

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

GROWTH, SLOWDOWNS, AND RECOVERIES

Francesco Bianchi
Howard Kung
Gonzalo Morales

Working Paper 20725
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w20725>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
December 2014, Revised June 2018

We thank Ufuk Akcigit, Ravi Bansal, Julieta Caunedo, Gauti Eggertsson, Roger Farmer, Mark Gertler, Francisco Gomes, Leonardo Melosi, Neil Mehrotra, Karel Mertens, Pietro Peretto, Assaf Razin, Tom Sargent, Laura Veldkamp, Gianluca Violante, David Weil, and seminar participants at the Society of Economic Dynamics Meeting, Brown University, Duke University, New York University, University of British Columbia, London Business School, and Cornell University for comments. We also thank Alexandre Corhay and Yang Yu for research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

© 2014 by Francesco Bianchi, Howard Kung, and Gonzalo Morales. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Growth, Slowdowns, and Recoveries
Francesco Bianchi, Howard Kung, and Gonzalo Morales
NBER Working Paper No. 20725
December 2014, Revised June 2018
JEL No. C11,E3,O4

ABSTRACT

We construct and estimate an endogenous growth model with debt and equity financing frictions to understand the relation between business cycle fluctuations and long-term growth. The presence of spillover effects from R&D imply an endogenous relation between productivity growth and the state of the economy. A large contractionary shock to equity financing in the 2001 recession led to a persistent growth slowdown that was more severe than in the 2008 recession. Equity (debt) financing shocks are more important for explaining R&D (physical) investment. Therefore, these two financing shocks affect the economy over different horizons.

Francesco Bianchi
Social Sciences Building, 201B
Department of Economics
Duke University
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0097
and CEPR
and also NBER
francesco.bianchi@duke.edu

Gonzalo Morales
Alberta School of Business
University of Alberta
2-32C Business Building
Edmonton, AB T6G 2R6
Canada
gonzalo.morales@ualberta.ca

Howard Kung
London Business School
Regent's Park, Sussex Place
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
hkung@london.edu

Growth, Slowdowns, and Recoveries [☆]

Francesco Bianchi^a, Howard Kung^{b,*}, Gonzalo Morales^c

^a*Duke University, NBER and CEPR, Durham, NC 27708-0097, United States*

^b*London Business School and CEPR, Regent's Park, Sussex Place, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom*

^c*University of Alberta, School of Business, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada*

Abstract

We construct and estimate an endogenous growth model with debt and equity financing frictions to understand the relation between business cycle fluctuations and long-term growth. The presence of spillover effects from R&D imply an endogenous relation between productivity growth and the state of the economy. A large contractionary shock to equity financing in the 2001 recession led to a persistent growth slowdown that was more severe than in the 2008 recession. Equity (debt) financing shocks are more important for explaining R&D (physical) investment. Therefore, these two financing shocks affect the economy over different horizons.

Keywords: Endogenous growth, Financial frictions, Business cycles, Bayesian methods

1. Introduction

Macroeconomic growth rates exhibit low-frequency patterns often associated with innovation and technological change. The advent of electricity and the introduction of computers are each associated with persistent waves in the trend component of productivity.¹ Aggregate patterns in innovative activity, as measured by research and development (R&D) expenditures, are closely related to waves in external equity financing. For example, the R&D boom in the 1990s was fueled by an expansion in the supply of equity finance, while the sharp decline in R&D in the early

[☆]We thank Ufuk Akcigit, Ravi Bansal, Julieta Caunedo, Gauti Eggertsson, Roger Farmer, Mark Gertler, Francisco Gomes, Leonardo Melosi, Neil Mehrotra, Karel Mertens, Pietro Peretto, Assaf Razin, Tom Sargent, Laura Veldkamp, Gianluca Violante, David Weil, and seminar participants at the Society of Economic Dynamics Meeting, Brown University, Duke University, New York University, University of British Columbia, London Business School, and Cornell University for comments. We also thank Alexandre Corhay and Yang Yu for research assistance.

*Corresponding author

Email addresses: francesco.bianchi@duke.edu (Francesco Bianchi), hkung@london.edu (Howard Kung), gonzalo.morales@ualberta.ca (Gonzalo Morales)

¹See, for example, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) and Gordon (2010) for surveys.

8 2000s coincided with a contraction in supply.² Despite the efforts in the growth literature, there
9 is no consensus on the macroeconomic or financial origins of prolonged productivity slowdowns
10 and the subsequent recoveries. In particular, there is substantial disagreement in projecting the
11 long-run effects of the recent Great Recession on economic growth (e.g., Summers (2013)).³

12 In this paper we quantitatively explore the role of macroeconomic and financial shocks for
13 understanding economic growth and business cycle fluctuations in a Dynamic Stochastic General
14 Equilibrium (DSGE) model (e.g., Christiano et al. (2005)) with two key departures. First, our
15 model features endogenous technological progress through vertical innovations (e.g., Aghion and
16 Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Barlevy (2004b), and Peretto (1999)) and endoge-
17 nous utilization of existing technologies. In equilibrium, total factor productivity (TFP) growth is
18 endogenously related to knowledge accumulation through R&D and technology utilization rates.
19 The presence of spillover effects from knowledge accumulation provides a link between business
20 cycle fluctuations and long-term growth.

21 Second, the model incorporates explicit roles for firms' debt and equity financing along with
22 frictions associated with adjusting capital structure following Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Debt
23 is preferred over equity due to a tax advantage, however borrowing is limited by an enforcement
24 constraint. The intangible nature of the knowledge stock implies that it provides poor collateral
25 to creditors (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). We capture this link between asset tangibility and
26 liquidation values by assuming that only physical capital is pledgeable as collateral in the debt
27 contract. We also model financial shocks that affect the ease to which firms can access external
28 financing. The *equity financing shock* is captured by disturbances to the cost function for net
29 equity payouts. Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), the *debt financing shock* is modeled as
30 disturbances to liquidation values in the enforcement constraint for the debt contract.

31 We conduct a structural estimation of the model using standard macroeconomic data, together
32 with the newly-released series for R&D investment and the series for net debt issuance and net
33 equity financing. Thus, our results are disciplined by the joint observation of macroeconomic
34 dynamics and financing flows. Given that only physical capital (and not knowledge capital) is

²Brown et al. (2009) provide micro-evidence showing shifts in the supply of external equity finance can explain most of the 1990s boom in R&D.

³Benigno and Fornaro (2015), Gordon (2014), and Fernald (2014) are examples that provide opposing views.

pledgeable as collateral, shocks to liquidation values have a stronger impact on the marginal value of physical investment relative to R&D investment. Consequently, we find that the debt financing shocks are relatively more important for explaining physical investment dynamics, while equity financing shocks are relatively more important for explaining R&D investment dynamics. Due to the presence of spillover effects from the accumulation of the knowledge stock, shocks that have a sizable effect on R&D investment also have a significant impact on growth rates in the long run. Therefore, accounting for the tangibility of assets in the enforcement constraint and the production externalities implies that debt financing shocks have immediate effects on macroeconomic variables, while the effect of equity financing shocks builds over time.

Our model-implied TFP can be decomposed into an exogenous and an endogenous component. The exogenous component is represented by a stationary TFP shock. The endogenous component can be further decomposed into knowledge accumulation and technology utilization. Both of these components provide a link between TFP and the state of the economy. We interpret technology utilization as the *absorptive capacity* of the firm with respect to the ability to adapt raw knowledge to the production process. The stock of knowledge is accumulated through R&D investment, then resources are expended for the stock of knowledge to be utilized in production. Given that it is more difficult to make large adjustments to a stock (knowledge capital) rather than a flow (technology utilization) input, we find that higher-frequency disturbances are absorbed by the technology utilization margin. In the estimated model, the endogenous component of TFP explains most of the variability in TFP growth through technology utilization. In contrast, the accumulation of knowledge is primarily related to long-run trends in TFP growth.

Accounting for these two margins of technology adjustment, R&D accumulation and technology utilization, has important implications for the consequences of a recession, especially over longer horizons. We find that the Great Recession was associated with a large drop in utilization rates, while R&D was not equally affected. In contrast, during the 2001 recession there was a significant decline in R&D investment after the bust of the information technology (IT) boom. Controlling for the size of the two recessions, the decline in R&D investment – and therefore knowledge accumulation – was substantially more pronounced in the 2001 recession than in the 2008 recession. Also, the decline in knowledge accumulation started in the 2001 recession, while the 2008 recession exacerbated the pre-existing downward trend.

65 Consequently, while the 2008 recession was substantially more severe in the short-term, our
66 model suggests that trend growth was less affected during the Great Recession compared to the
67 2001 recession when controlling for the relative size of the two recessions. Importantly, the decline
68 in R&D and the low frequency component of TFP growth started with the 2001 recession, which
69 accords with the empirical evidence from Fernald (2014). The current model projections suggest
70 that long-run growth prospects remained relatively stable during the 2008 recession, however, our
71 results also imply that if market conditions did not improve, R&D would eventually start declining.

72 We then move to interpret these results in light of the different sources of financing. Specifi-
73 cally, we use two counterfactual simulations to account for the different behavior of the economy
74 during the two recessions. The 2001 recession coincided with the end of the IT boom, an event
75 that particularly affected high tech firms (i.e., high R&D intensity firms) that rely on equity issues
76 to finance R&D investment. Our model captures this fact through the dynamics of the equity fi-
77 nancing shock. We compare the actual data with a counterfactual simulation in which all shocks
78 are set to zero starting from the first quarter of 2000, except for the shocks to equity financing that
79 are instead left unchanged. This exercise shows that the bulk of the decline in knowledge growth
80 that started with the 2001 recession can be captured by a sequence of contractionary shocks to
81 equity financing that is consistent with microevidence (e.g., Brown et al. (2009)). The large ad-
82 verse shocks to equity financing that coincided with the 2001 recession led to a persistent decline
83 in R&D, which in the context of our model implies a long-lasting adverse effect on trend growth.

