WHAT DO VOTERS LEARN FROM FOREIGN NEWS? EMULATION, BACKLASH,
AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS

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NBER Working Paper No. 27497
July 2020
JEL No. D7,F13,L82

ABSTRACT

The paper demonstrates voter-based mechanisms underlying policy emulation across countries. We argue that exposure to news about foreign government policies and their effect can change policy preferences of citizens through emulation and backlash against it. These heterogeneous responses arise due to citizens' divergent predispositions about a foreign country being their peer. We test this argument with coordinated survey experiments in Japan and Taiwan, which randomly assigned news reporting on the South Korea-China trade agreement and solicited support for their government signing an agreement with China. The results suggest that exposure to the news decreases opposition to a trade agreement with China by 6 percentage points in Taiwan ("emulation") and increases opposition around 8 percentage points in Japan ("backlash"). The results further suggest respondents' predispositions about peer countries account for the heterogeneity. Our findings caution the optimism about policy convergence across countries as technology lowers the cost of acquiring information.

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Introduction

How does increasing exposure to news reports about foreign government policies affect the policy preferences of citizens? As technological advancement lowers the barriers to information, voters are exposed to an increasing volume of information about foreign government actions. Scholars have argued that this cross-border flow of information should lead to convergence of ideas and policies across countries through mechanisms such as emulative learning and market competition (Rydgren 2005; Simmons et al. 2006; Quinn and Toyoda 2007; Jensen and Oster 2009; Kelley and Simmons 2014). Despite this prediction, we have recently witnessed voter backlash against convergence, evidenced by *Brexit* referenda in United Kingdom (Colatone and Stanig 2018), *Grexit* referenda in Greece (Walter et al. 2018), the rise of protectionist rhetoric and policies in the United States and Western Europe (Rydgren 2005) and backlash against emulating the successful COVID-19 measures adopted in South Korea in Japan (Suzuki 2020).[1]

Our paper is one of the first to experimentally identify conditions under which information about foreign government policies and their effects (hereafter "foreign news") may trigger either emulation or backlash among voters against their own

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[1] Although this paper tests emulative learning on trade liberalization and cooperative agreement, our theory can be applied to emulative learning toward protectionist policy and non-cooperative arrangement as well. We return to this point later in the Conclusion, where we discuss the generalizability of our findings beyond the empirical scope of this paper.

government adopting a similar policy. Voluminous literature on policy emulation[2] has observed that "peer" countries (measured by geographic proximity, ideological similarity, shared colonial history and trade dependence) are more likely to adopt similar policies in issue areas such as privatization reforms, electoral systems and political regime choices, and labor and environmental rights (Brooks 2005; Rogowski 1987; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Simmons et al. 2006; Lee and Strang 2006; Greenhill, Mosley and Prakash 2009). However, these studies either demonstrate such emulation exists among policy-making elites or they neglect domestic politics altogether by modeling state responses to common shocks, such as globalization, recession, import shock from China and technological advancement (Autor et al. 2013; Colatone and Stanig 2018; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). With the exception of Quinn and Toyoda (2007), no study, to our knowledge, has tested if such emulation exists among voters and through what mechanisms. Indeed, Graham et al. (2013) reviews 781 articles

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[2] In political science, the terms policy "convergence", "diffusion" and "emulation" are often used interchangeably to refer to the process in which policies adopted by different administrative units (countries, states, cities, etc.) become similar over time. This paper defines "policy emulation" as a goal-oriented mimicking of a policy in an effort to produce a similar outcome (e.g., economic growth, reduction in poverty, etc.). The definition is consistent with the psychology literature, which differentiates the concepts of "emulation" and "imitation" by defining the former as more goal-oriented ("cause-effect"), purposeful mimicking, and the latter as less purposeful, process-centered mimicking. Policy "convergence" differs from policy emulation in that the former can occur without any learning of the foreign government actions (e.g., due to market pressures) and policy "diffusion" can also occur through imitation.

published in top-50 political science journals on policy diffusion and find very scant attention to voter-driven policy diffusion. The omission is critical as much of the backlash against globalization today seems to have originated from voters.

We designed and conducted coordinated survey experiments in Japan and Taiwan in 2015 and 2016 to test the "emulation-among-peer" hypothesis among voters: when citizens perceive a foreign government to be their socio-economic or cultural peer, they are more likely to increase support for their own government adopting a similar policy. We chose trade policy as our issue because observational studies have identified trade between countries as one of the key channels in which policy emulation occurs (Greenhill, Mosley and Prakash 2009; Lee and Strang 2006). We devised a novel survey instrument to measure citizens' perceived "peer-ness" across a range of countries before the treatments and randomly assigned respondents to read fact-based news articles about their neighboring countries (South Korea and China) signing trade agreements. We then solicited their opinion on their own government signing a trade agreement with China.

In the study, foreign news treatments are two-by-two factorial design, which randomly flip the main subject of the news between South Korea (relatively perceived as "peer" by Japanese and Taiwanese citizens) and China (relatively perceived as "non-peer"), and change the contents of the news between an estimated 2% GDP boost ("Economic Growth Treatment") and which sector benefits and loses domestically in the county of the main subject consistent with the sector-based, Ricardo-Viner predictions ("Winner and Loser Treatment"). The fifth group is a placebo group in which reports a factual news about the annual meeting of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) held in Nagoya City, Japan, on the

exact same day that South Korea and China concluded the negotiation for the trade agreement on November 10, 2014.

The results suggest that the effect of foreign news exposure can be polarizing. Foreign news exposure encourages emulative preference formation for those who perceive a foreign country to be their peer, but can provoke backlash reactions if the foreign country is not perceived as a peer. Our Korea Economic Growth treatment ("peer success") decreases opposition to the respondents' own government signing a trade agreement with China around 6 percentage points in the Taiwan sample compared to the placebo group. We find no such treatment effects for the news about China Economic Growth ("non-peer success"), consistent with our hypothesis. The emulative preference formation (i.e., increase in support for a trade agreement with China) is concentrated among those who rated South Korea to be similar to Taiwan before the treatment, although the interaction effects between the treatment and a dummy variable indicating respondents who rated South Korea to be a peer are statistically insignificant.

By contrast, foreign news exposure increases opposition to the respondents' government entering an agreement with China around 8 percentage points in Japan, compared to the placebo group. This backlashed preference formation (i.e., decrease in support for a trade agreement with China) is concentrated among those who rated South Korea to be dissimilar to Japan, recorded before the treatment, although the interaction effects between the treatment and a dummy variable indicating respondents who rated South Korea to be dissimilar are imprecisely estimated.

We further validate emulation vs. backlash preference formation by leveraging text analyses of 4,500 open-ended, post-treatment responses where respondents briefly explained why they support or oppose their own government entering a trade agreement

with China. Korea Economic Growth treatment was associated with 5 percentage points and 3 percentage points increase in the probability that Taiwanese and Japanese respondents, respectively, would cite "benefits to the national economy" as a reason to support their governments entering a similar agreement. The effect of China Economic Growth treatment (non-peer success) on the probability of respondents citing "benefits to the national economy" is statistically insignificant, lending further support to the emulation-among-peer hypothesis.

Moreover, both Korean and Chinese Economic Growth treatments increased anti-China sentiments expressed amongst Japanese respondents (e.g., "I don't like China", "China hates us") by 4 percentage points. This effect is concentrated among those who rated South Korea to be dissimilar to their own country, although the interaction effects between each treatment and a dummy variable indicating those who rated South Korea to be dissimilar, are not statistically significant at 5% level. In post-experiment analysis, we further show that both historical animosity against South Korea and China and economic insecurity are the two sources of backlash. Together, our findings question the optimism about policy convergence across countries as technology lowers the cost of acquiring information across borders.

Our study advances the literature on policy emulation by providing some of the first experimental evidence on emulative preference formation among citizens when they are exposed to information about foreign government policy. Our research contributes to the growing literature on sources and consequences of backlash against policy emulation, convergence and globalization. We demonstrate, in the domain of trade policy, it is not partisan or ideological identification of citizens but is instead, their predispositions about other countries being their "peers" that facilitates or blocks

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emulative preference formation. Finally, the field of international political economy has examined how educating citizens with information about well-established economic models, such as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of international trade, can guide citizen preference formation along citizen self-economic interests (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Rho and Tomz 2017; Naoi 2020). We show that peer reference is a critical component in learning and updating citizen briefs with the information about foreign government policy. Information about well-established trade models do not inform economic self-interests, but rather, shift public opinion through increasing concerns for the national economy and economic rivalry.

What We Know (and Don't Know) about Policy Emulation

What do citizens learn from information about foreign government policy and its effect on foreign society? Voluminous literature exists on policy emulation, which we define as: "actors model *a policy* on the examples provided by others, where one key set of connections are peer-based reference groups" (Strang and Lee 2006: p.899).[3] The observational evidence abounds across fields of American Politics, Comparative Politics and International Relations to support the "emulation-among-peer" argument. Scholars have demonstrated policy emulation across U.S. states with similar ideological make-ups and geographic proximity (Volden 2006), and among countries that are geographically proximate, highly trade dependent or share colonial history (Simmons and Elkins 2006; and Greenhill, Mosely and Prakash 2009).

