in pension wealth for working from an additional year of employment, denominated as a share of final salary. Three lines are presented, each representing different discount rates used in calculating the present value of pension wealth: the black line represents the returns assuming a 3 percent discount rate (max_PDV_slope); the slate represents a 5 percent rate; the light grey represents a 7 percent rate. The first figure shows the return-to-experience profile pre-reform, where there is a significant spike in pension wealth accrual at 20 years, when workers qualify for early retirement. The second figure shows the return profile after the reform. The early retirement spike has been eliminated.

Figure A.2: Teacher Retention Rates Relative to Grandfathering Cutoff




Note: This figure illustrates the retention rates of public school teachers in Texas over various time horizons following the reform. The x-axis represents the distance from the cutoff in years, with negative values indicating teachers below the cutoff (not grandfathered) and positive values above (grandfathered). The vertical dashed line at 0 marks the cutoff point. The y-axis shows the share of teachers retained. Each dot represents the average retention rate for teachers at a specific distance from the cutoff. The four series correspond to different retention periods: 1 year (top series), 5 years, 10 years, and 15 years (bottom line), showing lower retention rates over longer periods. Source: Administrative data from Texas Education Agency.

Figure A.3: Effect over Time




(a) Year-by-Year Estimates




(b) Total Retention Profiles

Note: This figure shows the estimated effect of the reform on retention (measured in percentage points) at various years after implementation. We estimate the RDD with a triangular kernel and independent linear terms on either side of the threshold within the optimal bandwidth. Points represent point estimates, with vertical bars indicating 95% confidence intervals. The effects are indistinguishable from zero immediately after the reform, grow to approximately 2 percentage points from five years after the reform through eleven years after the reform, and then shrink back to approximately zero. Panel (b) shows retention rates over time for two groups at the threshold: grandfathered workers (solid navy line) and reform-affected workers (dashed red line). The difference between these lines represents the reform effect shown in panel (a). Source: Administrative data from Texas Education Agency.


Figure A.4: Assessing Bandwidth Selection among Teachers




(a) Linear Model, Average Retention



(b) Linear Model, Ten-Year Retention




(c) Quadratic Model, Average Retention




(d) Quadratic Model, Ten-Year Retention

Note: These figures show how the estimated effect of the reform on teacher retention vary with bandwidth choice. The base bandwidth choice is indicated by a vertical dashed line. The black triangles represent point estimates and the blue triangles show confidence intervals. All estimates use a triangular kernel. Panels (a) and (b) use linear terms on either side of the threshold, while (c) and (d) use quadratic. Panels (a) and (c) show effects on average retention odds, while (b) and (d) show effects on ten-year retention rates. The y-axis represents the estimated effect of the reform on the respective retention measure. Linear models show wider variation in estimates across bandwidths. Quadratic models display more consistent estimates, fluctuating around zero for both retention measures. Source: Administrative data from Texas Education Agency.


Figure A.5: Assessing Bandwidth Selection among All Workers




(a) Linear Model, Average Retention



(b) Linear Model, Ten-Year Retention




(c) Quadratic Model, Average Retention



(d) Quadratic Model, Ten-Year Retention

Note: These figures show how the estimated effect of the reform on all-worker retention vary with bandwidth choice. The base bandwidth choice is indicated by a vertical dashed line. The black triangles represent point estimates and the blue triangles show confidence intervals. All estimates use a triangular kernel. Panels (a) and (b) use linear terms on either side of the threshold, while (c) and (d) use quadratic. Panels (a) and (c) show effects on average retention odds, while (b) and (d) show effects on ten-year retention rates. The y-axis represents the estimated effect of the reform on the respective retention measure. Linear models show wider variation in estimates across bandwidths. Quadratic models display more consistent estimates, about half of which are significant at the 5% level. For linear models, estimates are consistent for bandwidths 3–7 (average retention) and 3–8 (ten-year retention). Source: Administrative data from Texas Education Agency.

Figure A.6: Distribution of Reform Exposure in Reading and Mathematics



Note: These histograms display the distribution of reform exposure for teachers in reading (left panel) and mathematics (right panel). The x-axis represents the share of a school-grade's teachers exposed to the reform based on 2004 teacher assignments. The values range from 0 (no exposure) to 1 (full career exposure). The y-axis shows the density of teachers at each exposure level. Values are rounded to the nearest 0.05 to prevent small-cell disclosures. Both distributions exhibit similar patterns. Source: Administrative data from Texas Education Agency.

Table A1: Placebo RD and Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates among Teachers

	(1) Retained ≥1 year	(2) Retained ≥5 years	(3) Retained ≥10 years	(4) Retained ≥15 years	(5) Average Ret. Rate
Treatment RD	-0.002*** (0.0001)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.019** (0.006)	0.004 (0.004)	0.010*** (0.001)
Placebo RD	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.048*** (0.010)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.005** (0.002)
Difference-in-RD	0.001 (0.001)	0.077*** (0.011)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.009* (0.006)	0.005* (0.002)

Notes: This table presents regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates of the effect of pension reform on teacher retention. The columns provide estimates for different periods of retention. The estimates indicate the increased probability associated with reform at the cutoff. The first row shows the baseline estimates. The second row shows placebo estimates when pretending the reform took place in 2000, five years before the policy. In the third row of each panel, we present the difference-in-discontinuity design (DDRD) estimates which is the first row subtracted by the second row. All estimates use a local-linear specification with a triangular kernel. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2: Summary Statistics of School Employees for Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Worker Retention

