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ADVERSE SELECTION AND SELF-FULFILLING BUSINESS CYCLES

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### **ABSTRACT**

We introduce a simple adverse selection problem arising in credit markets into a standard textbook real business cycle model. There is a continuum of households and a continuum of anonymous producers who produce the final goods from intermediate goods. These producers do not have the resources to make up-front payments to purchase inputs and must do so by borrowing from competitive financial intermediates. However, lending to these producers is risky: honest borrowers will always pay off their debt, but dishonest borrowers will always default. This gives rise to an adverse selection problem for financial intermediaries. In a continuous-time real business cycle setting we show that such adverse selection generates multiple steady states and both local and global indeterminacy, and can give rise to equilibria with probabilistic jumps in credit, consumption, investment and employment driven by Markov sunspots under calibrated parameterizations and fully rational expectations. Introducing reputational effects eliminates defaults and results in a unique but still indeterminate steady state. Finally we generalize the model to firms with heterogeneous and stochastic productivity, and show that indeterminacies and sunspots persist.

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# 1 Introduction

The seminal work of Wilson (1980) shows that in a static model, adverse selection can generate multiple equilibria because of asymmetric information about product quality. The aim of this paper is to analyze how adverse selection in credit markets can give rise to lending externalities that generate multiple steady states and a continuum of equilibria in an otherwise standard dynamic general equilibrium model of business cycles.

In particular, we introduce a simple type of adverse selection arising in credit markets into a standard textbook real business cycle (RBC) model. The model features a continuum of households and a continuum of anonymous producers. These producers use intermediate goods to produce the final goods. But because they do not have the resources to make up-front payments to purchase intermediate inputs, to finance their working capital they must borrow from competitive financial intermediaries. Lending to these producers however is risky, as some borrowers may default. We assume that there are two types of borrowers (producers). In our baseline model, honest borrowers will always pay back their loans, while dishonest borrowers will always default. The financial intermediaries do not know which borrower is honest and which is not. This gives rise to adverse selection: for any given interest rate, dishonest borrowers have a stronger incentive to borrow. In such an environment, an increase in lending from optimistic financial intermediaries encourages more honest producers to borrow. The increased quality of borrowers reduces the default risk, which in turn motivates other financial intermediaries to lend. The resulting decline in the interest rate brings down the production cost for all producers/borrowers. This drives output expansion, further increases the credit supply from households, and generates more future lending. In other words, a lending externality exists both intratemporally and intertemporally.

In our baseline model in section 2, we study the local dynamics of our model to show that this lending externality not only generates two steady state equilibria with low and high average default rates, but also gives rise to a continuum of equilibria around one of the steady states under calibrated parameterizations. We then move on to characterize the global dynamics of our model economy. The additional insight from the global dynamics analysis is that even in the absence of local indeterminacy we may still have global indeterminacy, with boom and bust cycles in output under rational expectations. Our adverse selection model can exhibit jumps across equilibria so that credit, consumption, investment and employment can suddenly collapse with some probability, driven by a Markov sunspot or a confidence crisis. We construct our

model such that agents expect such probabilistic jumps and thus build them into their optimal decisions. Jump probabilities can then capture occasional confidence and credit crises, or boom and bust cycles, as we demonstrate in section 2.6.

In a dynamic setting where producers who borrow are not completely anonymous, market forces and competition can mitigate adverse selection through reputational effects absent from our baseline model in section 2. Therefore in section 3, we examine whether indeterminacy survives under reputational effects. We follow Kehoe and Levine (1993) and assume that a borrower who defaults may lose reputation with some probability, and is then excluded from the credit market forever. In the model with reputational effects, we show that the steady state equilibrium is unique and no default occurs in equilibrium. Nevertheless, indeterminacy in the form of a continuum of equilibria persists.

We then extend our model in section 4 to incorporate a continuum of types of producers. Producers face different risks in their production. Adverse selection arises as the riskier firms have stronger incentives to borrow under limited liability. We show that for the given total inputs at any moment in time, the static equilibrium is unique.<sup>1</sup> In contrast to the static asymmetric information model (Wilson (1980)), the dynamic nature of our model is crucial: multiple equilibria would be impossible without dynamic capital accumulation in our setting. As a by-product, our model also provides a microfoundation for the aggregate increasing returns to scale.

It is well known that in a static setting, market structure is important for the existence of multiple equilibria. In section 5 we extend our analysis to the case with monopoly banking, which rules out multiple equilibria in a static setting. This is because in this case the monopolist bank optimally chooses the gross interest rate, which then determines the static equilibrium. We show however that dynamic indeterminacy still arises in such an environment.

Our model has several implications that are supported by empirical evidence. First, a large literature has documented that credit risk is countercyclical and has far-reaching macroeconomic consequences. For instance, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) find that shocks to credit risks lead to significant declines in consumption, investment, and output. Pintus, Wen and Xing (2015) show that interest rates faced by US firms move countercyclically and lead the business cycle. These facts are consistent with our model predictions. Second, our model delivers a countercyclical markup, an important empirical regularity well documented in the literature.

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<sup>1</sup>We intentionally focus on the interior solution by ruling out the uninteresting complete market collapse equilibrium.

Because of information asymmetry, dishonest borrowers enjoy an information rent. However, when the average quality of borrowers increases due to higher lending, this information rent is diluted. Hence the measured markup declines, which is critical to sustaining indeterminacy by bringing about higher real wages, a positive labor supply response, and a higher output that dominates the income effect on leisure. Third, our extended model in section 4 can explain the well-known procyclical variation in productivity. The procyclicality of average quality in the credit market implies that resources are reallocated towards producers with lower credit risk when aggregate output increases. The improved resource allocation then raises productivity endogenously. The procyclical endogenous TFP immediately implies that increases in inputs will lead to a more than proportional increase in total aggregate output, mimicking aggregate increasing returns. This effective increasing returns to scale arise only at the aggregate level. It is also consistent with the results of Basu and Fernald (1997), who find slightly decreasing returns to scale for typical two-digit industries in the US, but strong increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level. Adverse selection in credit markets then becomes realistic, in rich as well as developing countries.<sup>2</sup>

**Related Literature** Our paper is closely related to several branches of literature in macroeconomics. First, our paper builds on a large strand of literature on the possibility of indeterminacy in RBC models. Benhabib and Farmer (1994) point out that increasing returns to scale can generate indeterminacy in an RBC model. The degree of increasing returns to scale in production required to generate indeterminacy, however, is considered to be too large (See Basu and Fernald (1995, 1997)). Subsequent work in the literature has introduced additional features to the Benhabib-Farmer model that reduce the degree of increasing returns required for indeterminacy. In an important contribution, Wen (1998) adds variable capacity utilization and shows that indeterminacy can arise from a magnitude of increasing returns similar to that in the data. Gali (1994) and Jaimovich (2007) explore the possibility of indeterminacy via countercyclical markups due to output composition and firm entry respectively. The literature has also shown that models with indeterminacy can replicate many of the standard business cycle moments in the standard RBC models (see Farmer and Guo (1994)). Furthermore, indeterminacy models may outperform the standard RBC models in many other dimensions. For instance, Benhabib and Wen (2004), Wang and Wen (2008), and Benhabib and Wang (2014) show that models with indeterminacy can explain the hump-shaped output dynamics and the

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<sup>2</sup>See Sufi (2007) for evidence of syndicated loans in the US, and Karlan and Zinman (2009) for evidence from field experiments in South Africa.

relative volatility of labor and output, which are challenging for the standard RBC models. Our paper complements this strand of literature by adding adverse selection as an additional source of macroeconomic indeterminacy. The adverse selection approach also provides a microfoundation for increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level. Indeed, once we specify a Pareto distribution for firm productivity, our model in section 4 is isomorphic to those that have a representative-firm economy with increasing returns. It therefore inherits the ability to reproduce the business cycle features mentioned above without having to rely on increasing returns.<sup>3</sup>

Second, our paper is closely related to a burgeoning literature studying the macroeconomic consequences of adverse selection. Kurlat (2013) builds a dynamic general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the second-hand market for capital assets. Kurlat (2013) shows that the degree of adverse selection varies countercyclically. Since adverse selection reduces the efficiency of resource allocation, a negative shock that lowers aggregate output will negatively affect both adverse selection and resource allocation efficiency. Hence the impact of the initial shocks on aggregate output is propagated over time. Like Kurlat (2013), Bigio (2015) develops an RBC model with adverse selection in the capital market. As firms must sell their existing capital to finance investment and employment, adverse selection distorts both capital and labor markets. Bigio shows that the adverse selection shock widens the dispersion of capital quality, exacerbates the distortion of markets, and creates a recession with a quantitative pattern similar to that observed during the Great Recession of 2008. Our model generates similar predictions to Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015). First, adverse selection is also countercyclical in our model, and therefore the propagation of fundamental shocks via adverse selection, as highlighted by Kurlat (2013), is also present in our model. Second, in our model adverse selection in the credit markets naturally causes both capital and labor inputs to be distorted. Introducing stochastic and heterogeneous productivities into our extended model in section 4 aggravates adverse selection and makes the economy more vulnerable to self-fulfilling expectation-driven fluctuations. While Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) emphasize the role of adverse selection in propagating business cycle shocks, our paper complements their work by showing that adverse selection generates multiple steady states and indeterminacy, and hence can be a source of large business cycle fluctuations driven by self-fulfilling expectations.<sup>4</sup> One of the main differences

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<sup>3</sup>Liu and Wang (2014) provide an alternative mechanism to generate increasing returns via financial constraints.

