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DREAMING OF LEAVING THE NEST?
IMMIGRATION STATUS AND THE LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF DOCUMENTED

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Dreaming of Leaving the Nest? Immigration Status and the Living Arrangements of DACAmented
Rania Gihleb, Osea Giuntella, and Jakub Lonsky
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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the effects of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) on the living arrangements and housing behavior of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. Using an event-study approach and difference-in-differences (DID) estimates, we compared immigrants above and below eligibility cutoffs and demonstrated that, after the adoption of the policy in June 2012, DACA-eligible immigrants were less likely to live with their parents or in multigenerational households (-12.5%) and more likely to live independently (+15.5%). We also revealed that DACA-eligible immigrants were less likely to live in the same house (-2%) and more likely to quit ethnic enclaves (+8%). Notably, these patterns are not explained by the known effects of DACA on income and employment outcomes. Lower rental costs (-3%) may have facilitated this transition into adulthood and the observed trends in living arrangements. The DACA also led to a decline in marriage rates among DACA-eligible individuals, although we found no evidence of significant effects on cohabitation, divorce, and intermarriage. We also found no evidence of a clear impact on fertility.

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1 Introduction

The percentage of Americans living in multigenerational family households increased by 30% over the last 20 years from 42.4 million in 2000 to 64 million in 2016 (Taylor et al., 2011; Cohn and Passel, 2018). One of the main factors behind the rise in multigenerational living is the growth of foreign-born populations. Immigrants are more likely than native-born citizens to reside in extended families in the same household. Among the foreign-born, 34.2% lived in an extended family arrangement in 2019 and 19.2% among the native-born. Young adults have driven the rise in multigenerational living. Thirteen percent of individuals aged 25-29 were living in a multigenerational household in 1980, this number rose to approximately 32% in 2019.¹

Differences in family structures and living arrangements have been proven to affect the transition into adulthood and marital and fertility patterns (Hall et al., 2019; Gonzales, 2015; Cobb-Clark, 2008; Becker et al., 2005). Changes in living arrangements can have macroeconomic and demographic consequences (Albanesi et al., 2022; Giuliano, 2007). Understanding how policies affect changes in living arrangements is also relevant to debates on policies attempting to increase employment and fertility among young adults. There is a longstanding literature analyzing the effects of economic shocks on co residence (Bitler and Hoynes, 2015; Matsudaira, 2016)) as well as the effects of living arrangements on economic outcomes (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Krolikowski et al., 2020; Kaplan, 2012).

Previous research suggests that cultural preferences and economic constraints explain these differences in living arrangements (Van Hook and Glick, 2007; Chavez, 1990). Furthermore, previous scholars have highlighted how the challenges of international migration and immigrant status play an important role in shaping the family structures and housing behavior of immigrants and shown how undocumented immigrants are less likely to live independently than other groups (Hall et al., 2019). Legal restrictions may leave young

¹See also <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/05/a-record-64-million-americans-live-in-multigenerational-households/> (Accessed on June 7 2022).

undocumented immigrants unable to complete important transitions, leaving them in a “developmental limbo” (Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013; Gonzales, 2015). The economic and social precariousness associated with immigration status can significantly shape family experiences and living arrangements (Van Hook and Glick, 2007) and affect the propensity to actively engage outside ethnic enclaves (Hall et al., 2019). Simultaneously, multi-generational households and proximity to grandparents may help young parents balance work and childcare, pooling resources, etc., (Keene and Batson, 2010; Foster and Kalil, 2007). Furthermore, the threat of being deported, lack of documents and credit history, and lower outside options may reduce undocumented immigrants’ bargaining power in the housing market, limit their mobility, and their ability to live independently (Hall et al., 2019). Thus, changes in immigration policy may have significant effects on the living arrangements and housing behavior of immigrants. We analyzed the effects of the DACA program on the living arrangements of undocumented immigrant youth.

The DACA was approved in June 2012 by President Obama and provided temporary work authorization and deferral from deportation for undocumented, high-school-educated immigrants. Through an executive memorandum, President Obama approved the most important immigration reform since the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. While DACA does not provide a path to citizenship, DACA recipients are allowed to work and are provided with a temporary reprieve from deportation. Previous studies examined the effects of DACA on labor market outcomes, education, and access to care (Pope, 2016; Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2016; Kuka et al., 2020; Giuntella and Lonsky, 2020). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to consider the DACA impact on the living arrangements of young undocumented immigrants, known as “dreamers.”

We rely on discontinuities in the DACA eligibility program and identify the effects of DACA on living arrangements and housing market outcomes using an event-study approach and difference-in-difference (DID) estimates. Specifically, we restricted the analysis to high school graduates aged between 18 and 38 and compared non-citizens who were above and

below the age of 16 when they entered the United States, those who were above and below the age of 30 on June 15, 2012, and those who entered the US before and after 2007. Furthermore, we controlled non-parametrically for DACA eligibility criteria by including fixed effects for an individual’s age, education, and age on arrival in the U.S.

Data were drawn from the American Community Survey. We found that DACA-eligible immigrants were more likely to live on their own (+15.5%), less likely to live in a multi-generational household (-12.5%), less likely to live in the same house as the previous year (-2%), and were living in the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) with a lower percentage of co-ethnics (-8%). These results do not appear to be entirely explained by the impact DACA had on the income and employment of DACA-eligible immigrants, suggesting that other mechanisms such as lower fear of deportation, higher bargaining power in rental housing markets, and lower reliance on the ethnic network may play an important role in shaping the living arrangements of young undocumented immigrants in a critical phase of their life (Hall et al., 2019; Gonzales, 2015). Furthermore, DACA-eligible immigrants were less likely to be married after DACA was approved. While we found no clear evidence of an effect on the likelihood of marrying a US citizen, there is some evidence of a decline in the likelihood of endogamous marriages. We also found no evidence of significant effects on divorce, cohabitation, and fertility. However, the DID estimates also suggest some decline in these outcomes.

If undocumented immigrants face more search frictions and have less bargaining power when searching for accommodation, immigration policy may have significant effects on their housing market outcomes and contribute to explaining changes in the living arrangements of young undocumented immigrants. Previous studies have documented the extent of discrimination faced by racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities in housing markets (Combes et al., 2018; Edelman et al., 2017). Audit studies have revealed that agents and rental housing providers have fewer homes and apartments available to minorities than equally qualified whites (Page, 1995). These forms of discrimination affect search costs and limit housing op-

tions for minorities (Hanson et al., 2016, 2011; Yinger, 1986). Higher rents may deter young undocumented individuals from leaving their parents’ homes, constraining their geographical mobility and contributing to delaying their transition into adulthood. Undocumented immigrants face higher housing market costs Christopher (2020). Higher rental costs may be one of the factors impeding young immigrants from vacating their parents’ houses and living independently. We found that the program increased the ability of DACA recipients to obtain better conditions and lower costs in the housing market. After the introduction of DACA in 2012, DACA-eligible immigrants paid lower rents (-3%). The results hold for the inclusion of housing characteristics, and we found that, in general, all else being equal, DACA-recipients were more likely to live in larger houses or apartments.

Our estimates provided a lower bound (in absolute value) for the intent-to-treat effect of DACA on living arrangements, marital outcomes, and rental housing costs. Given that the U.S. Census estimates that 40% of non-citizens are authorized (Acosta et al., 2014), our estimated effects will be minor (in absolute value) than the intent-to-treat effects of DACA. In addition, not all DACA-eligible individuals applied for and received DACA status. In 2017, the Migration Policy Institute estimated 1,326,000 DACA-eligible individuals. However, as of January 2018, only 682,750 individuals had DACA status.² Based on these estimates, the program participation rate was 52%, suggesting that the treatment of the treated effects could be twice as large as the intent-to-treat effect.

This study relates to four strands of the literature. First, we relate to a set of studies analyzing the effects of immigration policy on the economic and social integration of undocumented immigrants, particularly recent studies analyzing the effects of DACA (Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2016, 2017; Pope, 2016; Kuka et al., 2020; Venkataramani et al., 2017; Giuntella and Lonsky, 2020; Patler et al., 2019; Gunadi, 2020; Hsin and Ortega, 2018). Second, our work contributes to the handful of studies analyzing the role of immigration status in shaping the transition to adulthood and the living arrangements of young undoc-

²See also <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca-profiles> (Accessed on June 7 2022).

umented immigrants (Hall et al., 2019; Van Hook and Glick, 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo, 2019). We also relate to previous works analyzing how recessions and public policies may influence living arrangements Bitler et al. (2006); Bitler and Hoynes (2015). Finally, we relate our findings to the literature on ethnic and racial discrimination in the housing market (Page, 1995). In particular, our analysis of the effects of DACA on rental costs relates to recent work by Christopher (2020) documenting the higher price paid by undocumented renters in the U.S. and demonstrating that sanctuary city policies reduced the housing costs of undocumented renters. Finally, our work relates to recent work analyzing the role of credit constraints in explaining variation in homeownership among undocumented immigrants (Christopher, 2022).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the institutional details and previous work on the effects of DACA, the living arrangements of undocumented immigrants, and the effects of immigration on housing markets. Section 3 describes the study’s data and empirical specifications. The main results are discussed in Section 4. The robustness checks are discussed in Section 5. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.