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[3] We replaced the word 'behavior' in the original definition with 'policy' to be consistent with the focus of our paper.

Yet these studies on policy emulation or diffusion have often suffered from observational equivalence between "myopic" policy diffusion (governments adopting similar policy without learning from each other, e.g., responding to a common shock or policy problem) and actual learning among policy-makers. Volden, Ting and Carpenter (2008) formally demonstrate both game-theoretic (i.e., allow actors to learn from each other) and decision-theoretic (i.e., individual governments make decisions without strategic interactions) models can produce policy diffusions. As they contend, "scholars must redirect our efforts toward providing evidence that distinguishes between policy diffusion and myopic choice (p.327)." They advocate scholars demonstrate the existence of success-based learning (the effectiveness of the policy adopted by others increases the adoption of similar policies), because the success-based learning is only predicted by the learning-based diffusion (i.e., game-theoretic diffusion model) and not by the myopic version (p.328).

The second issue with the policy emulation and diffusion literature is that scholars have extensively studied learning among policy elites with scant attention to voters (see Graham et al. 2013 for a comprehensive survey of the literature). The exception is Quinn and Toyoda (2007), which demonstrates that voter ideology, measured by the changes in vote shares of Communist Parties and pro-capitalist parties across 82 nations, accounts for cross-national variations in international capital account regulation between 1955 to 1999. However, Quinn and Toyoda (2007) are interested in voter preference as an explanatory variable, not the outcome to be explained. The inclusion of country fixed effects in their specifications does not allow them to capture the spread of ideas among voters across different countries (see Berry and Berry 1990) either. In sum, we still lack evidence on whether the emulation-among-peer mechanism

holds for citizens, beyond simple observed convergence of opinions and norms across national borders.

A growing set of public opinion studies has demonstrated exposure to information about foreign elites or foreign governments can change public opinion. Duch and Stevenson (2008) and Kayser and Peress (2012) have found "benchmarking" in economic voting where citizens assess their government competence based on how their economy is doing relative to their neighboring countries in Europe. Huang (2015), with survey experiments in China, finds that respondents are more likely to lower their evaluation of Chinese government competence when exposed to news about a foreign governments' stellar economic performance.

Other experimental studies find that a message from foreign elites or foreign government can shift public opinion by functioning as a "cue" that fills an information gap for voters. Chapman (2011), Hayes and Guardino (2010 and 2011) and Guardino and Hayes (2017) find that messages from foreign elites and international institutions, reported in American television news, lowered American public support for the Iraq War and the U.S. President's use of force.[4] Walter et al. (2018) show that a signal from foreign actors, such as the European Central Bank, shifted Greek public opinion on negotiating further on the bailout proposal during the Eurozone crisis in 2015.

These emerging experimental studies have demonstrated that information about foreign elites or foreign governments can have causal effects on public opinion through

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[4] Communication literature has also shown that exposure to news about foreign countries affects issue salience among citizens and how favorably they perceive foreign countries. See Salwen and Matera 1989; Wanta, Golan and Lee 2004.

cue and endorsement effects. Yet, the outcome of interest in these studies is not policy emulation, i.e., whether exposure to information about foreign government policy and its effects on foreign society ("foreign news") mobilizes citizen support for their own government adopting a similar policy. Moreover, while some of the studies cited above varied the nationality of foreign endorsers in treatments, their choice of nationalities mentioned in the treatments are not guided by theories of policy diffusion and emulation.

The Emulation-among-Peer among Citizens

We build our emulation-among-peer hypothesis on the following three premises about the informational environment surrounding citizens in well-developed democracies.

Premise 1: Low Information about Forthcoming Policies

Our first premise is well-established: citizens rarely know how a forthcoming policy will affect their welfare unless they have prior experience with it or rely on accessible cues (Popkin 1994; Lupia 1994; Guisinger 2009). Guisinger (2009; 2017) demonstrates that trade policy is a quintessential low-information issue area where American voters have a low-level of knowledge and the issue is of low salience during elections. Similarly, empirical tests of the pocket-book theory of economic voting have shown that even when voters have actual personal experience with the economy (e.g., rise or decline of income or job losses etc.), they often have difficulty discerning who and what policy is responsible for the changes in their personal finances (Gomez and Wilson 2001; 2006). In this low-information environment, citizens often rely on elite cues, coming from legislators, political parties and the media (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Bullock, Hill and Huber 2016). Yet, media reporting of domestic government

actions can be partisan or polarized. Foreign news — media reporting on foreign government actions – can fill the void caused by partisan and polarized media by serving as a cue that guides the process of citizen preference formation.

Premise 2: High Predispositions about Foreign Countries that Function as "Cues"

In contrast with low information about forthcoming policies, citizens have strong predispositions about the world and other countries, such as whether a foreign country is "successful" or whether the country is their country's "peer". Citizen predispositions, defined here as relatively enduring political or cultural orientations, are shaped through their interactions with family and friends, schools, communities and elites, including the media (Zaller 1992; Jensen and Oster 2009). Long-standing literature has shown that American attitudes toward other countries are determined by their perceived similarity with the United States (Nincic and Russett 1979) and that media coverage of a foreign country substantially shapes public attitudes toward a given country (Wanta et al. 2004).

The idea that citizens have high predispositions about other countries breaks away from the conventional wisdom that foreign news–information about foreign government actions–is generally of low salience unless it directly threatens the safety or income of citizens (Entman 2004). Experimental studies that manipulate a country name or country of origin of goods and immigrants have shown how a country name serves as a powerful cue for citizens by signaling the type of a government (e.g. poor or rich, trustworthy vs. untrustworthy), the character of an immigrant or asylum seeker (e.g. high-skilled or low-skilled), and the quality of a product (e.g. high or low quality) (see Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016).

In the context of trade policy, studies have found that respondents express stronger policy positions on trade policy when the survey asks their opinion on increasing trade with a specific partner country, rather than asking their general opinion toward increasing trade (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Chiang, Liu and Wen 2013; Kuo and Naoi 2016). Empirical evidence on the effect of "country of origin" labels on consumer choices, accumulated in the field of marketing studies, corroborate with this finding. Consumers in both developed and developing economies infer product quality and types of foreign products from the country of origin label (Laroche et al. 2005).[5]

Taken together, we argue that when citizens have low information about a forthcoming policy and high predispositions about other countries, citizens rely on information about a peer country's policy and its effects on a foreign society (we call this "foreign news" throughout the paper) as a cue that guides their policy preference. This effect is akin to the "precedent effect" extensively studied in the literature on court opinions and elite decision-making (Shaufer 1987; Lupu and Voeten 2012). Smithey (2001), for instance, finds that high court judges in Canada and South Africa relied on foreign case law for "cutting information costs, decreasing uncertainty and providing

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[5] Our surveys conducted in Japan and Taiwan further lend support to the premise that citizens have high predispositions about foreign countries. Our respondents have stronger opinions about whether or not other countries are their peers than they have about their positions on trade policy, both measured before our treatments. In 5-point Likert scale, 32% of Japanese respondents took the most extreme position that South Korea is either "very dissimilar" or "very similar" to Japan, while 18% of them took the most extreme position on trade attitudes that increasing imports is either "very good" or "very bad".

justification" (p.1188) when the case was highly contentious domestically. Likewise, Hayes and Guardino (2011) find that foreign elite endorsement is effective in strengthening pre-existing briefs among the public when there is an informational void in domestic politics.

Premise 3: Perceived Peer-ness as an Effective Cue

Whether citizens learn from (i.e., update their preference) the information about a foreign government's policy and its effects depends on perceived peer-ness of the foreign government. This perceived peer-ness might originate from a variety of factors such as a similar level of economic development, linguistic or cultural affinity, ideological make-up and geographical proximity. By contrast, perceived non-peer-ness can originate from two sources: perceived differences in the levels of economic, political and social development or culture and status hierarchy (i.e., one country is perceived as ranked higher or lower) (Lake 2009).

Building on the three premises of informational environment discussed above, we derive the following testable implication and its null counterpart:

H1: Peer Success Hypothesis: Exposure to news reporting on a peer country's policy success is more likely to mobilize support among citizens for their own government adopting a similar policy.

H1a: Non-peer Success Hypothesis: Exposure to news reporting about a non-peer country's policy success has a null effect on support among citizens for their own government adopting a similar policy.

We then predict cross-country heterogeneity of citizen responses between the two

otherwise similar economies with varying citizen perception about which country is their peer.

> ***H2: Cross-country Heterogeneous Treatment Effects:*** Exposure to news reporting on a peer country's policy success is more likely to mobilize support for a similar policy in a country with a high proportion of citizens perceiving the foreign country to be their peer than in an otherwise similar country with a lower proportion of such citizens.

Finally, our theory predicts the same patterns hold for within-country subgroups:

> ***H3: Within-country Heterogeneous Treatment Effects***: Citizens who perceive a foreign country, in news, to be their peer are more likely to support their own government adopting a similar policy than citizens who perceive the country to be non-peer.