<sup>4</sup>Many other papers have also addressed adverse selection in a dynamic environment. Examples include Williamson and Wright (1994), Eisfeldt (2004), House (2006), Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010), Chiu and

between our model and these two studies is the source of asymmetric information. Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) both focus on asymmetric information about the quality of physical capital. Kurlat (2013) assumes an inelastic labor supply and hand-to-mouth workers. In this setup adverse selection does not change the labor input and thus dynamic indeterminacy is not possible. Optimistic beliefs or expectations of higher output cannot be self-fulfilling, as output is pre-determined by capital stock. In Bigio (2015), adverse selection also produces a wedge between labor productivity and real wage, as in our model. Bigio also assumes workers do not have access to financial markets and therefore consume all their income. Although labor supply is endogenous in Bigio (2015), it depends only on real wage and exhibits no income effect (as in the case of GHH preferences by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988)). As demonstrated by Jaimovich (2008), dynamic indeterminacy is not possible when there are no income effects on the supply of labor, even under increasing returns and externalities. In our paper, adverse selection creates a distortion in both labor and in output. Optimistic beliefs about output increases the real wage, either through a countercyclical markup as in our baseline model, or through the procyclical productivity channel described in section 4.<sup>5</sup> Under the standard household preferences that we use, both labor and output can increase sufficiently, confirming the initial optimistic belief about higher output.

All of the above papers focus on local dynamics via log-linearization. As Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and He and Krithnamurthy (2012) have cautioned, analyzing the local dynamics may not yield the same insights about economic fluctuations and crises that analyzing the global dynamics does. Thus we use a continuous-time setup to characterize both the local and global dynamics in the presence of information asymmetry. Indeed, a global dynamics analysis in our model shows that large economic crises can be triggered by confidence shocks in the credit market, arguably an important feature of the recent 2008 financial crisis.

Finally, our extended model in section 3 with reputational effects is also related to that of Chari, Shourideh and Zeltin-Jones (2014), who model a secondary loan market with adverse selection and show how reputational effects can generate persistent adverse selection. Multiple equilibria also arise in their model as in Spence's (1973) classic signaling model. In contrast, multiple equilibria in our reputational model take the form of indeterminacy. They are generated by endogenously countercyclical markups that mimic aggregate increasing returns.

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Koepl (2012), Daley and Green (2012), Chang (2014), Camargo and Lester (2014), and Guerrieri and Shimer (2014).

<sup>5</sup>Jaimovich (2008) uses JR preferences of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) which span the range from GHH to the KPR preferences of King and Plosser(1988)

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model, characterizes the conditions for local indeterminacy, and then proceeds to analyze global dynamics. Section 3 incorporates reputational effects into the baseline model and shows that indeterminacy may still arise, even without defaults in equilibrium. In section 4 we introduce a continuous distribution of heterogeneous and stochastic firm productivity, and show that adverse selection in that model can induce endogenous TFP, amplification, aggregate increasing returns to scale and a continuum of equilibria. In section 5 we conduct an additional robustness analysis. In particular we extend our model to endogenize the size of project, or output, that each firm can undertake. This weakens the lending externality because additional lending may be allocated to the riskier borrowers that can, at some cost, adjust the size of their project. Nevertheless we show that our results are robust to such an extension. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 The Baseline Model

Time is continuous and proceeds from zero to infinity. There is an infinitely-lived representative household and a continuum of final goods producers. The final goods producers purchase intermediate goods as input to produce the final good, which is then sold to households for consumption and investment. The intermediate goods are produced with capital and labor in a competitive market. We assume no distortion in the production of intermediate goods. Final goods firms do not have resources to make up-front payments to purchase intermediate goods before production takes place and revenues from sales are realized. They must therefore borrow from competitive financial intermediaries (lenders) to finance their working capital. Lending to these final goods producers is risky however, as they may default. We assume that there are two types of producers (borrowers): honest borrowers who have the ability to produce and will always pay back the loan after the production, and dishonest borrowers who will always default on their loan. The lenders do not know which borrower is which. They make loans to firms fully aware of the adverse selection problem. We begin by assuming that all trade is anonymous by excluding the possibility of reputational effects. We relax these strong assumptions in section 3, where we introduce reputational effects.



## 2.1 Setup

**Households** The representative household has a lifetime utility function

$$\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left( \log(C_t) - \psi \frac{N_t^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma} \right) dt \quad (1)$$

where  $\rho > 0$  is the subjective discount factor,  $C_t$  is the consumption,  $N_t$  is the hours worked,  $\psi > 0$  is the utility weight for labor, and  $\gamma \geq 0$  is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply.

The household faces the following budget constraint:

$$C_t + I_t \leq R_t u_t K_t + W_t N_t + \Pi_t, \quad (2)$$

where  $R_t$ ,  $W_t$  and  $\Pi_t$  denote respectively the rental price, wage and total profits from all firms and financial intermediaries. As in Wen (1998) we introduce an endogenous capacity utilization rate  $u_t$ . As is standard in the literature, the depreciation rate of capital increases with the capacity utilization rate according to

$$\delta(u_t) = \delta^0 \frac{u_t^{1+\theta}}{1+\theta}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\delta^0 > 0$  is a constant and  $\theta > 0$ .<sup>6</sup> Finally, the law of motion for capital is governed by

$$\dot{K}_t = -\delta(u_t)K_t + I_t. \quad (4)$$

The households choose a path of consumption  $X_t$ ,  $C_t$ ,  $N_t$ ,  $u_t$ , and  $K_t$  to maximize their utility function (1), taking  $R_t$ ,  $W_t$  and  $\Pi_t$  as given. The first-order conditions are

$$\frac{1}{C_t} W_t = \psi N_t^\gamma, \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} = u_t R_t - \delta(u_t) - \rho, \quad (6)$$

and

$$R_t = \delta^0 u_t^\theta. \quad (7)$$

The left-hand side of equation (5) is the marginal utility of consumption obtained from an additional unit of work, and the right-hand side is the marginal disutility of a unit of work. Equation (6) is the usual Euler equation. Finally, a one-percent increase in the utilization rate

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<sup>6</sup>Dong, Wang, and Wen (2015) develop a search-based theory to offer a microfoundation for the convex depreciation function.

raises the total rent by  $R_t K_t$  but also increases total depreciation by  $\delta_0 u_t^\theta K_t$ . Equation (7) thus states that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of utilization. Finally the transversality condition is given by  $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\rho t} \frac{1}{C_t} K_t = 0$ .

**Final goods producers** There is a unit measure of final goods producers indexed by  $i \in [0, 1]$ . A fraction  $\pi$  of them are dishonest and a fraction  $1 - \pi$  are honest. Each one of the honest producers is endowed with an indivisible project as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), which transforms  $\Phi$  units of intermediate goods to  $\Phi$  units of final goods. Let  $P_t$  be the price of the intermediate goods input. Each project then requires  $\Phi P_t$  of working capital. The dishonest producers, however, can claim to be honest and borrow  $P_t \Phi$  and then default and keep, for simplicity, all of the borrowed funds. They thus enjoy a profit of  $P_t \Phi$ . Anticipating this adverse selection problem, the final intermediates will therefore charge all borrowers a gross interest rate  $R_{ft} > 1$ . Hence the profit from borrowing and producing for a honest producer is given by

$$\Pi_t^h = (1 - R_{ft} P_t) \Phi. \quad (8)$$

Denote by  $s_t$  the measure of honest producers who invest in their projects:

$$s_t = \begin{cases} 1 - \pi & \text{if } R_{ft} < \frac{1}{P_t} \\ \in [0, 1 - \pi) & \text{if } R_{ft} = \frac{1}{P_t} \\ 0 & \text{if } R_{ft} > \frac{1}{P_t} \end{cases}. \quad (9)$$

The total demand for intermediate goods is hence given by

$$X_t = s_t \Phi. \quad (10)$$

Since each firm also produces  $\Phi$  units of the final goods, the total quantity of final goods produced is

$$Y_t = s_t \Phi = X_t \quad (11)$$

**Intermediate goods** The intermediate goods are produced with capital and labor using the technology

$$X_t = A \tilde{K}_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}, \quad (12)$$

where  $\tilde{K}_t = u_t K_t$  is total capital supply from the households. In a competitive market the profit of producers is  $\Pi_t^x = P_t A \tilde{K}_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha} - W_t N_t - R_t \tilde{K}_t$ . The first-order conditions are

$$R_t = P_t \alpha \frac{X_t}{\tilde{K}_t} = P_t \alpha \frac{X_t}{u_t K_t}, \quad (13)$$

$$W_t = P_t (1 - \alpha) \frac{X_t}{N_t}. \quad (14)$$

Under competition profits are zero, so  $\Pi_t^x = 0$ , and  $W_t N_t + R_t u_t K_t = P_t X_t$ .