2 Background

2.1 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)

On June 15, 2012, President Barack Obama announced DACA. In an executive memorandum, the President announced the largest change in immigration policy since the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, 1986). The program aimed to provide an opportunity for approximately 1.7 million qualifying unauthorized immigrants to apply for a two-year renewable reprieve from deportation. The program would provide eligible applicants with work authorization and a temporary social security number but not a path to citizenship. The first application was accepted two months after the announcement on August 15, 2012.

In September 2017, the Trump administration announced the withdrawal of the DACA program. In June 2020, the Supreme Court affirmed that the reasoning for rescission was arbitrary. On January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden reinstated DACA with an executive order.

2.1.1 Eligibility Criteria

To be eligible, applicants had to meet the following seven criteria: (1) no lawful status as of June 15, 2012; (2) under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; (3) entered the U.S. before reaching their 16th Birthday; (4) continuously residing in the U.S. since June 15, 2007; (5) physically present in the U.S. on June 15, 2012, and at the time of applying for DACA; (6) currently in school with high School diploma (or GED), or honorably discharged veterans of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; (7) no convictions for felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors. In addition, applicants must be 15 years or older and pay a processing fee of \$ 495. DACA applicants must provide evidence that they lived in the U.S. at prescribed times, proof of education, and confirmation of their identities. They must also pass a background check, fingerprinting, and other checks that consider their identification of biological features. Applicants do not require legal representation. Officials can revoke DACA protection if individuals pose threats to public safety or national security. Approximately 1,500 people have had their deferral canceled due to a crime, gang-related activity, or admission to such activity. This is less than 0.2% of the total number of people accepted into the program. (Source: Immigration and Customs Enforcement).

2.1.2 DACA benefits

The main benefits of DACA are the deferral of deportation and the working permit. The provision of a temporary social security number allows successful applicants to open a bank account, build a credit history, and in most states, obtain a driving license. Social security numbers allowed DACA recipients to build credit and access financing for vehicles and home

mortgages. Although the program does not grant access to federal welfare programs or federal student aid per se, successful applicants are eligible for Earned Income Tax Credit. Furthermore, in some states, DACA-eligible immigrants were granted access to state-funded Medicaid programs (e.g., California, New York, Minnesota, Massachusetts, D.C., Illinois, Oregon, and Washington).

2.2 Previous work

2.2.1 Effects of DACA on Labor Market, Health, and Human Capital

Our research adds to the recent set of studies that analyze the effects of DACA on labor market outcomes, human capital, health, fertility, and crime. [Pope \(2016\)](#) found that DACA significantly improved the labor market opportunities for undocumented immigrants. It has been demonstrated that DACA reduces the likelihood of a life in poverty ([Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2016](#)) and promotes GDP growth ([Ortega et al., 2018](#)). [Hsin and Ortega \(2018\)](#) and [Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman \(2016\)](#) suggested that DACA may have incentivized work over educational investments, although this effect is mediated by how easily colleges accommodate working students. Simultaneously, [Kuka et al. \(2020\)](#) found that DACA significantly increased high school attendance and graduation rates. There is also increasing evidence that DACA improves mental health ([Venkataramani et al., 2017](#); [Giuntella and Lonsky, 2020](#); [Hainmueller et al., 2017](#); [Patler et al., 2019](#); [Giuntella et al., 2021](#)), birth outcomes ([Hamilton et al., 2021](#)), teenage fertility ([Kuka et al., 2019](#)), and crime ([Gunadi, 2020](#)).

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of DACA on the living arrangements of undocumented youth and their mobility and housing market outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the effects of living arrangements are not explained by the previously documented changes in income and employment.

2.2.2 Living Arrangements of Undocumented Immigrants

We also directly relate to the literature on the living arrangements of immigrants. It is well known that Hispanics are more likely to reside with extended families than non-Hispanic whites (Van Hook and Glick, 2007; Chavez, 1990). These differences hold true even after accounting for demographic and socioeconomic differences. Several studies have attempted to explain these patterns in the living arrangements of Hispanics, highlighting both the role of cultural preferences for co-residence and socioeconomic and demographic constraints. Van Hook and Glick (2007) demonstrated that high levels of co-residence among recently arrived Mexican immigrants are a departure from the traditional family arrangements prevalent in Mexico, suggesting that they are more likely to reflect challenges associated with international migration and, for many, the uncertainty surrounding immigrant legal status. In related work, Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo (2019) examined the effects of immigration enforcement on the living arrangements of children of immigrants (aged 0-15), finding that the increase in immigration enforcement between 2005 and 2015 raised the likelihood that Hispanic U.S.-born children might live without their parents in households headed by naturalized relatives or friends unthreatened by deportation by 19%.³

Previous studies have also documented the positive emotional consequences of transitioning from undocumented status in young immigrants to adults (Patler and Pirtle, 2018). However, less is known about the mechanisms by which changes in legal status may affect young immigrants' well-being and their transition into adulthood (Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013). Hall et al. (2019) reported how undocumented immigrants are significantly less likely to live in simple arrangements than documented immigrants, highlighting the importance of legal and structural forces in shaping the living arrangements of undocumented immigrants. These patterns can, in turn, have long-term effects on the life course of young immigrants, affecting their transition to adulthood and thus their well-being and economic

³In the results section, we showed our results suggesting immigration enforcement policy and deportations are not likely to explain our results.

success. There are nearly five million undocumented immigrants under the age of 30 in the U.S. (Fortuny et al., 2007; Zong et al., 2015; Passel and D’Vera Cohn, 2011). However, there is still incomprehension about how changes to legal status affect young people’s transition into adulthood.

2.2.3 Immigration and Housing Markets

Finally, our work relates to the literature analyzing the housing market behavior of immigrants, as well as the impact of immigration on housing markets. Although public and academic debates have largely focused on the effect of immigration on labor market outcomes, few studies have investigated the impact of immigration on housing markets. Saiz (2007) examined the impact of immigration on house prices and rents in the U.S. and found that 1% increase in the percentage of immigrants in a city was associated with 3% increase in average price and 1% increase in rents. A positive relationship between immigration and prices has also been observed in Switzerland (Degen and Fischer, 2017) and Spain (Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013), with effects comparable in magnitude to those observed in the U.S. Other studies found minor effects in Canada (Akbari and Aydede, 2012) and New Zealand (Stillman and Maré, 2008). In contrast, Sá (2015) found negative effects on house prices in the UK and suggested that these effects are explained by the mobility response of the native population reducing housing demand.

However, while there is now a rich set of studies analyzing the impact of immigration on housing markets, the role of immigration status in housing markets is understudied. Related work by Christopher (2020) examined the impact of sanctuary cities on rental costs. In another related work, Christopher (2022) examined the effects of DACA on home ownership and found evidence that DACA-eligibility increased home ownership. We contribute to this concurrent study by focusing on the living arrangements and transition into adulthood of undocumented immigrant youth (Hall et al., 2019).

3 Data and Empirical Specification

3.1 Data

Our main data were drawn from the American Community Survey (ACS) (2005–2019), the largest household survey administered by the U.S. Census Bureau. We covered the period 2005–2019 as 2005 was the first year in which the ACS collected data on a full one-percent sample of the U.S. population and 2019 is the last year for which the survey data are available. Designed as a replacement for the long form of the decennial census, ACS contains a detailed set of standard socio-demographic characteristics, labor market outcomes (e.g., employment, labor force participation, and annual income), and relevant information on respondents’ home ownership, rental prices, and home characteristics. The ACS contains information on U.S. citizenship status, number of years spent in the U.S., quarter of birth, and educational background, which can be used to determine respondents’ DACA eligibility status.⁴

The U.S. Census Bureau uses a near-universe of housing addresses from its Master Address File as the sample frame from which it draws a systematic sample of addresses each month. The ACS is then mailed to the selected addresses. Non-respondents were contacted one month later for a computer-assisted telephone interview. After that, one-third of the remaining non-respondents are contacted in person to complete the ACS one month after the telephone survey attempt (Pope, 2016). Consequently, unauthorized immigrants may be selected into the sample. However, the remaining concern is that they may not truthfully answer the citizenship question (see, for instance, Van Hook and Bachmeier (2013)).

For the analysis of living arrangements of young undocumented immigrants, we followed previous studies (Van Hook and Glick, 2007; Hall et al., 2019) and defined the following four mutually exclusive (but not completely exhaustive) variables: (1) *simple arrangement household* — captures households composed only of partners and own/adopted children;

⁴There is no information on whether an individual had criminal convictions or whether the respondent had been honorably discharged from the military.

(2) *extended family arrangement household* — households that include other relatives, such as grandparents (3-generation and “skip” generation), adult siblings, etc.; (3) *single-parent household* — households with a single parent and own/adopted children only; and (4) *non-family arrangement household* — any household arrangement where only non-relatives live together (e.g., householders living alone, housemates/roommates, group quarters members, etc.). In addition, we explored two alternative classifications to examine the likelihood of (5) *Living with Parents* and (6) *Living in 3-Generational Household*. These variables are constructed using the information on household structure available in the ACS (i.e., information on the individual’s relationship to the head of the household and the number of distinct generations contained in each household).

