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INTEREST RATES IN THE REAGAN YEARS

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ABSTRACT

The Reagan Administration entered office in 1981 with one of the clearest and most ambitious agendas in recent times. The new administration advanced five economic/budgetary goals to rebuild America economically and militarily: (1) reduce inflation, (2) deregulate the economy, (3) cut taxes, (4) increase military spending and (5) reduce nondefense spending sufficiently to balance the budget. Achieving, or not achieving, these economic/budgetary goals likely had a significant impact on interest rates. Six specific hypotheses are investigated in this paper.

During the first Reagan term, the battle to lower inflation acted to maintain the high real interest rates carried over from the Carter years and, while the increase in structural deficits did not raise real rates much, the reduction in private saving due to the unwinding of the second OPEC shock and an aggressive foreign policy that heightened fear of nuclear war raised real interest rates to levels not seen since the late 1920s. Moreover, the increased volatility of interest rates during this protracted battle with inflation raised yields on callable fixed-rate mortgages by over a percent (one) percentage point relative to the already inflated yields on noncallable Treasuries.

By the end of Reagan's second term, inflation, marginal tax rates, nuclear fear, and interest rate volatility were all down. As a result, nominal Treasury rates have plunged (real bill rates since 1986 are below their average values for the previous quarter century), and yields on callable securities have receded to more normal levels relative to noncallable Treasuries. Yields on tax-exempt securities are one and a quarter percentage points higher relative to Treasuries than in the pre-Reagan years, and yields on fixed-rate mortgages are up by a half percentage point. These constitute an intended reduction in the previous financial subsidies to state and local and household capital formation, respectively.

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The Reagan Administration entered office in 1981 with one of the clearest and most ambitious agendas in recent times. The new administration advanced five economic/budgetary goals to rebuild America economically and militarily: (1) reduce inflation, (2) deregulate the economy, (3) cut taxes, (4) increase military spending and (5) reduce nondefense spending sufficiently to balance the budget. Deregulation and the military buildup were begun under the Carter Administration; major commitments to reduce inflation and to cut taxes and nondefense spending were new.¹

In its first term, the Reagan Administration successfully achieved the first four goals. However, while nondefense spending was cut, the reduction was insufficient to offset the tax reductions, leaving a substantial structural deficit. In its second term, some progress was made toward reducing this deficit, but the progress was achieved largely by scaling back defense, not nondefense, outlays. In addition, tax reform was passed, but this was a tax shift (household taxes lowered, business taxes raised), not an overall cut. Nonetheless, both personal and corporate marginal tax rates were cut.

Achieving, or not achieving, these economic/budgetary goals likely had a significant impact on interest rates. Six specific hypotheses are investigated in this paper:

- a) the cut in the inflation rate from 10 to 4 percent lowered nominal interest rates generally by reducing the inflation premium in them,
- b) the increased structural deficits raised real interest rates generally (Feldstein, 1985),
- c) the tight money leading to the inflation reduction was unprecedented in severity and caused equally unprecedented high real interest rates, (Clarida and Friedman, 1983; Blanchard and Summers, 1984),
- d) the process by which inflation was cut -- the switch of the Federal Reserve from interest rate to money supply targets -- increased the volatility of nominal interest rates and thus raised real rates on securities with borrower call or prepayment options, such as long term fixed-rate mortgages (Hendershott and Buser, 1984),
- e) the deregulation of thrift institutions raised rates on fixed-rate mortgages relative to those on Treasuries, and
- f) the cut in personal and corporate marginal tax rates and "tax reforms" raised yields on tax-exempt securities relative to those on Treasuries.

The first three hypotheses relate to interest rates generally and are best addressed by examining yields on noncallable Treasury securities. The second three pertain to the relationship between yields on Treasury and other securities and thus require analyses of other yields.