84 In contrast, the 2008 recession originated from a severe financial crisis. We then show that
85 a counterfactual experiment in which all shocks are set to zero – except for the debt financing
86 shock – closely tracks the large decline in real activity during the Great Recession, but that it
87 only had a limited impact on the accumulation of knowledge. This is consistent with our im-
88 pulse response analysis that shows that shocks to collateral values have an immediate impact on
89 investment in physical capital and R&D. However, the impact on R&D, and therefore long-term
90 growth prospects, is less pronounced than when the economic contraction originates from a shock
91 to equity financing.

92 Further, counterfactual experiments suggest that during the Great Recession, accommodative
93 monetary and fiscal policies helped to stabilize both R&D rates and the utilization of existing tech-
94 nology, which has important consequences on the trend component of productivity. In a model

95 with exogenous growth, TFP and trend growth do not depend on policymakers' actions. As a re-
96 sult, these models generally imply a steady and relatively fast return to the trend, independent from
97 the actions undertaken by the fiscal and monetary authorities. Instead, in the present model sus-
98 taining demand during a severe recession can deeply affect the medium- and long-term outcomes
99 for the economy. This result has important implications for the role of policy intervention dur-
100 ing recessions. For example, we believe that the link between policy interventions and growth is
101 particularly salient in light of the recent debate on the consequences of performing fiscal consolida-
102 tions during recessions (Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and Guajardo et al. (2014) provide opposing
103 views).

104 The endogenous growth mechanism generates positive responses in consumption and invest-
105 ment to debt financing shocks, which is sometimes a challenge in DSGE models (e.g., Barro and
106 King (1984)). In standard DSGE models, positive investment shocks often lead to a decline (or an
107 initial decline) in consumption, while investment, hours, and output increase. In our model, the
108 investment shocks are amplified, as they affect TFP growth through the knowledge accumulation
109 and endogenous TFP channels. Thus, a positive investment shock increases output more than in
110 the standard models without the endogenous technology margins, which helps our model generate
111 a positive consumption response. Finally, monetary policy shocks induce positive comovement
112 between measured productivity and inflation, consistent with evidence from Evans and dos Santos
113 (2002).

114 Our approach of estimating a structural model helps to elucidate the link between R&D,
115 growth, and business cycle dynamics. Due to data limitations, it would be hard to learn about
116 the impact of R&D by only looking at its effect on growth *decades* later. Instead, our endogenous
117 growth framework imposes joint economic restrictions on the evolution of macroeconomic quan-
118 tities at short- and long-horizons. Therefore, conditional on the model, the dynamics at business
119 cycle frequencies are also informative about the low-frequency behavior of the economy. This is
120 because, given a parametric specification, the deep parameters that govern high- and low-frequency
121 movements are invariant and can be inferred by examining fluctuations at all frequencies.

122 This paper is related to the literature linking business cycles to growth. Barlevy (2004a) and
123 Barlevy (2007) show that the welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations are higher in an endoge-
124 nous growth framework due to the adverse effects of uncertainty on trend growth. Basu et al.

125 (2006) explore the impact of technological change on labor and capital inputs over the business
126 cycle. Kung and Schmid (2014) examine the asset pricing implications of a stochastic endogenous
127 growth model and relate the R&D-driven low-frequency cycles in growth to long-run risks. Kung
128 (2014) builds a New Keynesian model of endogenous growth and shows how the model can ra-
129 tionalize key term structure facts. In the context of the asset pricing literature on long-run risks
130 based on the work by Bansal and Yaron (2004), our results imply that financing shocks, typically
131 associated with business cycle fluctuations, are an important source of low-frequency movements
132 in consumption growth. Guerron-Quintana and Jinnai (2013) use a stochastic endogenous growth
133 model to analyze the effect of liquidity shocks on trend growth.

134 We also relate to papers examining the causes and long-term impact of the Great Recession.
135 Benigno and Fornaro (2015) analyzes how animal spirits can generate a long-lasting liquidity trap
136 in a New Keynesian growth model with multiple equilibria. Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014)
137 illustrate how a debt deleveraging shock can induce a persistent, or even permanent, economic
138 slowdown in a New Keynesian model with overlapping generations. Christiano et al. (2014a)
139 show how interactions of financial frictions with a zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest
140 rates in a DSGE framework can help explain the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates during
141 the Great Recession. Bianchi and Melosi (2014) link the outcomes of the Great Recession to
142 policy uncertainty. Our paper focuses on the effects of the Great Recession through the R&D and
143 technology adoption margins, and thus, we view our contribution as complementary to the existing
144 literature.

145 The financial frictions in our DSGE model relate to a vast literature (see, among many others,
146 Bernanke et al. (1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Christiano et al. (2014b)). We closely
147 follow Jermann and Quadrini (2012) in modeling the financial frictions and financial shocks that
148 affect the substitution between debt and equity. Explicitly accounting for the differences in collater-
149 alizability between physical and knowledge capital relates to Garcia-Macia (2017). We differ from
150 these papers by incorporating an endogenous growth margin, which allows us to study the impact
151 of external financing shocks on macroeconomic variables, including TFP and R&D, at different
152 horizons.

153 This paper makes two methodological contributions with respect to the existing literature. We
154 embed an endogenous growth framework in a medium-size DSGE model with nominal rigidities.

155 Second, we structurally estimate the model using Bayesian methods. To the best of our knowl-
156 edge, this is the first paper that estimates a quantitative model of the business cycle augmented
157 with endogenous growth and technology utilization by using data on the amount of R&D invest-
158 ment. In this respect, our work is related to, but differs from the seminal contribution of Comin
159 and Gertler (2006) and the subsequent work by Anzoategui et al. (2016) across several dimensions.
160 First, our model incorporates financial constraints and external financing shocks. These explicit
161 financial elements allow us to have different interpretations of the 2001 and 2008 recessions, and
162 in particular, for explaining the divergence in R&D dynamics during the two events. Our inter-
163 pretation of the two recessions relate to differences in debt and equity financing conditions, while
164 Anzoategui et al. (2016) relate to differences in R&D productivity. Second, we make use of the
165 recently released series for quarterly R&D investment to inform us on the process of knowledge
166 accumulation. Finally, these papers use an endogenous growth framework with horizontal innova-
167 tions (i.e., expanding variety model of Romer (1990)) whereas we use a growth model with vertical
168 innovations.

169 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the model. Section 3 presents the
170 estimates. Section 4 studies the Great Recession and the 2001 Recession in light of our model.
171 Section 5 present an analysis of the model across different frequency intervals. Section 6 concludes.

172 2. Model

173 The benchmark model is a medium-scale DSGE model with endogenous growth and tech-
174 nology utilization. The endogenous growth production setting of within-firm vertical innovations
175 follows Kung (2014), the financial structure is modeled following Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
176 and the additional macroeconomic frictions and shocks are standard in the literature and taken
177 from Christiano et al. (2005).

178 2.1. Representative Household

179 There are a continuum of households, each with a specialized type of labor $i \in [0, 1]$. House-
180 hold i is also assumed to have external habits over consumption $C_{i,t}$.

$$181 E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \zeta_{C,t+s} \left\{ \log(C_{i,t+s} - \Phi_c \bar{C}_{t+s-1}) - \chi_{t+s} L_{i,t+s}^{1+\sigma_L} / (1 + \sigma_L) \right\},$$

182 where β is the discount rate, Φ_c is an external habit parameter, \bar{C}_t is average consumption, $L_{i,t}$
183 denotes the labor service supplied by the household, and σ_L is the inverse of the the Frisch labor
184 supply elasticity. The variable $\zeta_{C,t}$ represents an intertemporal preference shock with mean one
185 and the time series representation, $\log(\zeta_{C,t}) = \rho_{\zeta_C} \log(\zeta_{C,t-1}) + \sigma_{\zeta_C} \epsilon_{\zeta_C,t}$, where $\epsilon_{\zeta_C,t} \sim N(0, 1)$. The
186 variable χ_t represents shocks to the marginal utility of leisure and has the following time series
187 representation, $\log(\chi_t) = (1 - \rho_\chi) \log(\chi) + \rho_\chi \log(\chi_{t-1}) + \epsilon_{\chi,t}$, where $\epsilon_{\chi,t} \sim N(0, 1)$.

188 The household budget constraint is given by:

$$189 \quad P_t C_{i,t} + P_t T_t + B_{t+1}/(1 + r_t) = W_{i,t} L_{i,t} + P_t D_t + B_t,$$

190 where P_t is the nominal price of the final goods, T_t is the amount of taxes paid by the households,
191 $W_{i,t}$ is the wage rate paid to the supplier of $L_{i,t}$, B_t is the amount of debt issued by the firm, D_t is
192 the net equity payout paid by the firms, and r_t is the interest rate. Households are monopolistic
193 suppliers of labor to intermediate firms following Erceg et al. (2000). In particular, intermediate
194 goods firms use a composite labor input:

$$195 \quad L_t = \left[\int_0^1 L_{i,t}^{\frac{1}{1+\lambda_w}} di \right]^{1+\lambda_w},$$

196 where λ_w is the wage mark-up. Employment agencies purchase labor from the households, package
197 the labor inputs, and sell it to the intermediate goods firms. The first-order condition from profit
198 maximization yields the following demand schedule:

$$199 \quad L_{i,t} = (W_{i,t}/W_t)^{-\frac{1+\lambda_w}{\lambda_w}} L_t.$$

200 The aggregate wage index paid by the intermediate firms for the packaged labor input L_t is given
201 by the following rule:

$$202 \quad W_t = \left[\int_0^1 W_{i,t}^{-\frac{1}{\lambda_w}} di \right]^{-\lambda_w}.$$

203 The household sets wages subject to nominal rigidities. In particular, a fraction $1 - \zeta_w$ can readjust
204 wages. The remaining households that cannot readjust wages will set them according the following
205 indexation rule, $W_{j,t} = W_{j,t-1} (\Pi_{t-1} M_{n,t-1})^{t_w} (\Pi \cdot M_n)^{1-t_w}$, where $M_{n,t} \equiv N_t/N_{t-1}$, M_n is the steady-

206 state value of $M_{n,t}$, ι_w is the degree of indexation of wage, $\Pi_{t-1} = P_{t-1}/P_{t-2}$ is the gross inflation
 207 rate at $t - 1$, and Π is the steady-state value of the gross inflation rate.