Furthermore, we used information on marital status to examine the effects of DACA on marriage, cohabitation, and divorce. We then defined dichotomic variables for marrying a U.S. citizen and marrying a first-generation immigrant from their country of origin. The ACS also includes information on fertility in the previous year for all women aged 15–50 years.

To examine the impact of DACA on the mobility of DACA-eligible immigrants, we exploited information on whether the respondent relocated compared to the previous year. To investigate the effects of the program on the likelihood of living in an ethnic enclave, we developed a variable measuring the percentage of immigrants from the same ethnic group living in the same PUMA, as well as an indicator of whether the respondent was living in a PUMA with a share of immigrants from the same country above the median.

Finally, the ACS includes information on monthly rent for all renter-occupied units, the number of rooms in a household’s residence, an indicator of homeownership, and the cost of monthly property insurance. We explored these data to examine the impact of the DACA program on the housing market behavior of DACA-eligible immigrants. The summary statistics by DACA-eligibility status before and after the beginning of the DACA program in 2012 are reported in Table A.1. Immigrants with DACA -eligibility are, by

construction, different from the non-eligible population in some of the variables that define the eligibility status (i.e., age, age at arrival, and education). There were notable differences in race and ethnicity between the groups. These differences are similar to those reported by [Pope \(2016\)](#). For these reasons, as explained in Section 3, we controlled non-parametrically for these characteristics in all specifications.

3.2 Empirical Specification

We defined DACA-eligible individuals as follows: (1) were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; (2) have lived in the U.S. since June 15, 2007; (3) entered the U.S. before reaching their 16th birthday; (4) have at least a high school degree (or equivalent); (5) were born outside the U.S. and its territories; and (6) were not U.S. citizens.

We followed previous literature analyzing the effects of DACA on labor market outcomes and human capital ([Pope, 2016](#); [Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2017](#)) and compared DACA-eligible and DACA-ineligible individuals before and after the implementation of the reform.

In the ACS, our main estimation sample comprises all non-citizens aged 18–38 years with at least a high school degree (or equivalent). We then compared non-citizens who were above and below the age of 16 when they entered the United States, those who were above and below the age of 30 on June 15, 2012, and those who entered the US before and after 2007 (see Section 2.1 for a full description of the DACA program eligibility criteria). In practice, the variation in the DACA-eligibility stems from the combination of the following three eligibility criteria: (1) under 31 years of age as of June 15, 2012; (2) arrived into the US before reaching the age of 16; (3) continuous residence in the US from June 15, 2007, to the present.

Formally, we estimated the following equation using a linear probability model⁵:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Post_{it} + \beta_2 Elig_{it} + \beta_3 Post_{it}Elig_{it} + \beta_4 X_{it} + \beta_5 Z_{it} + \Lambda_t + \Theta_c + \Theta_c * t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

⁵In the Appendix, we reported results obtained using a probit model.

where Y refers to the outcome of interest of individual i in year t in state c (e.g., living arrangements, marital and fertility behavior, mobility, rental costs, etc.). $Post$ is a binary variable equal to one if the survey took place after the adoption of the DACA program, and $Elig$ is a dummy equal to one if the individual is DACA-eligible when the survey is administered. The coefficient of interest (β_3) measures the ITT effect of DACA. The regression also controls for an individual’s socio-demographic characteristics (X_{it}), year fixed effects (Λ_t), state fixed effects (Θ_c), and state-specific effects ($\Theta_c * t$). We non-parametrically controlled for DACA eligibility criteria (Z_{it}) by including fixed effects for an individual’s age, education, and age on arrival in the U.S. These controls are important, as our outcomes may be directly affected by correlates of age, education, and time spent in the U.S. This flexible set of controls allows us to account for unobservable characteristics that may correlate with the determinants of eligibility status as well as with the outcomes under investigation. Furthermore, it ensures that our findings are not driven by any of the eligibility criteria alone.

4 Results

4.1 Effects of DACA on Living Arrangements

We began our analysis by documenting the effects of DACA on living arrangements. Figure 1 shows a sharp decline in the percentage of DACA-eligible immigrants living in extended family arrangements. There is no evidence of a pre-trend in the difference between eligible and non-eligible immigrants before 2012. However, since 2013, there has been a stark decline in the likelihood of DACA-eligible individuals living in extended family arrangements. By 2015, DACA-eligible immigrants were approximately three percentage points less likely to live in extended family arrangements, and by 2019, the difference increased to approximately four percentage points. This trend is even more marked when examining the impact of DACA on the likelihood of DACA-eligible immigrants reporting living with their parents. By 2015,

DACA-eligible immigrants were four percentage points less likely to live with their parents, and by 2019, the difference with non-eligible immigrants increased to eight percentage points. Similarly, there has been a decline in the percentage of DACA-eligible immigrants living in 3-generational households. These patterns are mirrored by an increase in the percentage of households with non-family arrangements. There is also an increase in simple-arrangement households, while we found no evidence of a change in the share of single-parent households.

The effects on living arrangements are sizable and are summarized in the DID results in Table A.2. After 2012, DACA-eligible immigrants were 1.6 percentage points more likely to live in an extended family arrangement (Column 1, Panel A, +6% with respect to the mean) and 2 percentage points more likely to live with their parents (Column 2, Panel A, +15.5% with respect to the mean). The DACA-eligible immigrants were also 1 percentage point less likely to live in a 3-generation household (column 3, Panel A, -12.5%), 1.4 percentage points more likely to live in non-family arrangements (column 4, Panel A, +6.6%), and 0.7 percentage points more likely to live in simple arrangement households (column 5, Panel A, +1.6%). Column 6 confirms the lack of a significant effect on single parenthood. Overall, the effects are similar between men (Panel B) and women (Panel C). However, interestingly, the overall effect on the likelihood of simple arrangement households is driven by women who are 0.9 percentage points more likely to live in simple arrangements if DACA-eligible after 2012 (+19%). Interestingly, Table A.3 shows that the effects barely change when controlling for income (Panel A) or employment status (Panel B), suggesting that these effects are not likely to be explained by the increased effects of DACA on increased income opportunities.

Taken together, these findings suggest that DACA had substantial effects on the living arrangements of undocumented youth who were eligible for the program, with a significant decline in their likelihood of living in extended family arrangements or with their parents, and an increase in the likelihood of living independently with non-family members or alone.⁶

⁶In related work, Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo (2019) investigated the effects of immigration enforcement on the living arrangements of children of immigrants (aged 0-15). While we focused on a different age sample and exploited the DACA eligibility criteria, the deportation policy may have contributed to our findings on living arrangements. Interestingly, using yearly data on deportations by state, we found that the

4.2 Effects of DACA on Marital Behavior and Fertility

Changes in living arrangements may also reflect the impact of DACA on marital behavior and fertility. Therefore, we investigated the effects of DACA on the likelihood of being married, cohabiting, or divorced. Furthermore, we explored whether the program had any effect on intermarriage, as previous studies have indicated that immigration policy can have substantial effects on immigrant marriage patterns and their likelihood of marrying a U.S. citizen ([Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2020](#)).

Overall, DACA-eligible immigrants were less likely to marry (Figure 2). There is some evidence of a mild decline in cohabitation patterns immediately after the approval of DACA, suggesting that this trend may have contributed to the subsequent decline observed in marriages among DACA-eligible individuals. We found no evidence of significant effects on divorce and no evidence of significant changes in intermarriage patterns. While one may expect that DACA would reduce the legal benefits associated with intermarriage, it is worth noting that this is still a temporary program with non-negligible uncertainty regarding its destiny. Interestingly, we found some evidence of a decline in the likelihood of marrying first-generation immigrants from their own country, which may be consistent with the effects of DACA on living arrangements and the movement away from the ethnic enclaves.

Table A.5 reports DID estimates on marital behavior. The DACA-eligible immigrants were 1 percentage point less likely to be married than their non-eligible counterparts (column 1). These effects are majorly driven by men (see Panel B).

The DID estimates suggested the following: A reduction in cohabitation (-14%) and an increase in divorce, both largely driven by women. Interestingly, we found no overall evidence of a change in intermarriage rates, and Panel B shows that men are significantly less likely to intermarry. This result suggests that the decline in legal returns to intermarriage may have reduced the propensity of men to marry U.S. citizens. However, Column 5 also shows

effects of DACA on living arrangements were larger in states with relatively low (below median) deportations. The results are available upon request. Furthermore, our findings are not affected by the inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects (see Table A.4).

that DACA-eligible immigrants are less likely to marry endogamously.