Our investigation is divided into three parts dealing with Treasury securities (six-month and ten-year maturities), fixed-rate mortgages, and tax-exempt securities (one and five years). In each part we begin by examining how interest rates (or interest rate relationships) have changed in the 1980s relative to the 1970s and then discuss the role of Reagan policies in these changes. The first two parts draw heavily on Hendershott and Peek (1989) and Hendershott and Van Order (1989). We generally find

support for all the hypotheses except those relating to the impact of monetary and fiscal policies on real interest rates. These impacts have been overstated.

I. Treasury Rates

Expected Inflation, Nominal Rates, and Real Rates

The top two series in Figure 1 are the yields on six-month and ten-year Treasury securities, both computed on a bond-equivalent basis, for the 1970s and 1980s. April and October values of the yields are plotted. The bottom two series are expected inflation rates from the Livingston and Hoey surveys on corresponding dates; the latter survey did not begin until September 1978 and was not collected continuously until the 1980s.² The long rise in nominal rates up to 1981 is clear, as is the decline since then. The rise and fall correspond to a rise and fall in expected inflation, although the correspondence is far from perfect. The figure suggests about a one-for-one relationship between interest rates and expected inflation, and empirical estimation supports this view.

The term structure of interest rates appears to be related to the term structure of inflation rates. Twice the term structure became inverted (the six-month rate exceeded the 10-year rate), briefly in 1973-74 and for an extended period between 1978 and 1981. Both episodes correspond to a sharp, but temporary surge in inflation. If the temporary nature of this shock was perceived, short-term expected inflation would likely exceed longer-term

expected inflation. We have a long-run expected inflation rate for the second inversion only. During this inversion, the short-term expected inflation rate did exceed the long-term rate, and when the short-term expected inflation rate fell below the long-term rate, the inversion ceased.

Figure 2 plots the pretax real six-month and 10-year Treasury rates and the after-tax real six-month rate. The tax rate is a weighted average marginal tax rate paid by households on interest income.³ To put these real rates in perspective, we have plotted them for the longer 1964-88 period. Here, the high pretax real rates in the early 1980s, especially relative to the middle 1970s, are obvious. The real six-month Treasury rate averaged 5.5 percent in the 1981-84 period, a level observed previously only in the 1926-30 period, as opposed to 0.2 percent in the mid1974-mid1978 span. Real 10-year Treasury rates appear to have jumped similarly in the early 1980s. Furthermore, real short- and long-term Treasury rates have been similar in magnitude in the 1980s, i.e., the long-term premium has not systematically exceeded the short-term premium.

Also noteworthy is the decline in real interest rates since 1984. The real six-month bill rate in the 1986-88 period was slightly below its average in the previous quarter century. This little recognized fact is particularly remarkable because real activity has been so strong in recent years and real bill rates have historically exhibited a strong procyclical pattern (Hendershott, 1986).

Movements in the after-tax real bill rate are also interesting. According to this measure, the interest rate puzzle really hasn't been the high rates in the 1980s so much as the low rates in the 1970s; the after-tax real rate never exceeded minus one percent for the entire 1974-80 period. The early 1980s values are quite comparable to those observed throughout the 1960s, and more recent values are roughly half those in the 1960s. In any event, explaining the jump in real interest rates in the 1980s, either before or after tax, requires starting with why interest rates were so low in the middle 1970s (Wilcox, 1983, attributes these low rates to the first OPEC shock).

Reagan Policies and Real Rates

How did fiscal and monetary policy affect the pattern of real rates in the 1980s? Figure 3 contains the real interest rate and two fiscal policy variables: the structural federal deficit as a fraction of middle-expansion trend GNP and the average marginal tax rate used to measure after-tax real interest rates.⁴ The deficit would appear to be negatively correlated with real rates in the 1970s and early 1980s. More specifically, the structural deficit had hardly begun to rise when the real rate peaked in the 1980s, and the real rate was back down to a normal level before the deficit reversed course. While the deficit might be badly mismeasured, any reasonable measure must have risen between 1981 and 1983, just when the real rate was declining.⁵ The tax rate series is positively correlated with the real rate during the 1977-88 period, as we would expect (the pretax rate rises in

response to an increase in the tax rate in order to maintain the after-tax rate at a given level).