208 2.2. Firms

209 A representative firm produces the final consumption goods in a perfectly competitive market.
 210 The firm uses a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods, $Y_{j,t}$, as input in the CES production
 211 technology:

$$212 \quad Y_t = \left(\int_0^1 Y_{j,t}^{1/\lambda_{f,t}} dj \right)^{\lambda_{f,t}},$$

213 where $\lambda_{f,t}$ is the markup over marginal cost for intermediate goods firms and evolves in logs as an
 214 AR(1) process, $\log(\lambda_{f,t}) = (1 - \rho_{\lambda_f}) \log(\lambda_f) + \rho_{\lambda_f} \log(\lambda_{f,t-1}) + \sigma_{\lambda_f} \epsilon_{\lambda_{f,t}}$, where $\epsilon_{\lambda_{f,t}} \sim N(0, 1)$.

215 The profit maximization problem of the firm yields the following isoelastic demand schedule

$$216 \quad Y_{j,t} = Y_t (P_{j,t}/P_t)^{-\lambda_{f,t}/(\lambda_{f,t}-1)},$$

217 where P_t is the price of the final goods and $P_{j,t}$ is the price of intermediate good j . The price of
 218 final goods is obtained by integrating over the intermediate goods prices.

219 The intermediate good j is produced by a price-setting monopolist using the following produc-
 220 tion function:

$$221 \quad Y_{j,t} = (u_{j,t}^k K_{j,t})^\alpha (Z_{j,t} L_{j,t})^{1-\alpha},$$

222 and measured TFP at the firm level is $Z_{j,t} \equiv A_t (u_{j,t}^n N_{j,t})^\eta (u_t^n N_t)^{1-\eta}$, where $K_{j,t}$ is physical capital,
 223 $N_{j,t}$ is knowledge capital, $u_{j,t}^k$ is the physical capital utilization rate, $u_{j,t}^n$ is the technology utilization
 224 rate, $u_t^n \equiv \int_0^1 u_{j,t}^n dj$ is the aggregate technology utilization rate, $N_t \equiv \int_0^1 N_{j,t} dj$ is the aggregate
 225 stock of R&D capital, and $(1 - \eta) \in [0, 1]$ represents the degree of spillovers over the utilized
 226 stock of knowledge. This specification of technology spillovers assumes that there are positive
 227 externalities from the creation of new knowledge and the increased utilization of the knowledge
 228 stock. Increased utilization requires increased maintenance costs in terms of investment goods per
 229 unit of physical or knowledge capital measured by the function $a_i(u^i)$, for $i = k, n$ (in the steady-
 230 state $a_i(u^i) = 0$). We interpret technology utilization as the absorptive capacity of the firm with
 231 respect to the ability to adapt raw knowledge to the production process (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal
 232 (1990)).

233 The variable A_t represents a stationary aggregate productivity shock that is common across
 234 firms and evolves in logs as an AR(1) process, $a_t = (1 - \rho_a)a^* + \rho_a a_{t-1} + \sigma_a \epsilon_{a,t}$, where $a_t \equiv \log(A_t)$,
 235 $\epsilon_{a,t} \sim N(0, 1)$ is an i.i.d. shock, and a^* is the unconditional mean of a_t .

236 The intermediate firm j accumulates physical capital according to the following law of motion:

$$237 \quad K_{j,t+1} = (1 - \delta_k)K_{j,t} + [1 - \Psi_k(I_{j,t}/I_{j,t-1})] I_{j,t},$$

238 where δ_k is the depreciation rate, $I_{j,t}$ is physical investment, Ψ_k is a convex adjustment cost function
 239 (in the steady-state $\Psi_k = 0 = \Psi'_k$). Knowledge capital is accumulated by firm j according to:

$$240 \quad N_{j,t+1} = (1 - \delta_n)N_{j,t} + [1 - \Psi_n(S_{j,t}/S_{j,t-1})] S_{j,t},$$

241 where δ_n is the depreciation rate, $S_{j,t}$ is R&D investment, and Ψ_n is a convex adjustment cost
 242 function (in the steady-state, $\Psi_n = 0 = \Psi'_n$).

243 Intermediate firms face nominal price adjustment costs following Rotemberg's approach:

$$244 \quad \Gamma_P(P_{j,t}, P_{j,t-1}) = 0.5\phi_R \left(P_{j,t}/P_{j,t-1} - \Pi^{1-\iota_p} \Pi_{t-1}^{\iota_p} \right)^2 Y_t,$$

245 where ϕ_R is the magnitude of the costs, ι_p is the degree of indexation of prices, Π is steady-state
 246 inflation and Π_{t-1} is the inflation in the previous period.

247 The financial structure of intermediate firms is modeled following Jermann and Quadrini (2012).

248 Firms use equity and debt to finance their operations. Debt is preferred to equity because of
 249 the tax advantage (e.g., Hennessy and Whited (2005)). The effective gross rate paid by firms is
 250 $R_t = 1 + r_t(1 - \tau)$, where τ captures the tax benefits of debt.

251 Firms also face adjustment costs for net equity payouts that affect the substitution between debt
 252 and equity financing:

$$253 \quad \Gamma_D(D_{j,t}, D_{j,t-1}) = 0.5\phi_D (D_{j,t}/D_{j,t-1} - \zeta_{D,t} \Delta D)^2 Y_t,$$

254 where ΔD is the steady-state growth of the net equity payout and ϕ_D is the magnitude of the costs.⁴

⁴The growth rate specification for the equity payout adjustment costs is well-defined in our estimation as the net

255 The variable $\zeta_{D,t}$ represents a mean one shock to the target growth rate of net equity payouts and
 256 evolves as, $\log(\zeta_{D,t}) = \rho_{\zeta_D} \log(\zeta_{D,t-1}) + \sigma_{\zeta_D} \epsilon_{\zeta_{D,t}}$, where $\epsilon_{\zeta_{D,t}} \sim N(0, 1)$. We refer to $\zeta_{D,t}$ as an *equity*
 257 *financing shock*. This shock captures unspecified changes in aggregate market conditions affecting
 258 equity payouts/financing, which is in similar spirit as Belo et al. (2016).

259 The firms use intra- and intertemporal debt. The intraperiod debt, X_t , is used to finance pay-
 260 ments made before the realization of revenues at the beginning of the period and is repaid at the
 261 end of the period with zero interest. The size of the intraperiod loan is equal to

$$262 \quad X_{j,t} = W_t L_{j,t} + P_t I_{j,t} / \zeta_{Y,t} + P_t S_{j,t} + P_t \Gamma_P(P_{j,t}, P_{j,t-1}) + P_t D_{j,t} + P_t \Gamma_D(D_{j,t}, D_{j,t-1}) \\ 263 \quad + P_t a_k(u_{j,t}^k) K_t + P_t a_n(u_{j,t}^n) N_t + B_{j,t+1} / R_t - B_{j,t}. \\ 264$$

265 The budget constraint of the firm is:

$$266 \quad W_t L_{j,t} + P_t I_{j,t} / \zeta_{Y,t} + P_t S_{j,t} + P_t \Gamma_P(P_{j,t}, P_{j,t-1}) + P_t D_{j,t} + P_t \Gamma_D(D_{j,t}, D_{j,t-1}) = \\ 267 \quad P_{j,t} Y_{j,t} - P_t (a_k(u_{j,t}^k) K_t + a_n(u_{j,t}^n) N_t) + B_{j,t+1} / R_t - B_{j,t}. \\ 268$$

269 Therefore, the size of the intraperiod loan is equal to the revenues, $X_{j,t} = P_{j,t} Y_{j,t}$. The intra-
 270 and intertemporal debt capacity of the firms is constrained by the limited enforceability of debt
 271 contracts. In particular, firms can default on their debt obligations after the realization of revenues
 272 but before repaying the intraperiod loan. It assumed that the lender will not be able to recover the
 273 funds raised by the intraperiod loan in the event of default.

274 We allow for changes in the relative price of physical investment to capture technological
 275 progress that affects the rate of transformation between consumption and investment, but that is
 276 not directly linked to the accumulation of knowledge through R&D investment. The currency
 277 price of the consumption good is P_t , the currency price of a unit of investment good is $P_t \zeta_{Y,t}^{-1}$. The
 278 law of motion for $\zeta_{Y,t}^{-1}$ is given by, $\log(\zeta_{Y,t}) = \rho_{\zeta_Y} \log(\zeta_{Y,t-1}) + \sigma_{\zeta_Y} \epsilon_{\zeta_{Y,t}}$, where $\epsilon_{\zeta_{Y,t}} \sim N(0, 1)$.
 279 Variation in the relative price of investment is needed mostly to correctly measure the process of
 280 physical capital accumulation that occurred in the US starting from World War II.

281 The intangible nature of knowledge capital implies that it provides poor collateral to creditors.

equity payout series is positive in our data sample.

282 We capture this notion, in reduced-form, by assuming that knowledge capital, $N_{j,t}$, has a zero
 283 liquidation value in the event of default while the liquidation value of physical capital, $K_{j,t}$, is
 284 positive, but uncertain, at the time of contracting. Uncertainty in the liquidation value of physical
 285 capital is modeled as follows. With probability $\zeta_{B,t}$ the lender can recover the full value of physical
 286 capital, but with probability $1 - \zeta_{B,t}$ the recovery rate is zero. As shown in Jermann and Quadrini
 287 (2012), the renegotiation process between the firm and lender implies the following enforcement
 288 constraint:

$$289 \quad X_{j,t} \leq \zeta_{B,t} [K_{j,t+1} - B_{j,t+1}/(P_t(1 + r_t))].$$

290 We label $\zeta_{B,t}$ as a *debt financing shock*. This shock is interpreted as unspecified disturbances in
 291 aggregate market conditions affecting liquidation values for physical capital, and therefore debt
 292 capacity. The law of motion for $\zeta_{B,t}$ is given by, $\log(\zeta_{B,t}) = (1 - \rho_{\zeta_B})\zeta_B + \rho_{\zeta_B} \log(\zeta_{B,t-1}) + \sigma_{\zeta_B} \epsilon_{\zeta_B,t}$,
 293 where $\epsilon_{\zeta_B,t} \sim N(0, 1)$.