The program may also have a significant impact on fertility decisions. [Kuka et al. \(2019\)](#) explored the impact of DACA on teen pregnancy, finding evidence of a 1.6 percentage points decline in the average likelihood of having a teenage birth. Here, we expanded our analysis to include older women. We found no evidence of any significant effect when examining the event study analysis (Figure 3).⁷ However, Table A.6 shows that when pooling the effect of DACA in the DID analysis, we found some evidence that DACA-eligible women were less likely to report a birth in the year after 2012 (-1.6 percentage points, or -10% with respect to the mean; see column 2). These effects, although not precisely estimated, are larger when focusing on unmarried women (-2.3 percentage points, or -18%; see column 3).

4.3 Effects of DACA on Mobility

Interestingly, we showed that DACA has significant effects on the likelihood of DACA-eligible immigrants changing their residence with respect to the previous year (Figure 4). While the decline started immediately after the approval of DACA, it only became statistically significant in 2015 (-3% with respect to the mean of the dependent variable), falling substantially in the following years (-10% with respect to the mean in 2019). The DID estimates suggest that DACA-eligible immigrants after the approval of DACA were 1.5 percentage points less likely to reside in the same house. This corresponds to a 2% decline in the mean (69.9

Figure 4 also illustrates that DACA-recipient gradually became less likely to live in an ethnic enclave. After the introduction of the program, on average, immigrants were living in PUMAs with a lower percentage of co-ethnic immigrants (-8% with respect to the average percentage of immigrants in the area, Column 1, Table A.7). Similarly, they were 1.5 percentage points less likely to live in PUMAs with the percentage of immigrants of their own country above the median (-3%). The effects are larger among women (Panel C) than

⁷It is worth noting that a reduction in fertility may have mechanically affected the percentage of 3-generation households. However, including controls for the number of children does not significantly affect our results on living arrangements (Table A.31, Panel B), suggesting that this is not likely to explain our baseline results.

men (Panel B).

4.4 Effects of DACA on Housing Rental Prices

One of the channels through which the DACA program may have increased the share of young undocumented immigrants leaving their parental home and going to live independently in a different neighborhood is the housing market. As previously mentioned, undocumented immigrants face higher rental costs than legal immigrants and U.S. citizens. Temporary authorization may reduce search costs in the housing market and increase the ability of young undocumented immigrants to obtain better terms.

Figure 5 illustrates the effect of DACA on housing rental prices. There was no evidence of significant differences in the rental prices for DACA-eligible and non-eligible undocumented immigrants before 2012. This supports the underlying assumption of parallel pre-trends between treated and non-treated undocumented immigrants before DACA. However, with the approval of the program, DACA-eligible immigrants experienced a significant decline in housing rental prices. Between 2012 and 2019, they paid \$ 25-55 less per month, a reduction of 1.5-3%. Furthermore, DACA-eligible immigrants were living in larger apartments. There is no evidence of a significant effect on home ownership, but there is some evidence that, everything else being equal, DACA-eligible immigrants were paying lower monthly property insurance. Notably, in a concurrent study, [Christopher \(2022\)](#) found that DACA led to an increase in homeownership. The differences in our results can be explained by the different approaches used.⁸

To gauge the magnitude of the overall average effect of DACA on rents since approval, the main DID estimates are listed in Table A.8. We showed that, on average, DACA eligibility reduced the average gross monthly rent by 51\$ (column 1), a 2.6% reduction (column 2).⁹ The

⁸Restricting the sample to individuals who arrived before age 10, we obtained a positive point-estimate within the confidence of interval of what was found by [Christopher \(2022\)](#) (coef: 0.0312, std.err: 0.011). However, even in this sample, the event study showed no evidence of a significant change in the trend after 2012 (results are available upon request).

⁹This effect is significantly larger and close to a 3.8% when focusing on individuals living on their own

effect was slightly more among men than women. Among men, DACA reduced the monthly rent by 62\$, a 3% reduction (column 1, Panel A), while the reduction was equivalent to 49\$ or 2.4% among women (column 1-2, Panel B). All of these estimates include controls for the number of rooms. However, column 3 shows that DACA-eligible immigrants moved to slightly larger apartments (+2.5%). However, there is no evidence of any effect on home ownership, but interestingly, there is evidence of a significant decline in monthly property insurance fees (-18.5%). Furthermore, when examining the impact on living arrangements and rents, we found only marginal differences between movers and non-movers (Table A.9).¹⁰ Similarly, the coefficient of rent remains negative and significant when including PUMA fixed effects or restricting the sample to non-movers (Table A.10). There is some evidence that DACA-eligible immigrants are more likely to move to counties with higher median income, higher interquartile range, and mobility scores (see Table A.11).

Overall, we believe that these results are consistent with the hypothesis that DACA increases the bargaining power of DACA-eligible immigrants in the housing rental market. The reduction in rental costs made it more affordable for many eligible immigrants to live independently, thus contributing to explaining the impact of DACA on living arrangements.

5 Robustness Checks

5.1 Selection and Compositional Effects

A possible concern is that ineligible and eligible individuals are different with respect to multiple dimensions and that the differences in the composition of the groups may result in a violation of the parallel trend assumption. To mitigate this concern, we conducted several robustness checks. Table A.12 shows that controlling for an index of the baseline predictors

(results available upon request).

¹⁰It is possible that DACA-eligible youth may be signing a lease for a longer term due to the change in immigration status. This may contribute to explaining the reduction in discrimination in the labor market. Unfortunately, we do not have data to test this potential mechanism.

of living arrangements, the results are similar to our baseline estimates. This suggests that our results are not likely to be driven by compositional effects. Furthermore, we showed that the results generally hold when focusing on tighter comparison groups with respect to ethnicity, immigrant status, year, and age at arrival.

First, in Tables A.13, we restricted the analysis to individuals reporting Hispanic ethnicity (Panel A) and alternatively to those born in Mexico, Central America, and South America (Panel B). Immigrants of Hispanic origin comprise a vast majority of DACA applicants.¹¹ The overall results were consistent with those presented in our baseline estimates. Second, Tables A.14–A.18 replicate our main results by using the residual method proposed by Passell and D’Vera Cohn (2011) and Borjas (2017) to identify undocumented immigrants. Overall, the findings are very similar to those reported in the main analysis, although some coefficients are estimated less precisely owing to the smaller sample size imposed by the residual method. Third, Tables A.19–A.21 document the robustness of our results when comparing immigrants who arrived in a tighter range of age at arrival or spent a tighter range of years in the U.S. Our main estimates were confirmed again .

We tested for the presence of systematic pre-trends in the outcomes in Table A.22. For most outcomes, we failed to reject the null hypothesis of no systematic differences between DACA-eligible and DACA-non-eligible immigrants before 2012. For two results out of the 23 analyzed, we found marginally significant pre-trends. In particular, there is some evidence of a positive coefficient for the likelihood of living in non-family arrangements before DACA ($p = 0.072$). However, Figure 1 suggests a marked change in the slope after DACA-approval, with a significant effect a few years after approval. We also found evidence of a significant positive difference between DACA-eligible and non-eligible immigrants before 2012 in the likelihood of marrying within the group ($p\text{-value} < 0.05$). This is mostly driven by the positive coefficient in 2008 (see Figure 4), which appears as an outlier in an otherwise flat pre-trend. Reassuringly, we also noted that event studies are substantially unchanged, even when

¹¹As of September 2017, Mexicans alone comprised 79.4% of the applicants.https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/daca_population_data.pdf

excluding linear trends (Figure A.6 and A.7), suggesting that the treatment and comparison groups showed parallel trends even without this parametric assumption.

In addition, we calculated the p-values using permutation tests (Figures A.1–A.5). We reported histograms of the placebo estimates for our main outcomes. The vertical solid red line represents the DID estimate. The p-values obtained from the permutation tests are reported as dashed-dotted lines (p-value<0.01) in dashed (p-value<0.05) and dotted lines (p-value < 0.01). For most outcomes that were significant in our main DID estimates, permutation tests yielded a p-value of less than 0.05. However, some coefficients are less precisely estimated, such as the effect on the likelihood of living with the parents (p-value=0.068), the effect on marriage (p-value=0.069), and the effect on the likelihood of residing in the same house 12 months earlier (p =0.097).

5.2 Heterogeneity and Other Sensitivity Checks

We explored the heterogeneity of our results according to age and urban/rural status. Overall, the results for living arrangements and rent are pronounced among younger DACA-eligible immigrants (Table A.23). Table A.24 reports the results separately for individuals living in (Panel A) or outside (Panel B) a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). With the exception of the likelihood of living with an extended family (column 1), the results are large (in absolute value) among individuals living in an MSA.

We then explored the sensitivity of our results to different definitions of the treatment period and different model specifications. While the program was announced on June 15, 2012, the first applications were approved a few months later. Tables A.25–A.29 show the robustness of our results to the different definitions of the post-implementation period. In particular, we excluded the period from the Obama executive order to the end of 2012 from the treatment because most applications were only approved in 2013. Overall, we obtained similar results.

The results tend to be similar when omitting potentially endogenous controls (i.e., edu-

cation, family controls, see Tables [A.30–A.31](#)) or including individuals with less than a high school degree (Table [A.32](#)).