Our multivariate analysis (Hendershott and Peek, 1989) suggests a small positive impact (less than a quarter percentage point) of the 1980s structural deficits on yields. However, the cut in marginal tax rates has an even larger negative impact. Thus fiscal policy, broadly defined, tended to lower Treasury rates, not raise them, during the Reagan years.

Figure 4 plots the real six-month rate against our estimate of the impact of monetary policy on the six-month rate. (Monetary policy is attributed to Reagan, despite the Federal Reserve's "independence," because of his strong support of the Federal Reserve.) Our estimate is obtained by first constructing a proxy for monetary policy and then using this proxy as a regressor in an equation explaining the after-tax bill rate. We developed this proxy because customary money measures are of doubtful validity when effective deposit rate ceilings are changed and/or new "money-like" financial claims are introduced. Our proxy is based on the behavior of the six-month bill rate, which the Federal Reserve can control over short periods, relative to that of the five-year Treasury bond rate, over which the Federal Reserve has decidedly less control. More specifically, we explain the term structure of interest rates with the term structure of expected inflation, the business cycle, and traditional monetary policy variables and then attribute the residual (plus the traditional monetary policy variable's contribution) to monetary policy.

A number of observations follow from Figure 4. First, the decline in the real rate from two and a half percent in late 1973 to negative one percent in early 1977 and the rebound to two and a half percent in 1980 are almost fully accounted for by monetary policy. Second, while changes in monetary policy explain both the rebound in real rates to normal levels in the 1978-80 period and much of the decline since 1984, by our estimates monetary policy does not account for the jump in real rates between 1978-80 and 1981-84. In summary, monetary policy was not noticeably tighter in the early 1980s than in the 1973-74 period, although the period of tightness, mid1979 to mid1983, lasted much longer. As a result, the quarter-century upward trend in inflation was finally broken. Similarly, the recent period of ease has been longer than any in the last quarter-century and has contributed to the longest peace-time expansion on record.

Our principal conclusion is that the emphasis on the high real interest rates in the early 1980s has been overdone. The key to understanding real interest rates in the last quarter century is the extraordinarily low interest rates in much of the 1970s owing to the two OPEC oil shocks, which lowered investment demand and increased world saving by transferring wealth from the high consuming developed countries to OPEC. Figure 4 clearly indicates lower real rates relative to the contribution of monetary policy in the 1974-80 period than either before or after. Monetary policy was tight for a long stretch in the early 1980s, but only tight enough to cause real interest rates to be about a percentage point and a half above normal. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, had little impact, with decreasing

marginal tax rates more than offsetting the increase in structural deficits. Finally, some evidence suggests that foreign policy -- Reagan's evil empire posture in his first term -- contributed marginally (about a half percentage point) to the high real rates by increasing the fear of nuclear war and thus reducing the private propensity to save.

II. The Yield on Fixed-Rate Mortgages

Volatility and Yields on Fixed-Rate Mortgages

A fixed-rate mortgage differs from a Treasury security with equal duration because homeowners can call or prepay the mortgage while the Treasury cannot prepay its debt. For equal coupon securities, investors will prefer the Treasury; if market interest rates decline, investors in Treasuries will continue to receive their now above-market coupons, while investors in mortgages will find their funds repaid and themselves forced to invest in the now lower market coupons. To compensate for the possibility of borrowers prepaying when rates decline, investors in fixed-rate mortgages must receive a higher coupon than investors in Treasuries, the size of this coupon differential depending on the probability that interest rates will decline sufficiently to trigger prepayment. This probability, in turn, will be greater the more volatile are interest rates and the greater is the expectation that interest rates will decline.