294 The intermediate firms maximize shareholder value subject to the real and financial constraints
 295 outlined above. A detailed characterization of the intermediate firm's program is outlined in Sec-
 296 tion 1 of the Online Appendix.

297 2.3. Market Clearing and Fiscal Authority

298 The market clearing condition for this economy is $C_t + \zeta_{Y,t}^{-1} I_t + S_t + G_t = Y_t^G$, where G_t denotes
 299 government expenditures and Y_t^G is measured GDP (i.e., $Y_t^G = Y_t - a_k(u_t^k)K_t - a_n(u_t^n)N_t - \Gamma_{P,t} - \Gamma_{D,t}$).
 300 The government raises lump-sum taxes to finance government expenditures and the tax shield for
 301 firms:

$$302 \quad P_t T_t = P_t G_t + B_{t+1} (1/R_t - 1/(1 + r_t)).$$

303 Government expenditure follows an exogenous law of motion, $\hat{g}_t = \rho_g \hat{g}_{t-1} + \sigma_g \epsilon_{g,t}$, where $\epsilon_{g,t} \sim$
 304 $N(0, 1)$, $\hat{g}_t = \ln(g_t/g)$, and $g_t \equiv G_t/N_t$. In the steady-state, $G/Y^G = \eta_G$.

305 2.4. Monetary Policy

306 The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a feedback rule:

$$307 \quad (1 + r_t)/(1 + r) = ((1 + r_{t-1})/(1 + r))^{\rho_r} \left[(\Pi_t/\Pi_t^*)^{\phi_\pi} (\Delta Y_t/\Delta Y)^{4\phi_{dy}} \right]^{1-\rho_r} e^{\sigma_r \epsilon_{r,t}},$$

308 where $1 + r$, and ΔY are the steady-state values of the nominal interest rate and output growth,
 309 respectively; Π_t^* is the inflation target. The central bank responds to deviations in inflation and
 310 annualized output growth from their respective target levels. Unanticipated deviations from the
 311 interest rate rule are captured by $\epsilon_{r,t} \sim N(0, 1)$.

312 The target for inflation, Π_t^* , is assumed to follow an autoregressive process, $\pi_t^* = (1 - \rho_\pi) \pi^* +$
 313 $\rho_\pi \pi_{t-1}^* + \sigma_\pi \epsilon_{\pi,t}$, where $\pi_t^* = \log(\Pi_t^*)$, $\pi^* = \log(\Pi)$ is the steady state inflation target, and $\epsilon_{\pi,t} \sim$
 314 $N(0, 1)$. We allow for changes in the target to accommodate the possibility that the inflationary
 315 stance of the Federal Reserve has changed over time. An alternative approach would consist of
 316 explicitly modeling changes in monetary policy as in Bianchi (2013). While we regard this as an
 317 interesting path for future research, at this stage it would add an unnecessary layer of complexity.

318 2.5. TFP Decomposition

319 Imposing the symmetric equilibrium conditions, the aggregate variable output \tilde{Y}_t can be ex-
 320 pressed as:

$$321 \quad \tilde{Y}_t = (Z_t L_t)^{1-\alpha} K_t^\alpha,$$

322 where aggregate measured TFP, Z_t , is endogenous and depends on technology utilization and the
 323 knowledge stock:

$$324 \quad Z_t \equiv A_t u_t^n N_t.$$

325 As in Comin and Gertler (2006) and Kung and Schmid (2014), the trend component in TFP, N_t , is
 326 endogenous and time-varying. For the discussion of the results below, we define $a_t \equiv \log(A_t)$ as
 327 the *exogenous* stationary shock to TFP, u_t^n is the technology utilization rate, N_t is the knowledge
 328 stock.

329 2.6. Solving the Model

330 The trend component in TFP, N_t , is endogenous. In order to induce stationarity, aggregate
 331 variables, such as, consumption, R&D, investment, output and government expenditures, are nor-
 332 malized by N_t . Once the model is rewritten in terms of stationary variables, the nonstochastic
 333 steady state can be computed, which includes the endogenous trend growth rate, ΔN . After obtain-
 334 ing the non-stochastic steady state values, we log-linearly approximate the equations around the

335 steady-state values (the linearized equations are in the Online Appendix). In the linearized approx-
336 imation, we follow Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and conjecture that the enforcement constraint is
337 always binding.⁵

338 **3. Estimates**

339 This section presents the main estimation results. We estimate the model using a Metropolis
340 Hastings algorithm. As observables, we use eleven series of U.S. quarterly data: real GDP per
341 capita, annualized quarterly inflation, the federal funds rate (FFR), real consumption per capita,
342 physical investment in terms of consumption units, R&D investment in terms of consumption
343 units, hours, the growth rate of real wages, the relative price of investment, net debt issuance, and
344 net equity payout.

345 All macroeconomic variables, except for inflation and the FFR, enter as log differences and
346 are downloaded from the BEA website and the Federal Reserve website. The sample spans from
347 1955:Q1 to 2011:Q3. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that makes use of
348 the newly released series for quarterly R&D in a structural estimation. Following Jermann and
349 Quadrini (2012), the two financial series are calculated using data from the flow of funds accounts
350 of the Federal Reserve Board. Net equity payout is calculated as ‘Nonfinancial corporate business;
351 net dividends paid’ minus ‘Nonfinancial corporate business; corporate equities; liability’. Net debt
352 issuance is ‘Nonfinancial corporate business; debt securities and loans; liability’. Both series are
353 divided by business value added.

354 *3.1. Parameter Estimates*

355 Table 1 reports priors, modes, and 90% error bands for the model parameters. The priors are
356 diffuse and in line with the literature. For the parameters that characterize the endogenous growth
357 mechanism, we choose diffuse priors and take an agnostic view on their likely values, given that
358 there is no previous evidence to guide us. We also specify a prior on the steady-state trend growth
359 rate: $100\Delta N \sim N(.45, .05)$. Given that steady state growth in the model is a function of several
360 model parameters, this choice translates in a joint prior on these model parameters.

⁵The constraint is always binding given a sufficiently large tax advantage τ and sufficiently small shocks.

361 The posterior parameter estimates suggest a significant degree of price stickiness and habit
362 formation consistent with the literature (e.g., Altig et al. (2011) and Del Negro et al. (2007)). We
363 find higher adjustment costs for the knowledge stock relative to the capital stock (i.e., $\Psi_n'' > \Psi_k''$),
364 which helps to capture the fact that R&D expenditure dynamics are more persistent than physical
365 investment dynamics. On the other hand, the low value of a_n'' implies that the technology utilization
366 rate is very responsive to changes in the marginal return on the knowledge stock. We interpret these
367 two findings as implying that R&D needs to be carried on consistently over time in order to produce
368 significant results and that the important margin for technology adjustment in the short-run relies
369 on varying the utilization rate for the knowledge stock. The estimated value for the knowledge
370 spillover parameter, η , implies that the R&D spillover is around 2.59 times the private return,
371 $1 - \eta$, in line with microevidence from Griliches (1992) and Bloom et al. (2013).

372 The estimated parameters governing the debt financing shock are consistent with the values
373 from Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Both the debt and equity financing shocks are quite persistent,
374 however, the equity financing shock is more volatile than the debt financing shock, capturing the
375 large swings in equity payouts and issuance over the sample. The estimated parameter governing
376 the tax advantage of debt, τ , is similar to the calibrated value from Jermann and Quadrini (2012).

377 Given that in the model we have less shocks than observables (10 versus 11), we include ob-
378 servation errors on all variables, except for the FFR and the relative price of investment. Figure 1
379 in the Online Appendix reports the path of the actual variables together with the path implied by
380 the model. We find that observation errors play a minor role for all variables. Their importance is
381 more visible for the net equity payout series, but even in this case, the majority of the fluctuations
382 are explained well by the model, and only very high frequency fluctuations are explained by the
383 observation error.

384 3.2. *Impulse responses*

385 This section illustrates the key model mechanisms through impulse response functions. This
386 analysis provides a foundation for analyzing the 2001 and 2008 recessions through the lens of
387 our model (explored below in Section 4). Before proceeding, recall that the model-implied TFP
388 consists of three different components: The *stationary technology shock*, the *technology utilization*

389 rate, and the knowledge stock. Namely:

$$390 \quad TFP_t = \underset{\text{Tech. Shock}}{A_t} * \underset{\text{Utilization}}{u_t^n} * \underset{\text{Knowledge}}{N_t} .$$

391 The product of technology utilization and adopted knowledge is labeled as the *endogenous com-*
 392 *ponent of TFP*, $N_{e,t} = u_t^n N_t$, which includes the endogenous trend component. The stationary tech-
 393 nology shock, A_t , is the *exogenous component of TFP*. These definitions imply that TFP growth
 394 and the endogenous component of TFP can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta tfp_t &= \underset{\Delta \text{Exogenous}}{\Delta a_t} + \underset{\Delta \text{Endogenous}}{\Delta n_{e,t}} , \\ \Delta n_{e,t} &= \underset{\Delta \text{Utilization}}{\Delta u_t^n} + \underset{\Delta \text{Knowledge}}{\Delta n_t} , \end{aligned}$$

395 where we have used lower case letters to denote the logs of the corresponding economic variables.