Finally, Tables [A.33–A.36](#) report the results obtained using a probit model for the dichotomic variables used in our baseline estimates. These results confirm our main findings. However, we found evidence of a significant reduction in intermarriage, which is consistent with the reduced returns from marriage because of the temporary authorization provided by the DACA program.

6 Conclusion

Multigenerational households have been increasing since the early 1980s ([Cohn and Passel, 2018](#)). Immigrants and minorities are significantly more likely than white U.S.-born citizens to live in extended-family arrangements. The challenges associated with international migration, immigration status, and discrimination in housing markets have been proven to play a crucial role in shaping the living arrangements of immigrants in the U.S.

We studied the impact of temporary work authorization and deferral from deportation provided by the DACA program on the living arrangements of undocumented immigrants and their housing behavior. We found that DACA-recipient immigrants were more likely to live independently, less likely to marry, more likely to change residence, less likely to live outside an ethnic enclave, and to be married to a first-generation immigrant. The results on living arrangements are not fully explained by the changes in income and employment, suggesting that other factors associated with temporary authorization (i.e., lower fear of deportation and higher bargaining power in the housing market) may contribute to explaining these effects. We also found that, on average, DACA-recipients paid lower rents than non-DACA-recipient unauthorized immigrants. Lower rental costs may have contributed to explaining the effects on the living arrangements and mobility of DACA-eligible immigrants.

Immigration status, the associated fear of deportation, and the lack of documents can

affect the transition to adulthood of young undocumented immigrants, inhibiting their ability to participate in adult activities and become independent, with the risk of remaining in a developmental limbo ([Gonzales, 2015](#)). Precariousness and instability associated with undocumented status can have long-lasting effects on the economic integration of young undocumented immigrants and their well-being. Overall, our evidence suggests that policies enabling young undocumented immigrants to work, establish a credit history, and provide temporary relief from the constant fear of deportation may help them acquire independence and further integrate into the host economy. Future research should explore the medium-and long-term implications of immigration policies on young immigrants.

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
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
Figure 1: Event Study – DACA & Living Arrangements



Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.^a


^aThe significance of our results is not affected by alternative clustering choices, i.e., age at arrival.).

Figure 2: Event Study – DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy




Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual's spouse is born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure 3: Event Study – DACA & Fertility




Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if a married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (UnMarried)* – binary var. equal 1 if an unmarried individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure 4: Event Study – DACA & Residing in Ethnic Enclaves



Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50pPerc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.


Figure 5: Event Study – DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance



Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.


Appendix

Figure A.1: Permutation Test – DACA & Living Arrangements




Notes - The figure shows results from the permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc. (90th perc., respectively); vertical dashed line represents 5th perc. (95th perc., respectively); vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. (99th perc., respectively). The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.2: Permutation Test – DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy




Notes - The figure shows results from the permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc.; vertical dashed line represents 5th perc.; vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.3: Permutation Test – DACA & Fertility




Notes - The figure shows results from the permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc.; vertical dashed line represents 5th perc.; vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.4: Permutation Test – DACA & Residing in Ethnic Enclaves




Notes - The figure shows results from the permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc.; vertical dashed line represents 5th perc.; vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.5: Permutation Test – DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance




Notes - The figure shows results from the permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc. (90th perc., respectively); vertical dashed line represents 5th perc. (95th perc., respectively); vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. (99th perc., respectively). The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.6: Event Study – DACA & Living Arrangements (Omitting State Time Trends)




Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.7: Event Study – DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy (Omitting State Time Trends)




Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.8: Event Study – DACA & Fertility (Omitting State Time Trends)




Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if a married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Unmarried)* – binary var. equal 1 if an unmarried individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.9: Event Study – DACA & Residing in Ethnic Enclaves (Omitting State Time Trends)



Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50pPerc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.10: Event Study – DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance (Omitting State Time Trends)



Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). Ninety five percent confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent an individual pays for the rented unit; $\ln$ (*Gross Monthly Rent*) – natural log of gross monthly rent an individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if an individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; $\ln$ (*Monthly Prop. Ins.*) – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering the U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics

Characteristics	Daca Eligible (before DACA)	Daca-non-Eligible (before DACA)	Daca Eligible (after DACA)	Daca-non-Eligible (after DACA)
male	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.51
white	0.73	0.44	0.60	0.43
black	0.09	0.29	0.07	0.08
asian	0.16	0.36	0.13	0.39
hispanic	0.65	0.48	0.72	0.33
age	23.37	3.59	25.27	29.97
aged entered in the US	8.90	4.67	7.77	23.90
married	0.24	0.43	0.28	0.54
high school degree	0.52	0.50	0.49	0.28
some college	0.38	0.49	0.38	0.21
college degree	0.10	0.30	0.13	0.50
labor force participation	0.74	0.44	0.78	0.71
unemployed	0.09	0.29	0.07	0.04
total income	14852.46	18260.91	19483.21	31269.26
living with parents	0.35	0.48	0.32	0.06
extended family	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.16
non-family arrangement	0.15	0.36	0.14	0.26
single parents	0.04	0.19	0.04	0.03
gross monthly rent	1091.52	486.48	1271.02	1414.03
			571.01	688.22

Notes - Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019).

Table A.2: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Living Arrangements

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PANEL A: ALL	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.010*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.083*** (0.006)	0.116*** (0.007)	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.083*** (0.007)	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)
After DACA	0.026*** (0.007)	0.074*** (0.005)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.043*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.001)
Observations	786,420	786,420	741,718	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.220	0.270	0.056	0.284	0.571	0.112
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.129	0.082	0.210	0.432	0.024
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.335	0.274	0.407	0.495	0.153
PANEL B: MEN	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.010*** (0.003)	0.012** (0.006)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.098*** (0.006)	0.128*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.106*** (0.007)	0.014*** (0.005)	-0.003** (0.001)
After DACA	0.032*** (0.005)	0.115*** (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.003)	0.044*** (0.006)	-0.035*** (0.004)	-0.050*** (0.001)
Observations	391,449	391,449	363,964	391,449	391,449	391,449
R-squared	0.229	0.268	0.046	0.279	0.552	0.029
Mean of dep. var.	0.279	0.140	0.073	0.267	0.377	0.008
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.448	0.347	0.261	0.442	0.485	0.089
PANEL C: WOMEN	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)
DACA-Eligible	0.065*** (0.009)	0.102*** (0.008)	0.020*** (0.006)	-0.057*** (0.009)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.003)
After DACA	0.026** (0.011)	0.039*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.003)	0.029*** (0.008)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	394,971	394,971	377,754	394,971	394,971	394,971
R-squared	0.212	0.276	0.065	0.273	0.587	0.156
Mean of dep. var.	0.254	0.118	0.090	0.154	0.486	0.040
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.435	0.323	0.286	0.361	0.500	0.196

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.3: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Living Arrangements, Controlling for Income/Employment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PANEL A: Controlling for Income	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.0158*** (0.004)	-0.0201*** (0.004)	-0.0097*** (0.003)	0.0143*** (0.004)	0.0067*** (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.0832*** (0.006)	0.1168*** (0.007)	0.0105*** (0.003)	-0.0817*** (0.007)	0.0075*** (0.002)	-0.0071*** (0.001)
After DACA	0.0256*** (0.007)	0.0731*** (0.005)	-0.0079*** (0.002)	0.0420*** (0.005)	-0.0201*** (0.003)	-0.0155*** (0.001)
Observations	786,420	786,420	741,718	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.220	0.271	0.056	0.285	0.571	0.117
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.266	0.129	0.0819	0.210	0.432	0.0240
std. dev.	0.442	0.335	0.274	0.407	0.495	0.153
PANEL B: Controlling for employment	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.0154*** (0.004)	-0.0196*** (0.004)	-0.0096*** (0.003)	0.0143*** (0.003)	0.0068*** (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.0798*** (0.006)	0.1148*** (0.006)	0.0100*** (0.003)	-0.0785*** (0.007)	0.0074*** (0.002)	-0.0069*** (0.002)
After DACA	0.0248*** (0.007)	0.0737*** (0.004)	-0.0085*** (0.002)	0.0444*** (0.005)	-0.0189*** (0.003)	-0.0174*** (0.001)
Observations	786,420	786,420	741,718	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.223	0.272	0.057	0.289	0.571	0.114
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.266	0.129	0.0819	0.210	0.432	0.0240
std. dev.	0.442	0.335	0.274	0.407	0.495	0.153

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.4: DACA and the Living Arrangements of Immigrants, State-by-Year FE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.0152*** (0.004)	-0.0202*** (0.004)	-0.0097*** (0.003)	0.0145*** (0.003)	0.0064*** (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.0827*** (0.006)	0.1156*** (0.007)	0.0111*** (0.003)	-0.0829*** (0.007)	0.0063*** (0.002)	-0.0053*** (0.002)
After DACA	0.0726*** (0.006)	0.1369*** (0.005)	0.0047** (0.002)	-0.1365*** (0.005)	0.0081*** (0.002)	-0.0047*** (0.001)
Observations	786,420	786,420	741,718	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.221	0.271	0.058	0.286	0.572	0.113
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.266	0.129	0.0819	0.210	0.432	0.0240
std. dev.	0.442	0.335	0.274	0.407	0.495	0.153