Research Design

To test our hypotheses, we designed and conducted coordinated survey experiments on public support for a forthcoming free trade agreement with China in Japan and Taiwan from December of 2015 to January of 2016.[6] Bilateral trade agreements constitute an ideal empirical domain to test our hypotheses. Voters have little information about potential impacts of a forthcoming trade agreement with a foreign country because they have no first-hand experience with it, and the content of

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[6] Due to space constraints, we do not report the results of the pilot survey conducted in summer of 2015 here but rather offer them in supplementary documentation available by request.

a trade agreement is complex, spanning over 5,000 product lines with regulatory provisions (Naoi and Urata 2013).

The Sample Design. Our respondents were sampled from opt-in panelists registered with online survey companies, Nikkei Research (Japan) and Pollster Online Survey (Taiwan), and were aged between 20 and 60. For each country, our survey sample approximates the national census in age,[7] gender, and location of residence. The sample size was 2,151 in Japan and 2,390 in Taiwan. The surveys were conducted in tandem in two countries: from December 13, 2015, to January 5, 2016 in Japan and from December 18, 2015 to January 8, 2016 in Taiwan.

We chose citizens residing in Japan and Taiwan as our study sample for four reasons. First, neither Japan nor Taiwan has signed a bilateral trade agreement with China, making them appropriate subjects to test how news about foreign government actions change voter attitudes toward a forthcoming policy. Second, the two countries are similar in their levels of economic development, an export-oriented economic structure with sizeable manufacturing sectors, and mixed electoral systems for legislatures (single-member district and proportional representation systems). Third, Japan and Taiwan compete against South Korea for electronic manufacturing export and market shares, whereas they stand to lose heavily from the competition with China in agriculture and labor-intensive manufacturing industries.

Finally, during the time period we conducted our survey experiments, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea all had conservative parties in governments (Japan's Liberal

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[7] The age cutoff at sixty is due to technical difficulty ensuring high-age respondents in on-line surveys, especially in Taiwan.

Democratic Party, Taiwan's Kuomingtang and South Korea's Saenuri Party). The similarity in the ruling party's ideology allows us to test an alternative mechanism of emulation discussed in Quinn and Toyoda (2007) on how voter ideology, measured by ideological leaning of the party in power, affects emulative preference formation. These similarities make the results from our coordinated survey experiments more comparable than any two randomly chosen countries.

We note, however, Taiwanese citizens have been exposed to more information about possible effects of trade agreements with China. Taiwan had signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China in 2011. While ECFA is a framework agreement such that the two governments did not reach concrete agreements on the majority of trade issues, it nonetheless lowered tariffs for more than 500 products and Taiwanese citizens perceived it as a trade agreement.[8] Taiwan had also signed a service trade agreement with China in 2013, though it had been withheld since student protests in March, 2014, known as the "Sunflower Movement" (see Ho 2015). We address these issues by asking several outcome questions in Taiwan, such as attitudes toward deeper economic integration with China as well as attitudes for a merchandise or service trade agreement with China.

The Experimental Design. Our respondents were randomly assigned to five groups of approximately 440 respondents each. In each of the four treatment groups, respondents were asked to read a fact-based news article about South Korea and China concluding negotiations for a free trade agreement on November 10, 2014. The four

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[8] ECFA is also referred to as "trade deal," "trade pact," "free-trade agreement" in news reports from *CNN*, *BBC*, and *The Economist*.

treatment groups follow a two-by-two factorial design and vary their contents of the news in two dimensions: (i) whether the news reports the agreement's estimated effects on the national economy or its effects on sectors that benefit and lose from the agreement consistent with the sector-based, Ricardo-Viner predictions, and (ii) whether the news refers to South Korea (relatively perceived to be "peer") as the main subject or China (relatively perceived to be "non-peer") as the main subject. The key idea is to hold the general welfare and distributional effects of the trade agreement constant, while flipping the main subject of the news between a peer vs. non-peer country.

We use the two well-established effects of trade in the field of International Economics as descriptors of the estimated effect of the Korea-China trade agreement: that trade liberalization increases national welfare (e.g., estimated 2% GDP growth) and that it creates winners and losers along a sectoral line (export-oriented industries benefit, and import-competing industries lose). We chose to use the prediction from a sectoral, Ricardo-Viner model over skill-based prediction as a treatment content, because our collection of newspaper articles reporting the conclusion of this trade agreement in Japan and Taiwan reveals that estimates and predictions along export-oriented vs. import-competing sectors dominate the reporting over the skill-based discussion (see Rho and Tomz 2017; Naoi 2020).

The fifth group serves as a placebo, where we randomly assign a fact-based news article on the World Conference on Education for Sustainable Development held by the United Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the City of Nagoya, Japan. We chose this news for a placebo for two reasons: (i) major Japanese and Taiwanese newspapers reported this UNESCO meeting news on the exact same day as the news on the trade agreement between Korea and China, and (ii) the content

of the news is global in nature but has little to do with trade policy or the world economy. We held the foreign news article layout and length constant and only varied the news content across our experimental conditions.[9] **Table 1** summarizes our experimental design described above. Our experimental groups are well-balanced in key demographics co-variates. The balance table and the English translation of news articles for each country can be found in the appendix.

Table 1: A Summary of the Experimental Design

Frame of the Foreign News	*Subject of the Foreign News*	
	South Korea ("peer")	China ("non-peer")
National Economic Growth (2% bump in GDP)	Group 1 (G1): **Korea** Economic Growth	Group 3 (G3): **China** Economic Growth
Sectoral Winner and Loser (*E*lectronics vs. *A*griculture)	Group 2 (G2): **Korea** Winner (*E*) and Loser (*A*)	Group 4 (G4): **China** Winner (*A*) and Loser (*E*)
Group 5 (G5): Placebo Group (UNESCO Annual Meeting)		

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[9] The survey flow and visual look of our experimental design can be found in Appendix A2 and A3.

Our experiment involved minimal deception. The event reported in the news as well as the information describing the welfare and distributional effects of this agreement for citizens in Korea and China are factual, based on articles we collected from the major newspapers in Japan and Taiwan. For instance, on July 5, 2014, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, a right-leaning Japanese newspaper, reported that the trade agreement between China and Korea would boost the Korean economy up to 3% of its GDP and benefit Korean manufacturers of industrial goods.[10] On the same day, *China Times*, a right-leaning Taiwanese newspaper, reported estimates of 2.3% growth in GDP provided by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and Korean manufacturing industries.[11] On November 11, 2014, *Liberty Times*, a left-leaning Taiwanese newspaper, reported a backlash against the trade agreement with China among South Korean farmers who expected that "the FTA would make the Korean agriculture already in trouble much worse."[12] Note also that these distributional implications of the trade agreement as reported in the news are consistent with the well-known Ricardo-Viner model of international trade, which predicts that export-

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[10] "China and South Korea close to conclude a trade agreement," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 5 July 2014.

[11] "Hard to Secure the Minimal Wage of 22K," *China Times*, 5 July 2014.

[12] "Polarized Reactions to FTA in South Korea: A Backlash among Farmers," *Liberty Times*, 11 November 2014. These estimates on the agreement's boost to South Korea's GDP have been adjusted downward after the actual signing of the agreement. On June 2, 2015, *United Daily*, another right-leaning Taiwanese newspaper, reported that the agreement will bring 0.96% bump in Korea's GDP. See "China-Korea FTA signed," *United Daily*, 2 June 2015.

oriented sectors benefit further from trade liberalization and import-competing sectors lose from it (Ricardo 1955).

Pre-treatment Similarity Ratings. Before the foreign news treatment, respondents were asked to rate the similarity between their home countries and the following seven countries: United States, Germany, United Kingdom, South Korea, China, Singapore and Taiwan (for Japanese respondents) or Japan (for Taiwanese respondents). These countries were chosen by varying their regime types (China and Singapore are authoritarian, the rest is democratic), their levels of economic development (China is a developing economy, the rest is developed), ethnic make-ups (China, Taiwan and Singapore have a large ethnic Chinese population, while South Korea and Japan are ethnically Asian but not majority Chinese) and geography (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, China and Taiwan are in Asia, while the rest are in Western Europe and North America).

The exact wording of this survey question is "We talk about whether Japan (or Taiwan) and other countries are similar or dissimilar in politics, economy and culture etc. What do you think of the following countries, are they similar or dissimilar to Japan (or Taiwan)"? Respondents rate in a five-point Likert scale: "Similar," "Somewhat similar," "Can't say one or the other," "Somewhat dissimilar," or "Dissimilar." We dichotomize the responses to create dummy variables indicating if respondents chose "somewhat similar" or "similar" and zero otherwise. These provide subjective measures to proxy whether a foreign country is Japan's or Taiwan's peer.

We also asked respondents' general attitudes toward free trade before the treatment in each group: "We ask you about import liberalization, i.e., goods made in foreign countries coming into Japan at a lower price. Which opinion is closer to yours?

A: Good thing because low-income people can buy goods at lower price, B: Bad thing because it threatens Japanese (or Taiwanese) workers' jobs and income," where respondents choose from a five-point Likert scale, "Closer to A, somewhat closer to A, can't say one or the other, somewhat closer to B, closer to B."