396 Figure 1 displays impulse response functions from a negative debt financing shock (contraction
 397 in debt financing). A negative shock reduces the collateral value of physical capital and tightens
 398 the enforcement constraint. Given the frictions in substituting between debt and equity, tighter
 399 financial constraints reduce demand for factor inputs and utilization rates, which is reflected in
 400 the fall in physical investment, R&D investment, and eventually, in labor hours. The fall in R&D
 401 and technology utilization reduces measured TFP, and lowers trend growth due to the presence of
 402 aggregate knowledge spillovers. The sizable and immediate drop in TFP makes the debt financing
 403 shock act as a cost-push shock, increasing inflation on impact. Overall, the decline in production
 404 inputs reduces output and consumption. Importantly, the decline in physical investment is more
 405 substantial than the fall in R&D. This is due to the assumption that only physical capital, and
 406 not knowledge capital, is collateralizable. Therefore, the marginal value of an additional unit of
 407 physical investment is directly tied to its impact on the enforcement constraint through the *ex-post*
 408 liquidation value of the firm, in contrast to R&D investment, which does not impact liquidation val-
 409 ues directly. Consequently, physical investment is more responsive to shocks affecting liquidation
 410 values.

411 The model also produces positive comovement in consumption and investment, which is a
 412 challenge for standard medium-size DSGE models such as Christiano et al. (2005). For example,

413 after a negative debt financing shock, the drop in R&D and technology utilization magnify the
414 output response by affecting both the level and trend components of TFP persistently. Lower
415 current and future levels of output consequently induce a similar consumption response. The
416 positive comovement of macroeconomic quantities to debt financing shocks allow these shocks
417 to be an important driver of business cycles movements.

418 Figure 2 plots impulse response functions to a positive equity financing shock (contraction in
419 equity financing). This shock induces a different response of the macroeconomy compared to the
420 debt financing shock that unfolds over a significantly longer period of time. A positive shock to the
421 net equity payout target (in the adjustment cost function) increases equity payouts to households.
422 An increase in equity payouts reduces the resources available to the firm for production inputs, and
423 is exacerbated by costs affecting the substitution between debt and equity. As a result, demand falls
424 for production inputs, reflected by a drop in physical investment, R&D investment, labor hours,
425 and utilization rates. The fall in production inputs translates into a decline in TFP and output.

426 In contrast to a contractionary debt financing shock, consumption increases on impact to a
427 contractionary equity financing shock due to the large initial increase in financial income from
428 higher equity payouts. However, consumption eventually declines as aggregate income declines
429 persistently. Furthermore, R&D investment is affected more by an equity financing shock than
430 physical investment, which is the opposite relation of the responses to a debt financing shock.
431 Given that the dynamics of physical investment are closely tied to debt through the enforcement
432 constraint, but not R&D investment, R&D is more responsive to shocks affecting equity financing
433 (and internal cash flows). As the equity financing shock has a larger impact on R&D, the effect on
434 trend growth is also more pronounced due to the presence of spillover effects from R&D. Thus,
435 the equity financing shock has an effect that grows over the time horizon, which is in contrast to
436 the debt financing shock which generates an immediate contraction in the macroeconomy. These
437 key differences in the responses to the equity and debt financing shocks are important for capturing
438 salient features of the 2001 and 2008 recessions, which are explored in Section 4.

439 Figure 3 displays the impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy shock. A
440 tightening of monetary policy increases the FFR and lowers the price level. Due to sticky prices,
441 aggregate demand falls and the real rate rises, which discourages investment in physical capital and
442 R&D. The decline in R&D and the endogenous component of TFP leads to a decline in TFP after

443 a contractionary monetary policy shock, consistent with empirical evidence from Evans and dos
444 Santos (2002). Further, the drop in R&D lowers the trend component of TFP due to the endogenous
445 growth channel.

446 **4. A Tale of Two Recessions**

447 The most recent recession has generated concerns about the possibility of a prolonged slow-
448 down. Following the speech delivered by Larry Summers (Summers (2013)), some economists
449 have become interested in the possibility of a “secular stagnation” similar to the one that character-
450 ized the aftermath of the Great Depression according to Hansen (1939). Eggertsson and Mehrotra
451 (2014) build a model that can deliver secular stagnation as a result of household deleveraging or a
452 decline in the population growth rate. Gordon (2014) argues that the US might be heading toward a
453 prolonged period of reduced growth. On the other hand, using projections from a calibrated model,
454 Fernald (2014) finds that trend growth remained stable after the Great Recession.

455 Our model provides a useful framework to address these concerns from a quantitative point of
456 view, given the strong linkages between business cycle fluctuations and long term growth. Thus, in
457 this section we use our model to understand the differences between the two most recent recessions
458 in 2001 and 2008. Figure 4 analyzes the Great Recession through the lens of our model. The solid
459 blue line reports smoothed estimates at the posterior mode for investment, knowledge growth,
460 and the endogenous component of TFP over the past 15 years. The red dashed line describes
461 a counterfactual simulation in which all policy shocks are set to zero since the beginning of the
462 financial crisis. Specifically, starting from the first quarter of 2008 we set the filtered government
463 expenditure shocks, monetary policy shocks, and inflation target shocks to zero.

464 The first aspect that emerges from this analysis is that while the 2008 recession implied a signif-
465 icant fall in physical investment, the growth rate for the knowledge stock was less affected. Instead,
466 the fall in investment was associated with a significant and persistent decline in the technology uti-
467 lization rate to account for the decline in the marginal return of the knowledge input. As a result,
468 the endogenous component of TFP fell significantly. Interestingly, this pattern was reversed during
469 the 2001 recession. In the 2001 recession, the economy experienced a relatively small fall in phys-
470 ical investment, a substantial fall in the growth rate of knowledge (after the large accumulation
471 of R&D during the IT boom in the 1990’s), and only a relatively modest decline in endogenous

472 TFP. The knowledge growth rate did not fully recover, but instead, stabilized at a lower level un-
473 til the 2008 recession. The decline in the growth rate of knowledge during the 2008 recession is
474 relatively smaller when taking into account that the 2008 recession was significantly more severe.
475 Specifically, over the period 2001:Q1-2001:Q4, R&D investment declined by -6.99% , while over
476 the period 2007:Q4-2009:Q2 the decline in R&D investment was -3.35% . The difference in these
477 figures appears even larger when considering that during the 2001 recession the decline in Capital
478 investment was around a tenth of its decline over the 2008 recession (-2.52% vs. -29.70%).

479 In what follows, we show that these events can be interpreted from the perspective of changes in
480 the market conditions to external equity and debt financing. The 2001 recession coincided with the
481 end of the IT boom and significant contraction in the supply of equity finance. Notably, this event
482 particularly affected young tech firms (i.e., high R&D intensity firms that were the main driver of
483 the 90's R&D boom) that primarily use external equity as a marginal source of funds. Our model
484 captures this fact through the behavior of the equity financing shock. Figure 5 compares the actual
485 data with a counterfactual simulation in which all shocks are set to zero starting from 2000:Q1
486 except for the equity financing shocks that are instead left unchanged. Note that the counterfactual
487 simulation captures remarkably well the decline in knowledge growth that started with the 2001
488 recession.

489 As illustrated in the previous section through impulse responses, contractionary shocks to eq-
490 uity financing lead to a persistent decline in the accumulation of knowledge that unfolds over
491 several periods. Since R&D projects are often characterized by a high degree of asymmetric in-
492 formation and low asset tangibility, debt financing is more limited – this dimension is captured
493 in the model by the assumption that the knowledge stock cannot be used as collateral in the debt
494 contract. The large adverse shocks to equity financing that coincided with the 2001 recession led
495 to a persistent decline in R&D, which implies a long-lasting adverse effect on trend growth.

496 In contrast, the 2008 recession originated from a severe financial crisis that more significantly
497 impacted debt capital markets.⁶ Figure 6 considers a similar exercise as above, but instead focuses
498 on the 2008 recession in the context of the debt financing shock. The solid blue line corresponds
499 to the actual data, while the red dashed line reports a counterfactual in which all shocks are set to

⁶Net debt issuance decreased 150% while net equity payouts decreased by 80%.

500 zero starting from 2008:Q1, except for the debt financing shock. Note that the counterfactual series
501 captures very well the behavior of the growth of the investment in physical capital and the growth
502 of the endogenous component of TFP. On the other hand, it misses the large decline in knowledge
503 growth. As discussed in the impulse responses, debt financing shocks have a smaller effect on R&D
504 investment relative to physical investment. As a consequence, the decline in the marginal return
505 for the technology input (from the decline in investment) was mostly absorbed by sharp decline
506 technology utilization rather than a reduction in R&D. Accordingly, the *level* of endogenous TFP
507 fell precipitously, but the *trend* component of endogenous TFP was not as adversely affected by
508 the shock.

509 Therefore, our estimated model delivers two distinct interpretations for the 2001 and 2008
510 recessions. The results are disciplined by the fact that we use measures of debt and equity financing
511 as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), in addition to macroeconomic variables, including R&D flows.
512 Nevertheless, it is interesting to show that our story lines up with the evidence that can be extracted
513 from series not directly used in our estimation exercise.

514 The top panel of Figure 7 plots the R&D series for high tech firms (dash-dot black line), non-
515 high tech firms (dashed blue line), and all firms (solid red line) as a percentage of GDP. Observe
516 that the R&D of the tech firms drive most of the fluctuations in aggregate R&D dynamics and these
517 firms have steadily increased their share of R&D expenditures relative to non-tech firms since the
518 1980's. Thus, shocks to the financial constraints of high tech firms have important consequences
519 for aggregate innovation dynamics. The middle panel plots R&D expenditures (dashed blue line),
520 cash flow (solid red line), and net equity payout (dashed black line) as a percentage of GDP for tech
521 firms, while the bottom panel plots the same series for non-tech firms.⁷ From the middle panel, we
522 can see that the persistent decline in R&D for tech firms following the 2001 recession coincides
523 with a sharp decline in cash flow and an increase in net equity payout. In contrast, the drop in
524 R&D after the 2008 recession was only short-lived as there was a quick rebound in R&D, cash
525 flows fell significantly less than during the 2001 recession, and net equity payout was less volatile.
526 For non-tech firms, the three series are relatively stable compared to the tech firms, reaffirming the
527 fact that tech firms are the key drivers of innovation over the past three to four decades.