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.5: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PANEL A: ALL	Married	Cohabiting	Divorced	US Citizen Spouse	Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.056*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.002)	0.088*** (0.005)
After DACA	0.034*** (0.004)	-0.040*** (0.001)	-0.098*** (0.001)	0.011* (0.006)	0.028*** (0.006)
Observations	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.226	0.012	0.024	0.067	0.174
Mean of dep. var.	0.467	0.034	0.029	0.213	0.348
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.499	0.181	0.167	0.410	0.476
PANEL B: MEN	Married	Cohabiting	Divorced	US Citizen Spouse	Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.007** (0.002)
DACA-Eligible	0.083*** (0.006)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.003)	0.110*** (0.007)
After DACA	0.057*** (0.005)	0.062*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.001)	0.125*** (0.005)	0.042*** (0.007)
Observations	391,449	391,449	391,449	391,449	391,449
R-squared	0.220	0.012	0.024	0.075	0.186
Mean of dep. var.	0.402	0.029	0.026	0.178	0.300
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.490	0.169	0.158	0.382	0.458
PANEL C: WOMEN	Married	Cohabiting	Divorced	US Citizen Spouse	Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.004)
DACA-Eligible	0.032*** (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.004)	0.068*** (0.004)
After DACA	0.041*** (0.005)	-0.118*** (0.002)	-0.162*** (0.002)	-0.045*** (0.007)	0.017** (0.007)
Observations	394,971	394,971	394,971	394,971	394,971
R-squared	0.221	0.013	0.026	0.059	0.158
Mean of dep. var.	0.532	0.0385	0.032	0.248	0.396
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.499	0.192	0.175	0.432	0.489

Notes - *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.6: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Fertility (Women)

	(1) Child Last Year	(2) Child Last Year (Married)	(3) Child Last Year (Non-Married)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.009*** (0.002)
DACA-Eligible	0.016*** (0.004)	0.026** (0.012)	0.010*** (0.003)
After DACA	-0.098*** (0.003)	0.164*** (0.007)	-0.378*** (0.006)
Observations	394,226	209,632	184,594
R-squared	0.013	0.014	0.024
Mean of dep. var.	0.105	0.152	0.051
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.306	0.359	0.219

Notes - *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.7: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Residing in Ethnic Enclaves

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PANEL A: ALL	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.457*** (0.073)	-0.015** (0.006)
DACA-Eligible	0.128*** (0.005)	0.317** (0.147)	0.019*** (0.004)
After DACA	-0.091*** (0.006)	-0.080 (0.111)	-0.014 (0.009)
Observations	785,846	785,846	785,846
R-squared	0.086	0.294	0.182
Mean of dep. var.	0.699	5.181	0.487
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.459	6.597	0.500
PANEL B: MEN	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.367*** (0.108)	-0.011 (0.008)
DACA-Eligible	0.135*** (0.005)	0.293* (0.151)	0.024*** (0.004)
After DACA	-0.104*** (0.008)	0.494*** (0.136)	-0.025 (0.017)
Observations	391,152	391,152	391,152
R-squared	0.088	0.292	0.182
Mean of dep. var.	0.690	5.135	0.479
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.463	6.526	0.500
PANEL C: WOMEN	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.554*** (0.054)	-0.019*** (0.006)
DACA-Eligible	0.120*** (0.007)	0.349** (0.146)	0.013* (0.007)
After DACA	-0.075*** (0.008)	-0.593*** (0.188)	-0.011 (0.010)
Observations	394,694	394,694	394,694
R-squared	0.087	0.298	0.183
Mean of dep. var.	0.708	5.226	0.496
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.455	6.667	0.500

Notes - *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further controls for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.8: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PANEL A: ALL	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-51.49** (19.27)	-0.026** (0.010)	0.091*** (0.021)	-0.020 (0.012)	-5.953*** (1.698)	-0.185*** (0.027)
DACA-Eligible	35.42*** (6.428)	0.024*** (0.007)	-0.074*** (0.025)	0.081*** (0.009)	3.053** (1.260)	0.124*** (0.037)
After DACA	639.3*** (28.36)	0.583*** (0.020)	-0.405*** (0.030)	-0.185*** (0.006)	20.47*** (4.905)	-0.359*** (0.115)
Observations	191,831	191,831	191,831	270,044	74,648	74,648
R-squared	0.480	0.477	0.138	0.182	0.198	0.279
Mean of dep. var.	1,215	6.986	3.715	0.276	68.34	3.587
Std. dev. of dep. var.	617.6	0.486	1.560	0.447	68.54	1.545
PANEL B: MEN	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-62.91*** (21.60)	-0.036*** (0.011)	0.102*** (0.032)	-0.025* (0.014)	-6.066*** (1.912)	-0.165*** (0.051)
DACA-Eligible	40.48*** (10.82)	0.024** (0.011)	-0.011 (0.045)	0.089*** (0.012)	3.095 (2.822)	0.116 (0.072)
After DACA	218.0*** (30.98)	0.351*** (0.021)	-0.376*** (0.063)	-0.205*** (0.018)	63.96*** (7.737)	1.159*** (0.139)
Observations	117,185	117,185	117,185	165,391	45,972	45,972
R-squared	0.504	0.515	0.125	0.190	0.199	0.275
Mean of dep. var.	1,231	6.999	3.673	0.278	67.85	3.613
Std. dev. of dep. var.	628.2	0.483	1.554	0.448	66.57	1.507
PANEL C: WOMEN	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-38.95** (17.01)	-0.017 (0.012)	0.064** (0.029)	-0.014 (0.012)	-5.555 (3.404)	-0.199*** (0.051)
DACA-Eligible	27.52*** (9.209)	0.023** (0.009)	-0.118*** (0.034)	0.075*** (0.010)	3.336 (2.997)	0.133* (0.067)
After DACA	1,074.8*** (68.12)	0.826*** (0.045)	-0.408*** (0.086)	-0.153*** (0.014)	-15.48* (7.755)	-1.316*** (0.178)
Observations	74,646	74,646	74,646	104,653	28,676	28,676
R-squared	0.448	0.427	0.163	0.181	0.209	0.293
Mean of dep. var.	1,189	6.966	3.780	0.274	69.13	3.546
Std. dev. of dep. var.	599.7	0.489	1.569	0.446	71.59	1.605

Notes - *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.9: Rent Heterogeneity – Movers vs Non-Movers

	(1)	(2)
PANEL A: Living in Same Place as 12 Months Ago	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-73.47*** (8.71)	-0.042*** (0.009)
Observations	119,875	119,875
R-squared	0.284	0.275
Mean of dep. var.	1,195	6.975
Std. dev. of dep. var.	596.0	0.478
PANEL B: Moved Within State in Past 12 Months	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-83.41*** (30.86)	-0.058** (0.022)
Observations	45,031	45,031
R-squared	0.308	0.300
Mean of dep. var.	1,198	6.972
Std. dev. of dep. var.	611.2	0.485
PANEL C: Moved Across States in Past 12 Months	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-83.41*** (29.52)	-0.046* (0.025)
Observations	11,383	11,383
R-squared	0.316	0.335
Mean of dep. var.	1,301	7.053
Std. dev. of dep. var.	666.8	0.488

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals living in the same place of residence as 12 months ago (Panel A), those who moved within the same state during the past 12 months (Panel B), and those who moved across states during the previous 12 months (Panel C). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.10: Rent – Exploring Mobility Mechanism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-74.87*** (11.38)	-0.048*** (0.009)	-40.61*** (11.78)	-0.019** (0.009)	-43.69*** (10.89)	-0.020** (0.008)	-41.01*** (8.37)	-0.014* (0.008)
State Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
PUMA Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Restricted to Non-Movers	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	191,831	191,831	191,831	191,831	191,831	191,831	119,875	119,875
R-squared	0.288	0.282	0.466	0.470	0.598	0.584	0.586	0.569
Mean of dep. var.	1,215	6.986	1,215	6.986	1,215	6.986	1,195	6.975
Std. dev. of dep. var.	617.6	0.486	617.6	0.486	617.6	0.486	596	0.478

Notes - *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.11: Neighborhood Characteristics and Mobility

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Absolute Upward Mobility	Median Parent Income	Above 50p Median Parent Income	Interquartile Income Range
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	0.024 (0.058)	539.29 (325.08)	0.018** (0.008)	447.04** (203.39)
Observations	617,812	617,812	617,812	617,812
R-squared	0.457	0.311	0.310	0.288
Mean of dep. var.	42.19	62,614	0.492	71,817
Std. dev. of dep. var.	3.433	19,729	0.500	17,871

Notes - All outcomes are measured at the county level (cross-sectional variation only). *Absolute Upward Mobility* – expected rank of children whose parents are at the 25th percentile of the national income distribution based on rank-rank regression; *Median Parent Income* – 50th percentile of parent family income in the county; *Above 50p Median Parent Income* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in a county above the 50th percentile median parent family income; *Interquartile Income Range* – difference between 75th and 25th percentile of parent income within the county. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019) and from [Chetty et al. \(2014\)](#). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals whose county of residence can be identified in the ACS data. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.12: Controlling for Predicted Outcome