Figure 5 plots the ex post volatility of interest rates and the spread between the conventional new issue mortgage rate and the seven-year Treasury rate (comparable duration Treasury).⁶ The spread oscillated between about

one and two percentage points in the 1970s before the switch to a more volatile interest-rate monetary policy in late 1979. From this point, the spread trended upward until it peaked at over three percentage points in 1981 and 1982. After dipping below two percentage points in early 1984, the spread again rose to nearly three percentage points in late 1986 before finally declining to about two percentage points.

That increased interest rate volatility explains some of the increase in the mortgage-Treasury rate spread is obvious from the figure. Volatility jumped in late 1979, just when the spread did, and remained high through the peak of the spread in late 1982. That is, much of the relative increase in the mortgage rate in 1981-82 simply reflected a more valuable prepayment or call option. However, more than the rising call value contributed to the relatively high mortgage rates in the early 1980s.

The Savings and Loans, the Agencies and the Mortgage Rate

Figure 6 plots both the actual conventional mortgage coupon rate and an estimate of what the rate should have been given seven-year Treasury rates and the value of the homeowner's call option (Hendershott and Van Order label this the "perfect-market" coupon rate). As can be seen, the actual rate was about a half percentage point too low during most of the 1970s, but then was about a half point too high in the 1982-86 period, giving a total increase of a full percentage point. Since early 1987, the actual rate has been equal to the perfect market rate.

In the 1970s, mortgage lending was largely tied to the thrifts. Portfolio restrictions on savings and loans (no corporate loans, bonds, or

equities) encouraged their investment in residential mortgages, and these investments were especially profitable to thrifts owing to special tax advantages. Thrifts that invested a large fraction of their assets in housing-related loans or liquid assets could transfer a large fraction of their pretax income to loan loss reserves, thereby avoiding taxes. Between 1962 and 1969, this fraction was 60 percent; between 1969 and 1979, the fraction was gradually reduced to 40 percent; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 lowered the fraction to 8 percent. The incentive for mortgage investment provided by the extraordinary transfers to loan loss reserves was substantial in the 1960s and 1970s; savings and loans would have accepted a half to three-quarters of a percentage point lower pretax return on tax preferred housing-related assets than on comparable nonpreferred assets.

Thrifts have shifted sharply out of fixed-rate home mortgages (FRMs) in the 1980s. Most strikingly, the share of savings and loan total assets in home mortgages and agency securities (largely Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pass-throughs) fell from 72 to 57 percent during the 1982-87 period. Because savings and loans have aggressively added adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) to their portfolios, the shift out of FRMs was far greater than 15 percent of the portfolio. These portfolio shifts were in response to the reduced profitability of savings and loans (first due to high interest rates and a maturity mismatch and then due to disinflation and credit losses), the expansion of savings and loan asset powers, and a regulatory-enhanced aversion to interest-rate risk. The reduced profitability eroded the tax incentive for residential mortgage investment, while the expansion of powers

and regulatory risk aversion encouraged thrifts to invest more widely (the latter also encouraged switching from FRMs to ARMs). The net result was the mortgage rate rising from a half percentage point below the perfect-market rate to a half point above.

The half percentage point premium in the early 1980s provided the incentive for the securitization of conventional FRMs by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The premium covered both the start-up cost of the securitizers and the liquidity premium demanded by investors. And securitize Fannie and Freddie did: roughly half of newly-issued conventional fixed-rate mortgages originated in 1986 and 1987 were sold directly to Fannie and Freddie to be packaged into mortgage pools. As the volume of mortgage pools grew, bid/ask spreads were bid down (and thus the liquidity premium fell), and the marginal costs of the securitizers declined. As a result, the yields on conventional loans have fallen back in line with capital market rates.

Nonetheless, conventional FRM rates are still about a half percentage point higher, relative to Treasury rates, than they were in the 1970s. Attributing this half point increase to Reagan policies seems inappropriate, however. The deterioration of the thrifts' relative position as profitable investors can be traced to policy errors, such as regulatory prevention of adjustable-rate mortgages and the imposition of deposit rate ceilings, that date back to the 1960s.