⁷Section 3 in the Online Appendix provides details on the construction of the data series. Tech firms are defined as firms with the following SIC code: 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384 or 737.

528 This analysis above has important implications for assessing the long-term consequences of the
529 Great Recession. The decline in TFP experienced during the 2008 recession is largely explained
530 by a reduction in technology utilization, as opposed to a fall in knowledge accumulation. However,
531 while the adverse effects of the Great Recession on knowledge accumulation was not commensu-
532 rate to its sizable impact on the rest of the economy, such as physical investment, the relatively
533 moderate contraction in R&D investment still exacerbated a pre-existing decline in trend growth
534 that started with the 2001 recession. Furthermore, as shown by our impulse responses, a slowdown
535 in the technology utilization rate persists for many years, suggesting that a significant amount of
536 time is required for economic growth prospects to return to steady-state. During this time, in-
537 centives for engaging in R&D are also affected, and therefore, a longer recession exacerbates the
538 long-term consequences on growth. Thus, our analysis should not be interpreted as saying that the
539 2008 recession was inconsequential for long-term dynamics.

540 In this respect, it is interesting to analyze the role of policymakers' behavior. Modeling uncon-
541 ventional monetary policy or changes in policy rules is beyond the scope of the paper. However, it
542 is still instructive to study the implications of policy shocks. Given that we do not explicitly model
543 the zero lower bound and forward guidance, our model captures the prolonged period of near zero
544 interest rates as expansionary monetary policy. The counterfactual simulation reported in Figure
545 4 shows that absent monetary and fiscal policy shocks, the growth rate of knowledge would have
546 been only mildly affected, but the extent of the recovery in investment and technology utilization
547 would have been much more contained.

548 These results have important implications for the role of policy interventions during recessions.
549 In models with exogenous growth, TFP and trend growth does not depend on policymakers' ac-
550 tions. As a result, these models generally predict a steady and relatively fast return to the long-term
551 trend, independent from the actions undertaken by the fiscal and monetary authorities. Instead, in
552 the present model sustaining demand during a severe recession can deeply affect the medium- and
553 long-term consequences for the economy. Of course, policymakers cannot intervene each period to
554 permanently alter the trend growth rate of the economy. This would violate the notion of the equi-
555 librium steady-state and be subject to the Lucas critique. However, policymakers can substantially
556 reduce the long-term consequences of a recession.

5. Additional Implications

In this section, we decompose the behavior of the different components of TFP, provide external validity for the technology utilization margin, and show that our model mechanisms are robust to alternative model specifications and in different data samples.

5.1. Different TFP Components

The endogenous component of TFP ($N_{e,t} \equiv u_t^n * N_t$) captures the bulk of the fluctuations in the model-implied measured TFP growth, through changes in the stationary technology utilization margin (u_t^n), while the long-term trend growth component, the knowledge stock (N_t), is quite stable and persistent. The level of technology utilization is a persistent stationary process, but the growth rate exhibits business cycle fluctuations that are able to explain a significant portion of the high-frequency TFP growth fluctuations. Therefore, technology utilization provides a growth propagation mechanism at higher frequencies while knowledge accumulation provides a growth propagation mechanism at lower frequencies. In principle, the exogenous component of TFP (a_t) could account for all business cycle fluctuations in TFP growth. However, our estimation favors the endogenous technology utilization margin over the exogenous TFP shock for explaining business cycle fluctuations in TFP growth. Evidently, the data prefers the positive co-movement between TFP and business cycle dynamics induced by changes in technology utilization.

Table 2 decomposes the model-implied variance of the observed variables and the components of the model-implied TFP across three frequency intervals. Long-term frequencies correspond to cycles of more than 50 years, medium-term frequencies are associated with cycles between 8 and 50 years, whereas business cycle frequencies correspond to cycles of a duration between 0.5 and 8 years. For all the observed variables, the volatility at medium-term frequencies plays a significant role. In fact, for the FFR, labor hours, and R&D growth more than 50% of volatility is explained by medium-term fluctuations. Furthermore, for consumption growth, investment growth, and GDP growth, the variance of the medium-term and business cycle components are quite similar in magnitude, providing further evidence of the importance of studying jointly business cycle and lower frequency fluctuations. Quite interestingly, medium-term fluctuations are also important for explaining financial cycles. Not surprisingly, a large fraction of the estimated variation for net equity payouts occurs at low frequencies, in line with the observed behavior of this variable over

586 the sample (see Figure 1 in the Online Appendix).

587 For the model-implied TFP, the decomposition across frequencies varies mostly because of the
588 dynamics of its endogenous components, technology utilization and the knowledge stock. The
589 growth rate of TFP and the endogenous component of TFP exhibit fluctuations mostly at business
590 cycle frequencies primarily through variation in the technology utilization margin. On the other
591 hand, the fluctuations in the growth rate of the knowledge stock occur mostly at low frequencies,
592 and to some extent, at medium-term frequencies, which is attributed to the high R&D adjustment
593 costs.

594 Overall, most of the variation in the model-implied TFP is attributed to the movements in the
595 endogenous TFP component, and the fraction is more significant at lower frequencies. Figure
596 8 provides a visual characterization of this result by plotting the evolution of the model-implied
597 TFP growth (dashed black line), the endogenous component of TFP (solid blue line), and knowl-
598 edge growth (red dashed-dotted line). These series are obtained by extracting the corresponding
599 smoothed series based on the posterior mode estimates. Consistent with the variance decomposi-
600 tion, measured TFP growth appears substantially more volatile than the growth rate of knowledge
601 itself. In principle, such large fluctuations could be explained by changes in the exogenous com-
602 ponent of TFP. However, from visual inspection, it is evident that changes in the endogenous com-
603 ponent of TFP capture the bulk of the fluctuations in TFP growth mainly through adjustments in
604 technology utilization. In particular, the endogenous component tracks quite closely the medium-
605 term fluctuations in TFP, whereas the exogenous fluctuations are significantly smaller and are more
606 important at higher frequencies. In sum, this figure provides support for the finding that the most
607 important margin for explaining TFP growth dynamics consists of changes in endogenous TFP –
608 primarily through adjustments in technology utilization rates – as opposed to exogenous distur-
609 bances to technology captured by the stationary technology shock.

610 *5.2. External Validity*

611 We provide corroborating evidence for the important role played by the endogenous technology
612 utilization channel by comparing our latent utilization series with two empirical proxies, software
613 expenditures and investment in information processing equipment, both of which are obtained from
614 the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). As explained above, changes in technology utilization

615 represent the most important margin for producing significant variation in the endogenous com-
616 ponent of TFP growth, especially at business cycle and medium-term frequencies. We find that
617 the correlation between our technology utilization measure and software expenditures is 0.84 at
618 business cycle and medium-term frequencies while the correlation with investment in information
619 processing equipment is 0.50.⁸ Given that these two empirical measures are not directly used in
620 our estimation, these correlations provide external validity for our technology utilization margin.

621 Our technology utilization series also qualitatively replicates the low-frequency patterns of
622 the two empirical measures. Namely, the growth rate of software expenditures and information
623 processing equipment are higher in the first half of the sample. Despite not using these two data
624 series as observables, technology utilization in our model is also higher in the beginning of the
625 sample, to partially account for the opposing low-frequency trends in R&D and measured TFP
626 (i.e., TFP growth is higher in the first half of the sample while R&D growth is higher in the second
627 half). The finding that technology utilization is above trend over the first half of the sample is
628 consistent with several contributions that have studied US macroeconomic dynamics over the post
629 World-War II period. A popular narrative argues that the US economy was, on average, above
630 potential in the 1960s and 1970s, and that this resulted in a progressive increase in inflation (e.g.,
631 Orphanides (2002)). In our model, technology utilization responds positively to the state of the
632 economy. Thus, our finding that technology utilization contributed to higher TFP at the beginning
633 of the sample is internally consistent.

634 *5.3. Alternative Specifications*

635 Section 4 of the Online Appendix considers the estimation of an extension of the benchmark
636 model where the technology utilization rate is modeled as a slow-moving accumulation process,
637 $\bar{u}_{j,t}^n = (1 - \rho_n)u_{j,t}^n + \rho_n\bar{u}_{j,t-1}^n$, where $u_{j,t}^n$ are firm expenditures towards technology utilization and
638 $(1 - \rho_n)$ captures the depreciation rate of utilized technology. In our benchmark model, we assume
639 a flow specification for technology utilization. Therefore, this extension assumes that technology
640 utilization depreciates partially rather than fully each period. Figures 3, 4, and 5 in the Online Ap-
641 pendix compare the impulse response functions from an estimated version of this extended model

⁸The volatility of our utilization measure is also quantitatively similar to that of software expenditures both at business cycle and medium-term frequencies.

642 and from the benchmark model. Overall, both model specifications imply a similar propagation
643 of financial and macroeconomic shocks. Importantly, technology utilization is the main driver of
644 business cycle fluctuations in TFP growth in this extension, consistent with the benchmark model.

645 We favor the more parsimonious specification for technology utilization in the benchmark for
646 two primary reasons. First, given that the implications of the two models are quite similar, the
647 streamlined specification helps us to emphasize the role of the financial constraints and financial
648 shocks, which are the focal points of the paper. Second, the data prefers the flow specification for
649 technology utilization over the stock specification in our likelihood-based estimation. We reach
650 this conclusion as the marginal data density is larger and the observation errors are smaller in the
651 benchmark model relative to the extended model.