	(1) Extended Family Arr.	(2) Simple Arr. Hh	(3) Same House	(4) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(5) Gross Monthly Rent	(6) Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.012* (0.006)	0.006** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.440*** (0.074)	-54.03*** (18.89)	-0.028** (0.010)
Observations	786,420	786,420	785,846	785,846	191,831	191,831
R-squared	0.321	0.577	0.094	0.301	0.466	0.464
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.432	0.699	5.181	1,215	6.986
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.495	0.459	6.597	617.6	0.486

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). All regressions control for the predicted outcome derived by regressing the outcome in question on the following set of individual characteristics using pre-period (2005-2011) data: age, age-squared, # of years in the US, sex, race/ethnicity, parental education, and parental English proficiency. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.13: Heterogeneity Analysis - Hispanics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PANEL A: Hispanic Origin	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.032*** (0.007)	0.013*** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.815** (0.306)	-42.05*** (10.65)	-0.033*** (0.011)
Observations	326,462	326,462	326,437	326,437	71,222	71,222
R-squared	0.200	0.496	0.040	0.028	0.270	0.259
Mean of dep. var.	0.357	0.384	0.771	8.319	1,053	6.862
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.479	0.486	0.420	7.647	482.4	0.449
PANEL B: Born in Mexico, Central & South America	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.030*** (0.006)	0.008*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.551*** (0.162)	-51.19*** (10.60)	-0.037*** (0.012)
Observations	317,547	317,547	317,547	317,547	68,978	68,978
R-squared	0.202	0.501	0.041	0.047	0.280	0.274
Mean of dep. var.	0.349	0.395	0.770	7.905	1,062	6.870
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.477	0.489	0.421	7.252	494.7	0.450

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to: (1) individuals who identify themselves as having a Hispanic/Spanish/Latino origin (Panel A); (2) individuals born in Mexico, Central America, or South America (Panel B). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.14: DACA & Living Arrangements – Residual Method (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.008*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.077*** (0.007)	0.106*** (0.008)	0.016*** (0.003)	-0.078*** (0.007)	0.007* (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.002)
After DACA	0.033*** (0.006)	0.084*** (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.033*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.001)
Observations	717,733	717,733	675,307	717,733	717,733	717,733
R-squared	0.201	0.264	0.050	0.310	0.573	0.108
Mean of dep. var.	0.231	0.098	0.071	0.221	0.455	0.023
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.422	0.297	0.256	0.415	0.498	0.150

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.15: DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy – Residual Method (Both Sexes)

	(1) Married	(2) Cohabiting	(3) Divorced	(4) US Citizen Spouse	(5) Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.053*** (0.006)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.003)	0.079*** (0.006)
After DACA	0.003 (0.004)	-0.043*** (0.002)	-0.083*** (0.001)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)
Observations	717,733	717,733	717,733	717,733	717,733
R-squared	0.227	0.013	0.023	0.069	0.171
Mean of dep. var.	0.487	0.035	0.027	0.221	0.363
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.500	0.183	0.162	0.415	0.481

Notes - *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.16: DACA & Fertility – Residual Method (Women)

	(1) Child Last Year	(2) Child Last Year (Married)	(3) Child Last Year (Non-Married)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.010*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.016*** (0.006)	0.019 (0.014)	0.013*** (0.003)
After DACA	-0.090*** (0.003)	0.189*** (0.008)	-0.415*** (0.005)
Observations	360,874	199,792	161,082
R-squared	0.013	0.014	0.026
Mean of dep. var.	0.106	0.151	0.049
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.307	0.358	0.216

Notes - *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.17: DACA & Ethnic Enclaves – Residual Method (Both Sexes)

	(1) Same House	(2) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(3) Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.484*** (0.082)	-0.016** (0.006)
DACA-Eligible	0.113*** (0.007)	0.423*** (0.119)	0.019*** (0.004)
After DACA	-0.095*** (0.006)	-0.047 (0.107)	-0.020* (0.011)
Observations	717,239	717,239	717,239
R-squared	0.088	0.305	0.186
Mean of dep. var.	0.691	4.935	0.488
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.462	6.302	0.500

Notes - *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further controls for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.18: DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance – Residual Method (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-53.89*** (18.20)	-0.028*** (0.009)	0.094*** (0.023)	-0.018 (0.012)	-5.921*** (1.659)	-0.183*** (0.033)
DACA-Eligible	36.54*** (5.474)	0.022*** (0.006)	-0.067* (0.034)	0.081*** (0.010)	2.102 (1.299)	0.105** (0.040)
After DACA	640.5*** (27.78)	0.584*** (0.019)	-0.380*** (0.030)	-0.182*** (0.006)	18.10*** (5.092)	-0.408*** (0.106)
Observations	180,440	180,440	180,440	253,080	69,344	69,344
R-squared	0.485	0.487	0.138	0.182	0.194	0.281
Mean of dep. var.	1,218	6.990	3.695	0.274	67.75	3.580
Std. dev. of dep. var.	619.4	0.484	1.554	0.446	67.96	1.544

Notes - *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.19: RDD Sample – Age at Arrival into US

	(1) Extended Family Arr.	(2) Simple Arr. Hh	(3) Same House	(4) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(5) Gross Monthly Rent	(6) Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.021*** (0.006)	0.010* (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.485*** (0.099)	-41.36*** (13.35)	-0.030*** (0.011)
Observations	158,968	158,968	158,832	158,832	30,476	30,476
R-squared	0.143	0.497	0.055	0.127	0.297	0.289
Mean of dep. var.	0.387	0.234	0.694	5.472	1,141	6.925
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.487	0.424	0.461	6.744	581.4	0.483

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals who meet the upper age DACA criterion and have arrived in the US between ages 12 and 19. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.20: RDD Sample – Length of Stay in the US

	(1) Extended Family Arr.	(2) Simple Arr. Hh	(3) Same House	(4) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(5) Gross Monthly Rent	(6) Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.028*** (0.006)	0.013** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.552*** (0.114)	-63.51*** (16.47)	-0.039** (0.016)
Observations	217,397	217,397	217,241	217,241	52,586	52,586
R-squared	0.240	0.223	0.019	0.127	0.318	0.313
Mean of dep. var.	0.333	0.208	0.737	5.309	1,189	6.965
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.471	0.406	0.440	6.583	606.5	0.483

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals who meet the upper age DACA criterion and have been living in the US for 4-12 years. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.21: Arrived By Age 10 (Sample Composition Test)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.054*** (0.010)	0.016** (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.229 (0.247)	-45.25*** (11.40)	-0.038*** (0.010)
Observations	113,475	113,475	113,411	113,411	17,208	17,208
R-squared	0.221	0.525	0.011	0.155	0.257	0.235
Mean of dep. var.	0.542	0.209	0.790	7.630	1,114	6.913
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.498	0.407	0.407	7.626	521.0	0.465

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals who arrived in the US by the age of 10. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.22: Testing Parallel Pre-Trends Assumption

	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
F-statistic (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009+2010=0)	2.527	1.106	1.716	3.359	0.015	0.411
Two-sided p-value	0.118	0.279	0.196	0.073	0.296	0.525
	Married	Cohabiting	Divorced	US Citizen Spouse	Same Country Immig.	Spouse
F-statistic (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009+2010=0)	0.996	1.840	2.119	0.116	0.039	
Two-sided p-value	0.323	0.552	0.375	0.282	0.000	
	Child Last Year	Child Last Year (Married)	Child Last Year (Non-Married)	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Sh.	Above 50p Immig. Sh. in PUMA
Joint F statistic (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009+2010=0)	2.118	0.204	2.277	2.422	1.810	0.440
Two-sided p-value	0.152	0.654	0.312	0.126	0.185	0.165
	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
Joint F statistic (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009+2010=0)	0.276	0.389	0.128	0.180	0.117	0.001
Two-sided p-value	0.602	0.253	0.746	0.673	0.353	0.978

Notes - The tests were obtained from the estimation of Eq. (1) with the variable $Eligi_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). The dependent variables: *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is born in the same country as the individual; *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year); *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further limited to 2005–2011. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2011). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics, DACA eligibility criteria dummies, housing characteristics (where applicable), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table A.23: Heterogeneity by Age