	(1) Mean	(2) SD	(3) N
Age	44.20	11.41	620,508
Experience	8.035	9.808	620,508
Here in 1yr	0.883	0.322	620,508
Here in 5yrs	0.696	0.460	620,508
Here in 10yrs	0.508	0.500	620,508
Here in 15yrs	0.377	0.485	620,508
Distance	-4.842	10.83	620,508
Grandfathered	0.373	0.484	620,508
Teacher	0.499	0.500	620,508
Base pay	\$33,492	\$16,876	620,508
Other pay	\$949	\$2,076	620,508
Bachelors	0.568	0.495	620,508
Masters	0.182	0.386	620,508

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the analytic sample, which includes all workers observed in the year of the pension reform ($N = 620,508$). “Distance” reflects years until pension eligibility, with negative values indicating years before eligibility. “Grandfathered” indicates the share of workers exempted from the new pension regime by grandfathering. “Here in X yrs” describes the retention rate after X years. Pay is reported in nominal dollars. Education levels (Bachelors, Masters) represent the highest degree attained.

Table A3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Retention Effects including All Workers

	(1) Retained ≥1 year	(2) Retained ≥5 years	(3) Retained ≥10 years	(4) Retained ≥15 years	(5) Average Ret. Rate
<i>Linear Controls</i>					
Reform (RDD)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	0.0120*** (0.0011)
Bandwidth	2.77	3.70	3.61	3.60	3.25
<i>Quadratic Controls</i>					
Reform (RDD)	0.000 (0.006)	0.016* (0.005)	0.012+ (0.006)	0.000 (0.007)	0.0063 (0.0037)
Bandwidth	5.54	7.39	7.22	7.19	6.49
Mean DV (at cutoff)	0.929	0.809	0.529	0.248	0.549
Observations	620,508	620,508	620,508	620,508	620,508

Notes: This table presents the regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates of the effect of pension reform on worker retention. Columns (1)-(4) show the effect of being retained for at least 1, 5, 10, and 15 years, respectively. Column (5) shows the effect on average retention rates. We use the IK-optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel in the linear specification, and twice the optimal bandwidth for the quadratic specification. We present the constant so the reader can gauge the size of each effect relative to the counterfactual. Other coefficients are omitted to spare clutter. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Output Effects – Reading Achievement

	Reading achievement (student standard deviations)					
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	RF (3)	RF (4)	2SLS (5)	2SLS (6)
Reform exposure x post	0.013** (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)			0.026 (0.009)	0.027 (0.009)
Reform exposure	-0.013 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)			-0.015 (0.006)	-0.015* (0.006)
Instrument x post			0.010** (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)		
First stage					0.239*** (0.0005)	0.239*** (0.0005)
Adjusted R-squared	0.581	0.582	0.581	0.582	0.581	0.582
Observations	8,199,421	8,199,421	8,199,421	8,199,421	8,199,421	8,199,421
Lag-score polynomial	X	X	X	X	X	X
School-year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
School-grade FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Grade-year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Experience controls		X		X		X

Notes: This table presents triple-difference estimates of the pension reform's effect on worker output, measured by student gains in reading achievement. (Estimates for math can be found in Table 4.) The outcome variable is normalized student reading scores (mean zero, standard deviation one), and the treatment variable describes what share of a school-grade cell was exposed to the reform. The controls in these specifications include a cubic polynomial of the student's past reading scores and demanding triple-difference controls (school-year FE, school-grade FE, and grade-year FE). We also present estimates controlling for experience, to show how much of the output effect is explained by retention. Columns (1) and (2) show OLS estimates, regressing student achievement on student's reform exposure $\times$ post. Due to potential endogeneity in teacher grade assignments and retention, we instrument exposure using each school-grade's exposure in 2004-2005, the year before the reform's announcement and implementation. Columns (3) and (4) present reduced form estimates, using the instrument as the treatment measure, providing intent-to-treat estimates. Columns (5) and (6) present two-stage least squares estimates, instrumenting post-reform exposure with pre-reform exposure. Columns (2), (4), and (6) additionally control for experience shares in each school-grade cell over time to investigate the role of retention in mediating achievement effects. These experience controls indicate what fraction of the school-grade's teachers are in each experience decile each year. Standard errors are clustered by school-grade cells. The results suggest usually significant effects of the reform on reading achievement, with the OLS estimates showing a significant increase of 0.012-0.013 student standard deviations in student reading scores post-reform. These effects change little when controlling for teacher experience, indicating that improved retention does not explain most of the positive impact. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.010$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A5: Dynamic Estimates of Reform Effect in Math Achievement

	Math achievement
	(1)
Reform $\times$ Event-time 0	0.025* (0.012)
Reform $\times$ Event-time 1	0.061*** (0.009)
Reform $\times$ Event-time 2	0.037*** (0.010)
Reform $\times$ Event-time 3	0.022*** (0.007)
Reform $\times$ Event-time 4	0.016** (0.005)
Reform $\times$ Event-time 5	0.015*** (0.004)
Reform $\times$ Event-time 6	0.019*** (0.005)
Adjusted R-squared	0.655
Observations	11,300,706

Notes: This table presents dynamic estimates of the pension reform's effect on student math achievement. The outcome variable is normalized student math scores (mean zero, standard deviation one). Each coefficient represents the effect of reform exposure in that event-time year relative to the year before the reform. The specification includes school-year, school-grade, and grade-year fixed effects, as well as a cubic polynomial in lagged achievement scores. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school-grade cells. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.010$, *** $p < 0.001$.