Table 2 reports summary statistics of pre-treatment variables and demographic variables. We note the major differences in Japan and Taiwan in their similarity ratings of foreign countries. 47% of Taiwanese respondents think that Taiwan is similar or somewhat similar to South Korea, and 27% think that Taiwan is similar or somewhat similar to China. In the Japanese sample, however, only 15% of Japanese feel that Japan is similar or somewhat similar to South Korea and 5% of them think that Japan is similar or somewhat similar to China.[13] Our Hypothesis 2 (Cross-country HTE) predicts Korea Growth Treatment ("peer success") mobilizes respondents' support for a government

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[13] The low-level of similarity rating among the Japanese respondents is a general pattern across a diverse set of countries they were asked to rate. The top two countries Japanese respondents perceived to be similar to their own were Taiwan and Germany, but even then, only around one-quarter of respondents rated them similar to Japan (27% for Taiwan and 26% for Germany). This stands in stark contrast to the Taiwanese sample where the top two countries rated similar to Taiwan were South Korea and Japan (47% for South Korea and 44% for Japan). We can speculate why Japan and Taiwan differ, perhaps because Japanese language is only spoken in Japan, while Chinese language is spoken by 20% of the world population, but exploring this difference is beyond the scope of this paper.

adopting a similar policy in Taiwan and this effect to be smaller or null in the Japanese sample.

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Demographic Covariates

Variable	Japan (n=2075)				Taiwan (n= 2390)			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max
Age	42.40	10.25	20	60	38.99	10.68	20	60
Female	0.48	0.49	0	1	0.54	0.49	0	1
College	0.58	0.49	0	1	0.64	0.48	0	1
Manufacture	0.16	0.36	0	1	0.22	0.42	0	1
Service	0.44	0.49	0	1	0.63	0.48	0	1
Protectionist	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.21	0.40	0	1
Similar2Korea	0.16	0.36	0	1	0.71	0.45	0	1
Similar2China	0.50	0.22	0	1	0.47	0.49	0	1
LDP	0.21	0.40	0	1	--	--	--	--
KMT	--	--	--	--	0.17	0.38	0	1
Opposing a FTA	0.44	0.49	0	1	--	--	--	--
Opposing deeper integration	--	--	--	--	0.23	0.42	0	1

Post-treatment Open-ended Responses. We asked an open-ended question immediately after our main outcome question for respondents to write their reason(s) for supporting vs. opposing a trade agreement with China. We classified 4,500 written responses into topics by human-coding and unsupervised machine learning (clustering) and analyzed the effect of treatments on the proportion of responses.

Foreign News and Emulative Preference Formation

Our dependent variable is *Opposition to a Trade Agreement with China*. This variable is constructed from a survey question asking whether respondents agree or disagree with the statement that "Japan (or Taiwan) should also sign a trade agreement with China" after the foreign news treatments. Our Taiwan survey used identical phrasing of questions as the Japanese counter-part but solicit support for the three policy outcomes: deeper economic integration with China, a forthcoming merchandise trade

agreement with China, and a service trade agreement with China.[14] We recode original, five-point Likert scale responses ("Agree," "Somewhat Agree," "Can't say one or the other," "Somewhat disagree," "Disagree") to a dichotomous variable indicating the value of one for respondents who chose "oppose" or "somewhat oppose" the trade agreement or deeper economic integration with China and zero otherwise. We estimate the average treatment effect (hereafter "ATE") of each treatment indicator against the placebo group using a linear probability model.[15]

Table 3: Peer Emulation Effects in Japan and Taiwan, OLS Estimates

Sample	Japan	Taiwan		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	Opposing a trade agreement with China	Opposing deeper integration with China	Opposing a Merchandise Trade Agreement with China	Opposing the Service Trade Agreement with China
Group 1 (G1): Korea Economic Growth	-0.017 (0.034)	**-0.068**** (0.026)**	-0.013 (0.025)	**-0.063* (0.026)**
Group 2 (G2): Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	-0.003 (0.033)	0.003 (0.025)	0.026 (0.024)	0.024 (0.025)
Group 3 (G3): China Economic Growth	0.021 (0.034)	-0.043+ (0.026)	0.010 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.026)
Group 4 (G4): China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	**0.075* (0.034)**	-0.001 (0.026)	0.021 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.026)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2075	2390	2390	2390

Note: Group 5 (placebo group) is excluded as our base category. Our control variables include pre-treatment protectionist attitude, age, female, college education, income categories, and manufacturing and service sectors of employment. These OLS estimates are in line with alternative logit estimates reported in Appendix Table A7.1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

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[14] This aims to accommodate the country-specific context in Taiwan. When we conducted our survey experiment in December of 2015, the service trade agreement with China remained withheld in Taiwan.

[15] We also provide coefficient estimates from the alternative logit specification in the online supplementary materials, Appendix Tables A7.

Table 3, column 1 reports the OLS estimate of the ATE for each treatment in the Japanese sample. The results suggest that, contrary to H1, Korea Growth Treatment ("peer success") does not mobilize additional support for Japanese government entering a trade agreement with China. We explore below whether this is due to a much smaller proportion of respondents who perceive South Korea to be their peer (H2) and whether foreign news is polarizing (i.e., mobilizes support among some, and opposition among others, and in aggregate, these effects offset each other to produce null results). We find support for both interpretations. Consistent with H1a, China Growth Treatment ("non-peer success") has null effects on their support for the trade agreement.

Contrary to our expectation, China Winner and Loser Treatment (G4, i.e., Chinese agriculture wins, electronic industry loses from the trade agreement) increases the Japanese opposition to a trade agreement with China by 8 percentage points compared to the placebo group (UNESCO annual meeting news).

The results from the Taiwanese sample are reported in **Table 3,** column 2 to column 4. Consistent with the H1, Korea Economic Growth Treatment reduces Taiwanese respondents' opposition to a deeper economic integration and the service trade agreement with China by 6 percentage points. China Economic Growth Treatment ("non-peer success") has no statistically significant effects on respondents' support for a trade agreement, lending support to H1a. [16]

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[16] These results are robust under the alternative logit specification. For logit estimates of these results, see Appendix Tables A7.1-3.

Together, we find strong and robust support for H1, H1a, and H2. Foreign news that reports a peer country's success mobilizes support for a government adopting a similar policy (H1) but news about a non-peer country's success produces null effects (H1a). Furthermore, Korea Growth Treatment mobilizes support among the Taiwanese sample, in which a higher proportion of respondents (45%) perceive South Korea to be their peer, but not among the Japanese sample in which a much lower proportion of respondents perceive South Korea as their peer country (H2).

We conduct two sets of statistical tests on Hypothesis 3 (within-country HTE): one with a split sample of subgroups that rate South Korea to be similar vs. dissimilar, and another estimating the interaction effects between the treatments and this subgroup dummy. **Table 4** reports the results of our subgroup analyses. Column 1 reports treatment effects among Japanese who rated South Korea as "similar" or "somewhat similar." Column 2 reports treatment effects among Japanese who rated South Korea as "somewhat dissimilar" or "dissimilar." Likewise, Column 3 reports treatment effects among Taiwanese who rated South Korea as "similar" or "somewhat similar" and Column 4, "somewhat dissimilar" or "dissimilar."

The results suggest peer-success treatment increases support for a trade agreement around 7 percentage points among respondents who rated South Korea to be similar in the Taiwan sample. The backlash effects we observe in the Japanese sample are also concentrated among those who rated South Korea to be dissimilar to Japan (column 1). Yet, when we interact the treatment dummies with the subgroup dummies, the coefficients of interactions are imprecisely estimated as shown in columns 3 and 6 of **Table 4**. The results lend suggestive but not robust evidence to support H3.

Table 4: Emulation Effects in Japan and Taiwan by Similarity Ratings, OLS Estimates

Sample	Japan			Taiwan		
Subsample: Similar to Korea	Yes	No	Full	Yes	No	Full
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Opposing a trade agreement with China			Opposing deeper economic integration with China		
Group 1 (G1): Korea Economic Growth	-0.090+ (0.051)	0.015 (0.044)	-0.012 (0.036)	-0.073* (0.029)	-0.033 (0.052)	-0.039 (0.049)
Group 2 (G2): Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	-0.033 (0.050)	0.013 (0.044)	- 0.011 (0.036)	0.001 (0.029)	0.008 (0.049)	0.044 (0.045)
Group 3 (G3): China Economic Growth	-0.003 (0.050)	0.036 (0.044)	0.012 (0.036)	-0.028 (0.030)	-0.084+ (0.050)	-0.048 (0.047)
Group 4 (G4): China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	0.007 (0.052)	0.104* (0.043)	0.086* (0.037)	0.001 (0.029)	-0.022 (0.052)	0.003 (0.048)
Sim2Korea			-0.118+ (0.067)			-0.010 (0.039)
Sim2Korea*G1			-0.025 (0.094)			-0.032 (0.057)
Sim2Korea*G2			-0.071 (0.092)			-0.028 (0.054)
Sim2Korea*G3			0.062 (0.093)			0.044 (0.056)
Sim2Korea*G4			-0.034 (0.091)			-0.022 (0.057)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	810	1265	2075	1708	682	2390