652 Given that there was an important Securities Exchange Committee (SEC) regulatory change
653 in 1982 that affected payout policy (e.g., Grullon and Michaely (2002)), we also estimate our
654 benchmark model in the post-1982 sample. Figures 6, 7, and 8 in the Online Appendix compare
655 the impulse response functions from the post-1982 estimation and the full sample estimation. The
656 responses, including that of the equity financing shock, are qualitatively similar between the two
657 samples, suggesting the robustness of our estimation results to the regulatory change. We also
658 compare our latent equity financing shock (the key driver of payout fluctuations in our model)
659 with an aggregate measure of external equity issuance costs from Belo et al. (2016) to provide
660 corroborating evidence.⁹ A higher value of their measure corresponds to lower equity issuance
661 costs. The correlation between our shock and the inverse of their measure is 0.69 over the entire
662 sample and 0.64 in the post-1982 sample.

663 **6. Conclusions**

664 In this paper, we build and estimate a medium-size DSGE model that features endogenous
665 technological progress and financial frictions. Total factor productivity in our model consists of
666 two endogenous components, the knowledge stock and technology utilization, that drive macroe-
667 conomic fluctuations across different frequencies. Positive externalities from knowledge accu-
668 mulation provide a economic channel linking macroeconomic and financial shocks to persistent

⁹They construct their external equity issuance cost measure by relating it to the volume of external equity issuance and the debt-to-capital ratio in a factor structure.

669 movements in long-term growth prospects. In contrast, endogenous technology utilization pro-
670 vides a strong business cycle propagation mechanism. Due to differences in the liquidation values
671 of physical versus knowledge capital, we find that debt financing shocks have large and immediate
672 impact on the macroeconomy through physical investment, whereas equity financing shocks have
673 long-lasting effects on growth that build over time through the sizable effects on R&D investment.

674 We use our estimated model to interpret the two most recent recessions in 2001 and 2008, and
675 to quantitatively assess their long-run consequences on economic growth. First, we identify large
676 contractionary shocks to debt financing in the 2008 recession that led to a significant decline in
677 physical investment and endogenous TFP, however knowledge accumulation was less affected. In
678 the context of our growth model, this implies that the most recent recession had severe conse-
679 quences in the short- and medium-term, but long-run growth prospects remained *relatively* stable.
680 The opposite was true during the 2001 recession, which was milder in the short term, as physical
681 investment and technology utilization were less affected, but large contractionary shocks to equity
682 financing triggered a sizable and persistent decline in knowledge growth.

683 **References**

- 684 Aghion, P., Howitt, P., 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction. *Econometrica* 60 (2),
685 323–351.
- 686 Alesina, A., Ardagna, S., 2010. Large changes in fiscal policy: taxes versus spending. In: *Tax*
687 *Policy and the Economy*, Volume 24. The University of Chicago Press, pp. 35–68.
- 688 Altig, D., Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., Linde, J., 2011. Firm-specific capital, nominal rigidi-
689 ties and the business cycle. *Review of Economic Dynamics* 14 (2), 225–247.
- 690 Anzoategui, D., Comin, D., Gertler, M., Martinez, J., 2016. Endogenous technology adoption and
691 r&d as sources of business cycle persistence. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
- 692 Bansal, R., Yaron, A., 2004. Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset pricing puzzles.
693 *The Journal of Finance* 59 (4), 1481–1509.
- 694 Barlevy, G., 2004a. The cost of business cycles under endogenous growth. *The American Eco-*
695 *nomics Review* 94 (4), 964–990.

- 696 Barlevy, G., 2004b. On the timing of innovation in stochastic schumpeterian growth models. Tech.
697 rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
- 698 Barlevy, G., 2007. On the cyclicalities of research and development. *The American Economic Re-*
699 *view*, 1131–1164.
- 700 Barro, R., King, R., 1984. Time-separable preferences and intertemporal-substitution models of
701 business cycles. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- 702 Basu, S., Fernald, J. G., Kimball, M. S., 2006. Are technology improvements contractionary? *The*
703 *American Economic Review* 96 (5), 1418–1448.
- 704 Belo, F., Lin, X., Yang, F., 2016. External equity financing shocks, financial flows, and asset prices.
- 705 Benigno, G., Fornaro, L., 2015. Stagnation traps. Working Paper.
- 706 Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1999. The financial accelerator in a quantitative business
707 cycle framework. *Handbook of macroeconomics* 1, 1341–1393.
- 708 Bianchi, F., 2013. Regime switches, agents' beliefs, and post-world war ii us macroeconomic
709 dynamics. *The Review of Economic Studies*.
- 710 Bianchi, F., Melosi, L., 2014. Escaping the Great Recession. CEPR.
- 711 Bloom, N., Schankerman, M., Van Reenen, J., 2013. Identifying technology spillovers and product
712 market rivalry. *Econometrica* 81 (4), 1347–1393.
- 713 Brown, J. R., Fazzari, S. M., Petersen, B. C., 2009. Financing innovation and growth: Cash flow,
714 external equity, and the 1990s r&d boom. *The Journal of Finance* 64 (1), 151–185.
- 715 Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., Evans, C. L., 2005. Nominal rigidities and the dynamic effects
716 of a shock to monetary policy. *Journal of political Economy* 113 (1), 1–45.
- 717 Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M. S., Trabandt, M., 2014a. Understanding the great recession.
718 Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
- 719 Christiano, L. J., Motto, R., Rostagno, M., 2014b. Risk shocks. *The American Economic Review*
720 104 (1), 27–65.

721 Cohen, W. M., Levinthal, D. A., 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and
722 innovation. *Administrative science quarterly*, 128–152.

723 Comin, D., Gertler, M., 2006. Medium term business cycles. *American Economic Review*.

724 Del Negro, M., Schorfheide, F., Smets, F., Wouters, R., 2007. On the fit of new keynesian models.
725 *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics* 25 (2), 123–143.

726 Eggertsson, G., Mehrotra, N., 2014. A model of secular stagnation.

727 Erceg, C. J., Henderson, D. W., Levin, A. T., 2000. Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage
728 and price contracts. *Journal of monetary Economics* 46 (2), 281–313.

729 Evans, C. L., dos Santos, F. T., 2002. Monetary policy shocks and productivity measures in the g-7
730 countries. *Portuguese Economic Journal* 1 (1), 47–70.

731 Fernald, J., 2014. Productivity and potential output before, during, and after the great recession.
732 In: *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2014, Volume 29*. University of Chicago Press.

733 Garcia-Macia, D., 2017. The financing of ideas and the great deviation. *International Monetary*
734 *Fund*.

735 Gordon, R. J., 2010. Revisiting us productivity growth over the past century with a view of the
736 future. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.

737 Gordon, R. J., 2014. The demise of us economic growth: Restatement, rebuttal, and reflections.
738 Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.

739 Griliches, Z., 1992. The search for r&d spillovers. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Re-
740 search.

741 Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 1991. Quality ladders and product cycles. *Quarterly Journal of Eco-*
742 *nomics* 106 (2), 557–586.

743 Grullon, G., Michaely, R., 2002. Dividends, share repurchases, and the substitution hypothesis.
744 *The Journal of Finance* 57 (4), 1649–1684.

745 Guajardo, J., Leigh, D., Pescatori, A., 2014. Expansionary austerity? international evidence. Jour-
746 nal of the European Economic Association.

747 Guerron-Quintana, P. A., Jinnai, R., 2013. Liquidity, trends and the great recession.

748 Hansen, A. H., 1939. Economic progress and declining population growth. *The American Eco-*
749 *nomics Review*, 1–15.

750 Hennessy, C. A., Whited, T. M., 2005. Debt dynamics. *The Journal of Finance* 60 (3), 1129–1165.

751 Jermann, U., Quadrini, V., 2012. Macroeconomic effects of financial shocks. *The American Eco-*
752 *nomics Review*, 238–271.

753 Jovanovic, B., Rousseau, P. L., 2005. General purpose technologies. *Handbook of economic*
754 *growth* 1, 1181–1224.

755 Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997. Credit cycles. *Journal of political economy* 105 (2), 211–248.

756 Kung, H., 2014. Macroeconomic linkages between monetary policy and the term structure of in-
757 terest rates. *Journal of Financial Economics*. Forthcoming.

758 Kung, H., Schmid, L., 2014. Innovation, growth, and asset prices. *Journal of Finance*. Forthcoming.

759 Orphanides, A., 2002. Monetary Policy Rules and the Great Inflation 92 (2), 115–120, (Proceed-
760 ings issue).

761 Peretto, P., 1999. Industrial development, technological change, and long-run growth. *Journal of*
762 *Development Economics* 59 (2), 389–417.

763 Romer, P. M., 1990. Endogenous technological change. *Journal of political Economy*, S71–S102.

764 Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 1992. Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market equilibrium
765 approach. *The Journal of Finance* 47 (4), 1343–1366.