**Financial Intermediaries** The financial intermediaries must compete for business. Anticipating that only a fraction  $\Theta_t$  of the loans will be paid back, the interest rate is then given by

$$R_{ft} = \frac{1}{\Theta_t}. \quad (15)$$

Hence the financial intermediaries earn zero profit. The honest producers altogether borrow  $X_t P_t$  of working capital and the dishonest producers altogether borrow  $\pi \Phi P_t$  of working capital. Since only the honest producers pay back their loan, the average payback rate is

$$\Theta_t = \frac{X_t P_t}{\pi \Phi P_t + X_t P_t} = \frac{X_t}{\pi \Phi + X_t}. \quad (16)$$

## 2.2 Equilibrium

We focus on an interior solution so  $R_{ft} = \frac{1}{P_t}$ .<sup>7</sup> In equilibrium, the total profit is simply  $\pi P_t \Phi$ . Hence the total budget constraint becomes

$$C_t + I_t = P_t X_t + \pi P_t \Phi. \quad (17)$$

Since  $P_t = \frac{1}{R_{ft}} = \Theta_t = \frac{X_t}{\pi \Phi + X_t}$ , the above equation can be further reduced to

$$C_t + I_t = P_t X_t + \pi P_t \Phi = X_t = Y_t. \quad (18)$$

We then obtain the resource constraint

$$C_t + \dot{K}_t = Y_t - \delta(u_t) K_t. \quad (19)$$

The inverse of markup, using equation (18), is therefore given by

$$\phi_t \equiv 1 - \frac{\Pi_t}{Y_t} = 1 - \frac{\pi P_t \Phi}{X_t} = \Theta_t = P_t.$$

As  $\phi_t = \Theta_t$ , the inverse of markup also represents the average quality of the borrowers in the credit market. Finally, the rental price of capital is given by

$$R_t = \phi_t \cdot \frac{\alpha Y_t}{u_t K_t}. \quad (20)$$

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<sup>7</sup>We assume, without loss of generality, that  $\Phi$  is large enough, so  $\Phi > AK_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}$ . We can also assume that there is free entry and that an infinite measure of potential honest producers exist as potential entrants. The free entry condition then implies  $R_{ft} = \frac{1}{P_t}$ .

Likewise, the wage rate is given by

$$W_t = \phi_t \cdot \frac{(1 - \alpha) Y_t}{N_t}. \quad (21)$$

Equations (5), (6) and (7) then become

$$\psi N_t^\gamma = \left( \frac{1}{C_t} \right) (1 - \alpha) \phi_t \frac{Y_t}{N_t}, \quad (22)$$

$$\frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} = \alpha \phi_t \frac{Y_t}{K_t} - \delta(u_t) - \rho, \quad (23)$$

$$\alpha \phi_t \frac{Y_t}{u_t K_t} = \delta^0 u_t^\theta = (1 + \theta) \frac{\delta(u_t)}{u_t}. \quad (24)$$

Then we have

$$u_t = \left( \frac{\alpha \phi_t Y_t}{\delta^0 K_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}}, \quad (25)$$

and thus

$$\frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} = \left( \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \right) \alpha \phi_t \frac{Y_t}{K_t} - \rho. \quad (26)$$

Equation (16) then becomes

$$\phi_t = \frac{Y_t}{\pi \Phi + Y_t} \quad (27)$$

Finally the aggregate production function becomes

$$Y_t = A (u_t K_t)^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}. \quad (28)$$

In short, the equilibrium can be characterized by equations (22), (23), (24), (28), (19) and (27). These six equations fully determine the dynamics of the six variables  $C_t$ ,  $K_t$ ,  $Y_t$ ,  $u_t$ ,  $N_t$  and  $\phi_t$ .

Equation (27) implies that  $\phi_t$  increases with aggregate output. Note that  $\frac{1}{\phi_t} = \frac{Y_t}{R_t u_t K_t + W_t N_t}$  is the aggregate markup. Therefore the endogenous markup in our model is countercyclical, which is consistent with the empirical regularity well documented in the literature.<sup>8</sup> The credit spread is given by  $R_{ft} - 1 = \pi \Phi / Y_t$  and moves in a countercyclical fashion as in the data.

The countercyclical markup has important implications. For example, it can make the number of hours worked and the real wage move in the same direction. To see this, suppose that  $N_t$  increases, so that output increases. Then according to equation (27), the marginal cost  $\phi_t$  increases as well, which in turn raises the real wage in equation (21). If the markup is a constant, then the real wage would be proportional to the marginal product of labor and

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<sup>8</sup>See, e.g., [Bils \(1987\)](#) and [Rotemberg and Woodford \(1999\)](#).

would fall when hours increase. Note also that when  $\pi = 0$ , *i.e.*, there is no adverse selection in the credit markets, equation (27) implies that  $\phi_t = 1$ , and our model simply reduces to a standard RBC model. The markup is  $1/\phi_t > 1$  if and only if dishonest firms obtain rent due to information asymmetry.

### 2.3 Steady State

We first study the steady state of the model. We use  $Z$  to denote the steady state of variable  $Z_t$ . To solve the steady state, we first express all other variables in terms of  $\phi$  and then we solve for  $\phi$  as a fixed-point problem. Combining equations (23) and (24) yields

$$\delta^0 u^{\theta+1} - \frac{\delta^0 u^{\theta+1}}{1+\theta} = \rho,$$

or  $u = \left(\frac{1}{\delta^0} \frac{\rho}{\theta} (1+\theta)\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}}$ . Note that  $u$  only depends on  $\delta^0$ ,  $\rho$  and  $\theta$ . Therefore, without loss of generality, we can set  $\delta^0 = \frac{\rho}{\theta} (1+\theta)$  so that  $u = 1$  at the steady state. The steady state depreciation rate is then  $\delta(u) = \rho/\theta$ . Given  $\phi$ , we have

$$k_y = \frac{K}{Y} = \frac{\alpha\phi}{\rho + \rho/\theta} = \frac{\alpha\phi\theta}{\rho(1+\theta)}, \quad (29)$$

$$c_y = 1 - \delta k_y = 1 - \frac{\alpha\phi}{1+\theta}, \quad (30)$$

$$N = \left( \frac{(1-\alpha)\phi}{1 - \frac{\alpha\phi}{1+\theta}} \frac{1}{\psi} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\gamma}}, \quad (31)$$

$$Y = A^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{\alpha\phi\theta}{\rho(1+\theta)} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{(1-\alpha)\phi}{1 - \frac{\alpha\phi}{1+\theta}} \frac{1}{\psi} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\gamma}} \equiv Y(\phi). \quad (32)$$

Then we can use equation (27) to determine  $\phi$  from

$$\bar{\Phi} \equiv \pi\Phi = \left( \frac{1-\phi}{\phi} \right) \cdot Y(\phi) \equiv \Psi(\phi), \quad (33)$$

where the left-hand side is the total debt obligation of the dishonest borrowers, and the right hand-side is the maximum amount of bad loans that the credit market can tolerate without collapsing under adverse selection, given that the average credit quality is  $\phi$ . The total loss from these dishonest borrowers,  $\pi\Phi = \pi\Phi P R_f$ , is exactly equal to the interest gained from the honest borrowers,  $\left(\frac{1-\phi}{\phi}\right) \cdot Y(\phi) = (R_f - 1)Y(\phi)$ , if equation (33) holds. When  $\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} + \frac{1}{1+\gamma} > 1$ ,  $\Psi(\phi)$  is a non-monotonic function of  $\phi$  since  $\Psi(0) = 0$  and  $\Psi(1) = 0$ . On the one hand, if the average credit quality is 0, the total supply of credit would be zero, and hence no lending would

be possible. On the other hand, if the average quality is one, *i.e.*,  $\phi = 1$ , then by definition no bad loan would be made. So given  $\bar{\Phi}$ , there may exist two steady state values of  $\phi$ . Denote  $\Psi_{\max} = \max_{0 \leq \phi \leq 1} \Psi(\phi)$  and  $\phi^* = \arg \max_{0 \leq \phi \leq 1} \Psi(\phi)$ . Then we have the following lemma regarding the possibility of multiple steady state equilibria.

**Lemma 1** *When  $0 < \bar{\Phi} < \Psi_{\max}$ , there exists two steady states  $\phi$  that solve  $\bar{\Phi} = \Psi(\phi)$ .*

It is well known that adverse selection can generate multiple equilibria in a static model (see, e.g., Wilson (1980)). Therefore it is not surprising that our model has multiple steady state equilibria. A credit expansion by financial intermediaries invites more honest firms to borrow and produce. The increased quality of borrowers reduces the default risk, which then stimulates more lending from other financial intermediaries. In turn, the interest rate charged by financial intermediaries decreases, bringing down the production cost. This triggers an output expansion, and further encourages credit supply from the households, and thus generates more future lending. In a nutshell, a lending externality exists both intratemporally and intertemporally. We will show that this type of lending externality generates a new type of multiplicity, which shares some similarities with the indeterminacy literature following Benhabib and Farmer (1994).

## 2.4 Local Dynamics

A number of studies have explored the role of endogenous markup in generating local indeterminacy and endogenous fluctuations (see, e.g., Jaimovich (2006) and Benhabib and Wang (2013)). Following the standard practice, we study the local dynamics around the steady state.