Note: This table summarizes the heterogeneous treatment effects by pre-treatment measure of respondents' perceived similarity between South Korea and their home country (Japan or Taiwan). Models (1) and (4) were the OLS estimates for the respondents who rated South Korea "somewhat similar" or "similar" to their home country, and Models (2) and (5) were the OLS estimates for the respondents who rated South Korea "somewhat dissimilar" or "dissimilar" to their home country. For the respondents who rated South Korea "neither similar nor dissimilar" to their home country (474 in the Japanese sample and 587 in the Taiwanese), we grouped them into subsamples of being rated as similar to Korea. We did so in order to split the full sample as evenly as possible. Group 5 (placebo group; UNESCO annual meeting news) is excluded as our base category. Models (3) and (6) were OLS estimates from interaction term specification. Our control variables include pre-treatment protectionist attitude, age, female, college education, income categories, and (manufacturing and service) sectors of employment. The summary statistics for each control variable is reported in **Table 2.** These OLS estimates are in line with alternative logit estimates reported in Appendix Table A7.2. ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$

Overall, we find robust and strong evidence to support peer-success and non-peer success hypotheses (H1a and H1b) in the Taiwan sample and heterogeneous peer-ness perceptions accounting for cross-country differences between Taiwanese and Japanese samples (H2). However, we did not expect foreign news treatment mobilizing opposition against a trade agreement with China in the Japan sample. The next section further analyzes the mechanism underlying this backlash by leveraging text analyses of 4,500 open-end responses.

Letting Respondents Explain Trade Preferences: Evidence from Open-Ended Responses

We further conduct analyses of post-treatment open-ended responses where respondents explain why they support or oppose a trade agreement with China immediately after answering our outcome question (five-point Likert scale supporting or opposing its own government entering a trade agreement with China). We received 2,151 responses for Japan and 2,390 for Taiwan.

We categorize these open-end responses into 12 categories for Japan and 16 categories for Taiwan, based on human-coding by a five-person team with native fluency in Japanese and Taiwanese. Categorization is done by key words used in responses which are not mutually-exclusive. The top three reasons Japanese respondents cite for their support or opposition to a trade agreement with China are: (i) Not sufficient information or don't know enough (22.7%), (ii) Lack of trust in China (13.6%), and (iii) Questionable product quality (11%).[17] In the Taiwanese sample, the

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[17] We exclude the residual category of "other" (13.57%) from the list of top three reasons.

top three reasons respondents cite for their support or opposition to a trade agreement with China are: (i) Benefits Taiwanese economy (18.5%), (ii) Insufficient information or don't know enough (13.4%), and (iii) Pro-cooperation (10%). The proportion of each human-coded topic categories is reported in **Table 5**.

Table 5: Human-Coded Categories of Open-Ended Responses, Japanese and Taiwanese Sample

Panel (A): Japan (n= 2052)		Panel (B): Taiwan (n=2390)	
Topic category	%	Topic category	%
Not enough info/don't know	23.4%	**Benefit TW Economy**	**18.5%**
Others	13.7%	Not enough info/don't know	12.2%
Trust	12.8%	Pro-Cooperation	10 %
Product quality	12.4%	Concerns for losing independence	9.5%
Mention of merits or demerits	6.9%	Big market in China	8.6%
Anti-China	**6.8%**	No Benefit to TW/Economy	6.5%
Chinese communism, system, govt	3.9%	Others (including comments)	6.9%
No rule or enforcement	3.8%	Uncodable	5.7%
No benefits to JP/JP economy	3.7%	Pro-trade, globalization	5.6%
Uncodable	3.6%	**Anti-China**	**4.9%**
Benefit JP economy	**3.3%**	Peace, destiny, trend	4.6%
Threats to JP economy/industry/workers	2.4%	For every plus there is a minus	3.7%
Big market	2.2%	Pro-China	1.4%
JP exports	1.1%	Benefit industry, labor, consumer	1.1%
		Product quality	0.9%
		Competition with Korea	0.5%

Note: Table summarizes the results of our human-coding of open-ended responses to why Japanese respondents would support vs. oppose a free trade agreement with China and why Taiwanese respondents would oppose deeper economic integration with China. Two coders for each sample, for a total of four coders, read and categorized these texts by tagging key words, leading to 14 topic categories in the Japanese sample (A) and 16 topic categories in the Taiwanese sample (B). Online supplementary materials will provide the examples of key words for each topical category.

As **Table 5** shows, what is striking about these open-end responses is how little statements about distributional implications of trade (e.g., manufacturing or agricultural sector, their own job security or consumer price benefits) have appeared in both surveys, especially in the Japanese survey. The results from Japanese and Taiwanese samples suggest that the Heckscher-Ohlin, Ricardo-Viner or Melitz theories of trade perform rather poorly in predicting how citizens explain their positions on trade agreements.

This is surprising given that our treatments solely focused on economic costs and benefits of a trade agreement, consistent with what has long been taught in economics textbooks (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Rho and Tomz 2017). Only 3% of Japanese responses cited the trade agreement's benefit to Japanese exports and only 2.5% of respondents cited China's threat to the Japanese economy, industries or workers as a reason to oppose a trade agreement. Only eight respondents (0.3%) cited the effect of a trade agreement with China on lowering consumer price and only one respondent cited its effects on his/her job.

In the Taiwanese sample, while 18.5% of respondents mentioned the trade agreement's benefits to the Taiwanese economy, few people mentioned its effects on economic interests at industry or personal levels. Only around 5% of respondents consider the benefits to or loss of Taiwanese industries, employment or consumer welfare.

To further validate our emulation-among-peer hypothesis, we generate a dummy variable indicating one if respondents mention "benefit Japanese (or Taiwanese) economy" and zero otherwise. We then regress this binary dependent variable on our treatment indicators. **Table 6,** columns 1 and 2, show that Korea Economic Growth Treatment (G1: "peer success") increases those who cited "benefit to national economy"

as a reason to support a trade agreement with China by 4 percent points in Japan and 5

percent points Taiwan. These results are in line with our hypothesis H1.

Table 6: "Peer Success" and Emulative Learning, OLS Estimates

Sample	Japan	Taiwan
Model	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	Benefit JP or TW economy	
Group 1 (G1):	**0.036****	**0.052***
Korea Economic Growth	**(0.012)**	**(0.025)**
Group 2 (G2):	0.021+	0.001
Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	(0.012)	(0.024)
Group 3 (G3):	0.015	**0.056***
China Economic Growth	(0.012)	**(0.025)**
Group 4 (G4):	0.011	-0.020
China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	(0.012)	(0.025)
Top-frequency Topic category	No	Yes
% Total Responses	3.3%	18.5%
Control Variables	Yes	Yes
Observations	2075	2390

Note: The table summarizes results of regressing two dependent variables on a set of dummy variables for our experimental treatment groups, respectively, for the Japanese and Taiwanese sample. The two dependent variables are drawn from human-coded responses to the open-ended question on why a respondent would support or oppose a trade agreement with China in the Japanese sample, and why a respondent would support or oppose deeper economic integration with China in the Taiwanese sample. For each column, the dependent variable is a binary outcome variable, with the value of one for statements related to "benefit Japan's economy" or "benefit Taiwan's economy" in responses to the open-ended question, respectively, in Japan and Taiwan, and otherwise zero. The reported marginal effects of experimental treatments and standard errors (in parentheses) are drawn from OLS estimates. Group 5 (placebo group; UNESCO annual meeting news) is excluded as our base category. Our control variables include pre-treatment protectionist attitude, age, female, college education, income categories, and (manufacturing and service) sectors of employment. The summary of statistics for each control variable is reported in Table 2. These OLS estimates are in line with alternative logit estimates reported in Appendix Table A7.3. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$

Sources of Anti-China Sentiments Expressed in the Japanese Sample

The results from the open-ended survey responses in Japan and Taiwan lend strong support to the H1. These results differ from the null results in the Likert-scale responses from the Japanese sample, where Korea Economic Growth Treatment (G1) produces null effects on respondents' opposition to a trade agreement in China. We suspect from the inconsistent results that foreign news treatment might be polarizing –i.e., it mobilizes support for a similar policy among some, while it fuels opposition among others, and these two effects in aggregate might have offset each other to produce the null results in a Likert scale responses.

To sort out this polarization effect, we leverage open-ended responses expressing anti-China sentiments. *Anti-China* responses are coded one and zero otherwise. We regress this binary dependent variable on our treatment indicators for the respective country sample. **Table 7,** column 1 shows that both Korea Economic Growth Treatment (G1) and China Economic Growth Treatment (G3) increase anti-China sentiments among Japanese respondents around 4 percentage points; and yet we find no parallel effect among Taiwanese respondents in column 2. Note that the size of backlash effects (4 percentage points) is roughly equal to the size of emulation-among-peer effects (3.6 percentage points increase in "benefits Japanese economy," see Table 6, Model 1), leading to the null results in the Japanese sample. These results provide evidence that news reporting of policy success of Korea and China can be polarizing in Japan.