III. Yields on Tax Exempt Securities

Determinants of Tax-Exempt Yields

Because investors are interested in after-tax returns, the tax-exempt status of a security will result in its pretax yield being bid down relative to pretax yields on fully taxable securities. Tax-exempt yields, then, will only be a fraction of taxable yields, the fraction being greater the less heavily taxed are returns on taxable securities. The relationship between default-free yields on exempts (r_{ex}) and taxables (r_{tx}) will depend on the state of the economy as well as tax rates. A deteriorating economy, for example, could lead to greater probability of bankruptcy (larger debt contracting costs) and thus reduced issues of fully taxable debt. Also, the deterioration could stimulate a flight to quality or greater demand for Treasury debt. In both cases, fully taxable rates would fall relative to tax-exempt yields. We thus express the ratio of exempt to taxable rates as

$$r_{ex}/r_{tx} = \phi(t_c, t_p, \rho),$$

where t_c is the corporate tax rate, t_p is an index representing the marginal personal tax rate schedule, and ρ is a risk adjustment that varies with the state of the economy.

Figure 7 plots the ratio of one-year exempt to one-year taxable yields (r_{ex}/r_{tx}), $1-t_p$, and a proxy for cyclical swings in the economy (GAP). The latter is measured as 100 times the difference between middle-expansion trend GNP and actual GNP, all divided by trend GNP. The corporate tax rate

is not plotted because it varied so little during this period. The personal tax rate is the average marginal personal tax rate on interest income earned (see footnote 3). The broad decrease and then increase in $1-t_p$ reflects both the bracket creep of the 1970s and the 1980s Reagan tax cuts. Figure 8 plots the same ratio for five-year securities. Here the personal tax rate is a five-year forward-looking rate (the single tax rate applied to all future cash flows that gives the same after-tax rate of return as the stream of after-tax payments based upon the average marginal personal tax rates that actually evolved). The general correlation of the rate ratios with the $1-t_p$'s and GAP seems clear.⁷

Closer inspection of the figures suggests two further points. First, the cyclical impact of GAP seems to be limited to positive values; when GAP is negative in the 1972-73, 1978-80, and 1986-88 periods, the rate ratios cease to follow its movements. This is consistent with a risk adjustment that develops when the economy falls below trend but is fully eliminated when the economy gets back to trend. Also, the one-period future, rather than current, value of GAP seems to influence the rate ratio. Second, both the one-year and five-year rate ratios are too high after about 1984 relative to the pattern existing over the 1970-84 period. More specifically, the rate ratios are far closer to the $1-t_p$'s than they were during comparable periods when the economy was above trend (1972-73 and 1978-80).

An alternative or additional proxy for the risk adjustment is the spread between the six-month commercial paper and Treasury bill rates divided by the bill rate (PREM).⁸ As Buser and Hess (1986) note, the corporate-Treasury yield spread is a contemporaneous proxy for expected bankruptcy. This variable moves somewhat like GAP, but falls far more abruptly in 1975 and rises much less in the 1980-82 period.

Computing the Impact of Reagan Policies

We have estimated some simple regression equations for the 1970-84 period and extrapolated them through 1988. The equations confirm both the importance of our variables and the unusually high rate ratios in the late 1980s. Representative equations are:

$$\text{One Year: } r_{\text{ex}}/r_{\text{tx}} = -.179 + 1.012(1-t_p) + .0080 \text{ GAPZ} + .159 \text{ PREM}$$

$$(.107) \quad (0.155) \quad (.0022) \quad (.057)$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = .709, \text{ SEE} = .022, \text{ DW} = 1.69$$

$$\text{Five Year: } r_{\text{ex}}/r_{\text{tx}} = -.111 + 1.008(1-t_p) + .0084 \text{ GAPZ} + .093 \text{ PREM}$$

$$(.125) \quad (0.183) \quad (.0019) \quad (.050)$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = .724, \text{ SEE} = .019, \text{ DW} = 1.32$$

where GAPZ is zero when GAP_{+1} is negative and equals GAP_{+1} otherwise and coefficient standard errors are in parentheses. Note the similarity of the tax rate and GAP coefficients in the two equations and the closeness of that on $1-t_p$ to unity.