Note that at the steady state  $\phi$  and  $\bar{\Phi}$  are linked by  $\bar{\Phi} = \Psi(\phi)$ , so we can parameterize the steady state either by  $\bar{\Phi}$  or  $\phi$ . We will use  $\phi$  as it is more convenient for the study of local dynamics. Denote by  $\hat{x}_t = \log X_t - \log X$  the percentage deviation from the steady state. First, we log-linearize equation (27) to obtain

$$\hat{\phi}_t = (1 - \phi)\hat{y}_t \equiv \tau\hat{y}_t, \quad (34)$$

which suggests that the percentage deviation of the marginal cost is proportional to output. Log-linearizing equations (28) and (24) yields

$$\hat{y}_t = \frac{\alpha\theta\hat{k}_t + (1 + \theta)(1 - \alpha)\hat{n}_t}{1 + \theta - (1 + \tau)\alpha} \equiv a\hat{k}_t + b\hat{n}_t, \quad (35)$$

where  $a \equiv \frac{\alpha\theta}{1+\theta-(1+\tau)\alpha}$  and  $b \equiv \frac{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)}{1+\theta-(1+\tau)\alpha}$ . We assume that  $1+\theta-(1+\tau)\alpha > 0$ , or equivalently  $\tau < \frac{1+\theta}{\alpha} - 1$ , to make  $a > 0$  and  $b > 0$ . In general these restrictions are easily satisfied (see section 2.5). We can also substitute out  $\hat{n}_t$  after log-linearizing equation (22) to express  $\hat{y}_t$  as

$$\hat{y}_t = \frac{a(1+\gamma)}{1+\gamma-b(1+\tau)} \hat{k}_t - \frac{b}{1+\gamma-b(1+\tau)} \hat{c}_t \equiv \lambda_1 \hat{k}_t + \lambda_2 \hat{c}_t. \quad (36)$$

It is worth mentioning that  $a+b = \frac{1+\theta-\alpha}{1+\theta-(1+\tau)\alpha} = 1$  if  $\tau = 0$ . Recall that  $\tau = 0$  corresponds to the case without adverse selection. Thus endogenous capacity utilization alone does not generate an increasing returns to scale effect at the aggregate level. However,  $a+b = \frac{1+\theta-\alpha}{1+\theta-(1+\tau)\alpha} > 1$  if  $\tau > 0$ . That is, through general equilibrium effects, adverse selection combined with endogenous capacity utilization mimics increasing returns to scale, even though production has constant returns to scale. Furthermore, if  $\tau > \theta$ , then  $b > 1$ . The model can then explain the procyclical movements in labor productivity  $\hat{y}_t - \hat{n}_t$  without resorting to exogenous TFP shocks.

The effective increasing returns in production can generate locally indeterminate steady states as in Benhabib and Farmer (1994). If increasing capital can increase the marginal product of capital, given a fixed discount rate, the relative price of capital must fall and the relative price of consumption must rise so that the total return including capital gains or losses equals the discount rate. The increase in the relative price of consumption boosts consumption at the expense of investment, so capital drifts back towards the steady state instead of progressively exploding. The steady state then becomes a sink rather than a saddle, and therefore becomes indeterminate. The mechanism responsible for the increase in the marginal product of capital however is the increase in the supply of labor in response to higher wages that offset diminishing returns to capital in production. In a standard context, this is not possible if leisure is a normal good. In our adverse selection context, however, the countercyclical markups, which are associated with lower default rates and higher intermediate goods prices that increase with output levels, allow wages to rise sufficiently. The resulting higher labor supply can then mimic increasing returns, as the marginal product of capital rises with capital.<sup>9</sup>

This mechanism can be seen directly from equation (35): a one-percent increase in capital directly increases output and the marginal product of labor by  $a$  percent and, from equation (34), reduces the markup by  $a\tau$  percent. Thanks to its higher marginal productivity, the labor supply also increases. A one-percent increase in labor supply then increases output by  $b$  percent.

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<sup>9</sup>The same mechanism for local indeterminacy can also operate in models of collateral constraints that also give countercyclical markups as in Benhabib and Wang (2013).

The exact increase in labor supply depends on the Frisch elasticity  $\gamma$ . This explains why the equilibrium output elasticity with respect to capital,  $\lambda_1$ , depends on parameters  $a$  and  $b$  and through them on  $\gamma$  and  $\tau$ . On the household side, since both leisure and consumption are normal goods, an increase in consumption has a wealth effect on labor supply. The effect of a change in labor supply on output induced by a change in consumption, as seen from equation (36) obtained after substituting for labor in equation (35), works through the marginal cost channel, and also depends on  $\tau$ . Again since both  $a$  and  $b$  increase with  $\tau$ , output elasticities with respect to capital and consumption are increasing functions of  $\tau$ . In other words, the presence of adverse selection makes equilibrium output more sensitive to changes in capital and to changes in autonomous consumption, and creates an amplification mechanism for business fluctuations.

Formally, using equation (36) and the log-linearized equations (19) and (23), we can then characterize the local dynamics as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{k}_t \\ \dot{c}_t \end{bmatrix} = J \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_t \\ \hat{c}_t \end{bmatrix}, \quad (37)$$

where

$$J \equiv \delta \begin{bmatrix} \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi}\right)\lambda_1 - (1+\tau)\lambda_1 & \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi}\right)(\lambda_2 - 1) + 1 - (1+\tau)\lambda_2 \\ \theta[(1+\tau)\lambda_1 - 1] & \theta(1+\tau)\lambda_2 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (38)$$

and  $\lambda_1 \equiv \frac{a(1+\gamma)}{1+\gamma-b(1+\tau)}$ ,  $\lambda_2 \equiv -\frac{b}{1+\gamma-b(1+\tau)}$ , and  $\delta = \rho/\theta$  is the steady state depreciation rate. The local dynamics around the steady state is determined by the roots of  $J$ . The model economy exhibits local indeterminacy if both roots of  $J$  are negative. Note that the sum of the roots equals the trace of  $J$ , and the product of the roots equals the determinant of  $J$ . Thus the sign of the roots of  $J$  can be observed from the sign of its trace and determinant. The following lemma specifies the sign of the trace and the determinant for local indeterminacy.

**Lemma 2** *Denote  $\tau_{\min} \equiv \frac{(1+\theta)(1+\gamma)}{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)+\alpha(1+\gamma)} - 1$  and  $\tau_{\max} \equiv 1 - \phi^*$ , then  $\text{Trace}(J) < 0$  if and only if  $\tau > \tau_{\min}$ , and  $\text{Det}(J) > 0$  if and only if  $\tau_{\min} < \tau < \tau_{\max}$ .*

According to Lemma 2, our baseline model is indeterminate if and only if  $\tau_{\min} < \tau < \tau_{\max}$ . In this case,  $\text{Trace}(J) < 0$  and  $\text{Det}(J) > 0$  jointly imply that both roots of  $J$  are negative. We summarize this result in the following proposition.

**Proposition 1** *The model exhibits local indeterminacy around a particular steady state if and only if*

$$\tau_{\min} < \tau < \tau_{\max}. \quad (39)$$



Equivalently, indeterminacy emerges if and only if  $\phi \in (\phi_{\min}, \phi_{\max})$ , where  $\phi_{\min} \equiv 1 - \tau_{\max} = \phi^*$ , and  $\phi_{\max} \equiv 1 - \tau_{\min}$ .

To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1, first note that if  $\tau > \tau_{\min}$ , we have

$$1 + \gamma - b(1 + \tau) < 1 + \gamma - \frac{(1 + \theta)(1 - \alpha)}{1 + \theta - (1 + \tau_{\min})\alpha}(1 + \tau_{\min}) = 0. \quad (40)$$

Then the equilibrium elasticity of output with respect to consumption  $\lambda_2$  becomes positive, namely, an autonomous change in consumption leads to an increase in output. Since capital is predetermined, labor must increase by equation (35). To induce an increase in labor, the real wage must increase enough to overcome the income effect, which is only possible if the increase in markup is large enough. In other words,  $\tau$  in equation (34) must be large enough.

We have used the mapping between  $\tau$  and steady state output to characterize the indeterminacy condition in terms of the model's deep parameter values. Notice that  $\tau_{\max} = 1 - \phi^*$ , where  $\phi^* \equiv \arg \max_{0 \leq \phi \leq 1} \Psi(\phi)$ . Since  $1 - \bar{\phi}_L > 1 - \phi^* = \tau_{\max}$ , the local dynamics around the steady state associated with  $\phi = \bar{\phi}_L$  are determinate according to Proposition 1. Indeterminacy is only possible in the neighborhood of the steady state associated with  $\phi = \bar{\phi}_H$ . The following corollary formally characterizes the indeterminacy condition in terms of  $\bar{\Phi}$ .

**Corollary 1** Denote  $\bar{\Phi} = \pi\bar{\Phi}$ .

1. If  $\bar{\Phi} \in (0, \Psi(\phi_{\max}))$ , then both steady states are saddles.
2. If  $\bar{\Phi} \in (\Psi(\phi_{\max}), \Psi_{\max})$ , then the local dynamics around the steady state  $\phi = \bar{\phi}_H$  exhibits indeterminacy while the local dynamics around the steady state  $\phi = \bar{\phi}_L$  is a saddle.

As suggested by Lemma 1, we focus on the nontrivial region in which  $\bar{\Phi} < \Psi_{\max}$ . When  $\Psi(\phi_{\max}) < \bar{\Phi} < \Psi_{\max}$ , we have  $\phi_{\min} = \phi^* < \bar{\phi}_H < \phi_{\max}$ , and  $\bar{\phi}_L < \phi_{\min}$ . As a result, according to Proposition 1, the steady state  $\bar{\phi}_H$  exhibits indeterminacy. For the steady state  $\phi = \bar{\phi}_L$ , by Lemma 2, we can conclude that the determinant of  $J$  is negative. So the two roots of  $J$  must have opposite signs and this implies a saddle. But if  $0 < \bar{\Phi} < \Psi(\phi_{\max})$ , we have  $\bar{\phi}_H > \phi_{\max}$  and  $\bar{\phi}_L < \phi_{\min}$ . In this case, the determinants of  $J$  at both steady states are negative. So both steady states are saddles.