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PANEL A: Ages 18-25	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.039*** (0.014)	0.047*** (0.005)	-0.032*** (0.010)	-1.197*** (0.155)	-84.50*** (14.91)	-0.059*** (0.013)
Observations	235,910	235,910	235,720	235,720	36,891	36,891
R-squared	0.158	0.063	0.093	0.178	0.279	0.262
Mean of dep. var.	0.462	0.152	0.634	5.353	1,130	6.904
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.499	0.359	0.482	6.769	610.1	0.505
PANEL B: Ages 18-28	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.026** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.005)	-0.012* (0.007)	-1.135*** (0.122)	-81.97*** (13.62)	-0.057*** (0.011)
Observations	352,372	352,372	352,083	352,083	69,152	69,152
R-squared	0.171	0.088	0.096	0.173	0.275	0.264
Mean of dep. var.	0.391	0.234	0.641	5.308	1,140	6.920
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.488	0.423	0.480	6.715	594.3	0.489
PANEL C: Ages 29-38	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.016 (0.011)	0.035*** (0.007)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.472** (0.177)	-52.10*** (16.10)	-0.022 (0.014)
Observations	434,048	434,048	433,763	433,763	122,679	122,679
R-squared	0.058	0.061	0.078	0.163	0.287	0.278
Mean of dep. var.	0.165	0.593	0.746	5.078	1,257	7.024
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.371	0.491	0.435	6.498	626.4	0.480

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals ages 18-25 (Panel A), those ages 18-28 (Panel B), and those ages 29-38 (Panel C). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.24: Heterogeneity – Living in MSA vs Outside of MSA

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PANEL A: Living in MSA	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.029*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.807*** (0.085)	-75.92*** (9.71)	-0.047*** (0.008)
Observations	719,643	719,643	719,219	719,219	178,208	178,208
R-squared	0.207	0.566	0.079	0.177	0.296	0.288
Mean of dep. var.	0.273	0.435	0.702	5.486	1,245	7.015
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.446	0.496	0.457	6.752	621.4	0.477
PANEL B: Living Outside of MSA	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.516** (0.206)	-0.240 (14.81)	0.028 (0.029)
Observations	66,777	66,777	66,627	66,627	13,623	13,623
R-squared	0.167	0.613	0.094	0.220	0.320	0.321
Mean of dep. var.	0.190	0.400	0.669	1.885	817.3	6.609
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.392	0.490	0.471	3.062	388.2	0.442

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual’s PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals residing in a metropolitan statistical area – MSA (Panel A) vs. those living outside of an MSA (Panel B). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.25: DACA & Living Arrangements – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.029*** (0.005)	-0.011*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.084*** (0.006)	0.119*** (0.007)	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.084*** (0.007)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.001)
After DACA (2013 Onwards)	0.027*** (0.007)	0.076*** (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.042*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.001)
Observations	786,420	786,420	741,718	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.220	0.270	0.056	0.284	0.571	0.112
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.129	0.082	0.210	0.432	0.024
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.335	0.274	0.407	0.495	0.153

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.26: DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Both Sexes)

	(1) Married	(2) Cohabiting	(3) Divorced	(4) US Citizen Spouse	(5) Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.057*** (0.004)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.002)	0.089*** (0.005)
After DACA (2013 Onwards)	0.035*** (0.004)	-0.040*** (0.001)	-0.098*** (0.001)	0.010* (0.006)	0.029*** (0.006)
Observations	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.226	0.012	0.024	0.067	0.174
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.467	0.0339	0.0288	0.213	0.348
std. dev.	0.499	0.181	0.167	0.410	0.476

Notes - *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.27: DACA & Fertility – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Women)

	(1) Child Last Year	(2) Child Last Year (Married)	(3) Child Last Year (Non-Married)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.009*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.015*** (0.005)	0.023* (0.012)	0.009*** (0.003)
After DACA	-0.099*** (0.003)	0.163*** (0.007)	-0.378*** (0.006)
Observations	394,226	209,632	184,594
R-squared	0.013	0.014	0.024
Mean of dep. var.	0.105	0.152	0.051
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.306	0.359	0.219

Notes - *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.28: DACA & Ethnic Enclaves – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Both Sexes)

	(1) Same House	(2) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(3) Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.471*** (0.069)	-0.017*** (0.006)
DACA-Eligible	0.129*** (0.005)	0.292* (0.155)	0.019*** (0.004)
After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-0.090*** (0.006)	-0.076 (0.109)	-0.014 (0.010)
Observations	785,846	785,846	785,846
R-squared	0.086	0.294	0.182
Mean of dep. var.	0.699	5.181	0.487
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.459	6.597	0.500

Notes - *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further controls for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.29: DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-48.40*** (17.56)	-0.023*** (0.008)	0.109*** (0.025)	-0.021* (0.011)	-6.891*** (1.719)	-0.199*** (0.028)
DACA-Eligible	30.45*** (7.865)	0.021** (0.008)	-0.078*** (0.024)	0.080*** (0.009)	3.264** (1.379)	0.122*** (0.036)
After DACA (2013 Onwards)	638.6*** (28.00)	0.582*** (0.020)	-0.406*** (0.030)	-0.185*** (0.006)	20.73*** (4.889)	-0.352*** (0.114)
Observations	191,831	191,831	191,831	270,044	74,648	74,648
R-squared	0.480	0.477	0.138	0.182	0.198	0.279
Mean of dep. var.	1,215	6.986	3.715	0.276	68.34	3.587
Std. dev. of dep. var.	617.6	0.486	1.560	0.447	68.54	1.545

Notes - *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.30: Omitting Education Controls

	(1) Extended Family Arr.	(2) Simple Arr. Hh	(3) Same House	(4) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(5) Gross Monthly Rent	(6) Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.014*** (0.004)	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.451*** (0.071)	-54.50*** (19.16)	-0.028** (0.010)
Observations	786,420	786,420	785,846	785,846	191,831	191,831
R-squared	0.211	0.569	0.084	0.291	0.465	0.464
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.432	0.699	5.181	1,215	6.986
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.495	0.459	6.597	617.6	0.486

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.31: Omitting Family Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PANEL A: Not Controlling for Marital Status	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.016*** (0.004)	0.008** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.457*** (0.073)	-51.39** (19.42)	-0.026** (0.011)
Observations	786,420	786,420	785,846	785,846	191,831	191,831
R-squared	0.215	0.285	0.086	0.294	0.480	0.476
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.432	0.699	5.181	1,215	6.986
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.495	0.459	6.597	617.6	0.486
PANEL B: Not Controlling for Number of Children	Extended Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.014*** (0.004)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.466*** (0.073)	-50.16** (19.03)	-0.025** (0.010)
Observations	786,420	786,420	785,846	785,846	191,831	191,831
R-squared	0.212	0.564	0.085	0.293	0.479	0.476
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.432	0.699	5.181	1215	6.986
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.495	0.459	6.597	617.6	0.486

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.32: Inclusion of Individuals with Less Than a High School Diploma

	(1) Extended Family Arr.	(2) Simple Arr. Hh	(3) Same House	(4) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(5) Gross Monthly Rent	(6) Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.013*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.146* (0.081)	-24.11** (10.33)	-0.014* (0.008)
Observations	1,133,206	1,133,206	1,132,499	1,132,499	272,272	272,272
R-squared	0.187	0.527	0.076	0.310	0.461	0.449
Mean of dep. var.	0.279	0.426	0.725	6.143	1,132	6.916
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.449	0.494	0.447	7.068	577.9	0.486

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Simple Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-38. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.

Table A.33: DACA & Living Arrangements – Probit Estimation (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004 (0.006)	0.000 (0.000)
DACA-Eligible	0.061*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.000)
After DACA	0.054*** (0.006)	0.096*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	-0.031*** (0.005)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Observations	786,420	786,420	741,718	785,120	786,420	786,369
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.129	0.082	0.210	0.432	0.024
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.335	0.274	0.408	0.495	0.153

Notes - Probit estimations; average marginal effects reported. *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.34: DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy – Probit Estimation (Both Sexes)

	(1) Married	(2) Cohabiting	(3) Divorced	(4) US Citizen Spouse	(5) Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.0037*** (0.001)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.005)
DACA-Eligible	0.071*** (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.003)	0.083*** (0.007)
After DACA	0.022*** (0.005)	-0.027*** (0.001)	-0.052*** (0.001)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
Observations	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420
Mean of dep. var.	0.467	0.034	0.029	0.213	0.348
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.499	0.181	0.167	0.410	0.476

Notes - Probit estimations; average marginal effects reported. *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.35: DACA & Fertility – Probit Estimation (Women)

	(1) Child Last Year	(2) Child Last Year (Married)	(3) Child Last Year (Non-Married)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.008*** (0.002)
DACA-Eligible	0.022*** (0.005)	0.026** (0.012)	0.010*** (0.003)
After DACA	-0.086*** (0.003)	0.174*** (0.007)	-0.359*** (0.006)
Observations	394,226	209,632	184,494
Mean of dep. var	0.105	0.152	0.051
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.306	0.359	0.219

Notes - Probit estimations; average marginal effects reported. *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.36: DACA & Ethnic Enclaves, Home Ownership – Probit Estimation (Both Sexes)

	(1) Same House	(2) Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share	(3) Homeowner
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.007)	-0.023* (0.013)
DACA-Eligible	0.120*** (0.007)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.109*** (0.007)
After DACA	-0.094*** (0.007)	-0.202*** (0.008)	-0.242*** (0.007)
Observations	773,967	771,235	270,041
Mean of dep. var.	0.699	0.490	0.276
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.459	0.500	0.447

Notes - Probit estimations; average marginal effects reported. *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year); *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample in col. (2) is further restricted to include on householders. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further controls for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.