766 Summers, L., 2013. Why stagnation might prove to be the new normal. *The Financial Times*.

767

| Description | Parameter | Mode Posterior | 5% | 95% | Type | Mean | St.dev. |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|---------|---------|------|--------|---------|
| Degree of indexation of wages | ι_w | 0.0589 | 0.0324 | 0.0762 | B | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Derivative R&D adjustment | Ψ_n'' | 7.9215 | 7.5090 | 8.2138 | G | 4 | 3 |
| Derivative capital adjustment | Ψ_k'' | 1.1678 | 1.0770 | 1.3038 | G | 2 | 1 |
| Degree of indexation of prices | ι_p | 0.2532 | 0.2242 | 0.2841 | B | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Monetary policy | ϕ_π | 1.0563 | 1.0486 | 1.0867 | N | 2 | 0.3 |
| Monetary policy | $\phi_{\Delta y}$ | 0.2852 | 0.2762 | 0.2991 | G | 0.3 | 0.15 |
| Monetary policy | ρ_R | 0.8495 | 0.8378 | 0.8588 | B | 0.6 | 0.2 |
| Spillovers knowledge | η | 0.2786 | 0.2623 | 0.2795 | B | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Fraction wage adjustment | ζ_w | 0.8327 | 0.8217 | 0.8499 | B | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Consumption persistence | ρ_{ζ_c} | 0.5717 | 0.5382 | 0.6266 | B | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Inflation target persistence | ρ_π | 0.9719 | 0.9693 | 0.9739 | B | 0.95 | 0.02 |
| R.P.I persistence | ρ_{ζ_T} | 0.9996 | 0.9987 | 0.9999 | B | 0.8 | 0.1 |
| Technology persistence | ρ_a | 0.9667 | 0.9605 | 0.9720 | B | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Government persistence | ρ_g | 0.9995 | 0.9987 | 0.9998 | B | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Labor persistence | ρ_χ | 0.8761 | 0.8634 | 0.8909 | B | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Equity financing persistence | ρ_{ζ_D} | 0.9165 | 0.9089 | 0.9365 | B | 0.8 | 0.1 |
| Price mark-up persistence | ρ_{λ_f} | 0.9992 | 0.9977 | 0.9996 | B | 0.8 | 0.1 |
| Debt financing persistence | ρ_{ζ_B} | 0.9800 | 0.9774 | 0.9799 | B | 0.6 | 0.1 |
| Wage mark-up | $\lambda_w - 1$ | 0.1647 | 0.1640 | 0.1695 | G | 0.15 | 0.02 |
| Labor steady state | L^* | 98.7175 | 98.6112 | 99.0717 | N | 100 | 2.5 |
| Inflation rate steady state | π^* | 0.0044 | 0.0044 | 0.0045 | N | 0.5 | 0.05 |
| Discount factor | $100(\beta^{-1} - 1)$ | 0.0164 | 0.0061 | 0.0209 | B | 0.2 | 0.095 |
| Habit in consumption | Φ_c | 0.9185 | 0.9046 | 0.9275 | B | 0.7 | 0.2 |
| Price mark-up | $\lambda_f - 1$ | 0.0958 | 0.0919 | 0.1052 | G | 0.15 | 0.05 |
| Depreciation rate capital | δ_k | 0.0323 | 0.0315 | 0.0333 | B | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Depreciation rate R&D | δ_n | 0.0026 | 0.0015 | 0.0030 | B | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Mean productivity shock | a^* | -8.3376 | -8.4933 | -8.2778 | U | -100 | 100 |
| Capital share | α | 0.2290 | 0.2227 | 0.2296 | B | 0.3 | 0.05 |
| Elasticity of labor | σ_L | 1.6546 | 1.4879 | 1.7311 | G | 2 | 0.75 |
| Monetary policy vol. | σ_R | 0.0021 | 0.0019 | 0.0022 | IG | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Consumption vol. | σ_{ζ_c} | 0.0493 | 0.0473 | 0.0523 | IG | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Inflation target vol. | σ_π | 0.0084 | 0.0070 | 0.0094 | IG | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| R.P.I vol. | σ_{ζ_T} | 0.0065 | 0.0061 | 0.0073 | IG | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Technology vol. | σ_a | 0.0074 | 0.0062 | 0.0083 | IG | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Government vol. | σ_g | 0.0203 | 0.0179 | 0.0219 | IG | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Labor vol. | σ_χ | 0.0747 | 0.0744 | 0.0771 | IG | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Debt financing vol. | σ_{ζ_B} | 0.0123 | 0.0113 | 0.0135 | IG | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Equity financing vol. | σ_{ζ_D} | 0.0783 | 0.0764 | 0.0800 | IG | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Price mark-up vol. | σ_{λ_f} | 0.0066 | 0.0058 | 0.0076 | IG | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Mean debt financing shock | ζ_B'' | 0.3081 | 0.3039 | 0.3173 | B | 0.3 | 0.08 |
| Derivative capital utilization | a_k'' | 0.0546 | 0.0530 | 0.0555 | G | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Derivative R&D utilization | a_n'' | 0.0033 | 0.0031 | 0.0034 | G | 0.004 | 0.002 |
| Price adjustment cost | ϕ_R | 8.7184 | 7.8264 | 8.9855 | IG | 5 | 5 |
| Equity payout cost | ϕ_D | 1.2782 | 1.0866 | 1.5966 | IG | 5 | 5 |
| Tax advantage | τ | 0.3212 | 0.3191 | 0.3291 | B | 0.3 | 0.05 |
| Wage obs. error vol. | σ_{OW} | 0.0066 | 0.0058 | 0.0073 | IG | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Inflation obs. error vol. | $\sigma_{O\pi}$ | 0.0031 | 0.0029 | 0.0031 | IG | 0.0005 | 0.001 |
| Capital inv. obs. error vol. | σ_{OI} | 0.0026 | 0.0020 | 0.0028 | IG | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| R&D inv. obs. error vol. | σ_{OS} | 0.0035 | 0.0024 | 0.0038 | IG | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| Debt issuance obs. error vol. | $\sigma_{O\Delta B}$ | 0.0077 | 0.0074 | 0.0086 | IG | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Equity payout obs. error vol. | σ_{OE} | 0.0073 | 0.0069 | 0.0074 | IG | 0.0025 | 0.0015 |
| Output obs. error vol. | σ_{OY} | 0.0133 | 0.0127 | 0.0141 | IG | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Labor obs. error vol. | σ_{OL} | 0.0022 | 0.0020 | 0.0025 | IG | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Consumption obs. error vol. | σ_{OC} | 0.0019 | 0.0017 | 0.0024 | IG | 0.01 | 0.01 |

Table 1: Posterior modes, 90% error bands, and priors of the model parameters.

| | Long | Medium | Business |
|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| GDP growth | 5.80 (4.7,7.0) | 41.94 (33.5,49.4) | 52.25 (46.8,58.6) |
| Inflation | 25.11 (21.4,29.6) | 29.07 (24.8,33.4) | 45.83 (37.9,53.5) |
| FFR | 40.15 (33.8,46.9) | 51.23 (42.7,59.3) | 8.62 (7.1,10.0) |
| Investment growth | 1.17 (1.0,1.3) | 42.30 (37.0,48.3) | 56.53 (51.4,63.9) |
| Consumption growth | 12.30 (9.9,15.2) | 35.18 (28.7,42.7) | 52.52 (41.2,61.0) |
| R&D growth | 7.72 (6.6,8.9) | 62.96 (53.5,72.4) | 29.32 (25.1,33.9) |
| Wages growth | 3.71 (3.0,4.5) | 14.55 (10.8,17.4) | 81.74 (65.8,96.7) |
| Hours | 38.58 (33.0,46.7) | 54.95 (48.0,61.5) | 6.48 (5.8,7.2) |
| Net Debt Issuance | 18.28 (14.7,22.2) | 73.51 (64.3,84.7) | 8.20 (7.2,9.2) |
| Net Equity Payout | 63.85 (55.6,73.7) | 34.93 (27.5,41.8) | 1.22 (0.8,1.6) |
| Knowledge growth | 58.39 (45.3,72.7) | 40.89 (28.9,50.8) | 0.73 (0.5,0.9) |
| R&D Utilization growth | 4.12 (3.2,5.0) | 33.45 (23.2,40.2) | 62.43 (47.3,73.4) |
| TFP growth | 5.82 (4.4,7.3) | 26.43 (18.2,32.2) | 67.75 (52.8,78.5) |
| Endogenous TFP growth | 6.49 (4.9,8.2) | 30.10 (20.2,36.8) | 63.41 (48.0,74.6) |

Table 2: Median and 90% error bands for the model-implied variance across different frequency intervals. Long term: Cycles of more than 50 years. Medium term cycle: Cycles between 8 and 50 years, Business cycle: Cycles between .5 and 8 years.




Figure 1: Debt Financing Shock. This figure displays impulse response functions for GDP, inflation, investment, consumption, R&D, change in wages, hours, and TFP to a negative innovation to the debt financing shock. The solid line corresponds to the median while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% error bands.




Figure 2: Equity Financing Shock. This figure displays impulse response functions for GDP, inflation, investment, consumption, R&D, change in wages, hours, and TFP to a positive innovation to the equity financing shock. The solid line corresponds to the median while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% error bands.




Figure 3: Monetary Policy Shock. This figure displays impulse response functions for GDP, inflation, investment, consumption, R&D, change in wages, hours, and TFP to a contractionary monetary policy shock. The solid line corresponds to the median while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% error bands.




Figure 4: Impact of the Great Recession. This figure analyzes the Great Recession through the lens of our model. The solid blue line reports smoothed estimates at the posterior mode for Investment, knowledge growth, and the endogenous part of TFP over the past 14 years. The red dashed line corresponds to a counterfactual simulation in which monetary and fiscal shocks are removed starting from the first quarter of 2008.




Figure 5: The 2001 Recession and Equity Financing. This figure analyzes the 2001 Recession through the lens of our model. The solid blue line reports smoothed estimates at the posterior mode for investment growth, knowledge growth, and the growth of the endogenous part of TFP from 1999-2004. The red dashed line corresponds to a counterfactual simulation in which all shocks are set to zero starting from 2000:Q1, except for the shocks to equity financing.




Figure 6: The Great Recession and Debt Financing. This figure analyzes the Great Recession through the lens of our model. The solid blue line reports smoothed estimates at the posterior mode for investment growth, knowledge growth, and the growth of the endogenous part of TFP from 2007-2012. The red dashed line corresponds to a counterfactual simulation in which all shocks are set to zero starting from 2008:Q1, except for the shocks to debt financing.




Figure 7: Financing of R&D for High Tech and Non-High Tech Firms. This figure depicts the financing and R&D patterns for tech firms and non tech firms. In Panel (a), the solid red line reports R&D investment as percentage of GDP for all firms. The the dash-dot black line and dashed blue line show R&D investment as percentage of GDP for tech and non tech firms, respectively. Panel (b) reports cash flow, R&D and net equity payout for tech firms (first figure) and non tech firms (second figure). The red solid line shows cash flow as percentage of GDP, the dashed blue line depicts R&D investment (as percentage of GDP) and the dash-dot black line shows net equity payout (as percentage of GDP). Tech firms are firms with the SIC code: 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384 or 737. Section 3 of the Online Appendix describes the data employed.




Figure 8: TFP Growth. This figure describes the evolution of TFP growth, knowledge growth, and endogenous TFP growth.