We summarize these different scenarios in Figure 1. The inverted  $U$  curve illustrates the relationship between  $\phi$  and  $\bar{\Phi}$  specified in equation (33). In Figure 1,  $\phi$  is on the horizontal axis and  $\bar{\Phi}$  is on the vertical axis. For a given  $\bar{\Phi}$ , the two steady states  $\bar{\phi}_L$  and  $\bar{\phi}_H$  can be located

from the intersection of the inverted  $U$  curve and a horizontal line through point  $(0, \bar{\Phi})$ . The two vertical lines passing points  $(\phi_{\min}, 0)$  and  $(\phi_{\max}, 0)$  divide the diagram into three regions. In the left and right regions, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix  $J$  is negative, implying that one of the roots is positive and the other is negative. Therefore if a steady state  $\phi$  falls into either of these two regions, it is a saddle. In the middle region,  $\text{Det}(J) > 0$  and  $\text{Trace}(J) < 0$ , and thus both roots are negative. Therefore if the steady state  $\phi$  falls into the middle region it is a sink, which supports multiple self-fulfilling expectation-driven equilibria, or indeterminacy, in its neighborhood.

Since  $\bar{\Phi} = \pi\Phi$ , we can reinterpret the above corollary in terms of  $\pi$ , the proportion of dishonest firms. For simplicity, assume  $\Phi$  is large enough such that  $\Phi > \Psi_{\max}$ . Denote  $\pi_L \equiv \Psi(\phi_{\max})/\Phi$  and  $\pi_H \equiv \Psi(\phi_{\min})/\Phi = \Psi_{\max}/\Phi$ , and thus  $0 < \pi_L < \pi_H < 1$ . Then we know that (i) if  $\pi \in (0, \pi_L]$ , both steady states are saddles, (ii) if  $\pi \in (\pi_L, \pi_H)$ , the steady state with  $\phi = \bar{\phi}_L$  is a saddle while the steady state with  $\phi = \bar{\phi}_H$  is a sink, and (iii) if  $\pi \in [\pi_H, 1]$ , then no non-degenerate steady state equilibria exist. As indicated in Lemma 1, the third case is the least interesting, and thus we focus on the scenarios in which  $\pi < \pi_H$ . Then the model is indeterminate if the adverse selection problem is severe enough, *i.e.*,  $\pi > \pi_L$ . We summarize the above argument in the following corollary.

**Corollary 2** *The likelihood of indeterminacy increases with  $\pi$ , the proportion of dishonest firms.*

Arguably, adverse selection is more severe in developing countries. Our study then also suggests that developing countries are more likely to be subject to self-fulfilling expectation-driven fluctuations and hence exhibit higher economic volatility, which is in line with the empirical regularity emphasized by Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000).

## 2.5 Empirical Possibility of Indeterminacy

We have proved that our model with adverse selection can generate self-fulfilling equilibria in theory. We now examine the empirical plausibility of self-fulfilling equilibria under calibrated parameter values. The frequency is a quarter. We set  $\rho = 0.01$ , implying an annual risk-free interest rate of 4%. We set  $\theta = 0.3$  so that the depreciation rate at steady state is 0.033 and the annualized investment-to-capital ratio is 12% (see Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)). We set




Figure 1: **Multiple Steady States and the Indeterminacy Region**

$\alpha = 0.33$  as in the standard RBC model. We assume that labor supply is elastic, and thus set  $\gamma = 0$ . We normalize the aggregate productivity  $A = 1$ . We set  $\psi = 1.75$  so that  $N = \frac{1}{3}$  in the good steady state. We set  $\bar{\Phi} = \pi\Phi = 0.13$  so that  $\phi = \bar{\phi}_H = 0.9$ , which is consistent with the average profit rate in the data. The associated  $\bar{\phi}_L = 0.011$ . If we further set  $\pi = 0.1$ , *i.e.*, the proportion of dishonest borrowers is around 10%, then  $\Phi = 1.3$ .<sup>10</sup> Consequently, based on our calibration and the indeterminacy condition (39), we conclude that our baseline model does generate self-fulfilling equilibria.

Parameter	Value	Description
$\rho$	0.01	Discount factor
$\theta$	0.3	Utilization elasticity of depreciation
$\delta$	0.033	Depreciation rate
$\alpha$	0.33	Capital income share
$\gamma$	0	Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
$\psi$	1.75	Coefficient of labor disutility
$\pi$	0.1	Proportion of firms that produce lemons
$\Phi$	1.3	Maximum firm capacity

**Table 1: Calibration**

<sup>10</sup>As shown in equation (33), only the product  $\pi\Phi$  matters for  $\phi$ .

Our calibration uses a delinquency rate of approximately 10%, which is of the same magnitude as in the Great Recession but higher than the average delinquency rate in the data (the average is 3.73% from period 1985 to 2013). Delinquency rates do vary over time, however. For example commercial residential mortgages had high delinquency rates during 2009-2013, which spread panic to financial markets through mortgage-backed securities and other derivatives. Nevertheless we will show in section 3, when we introduce reputational effects that indeterminacy arises even if there is no default in equilibrium.

## 2.6 Global Dynamics

So far we have characterized the steady states and the local dynamics around these steady states. We showed that for some parameters, the equilibrium around one of the steady states is locally determinate. In this section, we analyze the global dynamics and then show that global indeterminacy always exists in our model, even when where both steady states are saddles and locally determinate.<sup>11</sup>

Note that it is impossible for us to obtain a two-dimensional autonomous dynamical system that is only related to  $(C_t, K_t)$ . This is because we do not analytically formulate  $\phi_t$  in terms of  $(C_t, K_t)$ . One possible solution is to characterize a three-dimensional dynamical system on  $(C_t, K_t, \phi_t)$ . The main concern, however, is that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to completely characterize the economic properties of the high-dimensional dynamical system. Fortunately, we can still reduce the dynamical system to a two-dimensional one, but in terms of  $(\phi_t, K_t)$ , as shown in the following proposition.

**Proposition 2** *The autonomous dynamical system on  $(\phi_t, K_t)$  is given by*

$$\left(1 - \alpha + \frac{\alpha(1 + \gamma)}{1 + \theta}\right) \left(\frac{\phi_{\max} - \phi_t}{1 - \phi_t}\right) \frac{\dot{\phi}_t}{\phi_t} + \left(\frac{\alpha\theta(1 + \gamma)}{1 + \theta}\right) \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} = (1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha\theta}{1 + \theta} \phi_t \frac{Y(\phi_t)}{K_t} - \rho\right) \quad (41)$$

$$\dot{K}_t = \left(1 - \frac{\alpha\phi_t}{1 + \theta}\right) Y(\phi_t) - C(\phi_t, K_t) \quad (42)$$

with  $Y_t = Y(\phi_t) = \frac{\pi\Phi\phi_t}{1-\phi_t}$ ,  $\phi_{\max} \equiv 1 - \tau_{\min}$ ,  $\tau_{\min}$  defined in Lemma 2, and

$$C_t = C(\phi_t, K_t) = f_0 \cdot g(\phi_t) \cdot h(K_t) \quad (43)$$

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<sup>11</sup>See Gali (1996) for an early growth model with countercyclical markups, multiple steady states and global indeterminacy.




Figure 2: Illustration of  $\phi_t$

where  $f_0 = A^{\frac{1+\gamma}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{\delta^0}\right)^{\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)}} \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\psi}\right)$ ,  $h(K_t) = K_t^{\frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)}}$ , and

$$g(\phi_t) = \left[ \phi_t^{1-\alpha + \frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}} Y(\phi_t)^{1-\alpha - (1 - \frac{\alpha}{1+\theta})(1+\gamma)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}. \quad (44)$$

As shown in equation (43), we can formulate  $C_t$  as a function of  $\phi_t$  and  $K_t$ . In turn, we have the following corollary regarding the relationship between equilibrium  $\phi_t$  and  $C_t$ .

**Corollary 3** For any  $K_t > 0$  and  $C_t < f_0 \cdot h(K_t) \cdot g(\phi_{\max})$ , there exist two possible  $\phi_t$  values, denoted by  $\phi_t = \phi^+ \left(\frac{C_t}{f_0 h(K_t)}\right) > \phi_{\max}$  and  $\phi_t = \phi^- \left(\frac{C_t}{f_0 h(K_t)}\right) < \phi_{\max}$ , that yield the same level of consumption defined by (43).

We illustrate these two possible equilibria  $\phi_t$  in Figure 2. The function  $g(\phi_t)$  has an inverted U shape. It attains the maximum at  $\phi_{\max}$ . Notice that  $g(0) < C_t/[f_0 \cdot h(K_t)] < g(\phi_{\max})$ , and by the intermediate value theorem, there exist an  $\phi_t^-$  such that  $0 < \phi_t^- < \phi_{\max}$  and  $g(\phi_t^-) = C_t/[f_0 \cdot h(K_t)]$ . Since  $g'(\phi) > 0$  for  $0 < \phi < \phi_{\max}$ ,  $\phi_t^-$  must be unique. Similarly,  $g(1) < C_t/[f_0 \cdot h(K_t)] < g(\phi_{\max})$  and  $g'(\phi) < 0$  for  $\phi_{\max} < \phi < 1$ , so there exists a unique  $\phi_t^+$  such that  $\phi_{\max} < \phi_t^+ < 1$  and  $g(\phi_t^+) = C_t/[f_0 \cdot h(K_t)]$ .