Table 7: Foreign News Treatments and Anti-China Statements in Open-Ended Responses, OLS Estimates

Sample	Japan	Taiwan
Model	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	Anti-China	
Group 1 (G1):	**0.040***	-0.004
Korea Economic Growth	**(0.017)**	(0.014)
Group 2 (G2):	0.021	-0.001
Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Group 3 (G3):	**0.044***	-0.003
China Economic Growth	**(0.017)**	(0.014)
Group 4 (G4):	0.015	0.005
China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Top-frequency Topic category	No	Yes
Percent of Open-Ended Responses	6.77	4.85
Control Variables	Yes	Yes
Observations	2075	2390

Note: The table summarizes results of regressing two dependent variables on a set of dummy variables for our experimental treatment groups, respectively, for the Japanese and Taiwanese sample. The two dependent variables are drawn from human-coded responses to the open-ended question on why a respondent would support or oppose a trade agreement with China in the Japanese sample, and why a respondent would support or oppose deeper economic integration with China in the Taiwanese sample. For each column, the dependent variable is a binary outcome variable, with the value of one for statements that are "anti-China" in responses to the open-ended question, respectively in Japan and Taiwan, and otherwise zero. The reported marginal effects of experimental treatments and standard errors (in parentheses) are drawn from OLS estimates. Group 5 (placebo group; UNESCO annual meeting news) is excluded as our base category. Our control variables include pre-treatment protectionist attitude, age, female, college education, income categories, and (manufacturing and service) sectors of employment. The summary of statistics for each control variable is reported in Table 2. These OLS estimates are in line with alternative logit estimates reported in Appendix Table A7.4. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$

In post-experiment analysis, we further disentangle four potential sources of the observed backlash against trade policy emulation in Japan: patriotism (coded as one when respondents express support for an opinion that education should foster a love for the country, and zero otherwise), job insecurity (coded as one when respondents think it is difficult to get a comparable job if s/he loses current one, and zero otherwise), the lack of information (coded as one when respondents express "Don't know" or "Not enough information" in open-ended responses, and zero otherwise), and historical animosity (coded as one when respondents expressed support for legislators' visit to Yasukuni Shrine where Rank-A War criminals are commemorated, and zero otherwise) (see Davis and Meunier 2011 on the significance of Yasukuni visits on trade). We regress *Anti-China* on each of these potential sources of observed backlash against trade policy emulation in Japan and their interactions with each treatment dummy.

Table 8 summarizes the results. We find that patriotism, measured by whether respondents support an opinion that education should foster a love for the country, and the lack of knowledge about trade, are not the sources of backlash (i.e., patriotic and low-knowledge respondents do not systematically differ from other respondents in their propensity to express anti-China sentiments with the treatments). We further find that respondents' historical animosity against China, measured by the respondent's support for legislator's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and self-reported job insecurity are significant sources of backlash. China Economic Growth Treatment (G3) increases anti-China statements expressed in open-ended responses by 15 percentage points among Japanese respondents who support the legislator's visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

Exposure to the Korea Winner and Loser Treatment (G2), which reports that Korean manufacturing industries benefit and agriculture loses from the trade agreement

with China, increases respondents' propensity to express anti-China sentiments by 14 percentage points among economically insecure respondents. Our additional analysis, summarized in Appendix Table A5, suggests that the results are not due to the treatment increasing perceived labor market threats among the respondents employed in manufacturing sector. Appendix Table A6 also demonstrates, contrary to Quinn and Toyoda (2007), that conservative party identification is not the source of backlash. Rather, the information about winners and losers in South Korea (electronic industry wins, agriculture loses) has raised labor market concerns among economically insecure respondents regardless of their sector of employment, thus leading to opposition of a trade agreement, akin to "coalition of losers" discussed in Naoi and Kume (2011).

Importantly, Historical Animosity (support for legislators' Yasukuni Shrine visit) and Job Insecurity are weakly correlated at 0.14, suggesting that the two are relatively independent sources of backlash. The finding dispels the conventional wisdom that economic insecurities can feed into out group anxiety and ethnocentrism and vice-versa (Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Margalit 2012; Mutz and Kim 2017). Overall, these findings challenge the established wisdom about policy convergence across countries as technology lowers the cost of acquiring information across borders.

Table 8: Explaining Backlash Against Emulation in Japan, Interaction Specifications

Sample	Japan			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	Anti-China			
G1: Korea Economic Growth	0.053**	0.036+	0.049*	0.032
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)
G2: Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	0.028	0.009	0.031	0.003
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.023)
G3: China Economic Growth	0.053**	0.041*	0.058**	-0.019
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)
G4: China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	0.020	0.007	0.016	-0.011
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)
X: Nationalism (dummy)	0.032			
	(0.037)			
X: Difficult to Find a Job (dummy)		-0.044		
		(0.042)		
X: Lack of Info (dummy)			-0.053+	
			(0.029)	
X: Historical Animosity (dummy)				0.002
				(0.025)
G1*X	-0.102+	0.048	-0.053	0.019
	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.042)	(0.035)
G2*X	-0.057	**0.137***	-0.038	0.041
	(0.054)	**(0.062)**	(0.040)	(0.035)
G3*X	-0.074	0.039	-0.062	**0.148***
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.040)	**(0.035)**
G4*X	-0.040	0.085	-0.025	0.053
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.042)	(0.035)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2052	2052	2052	2052

Note: Group 5 (placebo group; UNESCO annual meeting news) is excluded as our base category. For each column, the dependent variable is a binary outcome variable, with the value of one for statements that are "anti-China" in responses to the open-ended question in Japan. Our control variables include pre-treatment protectionist attitude, age, female, college education, income categories, and (manufacturing and service) sectors of employment. Each cell reports a point estimate from the OLS model and its standard error (in parentheses). The summary of statistics for each control variable is reported in Table 2. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated causal effects of foreign news—news reporting about foreign government policy and its effect on foreign society—on citizen policy preferences. We documented emulative preference formation among voters when the main subject of the news is perceived to be a peer country and, in the Japanese sample, unexpected backlash effects when news report peer and non-peer success. In post-experiment analysis, we have shown two sources of backlash that blocked emulative preference formation among the Japanese respondents: historical animosity and economic insecurity. Information about economic growth of rival economies or sectoral beneficiaries and losers in a foreign country can cause those who have historical animosities and job insecurity to oppose emulation, regardless of their sector of employment.

In conclusion, we speculate the generatability of our findings beyond the empirical scope of this paper. First, do our findings still hold if the treatment is about "peer success" of protectionist policy (e.g., raising tariffs to protect domestic jobs), or is information about positive effects of globalization more conducive to emulative preference formation? While this is a topic for future research, we suspect information about the "peer success" of protectionist policy might be as effective as, or more effective than, information about the "peer success" of liberalization policy through a well-known human tendency for loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1979). Experimental studies on framing effects in the field of international political economy suggest protectionist framing is more effective than pro-trade framing in shifting public opinion (Hiscox 2006; Ardanaz et al. 2013).

Consistent with our speculation, Rydgren (2005) demonstrates right-wing parties in Europe emulated a successful frame of their platform that combines anti-establishment rhetoric with ethnocentrism across borders, giving rise to a "family of extreme right-wing parties" that share similar policy platforms especially since 1984, when French *Front National* had its first electoral success (p.416). Our findings on cross-border emulation among voters echo Rydgren's work on emulation among parties and challenge the emerging consensus on backlash against globalization that has emphasized common economic shocks and structural changes in the economy as an underlying cause. What is underlying the emergence of extreme right parties and protectionist rhetoric might not be the common economic shocks, but rather information acquisition and emulative learning among voters and elites across national borders.

Second, what is distinct about trade policy emulation and is our finding generalizable beyond the issue of trade policy? We speculate that domestic policy issues, such as taxation, redistribution, education and climate change, might be of higher salience among voters and more divisive along the partisan lines than trade (Gilens 2001). Citizens' higher predispositions about these domestic policy issues might hinder emulation among the peer, compared to the issue of trade where salience is low and uncertainty about its effect is high.

Finally, how generalizable are our findings beyond the case of Japan and Taiwan? Regions in East Asia differ from Western Europe and Latin America in the post-WWII division between communism (e.g., China, Vietnam and North Korea) and capitalism (e.g. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) and resulting heterogeneous paths of political and economic development. Indeed, conservative parties in power at the time of our

survey experiments (Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, Taiwan's Kuomingtang and South Korea's Saenuri party) shared pro-free trade platforms but differed on their positions on China (the LDP was relatively anti-China compared with the Kuomingtang and Saenuri parties). Determining how much our results travel to other continents with more homogeneous development paths is a fruitful line of future research.

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Appendix for *What Do Voters Learn from Foreign News?*

A1. Balance Tables

- ■ A1.1. The Japanese Sample
- ■ A1.2. The Taiwanese Sample

A2. The Survey Flow

A3. The English Translation of the Treatment

A4. Whose Minds Did Treatment 4 (China Winner and Loser) Change?