Plots of the actual and fitted/forecasted rate-ratio values are presented in Figures 9 and 10. The one- and five-year rate ratios appear to be roughly 0.08 and 0.06 too high, respectively, in 1986-88. That is, the tax-exempt rates are roughly 50 basis points too high.

The rise in the rate ratios far above those predicted in 1985-88 is likely due to the anticipation and enactment of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The 1986 Act cut corporate tax rates from 0.46 to 0.34 (the impact of the personal rate cut is already included in the forecasted rate ratio), disallowed all bank interest expense allocable to newly-acquired tax-exempt bonds, enacted an alternative minimum tax with tax-exempt interest included in the base, and substantially restricted future issues of business industrial revenue and household mortgage revenue bonds (since the end of 1985, the quantity of these bonds outstanding has declined by 10 percent). The rate cut, the disallowance of bank interest expense, and the alternative minimum tax should all reduce commercial bank demand for tax-exempts (Neubig and Sullivan, 1987). In fact, commercial bank holdings of tax-exempts have declined from \$231 billion at the end of 1985 to \$152 billion at the end of 1988. The increase in the rate ratios in 1985 reflected a surge in tax-exempt issues in anticipation of the Tax Act. Tax-exempt debt outstanding rose by \$139 billion in 1985 (\$98 billion in the fourth quarter alone) versus \$51-54 billion in 1983 and 1984.⁹

What do we conclude about the impact of Reagan policies on tax-exempt yields? In effect, we can attribute all of the 0.17 increase in the rate-ratios since 1980 to Reagan policies, first the 1981 rate cuts and later the 1986 Act. At a 7.5 percent taxable rate, this amounts to a one and a quarter percentage point increase in tax-exempt yields. Of course, if the Reagan tax cuts themselves lowered taxable rates by nearly a percentage point, as we are prepared to argue, then the net increase in tax-exempt yields is only about three-quarters of a percentage point.

IV. Summary

During the first Reagan term, the battle to lower inflation acted to maintain the high real interest rates carried over from the Carter years and, while the increase in structural deficits did not raise real rates much, an aggressive foreign policy increased them by half a percentage point by heightening nuclear fear and thus reducing private saving. These factors, strongly reinforced by the unwinding of the second OPEC shock, raised real interest rates to levels not seen since the late 1920s. Moreover, the increased volatility of interest rates during this protracted battle with inflation raised yields on callable fixed-rate mortgages by over a percentage point relative to the already inflated yields on noncallable Treasuries.

By the end of Reagan's second term, inflation, marginal tax rates, nuclear fear, and interest rate volatility were all down. As a result, nominal Treasury rates have plunged, and yields on callable securities such

as fixed-rate mortgages have receded to more normal levels relative to noncallable Treasuries. Real Treasury rates since 1986 are below their average values for the previous quarter century. Yields on tax-exempt securities are one and a quarter percentage points higher relative to Treasuries than in the pre-Reagan years, and yields on fixed-rate mortgages are up by a half percentage point. These constitute an intended reduction in the previous financial subsidies to state and local and household capital formation, respectively.

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Footnotes

1. While the period of tight money began well before Reagan took office, his support of that policy allowed it to continue until inflation was substantially reduced. Numerous previous administrations had begun attacks on inflation, but all had backed off before inflation was permanently lowered.