Figure 3: **Global Dynamics with One Saddle: A High  $\pi$**  (we set  $\pi = 0.2923$ , while all other parameter values are from Table 1.)

As stated in Lemma 1, the dynamical system on  $(\phi_t, K_t)$  has two steady states. Motivated by Corollary 1, we consider two cases. In the first case, one of the steady states is a sink and the other is a saddle. In the second case, both steady states are saddles.

### 2.6.1 Global Dynamics with Local Indeterminacy

We first consider the case in which one steady state is a sink. As illustrated in Figure 1,  $\pi$  (the proportion of dishonest firms) is high and both steady state  $\phi$  values are smaller than  $\phi_{\max}$  in this case. As noted before, there is local indeterminacy around the upper steady state but local determinacy around the lower steady state. However, globally the local steady state is also indeterminate as Figure 3 shows.

In Figure 3, the red line is the  $\dot{K}_t = 0$  locus and the solid blue line is the  $\dot{\phi}_t = 0$  locus. The small circles indicate the initial conditions of trajectories. These two loci intersect twice at the upper and lower steady states. For a given  $K_t$ , there is a unique  $\phi_t$  such that the economy converges to the lower steady state. The function giving the unique  $\phi_t$  as  $K_t$  and converging to the lower steady state is the saddle path in Figure 3, a dashed blue line. If the initial  $\phi_t$  is below this saddle path, the economy would eventually converge to the horizontal axis with  $\phi_t = 0$  and some positive capital.<sup>12</sup> By equation (43), this implies zero consumption which violates the transversality condition for households, so paths starting below this saddle path are ruled out. However, for a given  $K_t$  in the neighborhood of the lower steady state, a path starting above the saddle path cannot be ruled out. Figure 3 shows that a trajectory that starts above the saddle path initially moves down and to the left before turning right and up. The economy then circles around the upper steady state and eventually converges to it. As both the differential equations and the households' transversality conditions are satisfied, such a path is indeed an equilibrium path. As Figure 3 indicates, almost every initial  $\phi_t$  that is above the saddle path associated with the lower steady state will eventually converge to the upper steady state. It is clear that during the convergence, the economy exhibits oscillations in  $K_t$  and  $\phi_t$ . Since output is  $Y_t = \pi\Phi\phi_t/(1 - \phi_t)$ , it also exhibits boom and bust cycles. Such transition dynamics toward the upper steady state therefore implies a rich propagation mechanism for exogenous shocks. For example, if a transitory exogenous shock moves the economy away from the upper steady state, then the economy will display persistent oscillation in output before returning to the upper steady state.<sup>13</sup>

Figure 3 shows that for a given initial capital stock  $K_0$ , there are infinitely many deterministic equilibria defined by the initial value of  $\phi_0$  that converges to the upper steady state smoothly. However, there are at least two other types of equilibria with jumps in  $\phi_t$  and hence discontinuity in output. We delay discussing such equilibria when both steady states are saddles to the next section. The stark contrast between the local dynamics and the global dynamics is

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<sup>12</sup>When  $\phi_t = 0$ , both the capital utilization rate and the depreciation rate are zero.

<sup>13</sup>The global dynamics depicted in the case of a local saddle and a sink may be analyzed via the two-parameter Bogdanov-Takens (BT) bifurcation, which occurs at parameter values for the tangency point  $\Psi(\phi_{\max}) = \pi\Phi$ , or the BT point. By varying the parameters away from the BT point it is possible to analytically characterize the dynamics for various parameter regions yielding either zero and two steady states, and the qualitative dynamics and phase diagram in the region encompassing both steady states, including the saddle connection between the steady states, as depicted in Figure 3 (see in particular Kuznetsov, 1998, p. 322). However, not all parameter combinations are economically admissible. For Figure 3 we pick parameters in the economically admissible range. The qualitative dynamics, steady states and the saddle connection will remain as we perturb parameters.




Figure 4: **Global Dynamics with One Saddle: Relatively High  $\pi$**  (we set  $\alpha = 0.62$  and  $\Phi = 22$ , while all other parameter values are from Table 1.)

better illustrated in that context.<sup>14</sup>

### 2.6.2 Global Dynamics with Two Saddles

In this section we study the global dynamics when  $\pi$  is low such that both steady states are saddles, where  $\bar{\phi}_H > \phi_{\max}$  and  $\bar{\phi}_L < \phi_{\max}$ . We set  $\pi = 0.0615$  for the following numerical analysis, including in Figures 5 and 6. All other parameter values are the same as in Table 1.<sup>15</sup> Figure 4 graphs the two saddle paths associated with these two steady states. This then

<sup>14</sup>A large literature on local indeterminacy has already constructed stochastic equilibria by randomizing over deterministic equilibria (with random jumps). So it may come as no surprise to some readers that there exist equilibria with jumps in  $\phi_t$  when one of the steady states is locally indeterminate.

<sup>15</sup>To better illustrate the global dynamics with two saddles in Figure 4, we vary  $\alpha$  from 0.33 to 0.62, and  $\Phi$  from 1.3 to 22. All other parameter values are from Table 1. The numerical analysis in this section, however,



implies that both steady states are globally indeterminate: for any given  $K_t$ , the economy can be on either saddle path. Therefore globally there is still indeterminacy even around each of the steady states. Furthermore, we can create very complicated equilibrium paths if we allow  $\phi_t$  to jump. We can construct two types of jumps to illustrate the point. The first type of jumps in  $\phi_t$  are deterministic and fully anticipated. Utility maximization then requires consumption to change continuously. That is, consumption does not jump when  $\phi_t$  jumps. Notice that  $\phi_t = \phi_t^+$  and  $\phi_t = \phi_t^-$  yield the same consumption level for a given capital  $K_t$ . The economy can always jump from  $\phi_t = \phi_t^+ > \phi_{\max}$  to  $\phi_t = \phi_t^- < \phi_{\max}$  and back without changing the value of consumption on a deterministic cycle.

Figure 5 graphs one such possible equilibrium path for each of consumption, investment, output and interest spread once we allow  $\phi_t$  to jump. Initially, the economy is at point  $K = 6.2783$  and  $\phi = 0.9717 > \phi_{\max}$  and so  $C = 0.8723$ . With  $K = 6.2783$ , there exists another  $\phi = 0.8249 < \phi_{\max}$  that yields  $C = 0.8723$ . The economy then follows the trajectory according to equations (41) and (42). It takes around 4.41 years for the model economy to reach  $K = 11.1719$ ,  $\phi = 0.9270$  and  $C = 0.9307$ . We then let  $\phi$  jump down to a level that allows consumption to remain at 0.9307 upon the jump. By construction, this leads to  $\phi = 0.8241 < \phi_{\max}$  after the jump. We then let the economy follow the trajectory dictated by equations (41) and (42) again for another 8.02 years to reach  $K = 6.2783$ ,  $\phi = 0.8249$  and hence  $C = 0.8723$ . Notice that the consumption level has returned to its initial level. We then let  $\phi$  jump up from  $\phi = 0.8249$  to  $\phi = 0.9717$ . Again by construction, consumption does not change immediately. We repeat this process and obtain the deterministic cycles in consumption, investment, output and credit spread in Figure 5. The adverse selection problem is mild when  $\phi_t > \phi_{\max}$ , but it becomes much worse when  $\phi_t < \phi_{\max}$ . Thus when  $\phi_t$  jumps down, there is a collapse in output. Households can ensure their consumption by disinvesting capital after  $\phi_t$  jumps down. In general, there are infinite ways to construct these deterministic cycles, as pointed out by Christiano and Harrison (1999).<sup>16</sup> Around the upper steady state, equilibrium  $\phi_t$  can take many (possibly infinite) values. Hence the equilibrium around the upper steady-state is still indeterminate, albeit a saddle.

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uses standard parameterization in Table 1, only changing the value of  $\pi$  from 0.1 to 0.0615.

<sup>16</sup>These two  $\phi_t$  which yield the same level of consumption correspond to two different branches in the differential equations defined by  $C_t$  and  $K_t$ . As pointed out by Christiano and Harrison (1999) a model with two branches can display rich global dynamics, regardless of the local determinacy. For example, we can construct an equilibrium with regime switches along these branches. The jumps for  $\phi_t$  in the differential equations defined by  $\phi_t$  and  $K_t$  correspond to the switch of branches in the dynamics defined for  $C_t$  and  $K_t$ .




Figure 5: **Deterministic Cycles**

**Sunspot Equilibria** Finally we can also construct a stochastic sunspot equilibrium by allowing  $\phi_t$  to jump randomly. More specifically, we introduce sunspot variables  $z_t$ , which take two values, 1 and 0. We assume that in a short time interval  $dt$ , there is probability  $\lambda dt$  that the sunspot variable will change from 1 to 0 and probability  $\omega dt$  that it will change from 0 to 1. We construct the equilibrium  $\phi_t$  as a function of  $K_t$  and sunspot  $z_t$ , *i.e.*,  $\phi_t = \phi(K_t, z_t)$ , such that  $\phi(K_t, 1) > \phi(K_t, 0)$ . Thus the equilibrium  $\phi_t$  will jump with an anticipated probability when  $z_t$  changes its value. When  $z_t = 1$ , economic confidence is high so adverse selection is mild. But when  $z_t = 0$ , economic confidence is low, and adverse selection becomes severe. We use the change in  $z_t$  from 1 to 0 to trigger an economic crisis, and from 0 to 1 to stop the crisis as economic confidence is restored. We set  $\lambda = 0.01$  and  $\omega = 0.025$  as an example, which means that the economy will remain in the normal, non-crisis mode with probability 0.7143. Since jumps in  $\phi_t$  are now stochastic, consumption is exposed to a jump risk. Therefore equation (41) must be modified to take this risk into account. Denote  $\phi_{1t} = \phi(K_t, 1)$  and  $\phi_{0t} = \phi(K_t, 0)$ .