A5. Testing the Labor Market Competition Explanation (High vs. Low Skilled)

A6. Testing the Voter Ideology Explanation (Quinn and Toyoda 2007)

A7. Logit Estimates for Tables 3,4, 6 and 7

A1. Balance Tables

A1.1. The Japanese Sample

Variable	# of Obs.	Difference in Means (Std. Err.)				Mean
		G1-G5	G2-G5	G3-G5	G4-G5	G5
Age	2075	-0.07	0.30	-0.32	-0.27	42.47
		(0.71)	(0.71)	(0.71)	(0.71)	
Female	2075	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.46
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
College	2075	0.01	-0.04	0.01	-0.01	0.59
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Manufacturing	2075	-0.03	-0.06*	-0.03	-0.05	0.19
		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	
Service	2075	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.42
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Protectionist	2075	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.24
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Sim2Korea	2075	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.14
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Sim2China	2075	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.07
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Income: Category 1	2075	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 2	2075	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.05
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 3	2075	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.08
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 4	2075	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.10
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Income: Category 5	2075	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.10
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Income: Category 6	2075	0.03	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	0.11
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Income: Category 7	2075	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.24
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Income: Category 8	2075	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.06
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Income: Category 9	2075	-0.01	0.01	0.03*	0.01	0.03
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01	
Income: Category 10	2075	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 11	2075	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 12	2075	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.15
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	

Note: Except for the mean estimates for the placebo group (G5), each cell reports difference-in-means estimate and its standard error in parentheses. G1, G2, G3, and G4 are binary indicators for the experimental condition of *Korea Economic Growth*, *Korea Winner and Loser*, *China Economic Growth*, *China Winner and Loser*, respectively. G5 is the placebo group, in which respondents are randomly assigned to read news about UNESCO meeting.   ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

A1.2. The Taiwanese Sample

| Variable	# of Obs.	Difference in Means (Std. Err.)				Mean
		G1-G5	G2-G5	G3-G5	G4-G5	G5
Age	2390	-0.100	0.77	-0.35	-0.78	39.07
		(0.70)	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.69)	
Female	2390	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.53
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
College	2390	-0.02	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	0.65
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Manufacture	2390	0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.01	0.21
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Service	2390	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.62
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Protectionist	2390	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.21
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Sim2Korea	2390	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.70
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Sim2China	2390	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.05	0.51
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Income: Category 1	2390	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 2	2390	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 3	2390	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 4	2390	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.05
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 5	2390	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	0.10
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Income: Category 6	2390	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.14
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Income: Category 7	2390	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.17
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Income: Category 8	2390	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.19
		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Income: Category 9	2390	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.21
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03	
Income: Category 10	2390	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.06
		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Income: Category 11	2390	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Income: Category 12	2390	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02*	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	

Note: Except for the mean estimate for the placebo group (G5), each cell reports difference-in-means estimate and its standard error in parentheses. G1, G2, G3, and G4 are binary indicators for the experimental condition of *Korea Economic Growth*, *Korea Winner and Loser*, *China Economic Growth*, *China Winner and Loser*, respectively. G5 is the placebo group, in which respondents are randomly assigned to read news about UNESCO meeting.   ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

A2. The Survey Flow

Pre-treatment Questions

trade attitudes, subjective similarity ratings of foreign countries

⬇

Random Assignment to Five Treatment Conditions

G1: Korea Economic Growth

G2: Korea Winner (Electronics) and Loser (Agriculture)

G3: China Economic Growth

G4: China Winner (Electronics) and Loser (Agriculture)

G5: Placebo: UNESCO Meeting

⬇

Enforcement Question (Quiz)

"Q: What is the main issue covered in this news?"

    1. Arms races

    2. Economic cooperation

    3. Cultural and educational exchange

    4. Territorial dispute

⬇

Outcome Questions

⬇

Show the Same Treatment Again

⬇

Enforcement Question (a longer quiz)

"Q: What is the main idea of the news article you just read?"

1.   The Korea-China free trade agreement remains under negotiation.

2.   Neither Korean nor Chinese government is willing to enter a free trade agreement.

3.   [Options are randomly assigned by pre-assigned groups]

    3.1. The Korea-China free trade agreement will boost Korean economy.

    3.2. The Korea-China free trade agreement will benefit Korean electronics industries, but hurt its agriculture.

    3.3 The Korea-China free trade agreement will boost Chinese economy.

    3.4. The Korea-China free trade agreement will benefit Chinese electronics at the expense of its domestic agriculture.

   3.5. One thousand foreigners visited Nagoya city for the UNESCO annual meeting.

A3. The English Translation of Treatments

Treatment Group 1: Korea Economic Growth

English Translation: **Korea-China FTA Negotiation Concluded**
[Reporter, Beijing] On November 10, 2014, South Korea concluded the negotiation with China to enter a free trade agreement. Major newspapers in Korea report that this agreement will boost Korean economy by about 2% of its current GDP.


*Note:* Above image is a newspaper treatment for the Group 1 (Korea Economic Growth) in Japanese language.

Note: Above image is a newspaper treatment for the Group 1 (Korea Economic Growth) in Chinese language.

Treatment Group 2: Korea Winner and Loser

> *English Translation:* **Korea-China FTA Negotiation Concluded**
> [Reporter, Beijing] On November 10, 2014, South Korea concluded the negotiation with China to enter a free trade agreement. Major newspapers in Korea report that this agreement will benefit Korean electronics; by contrast, it will harm Korean agriculture.

韓中自由貿易協定交渉が妥結

[北京＝山田陽] 十一月十日、韓国は中国との自由貿易協定を締結するための交渉をおえた。韓国の主要各紙は、この協定の締結で韓国電子機器産業の躍進が見込め、農業は打撃を受けるだろうと発表した。

Note: Above image is a newspaper treatment for the Group 2 (Korea Winner and Loser) in Japanese language.

韓中自由貿易協定完成談判

[記者陳怡君，北京報導] 十一月十一日，南韓與中國完成自由貿易協定談判。韓國主要報紙估計，韓國電子業將自該協定中獲利；反之，韓國農業將受其受害。

Note: Above image is a newspaper treatment for the Group 2 (Korea Winner and Loser) in Chinese language.

Placebo Group 5: UNESCO Annual Meeting

English Translation: **UNESCO Meeting Held in Japan**

[Reporter, Beijing] On November 10, 2014, an annual meeting of UNESCO's Education for Sustainable Development was held in Nagoya City, Japan. Around a thousand representatives from the member states, NGOs and companies met to discuss worldwide issues.

ユネスコ総会、日本で開催

［名古屋市＝山田陽］十一月十日、ユネスコの、持続可能な開発のための教育の年次総会が名古屋市で開催された。加盟国、NGO、企業からおよそ千人の代表が集まり、世界規模の問題について議論した。

Note: Above image is a newspaper treatment for the Group 5 (placebo; UNESCO annual meeting) in Japanese language.

教科文組織於日本召開大會

［記者陳怡君，北京報導］十一月十一日，聯合國教科文組織世界可持續發展教育大會於日本名古屋召開。將近一千名會員國、非政府組織與企業代表齊聚討論世界各種議題。

Note: Above image is a newspaper treatment for the Group 5 (placebo; UNESCO annual meeting) in Chinese language.

A4. Whose Minds Did Treatment 4 (China Winner and Loser) Change?

Does Treatment 4 (China Winner and Loser) increase opposition to a trade agreement in Japan by changing the minds of pro-trade respondents or strengthening the belief of protectionist respondents, measured before the treatment? As Model (2) of Table A4 shows, the backlash effects (higher opposition to a trade agreement than a placebo group) are concentrated among free-trading respondents, measured before the treatment. A news report about the expected losses for Chinese electronic industries and benefits for the Chinese agriculture increased opposition to a trade agreement with China by 8.6 percentage points among free-trading Japanese respondents; though when we interact each of the treatment dummies with the pre-treatment attitudes toward trade, Model (3) shows the effect is imprecisely estimated (or not statistically significant).

Table A4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Pre-treatment Trade Attitudes

Sample	Japan		
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable	Opposing a Trade Agreement with China	Opposing a Trade Agreement with China	Opposing a Trade Agreement with China
	Coef. / (Std. Err.)	Coef. / (Std. Err.)	Coef. / (Std. Err.)
Group 1 (G1):	-0.038	-0.010	-0.010
Korea Economic Growth	(0.068)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Group 2 (G2):	0.080	-0.031	-0.033
Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	(0.067)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Group 3 (G3):	0.081	0.008	0.005
China Economic Growth	(0.070)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Group 4 (G4):	0.037	0.086*	0.084*
China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	(0.069)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Protectionist Predisposition			0.236**
			(0.055)
Protectionist*G1			-0.023
			(0.077)
Protectionist *G2			0.115
			(0.077)
Protectionist *G3			0.067
			(0.079)
Protectionist *G4			-0.039
			(0.078)
Subsample: Protectionist	Yes	No	Full
N	519	1556	2075

***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, +$p<0.1$

A5. Testing the Labor Market Competition Explanation (High vs. Low Skilled)

Does Treatment 4 (China Winner and Loser) increase opposition to a trade agreement in Japan due to the heightened sense of labor market competition? Table A5, Model (1) shows Treatment 4 increased opposition to a trade agreement with China only among Japanese respondents who had a college degree or above, who are expected to benefit from increasing trade with China. This finding disconfirms the labor market competition explanation for the opposition we observe with Treatment 4.

Table A5: Does G4 Increase Opposition to Trade in Japan Due to Labor Market Competition?