2. The interest rate series are the April and October monthly averages of daily secondary market six-month Treasury bill rates (converted from a discount basis to a bond-equivalent yield) and the ten-year constant maturity Treasury bond yield, both from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The April and October observations were selected to correspond with the approximate date at which respondents to the semiannual Livingston survey form their expectations. The six-month Livingston expected inflation rate series was provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The ten-year expected inflation rate series is from the Decision-Makers Survey conducted by Richard B. Hoey at Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. This series is not available for every April and October; when necessary, it has been interpolated from the data for nearby months.

3. The ex ante six-month pretax real interest rate is calculated as the six-month Treasury bill rate less the six-month Livingston expected inflation series. The ex ante ten-year pretax real rate is from the Decision Makers Survey. Missing April and October observations have been interpolated from the data for nearby months. The after-tax real rate is calculated as the after-tax nominal rate less expected inflation. The tax rate on interest income is an average marginal tax rate constructed from data contained in annual editions of Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax Returns as a weighted average of the statutory marginal personal income tax rate for each adjusted gross income class. The weight for each class is equal to its share of the total interest received by all income classes.

4. Both the real interest rate and the tax rate were described in footnote 3. The deficit measure is the cyclically-adjusted federal budget deficit as a percentage of middle-expansion trend GNP and is based on the series constructed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Our measure is an average of this series for the quarter beginning in April (or October) and the subsequent quarter to correspond to the time span covered by the six-month Treasury bill rate.

5. An inflation-adjusted measure of the deficit would exhibit an even sharper increase between 1981 and 1983 because the inflation rate was falling. However, any particular deficit measure will suffer from a number of problems. On general measurement issues, see, for example, Eisner (1989) and Kotlikoff (1986).

6. The seven-year Treasury rate is the constant maturity series from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The mortgage rate and the volatility measure are both based on data from Hendershott and Van Order (1989). The mortgage rate is the conventional commitment mortgage coupon rate adjusted for points, where that adjustment is equal to $(\text{Points}-1)/(4.2 + .106 \text{ slope} - .69 \text{ vol})$, where slope is the difference between the seven-year and six-month Treasury rates and volatility (vol) is one-half the cumulative absolute change in the seven-year Treasury rate over the previous 20 weeks. We plot semiannual averages of weekly data.

7. The five-year rate ratio exceeds the one-year ratio by about 0.05 on average. This could reflect the value of the tax-trading option (let capital gains run but take capital losses) of the longer term securities (Hendershott, 1985, pp. 158-60).

7. The commercial paper rate is for firms with bond ratings of Aa or equivalent, from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.

8. Part of the 1985 surge was matched by an increase in commercial bank demand -- an increase of \$57 billion in 1985 (\$49 billion in the fourth quarter) versus \$11 billion in 1984 -- as banks stocked up in anticipation of the 1986 Act.

Figure 1

Six-month and Ten-year Nominal Treasury Rates and
Six-month and Ten-year Expected Inflation Rate




Figure 2
 Ex Ante Pretax and After-tax Real Interest Rates




Figure 3

Six-month Pre-tax Real Treasury Bill Rate, Marginal Tax Rate and Cyclically-Adjusted Deficit




Figure 4
 Pretax Real six-month Treasury Bill Rate
 and Monetary Policy Impact





Figure 5
Mortgage Rate - Treasury Rate Spread And Interest
Rate Volatility



Effective Commitment Rate

Actual & Perfect Market

Figure 6




Figure 7
 Ratio of One-year Exempt to One-year Taxable Yields,
 One Minus Marginal Tax Rate, and Percentage GNP Gap




Figure 8
 Ratio of Five-year Exempt to Five-year Taxable Yields,
 One Minus Marginal Tax Rate, and Percentage GNP Gap




Figure 9
 Ratio of One-year Exempt to One-year Taxable Yields:
 Actual and Fitted/Forecasted




Figure 10
 Ratio of Five-year Exempt to Five-year Taxable Yields:
 Actual and Fitted/Forecasted