We then have

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(1 - \alpha + \frac{\alpha(1 + \gamma)}{1 + \theta}\right) \left(\frac{\phi_{\max} - \phi_{1t}}{1 - \phi_{1t}}\right) \frac{\dot{\phi}_{1t}}{\phi_{1t}} + \left(\frac{\alpha\theta(1 + \gamma)}{1 + \theta}\right) \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} \\ = & (1 - \alpha) \left[ \frac{\alpha\theta}{1 + \theta} \phi_{1t} \frac{Y_{1t}}{K_t} - \rho + \lambda \left( \frac{g(\phi_{1t})}{g(\phi_{0t})} - 1 \right) \right], \end{aligned}$$

for normal, non-crisis times. Here the last term  $\frac{g(\phi_{1t})}{g(\phi_{0t})} - 1$  reflects the percentage change in consumption due to the jump from  $\phi_{1t}$  to  $\phi_{0t}$  and  $Y_{1t} = \pi\Phi\phi_{1t}/(1 - \phi_{1t})$  is aggregate output when  $\phi_t = \phi_{1t}$ . Similarly we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(1 - \alpha + \frac{\alpha(1 + \gamma)}{1 + \theta}\right) \left(\frac{\phi_{\max} - \phi_{0t}}{1 - \phi_{0t}}\right) \frac{\dot{\phi}_{0t}}{\phi_{0t}} + \left(\frac{\alpha\theta(1 + \gamma)}{1 + \theta}\right) \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} \\ = & (1 - \alpha) \left[ \frac{\alpha\theta}{1 + \theta} \phi_{0t} \frac{Y_{0t}}{K_t} - \rho + \omega \left( \frac{g(\phi_{0t})}{g(\phi_{1t})} - 1 \right) \right], \end{aligned}$$

in crisis times when  $z_t = 0$ .

It is evident that if  $\lambda = \omega = 0$ , then  $\phi_{1t} = \phi(K_t, 1)$  and  $\phi_{0t} = \phi(K_t, 0)$  are functions defining the saddle paths toward the upper and lower steady states, respectively. By continuity, these two functions exist for small  $\lambda$  and  $\omega$ . We solve these two functions using the collocation method discussed in Miranda and Fackler (2002). More specifically we employ a 15-degree Chebychev polynomial of  $K$  to approximate these two functions. Once we obtain  $\phi_{1t} = \phi(K_t, 1)$  and  $\phi_{0t} = \phi(K_t, 0)$  as functions of capital  $K_t$ , we can then use equation (41) to simulate the dynamic path of capital. Figure 6 shows a possible dynamic path for this economy.

We assume that the economy is initially in the normal, non-crisis mode with  $z_t = 1$  for a sufficiently long period. Hence capital, consumption, output, and investment do not change. The parameter values we choose yield  $K = 10.5427$ . Due to precautionary savings, this level of capital is higher than the deterministic upper steady state level of capital, as households have an incentive to save to insure against a stochastic crash in output. The economy stays at this level of capital for 2.5 years, and then a crisis emerges, triggered by a drop in  $z_t$  from 1 to 0. The spread (the bottom-right panel of Figure 6) immediately jumps up as the adverse selection problem in the credit market deteriorates sharply. As a result, production and output collapse (the bottom-left panel). Since the timing of this collapse in output is unpredictable *ex ante*, consumption drops immediately (the top-left panel). Investment (the top-right panel) falls for two reasons: one is to partially offset the fall in output to finance consumption, and the other is due to the decline in the effective return as a result of severe adverse selection in the credit market. The economy stays in crisis mode for about a year before confidence is restored and




Figure 6: **Stochastic Switches between Branches**

the recession is over. Interestingly output and investment both over-shoot when the recession is over, and the longer the economy stays in recession, the larger the amount of overshoot. The longer the recession, the smaller the amount of capital remaining. The return to investment therefore is very high, and the households opt to work hard and invest more to enjoy this high return from investment. Figure 6 shows several large boom and bust cycles due to stochastic jumps in the sunspot variables. Thus there are rich multiple-equilibria in our benchmark model regardless of the model parameters.

### 3 Reputation

We now study the sensitivity of our indeterminacy results to reputational effects under adverse selection. If firms were not anonymous in the market, they may default all the time without a care for their reputation. But they are not and lenders may also refrain from lending to firms with a bad credit history. Arguably, these market forces can alleviate the asymmetric information problem. We therefore examine whether the indeterminacy results obtained in our baseline model can survive if such reputational effects are taken into account.

We follow Kehoe and Levine (1993) closely in modeling reputation. Firms are infinitely-lived and can choose to default at any time. Firms that default may, with some probability, acquire a bad reputation and may be excluded from the credit market forever. In equilibrium, the fear of that happening discourages firms from defaulting. We will show that self-fulfilling equilibria still exist even if there are no defaults in equilibrium.

To keep the model analytically tractable, we assume that all firms are owned by a representative entrepreneur. The entrepreneur's utility function is given by

$$U(C_{et}) = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho_e t} \log(C_{et}) dt, \quad (45)$$

where  $C_{et}$  is the entrepreneur's consumption and  $\rho_e$  her discount factor. For tractability, we assume  $\rho_e \ll \rho$  so that the entrepreneur does not accumulate capital. The entrepreneur's consumption equals the firm's profits,

$$C_{et} = \int_0^1 \Pi_t(i) di \equiv \Pi_t, \quad (46)$$

where  $\Pi_t(i)$  denotes the profit of firm  $i$ .

Since the only cost of defaulting is the loss of future production opportunities, the price must exceed the marginal cost (also the average cost) of production to be profitable. If the price exceeds the marginal cost, each firm will then have an incentive to produce an infinite amount. To overcome this problem, we assume that the production projects of firms are indivisible, as in the benchmark model, and that they produce to meet the orders they receive. A production project produces a flow of final goods  $\Phi$  from intermediate goods. Each unit of the final good requires one unit of the intermediate good for its production. The project is carried out only if the firms receive a purchase order. Denote the total demand for the final good by  $Y_t$ . Then a fraction  $\eta_t = Y_t/\Phi$  of firms will receive a purchase order. Again we assume that firms must borrow to finance their working capital. Denote the intermediate good price by  $P_t$ , so they must borrow  $P_t\Phi$  to produce  $\Phi$ .

To illustrate the reputation problem, let us consider a short time interval from  $t$  to  $t + dt$ . We use  $V_{1t}$  ( $V_{0t}$ ) to denote the value of a firm that receives an order (no orders). We can then formulate  $V_{1t}$  recursively as

$$V_{1t} = (1 - \phi_t)\Phi dt + e^{-\rho_e dt} \left( \frac{C_{e,t}}{C_{e,t+dt}} \right) (\eta_{t+dt} V_{1t+dt} + (1 - \eta_{t+dt}) V_{0t+dt}), \quad (47)$$

where  $\phi_t = P_t$  is the unit production cost. If  $\phi_t < 1$ , then the firm makes a positive profit from production. The second term on the right-hand side is the continuation value of the

firms. Since firms are owned by the entrepreneur, the future value is discounted by the ratio of marginal utilities of the entrepreneur. Since there is no default in equilibrium, the gross interest rate for a working capital loan is  $R_{ft} = 1$ .

The firms can also choose to default on their working capital and obtain an instantaneous gain of  $\Phi\phi_t$ . However, default comes with the risk of acquiring a bad reputation. Upon default, a firm acquires a bad reputation in the short time interval between  $t$  and  $t + dt$  with probability  $\lambda dt$ . In that case, the firm will be excluded from production forever. The payoff for defaulting is hence

$$V_t^d = \Phi dt + e^{-\rho_e dt} (1 - \lambda dt) E_t \left( \frac{C_{e,t}}{C_{e,t+dt}} \right) (\eta_{t+dt} V_{1t+dt} + (1 - \eta_{t+dt}) V_{0t+dt}). \quad (48)$$

The value of a firm that does not receive any order is given by

$$V_{0t} = e^{-\rho_e dt} E_t \left( \frac{C_{e,t}}{C_{e,t+dt}} \right) (\eta_{t+dt} V_{1t+dt} + (1 - \eta_{t+dt}) V_{0t+dt}). \quad (49)$$

Define  $V_t = \eta_t V_{1t} + (1 - \eta_t) V_{0t}$  as the expected value of the firm. The firm has no incentive to default if and only if  $V_{1t} \geq V_t^d$ , or

$$\Phi dt \leq (1 - \phi_t) \Phi dt + \lambda dt e^{-\rho_e dt} \left( \frac{C_{e,t}}{C_{e,t+dt}} \right) V_{t+dt}. \quad (50)$$

In the limit  $dt \rightarrow 0$ , the incentive compatibility condition becomes  $\phi_t \Phi \leq \lambda V_t$ .<sup>17</sup> Then the expected value of the firm is given by the present discounted value of all future profits as

$$V_t = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho_e s} \frac{C_{et}}{C_{es}} \Pi_s ds. \quad (51)$$

For simplicity, we assume  $\Phi$  is big enough such that  $\eta_t = Y_t/\Phi < 1$  always holds. The average profit is then obtained as  $\Pi_t = (1 - \phi_t) Y_t$ . Then using  $C_{ej} = \Pi_j$  and integrating the right-hand side of equation 51, we have

$$V_t = \frac{(1 - \phi_t) Y_t}{\rho_e}. \quad (52)$$

The households' budget constraint becomes

$$C_t + I_t \leq R_t u_t K_t + W_t N_t = \phi_t Y_t. \quad (53)$$

Then the incentive constraint (50) becomes

$$\phi_t \Phi \leq \lambda \frac{(1 - \phi_t) Y_t}{\rho_e}. \quad (54)$$

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<sup>17</sup>Under the incentive compatibility condition we can consider one-step deviations since  $V_{1t}$ , and  $V_{0t}$  are then optimal value functions.