Sample	Japan		
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable	Opposing a Trade Agreement with China	Opposing a Trade Agreement with China	Opposing a Trade Agreement with China
	Coef. / (Std. Err.)	Coef. / (Std. Err.)	Coef. / (Std. Err.)
Group 1 (G1):	0.019	-0.084	-0.084
Korea Economic Growth	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Group 2 (G2):	0.043	-0.064	-0.067
Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Group 3 (G3):	0.055	-0.042	-0.042
China Economic Growth	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Group 4 (G4):	0.100*	0.030	0.031
China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.052)
College			-0.084+
			(0.049)
College *G1			0.112
			(0.069)
College *G2			0.111
			(0.068)
College *G3			0.106
			(0.068)
College *G4			0.074
			(0.068)
Subsample: College	Yes	No	Full
N	1221	854	2075

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

A6. Testing the Voter Ideology Explanation (Quinn and Toyoda 2007)

According to Quinn and Toyoda (2007), conservative party identification could be an ideational or partisan source of backlash against emulation. Our experiments did not lend support to the voter ideology-diffusion argument. We interacted each of our treatment indicators with the conservative party identification (Japan's LDP and Taiwan's KMT) and estimate the effects on our main dependent variables, opposing a trade agreement with China in Japan and opposing deeper integration with China in Taiwan, respectively.

Table A6: Testing the Voter Ideology/Partisan ID Explanations in Japan and Taiwan

Sample	Japan	Taiwan
Dependent Variable	Opposing a trade agreement with China	Opposing deeper integration with China
	Coef. / (Std. Err.)	Coef. / (Std. Err.)
G1: Korea Economic Growth	-0.014	-0.097**
	(0.037)	(0.030)
G2: Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	0.008	-0.021
	(0.037)	(0.029)
G3: China Economic Growth	0.035	-0.071*
	(0.037)	(0.030)
G4: China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	0.079*	-0.025
	(0.038)	(0.030)
LDP (Ruling Party in Japan)	0.165**	
	(0.059)	
KMT (Ruling Party in Taiwan)		-0.268**
		(0.047)
G1*LDP (or KMT)	0.006	0.125
	(0.086)	(0.068)
G2* LDP (or KMT)	-0.054	0.019
	(0.083)	(0.069)
G3* LDP (or KMT)	-0.062	0.104
	(0.085)	(0.069)
G4* LDP (or KMT)	-0.054	0.035
	(0.080)	(0.075)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes
N	2075	2390

***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, +$p<0.1$

A7. Average Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates for Tables 3, 4, 6 and 7.

Table A7.1: Peer Emulation Effects in Japan and Taiwan, Average Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates

Sample	Japan		Taiwan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	Opposing a trade agreement with China	Opposing deeper integration with China	Opposing a Merchandise Trade Agreement with China	Opposing the Service Trade Agreement with China
Group 1 (G1):	-0.017	**-0.069**	-0.015	**-0.065**
Korea Economic Growth	(0.033)	**(0.025)**	(0.024)	**(0.025)**
Group 2 (G2):	-0.002	0.004	0.026	0.024
Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Group 3 (G3):	0.021	-0.043+	0.009	-0.018
China Economic Growth	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Group 4 (G4):	**0.075***	-0.001	0.020	-0.014
China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	**(0.034)**	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2075	2390	2390	2390

Note: Group 5 (placebo group; UNESCO annual meeting news) is excluded as our base category. Our control variables include pre-treatment protectionist attitude, age, female, college education, income categories, and (manufacturing and service) sectors of employment. The summary of statistics for each control variable is reported in Table 2.   *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table A7.2: Emulation Effects in Japan and Taiwan by Similarity Ratings, Average Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates

Sample	Japan			Taiwan		
Subsample: Similar to Korea	Yes	No	Full	Yes	No	Full
Model	(1)	（2）	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Opposing a trade agreement with China			Opposing deeper economic integration with China		
Group 1 (G1):	-0.090+	0.014	0.017	**-0.074****	-0.036	-0.036
Korea Economic Growth	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.041)	**(0.028)**	(0.052)	(0.045)
Group 2 (G2):	-0.032	0.013	0.013	0.003	0.010	0.011
Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.044)
Group 3 (G3):	-0.002	0.037	0.032	-0.029	-0.084+	-0.067
China Economic Growth	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.042)
Group 4 (G4):	0.010	**0.104***	0.100*	0.011	-0.023	-0.019
China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	(0.053)	**(0.043)**	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.045)
Sim2Korea			-0.121*			-0.052
			(0.047)			(0.036)
Sim2Korea*G1			-0.121+			-0.051
			(0.070)			(0.055)
Sim2Korea*G2			-0.042			-0.009
			(0.067)			(0.050)
Sim2Korea*G3			-0.038			0.040
			(0.067)			(0.054)
Sim2Korea*G4			-0.094			0028
			(0.068)			(0.053)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	801	1265	2075	1708	682	2390

Note: This table summarizes the heterogeneous treatment effects by pre-treatment measure of respondents' perceived similarity between South Korea and their home country (Japan or Taiwan). Models (1) and (4) were the average marginal effects from logit estimates for the respondents who rated South Korea "somewhat similar" or "similar" to their home country, and Models (2) and (5) were the average marginal effects from the logit estimates for the respondents who rated South Korea "somewhat dissimilar" or "dissimilar" to their home country. For the respondents who rated South Korea "neither similar nor dissimilar" to their home country (474 in the Japanese sample and 587 in the Taiwanese), we grouped them into subsamples of being rated as similar to Korea. We did so in order to split the full sample as equitably as possible. Group 5 (placebo group; UNESCO annual meeting news) is excluded as our base category. Models (3) and (6) were logit estimates from interaction term specification. Our control variables include pre-treatment protectionist attitude, age, female, college education, income categories, and (manufacturing and service) sectors of employment. The summary of statistics for each control variable is reported in Table 2.   ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table A7.3: Foreign News Treatments Informed Respondents in Japan and Taiwan, Average Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates

Sample	Japan	Taiwan
Model	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	Benefit JP or TW economy	
Group 1 (G1):	**0.036****	**0.052***
Korea Economic Growth	**(0.013)**	**(0.025)**
Group 2 (G2):	0.021+	0.001
Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	(0.011)	(0.023)
Group 3 (G3):	0.015	**0.056***
China Economic Growth	(0.010)	**(0.025)**
Group 4 (G4):	0.012	-0.019
China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	(0.010)	(0.0253)
Top-frequency Topic category	No	Yes
Percent of Open-ended Responses	3.31	18.45
Control Variables	Yes	Yes
Observations	2075	2390

Note: The table summarizes results of regressing two dependent variables on a set of dummy variables for our experimental treatment groups, respectively, for the Japanese and Taiwanese sample. The two dependent variables are drawn from human-coded responses to the open-ended question on why a respondent would support or oppose a trade agreement with China in the Japanese sample, and why a respondent would support or oppose deeper economic integration with China in the Taiwanese sample. For each column, the dependent variable is a binary outcome variable, with the value of one for statements related to "benefit Japan's economy" or "benefit Taiwan's economy" in responses to the open-ended question, respectively, in Japan and Taiwan, and otherwise zero. The reported marginal effects of experimental treatments and standard errors (in parentheses) are drawn from logit estimates. Group 5 (placebo group; UNESCO annual meeting news) is excluded as our base category. Our control variables include pre-treatment protectionist attitude, age, female, college education, income categories, and (manufacturing and service) sectors of employment. The summary of statistics for each control variable is reported in Table 2. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$

Table A7.4: Foreign News Treatments and Anti-China Statements in Open-End Responses, Average Marginal Effects from Logit Estimates

Sample	Japan	Taiwan
Model	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	Anti-China	
Group 1 (G1):	**0.040***	-0.004
Korea Economic Growth	**(0.017)**	(0.014)
Group 2 (G2):	0.021	-0.001
Korea Winner (E) and Loser (A)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Group 3 (G3):	**0.044****	-0.004
China Economic Growth	**(0.017)**	(0.014)
Group 4 (G4):	0.015	0.005
China Winner (A) and Loser (E)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Top-frequency Topic category	No	Yes
Percent of Open-ended Responses	6.77	4.85
Control Variables	Yes	Yes
Observations	2075	2390

Note: The table summarizes results of regressing two dependent variables on a set of dummy variables for our experimental treatment groups, respectively, for the Japanese and Taiwanese sample. The two dependent variables are drawn from human-coded responses to the open-ended question on why a respondent would support or oppose a trade agreement with China in the Japanese sample, and why a respondent would support or oppose deeper economic integration with China in the Taiwanese sample. For each column, the dependent variable is a binary outcome variable, with the value of one for statements that are "anti-China" in responses to the open-ended question, respectively in Japan and Taiwan, and otherwise zero. The reported marginal effects of experimental treatments and standard errors (in parentheses) are drawn from logit estimates. Group 5 (placebo group; UNESCO annual meeting news) is excluded as our base category. Our control variables include pre-treatment protectionist attitude, age, female, college education, income categories, and (manufacturing and service) sectors of employment. The summary of statistics for each control variable is reported in Table 2.   *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$