From the budget constraint (53), we know that household utility increases with  $\phi_t$  and thus the incentive constraint (54) must be binding. Then equation (54) can be simplified to

$$\phi_t = \frac{Y_t}{\pi\Phi + Y_t} < 1, \quad (55)$$

where now  $\pi \equiv \frac{\rho e}{\lambda}$ . Similar to the baseline model, here firms also receive an information rent. However, the rent in the baseline is derived from hidden information while the rent here arises from hidden action. As indicated in equation (55),  $\phi_t$  is procyclical and hence the markup is countercyclical. When output is high, the total profit from production is high. Therefore the value of a good reputation is high and the opportunity cost of defaulting also increases. This then alleviates the moral hazard problem since a high output dilutes the information rent.

The cost minimization problem again yields the factor prices given by equation (20) and (21). Since households do not own firms, their budget constraint is modified to

$$C_t + \dot{K}_t = \phi_t Y_t - \delta(u_t) K_t. \quad (56)$$

The equilibrium system of equations is the same as in the baseline model except that equation (19) is replaced by equation (56). The steady state can be computed similarly. The steady state output is given by

$$Y = A^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left[ \frac{\alpha\phi\theta}{\rho(1+\theta)} \right]^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \left[ \left( \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}} \right) \cdot \frac{1}{\psi} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\gamma}} \equiv Y(\phi), \quad (57)$$

and  $\phi$  can be solved from

$$\bar{\Phi} \equiv \pi\bar{\Phi} \equiv \Psi(\phi) = \left( \frac{1-\phi}{\phi} \right) \cdot Y(\phi). \quad (58)$$

Unlike in the baseline model, here the steady state equilibrium is unique as  $Y(\phi)$  is monotonic.<sup>18</sup> We summarize the result in the following lemma.

**Lemma 3** *If  $\alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ , a consistently standard calibrated value of  $\alpha$ , then the steady state equilibrium is unique for any  $\bar{\Phi} > 0$ .*

We can now study the possibility of self-fulfilling equilibria around the steady state. Since  $\phi$  and  $\bar{\Phi}$  form a one-to-one mapping, we will treat  $\phi$  as a free parameter in characterizing the indeterminacy condition. We can then use equation (58) to back out the corresponding value of  $\bar{\Phi}$ . The following proposition specifies the condition under which self-fulfilling equilibria arise.

<sup>18</sup>Note that compared to equation (32),  $\phi$  is missing from the numerator of the second bracket in equation (57).

**Proposition 3** *Let  $\tau = 1 - \phi$ . Then indeterminacy emerges if and only if*

$$\tau_{\min} < \tau < \min \left\{ \frac{1 + \theta}{\alpha} - 1, \tau_H \right\} \equiv \tau_{\max},$$

where  $\tau_{\min} \equiv \frac{(1+\theta)(1+\gamma)}{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)+\alpha(1+\gamma)} - 1$ , and  $\tau_H$  is the positive solution to  $A_1\tau^2 - A_2\tau - A_3 = 0$ , where

$$\begin{aligned} A_1 &\equiv s(1 + \theta)(2 + \alpha + \alpha\gamma) \\ A_2 &\equiv (1 + \theta)(1 + \alpha\gamma) - s[(1 + \theta)(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma) + (1 + \gamma)\alpha] \\ A_3 &\equiv (1 + \theta)(1 - \alpha)[s + (1 - s)\gamma]. \end{aligned}$$

Indeterminacy implies that the model exhibits multiple expectation-driven equilibria around the steady state. The steady state equilibrium is now unique however, which suggests that the continuum of equilibria implied by indeterminacy cannot be obtained in static models studied in the earlier literature. So far, the condition for sustaining indeterminacy has been given in terms of  $\phi$  and  $\tau$ . The following corollary specifies the underlying condition in terms of  $\rho_e$ ,  $\lambda$  and  $\Phi$ .

**Corollary 4** *Indeterminacy emerges if and only if  $\frac{\Psi(1-\tau_{\min})}{\Phi} < \frac{\rho_e}{\lambda} < \frac{\Psi(1-\tau_{\max})}{\Phi}$ .*

Given the other parameters, a decrease in  $\rho_e$  or an increase in  $\lambda$  increases the steady state  $\phi$ . According to the above lemma, this makes indeterminacy less likely. The intuition is straightforward. A large  $\lambda$  means the opportunity cost of defaulting increases, as the chances of the firm's being excluded from future production increases. This alleviates the moral hazard problem, which is the source of indeterminacy. Similarly, a decrease in  $\rho_e$  means that the entrepreneurs become more patient. The future profit flow from production becomes more valuable to them, which again increases the opportunity cost of defaulting and thus alleviates the moral hazard problem.

## 4 Adverse Selection with Heterogeneous Productivity

Liu and Wang (2014) show that credit constraints can generate aggregate increasing returns to scale. We now explore the possibility of increasing returns to scale by modifying our model in section 2. The households' problems as in the benchmark model and thus the first-order conditions are still equations (5), (6) and (7).



We now assume that the risk of lending to final good firms is continuous. We index the final goods firms by  $j \in [0, 1]$ . Again each final goods firm has one production project, which requires  $\Phi$  units of intermediate goods. The loan is risky as production may not be successful. More specifically, we assume that final goods firm  $j$ 's output is governed by

$$y_{jt} = \begin{cases} a_{jt}x_{jt}, & \text{with probability } q_{jt} \\ 0, & \text{with probability } 1 - q_{jt} \end{cases}, \quad (59)$$

where  $x_{jt}$  is the intermediate input for firm  $j$  and  $a_{jt}$  the firm's productivity. We assume  $q_{jt}$  is *i.i.d.* and drawn from a common distribution function  $F(q)$  and  $a_{jt} = a_{\min}q_{jt}^{-\zeta}$ . So a higher productivity  $a_{jt}$  is associated with a lower probability of success  $q_{jt}$ . Notice that expected productivity is given by  $q_{jt}a_{jt} = a_{\min}q_{jt}^{1-\zeta}$ . We assume, however, that  $\zeta < 1$ , *i.e.*, a firm with a higher success probability enjoys a higher expected productivity. Denote by  $P_t$  the price of intermediate goods. Then the total borrowing is given by  $P_t x_{jt}$ . Denote by  $R_{ft}$  the gross interest rate. Then final goods firm  $j$ 's profit maximization problem becomes

$$\max_{x_{jt} \in \{0, \Phi\}} q_{jt} (a_{jt}x_{jt} - R_{ft}P_t x_{jt}), \quad (60)$$

Note that due to limited liability, the final goods firm pays back the working capital loan only if the project is successful. This implies that, given  $R_{ft}$  and  $P_t$ , the demand for  $x_{jt}$  is simply given by

$$x_{jt} = \begin{cases} \Phi & \text{if } a_{jt} > R_{ft}P_t \equiv a_t^* \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad (61)$$

or equivalently,

$$a_{\min}q_{jt}^{-\zeta} > a_t^*, q_{jt} < q_t^* = \left(\frac{a_t^*}{a_{\min}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\zeta}} = \left(\frac{R_{ft}P_t}{a_{\min}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\zeta}}. \quad (62)$$

This establishes that only firms with risky production opportunities will enter the credit markets, which highlights the adverse selection problem in the financial market. Firms with  $q_{jt} > q_t^*$  are driven out of the financial market, despite their higher social expected productivity. Since financial intermediaries are assumed to be fully competitive, we have

$$R_{ft}P_t\Phi \int_0^{q_t^*} q dF(q) = P_t\Phi \int_0^{q_t^*} dF(q), \quad (63)$$

where the left-hand side is the actual repayment from the final goods firms, and the right-hand side is the actual lending. Then the interest rate is given by

$$R_{ft} = \frac{1}{\int_0^{q_t^*} q dF(q) / \int_0^{q_t^*} dF(q)} = \frac{1}{E(q|q \leq q_t^*)} > 1, \quad (64)$$

where the denominator is the average success rate. The above equation suggests that the interest rate decreases with the average success rate.

The total production of final goods is

$$Y_t = \int_0^1 qa_t x_t dF(q) = \Phi \int_0^{q_t^*} a_{\min} q^{1-\zeta} dF(q). \quad (65)$$

where the second equality follows equation (61). The total production of intermediate goods is

$$X_t = \Phi \int_0^{q_t^*} dF(q). \quad (66)$$

Finally the intermediate goods are produced according to  $X_t = A_t (u_t K_t)^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}$ , where  $u_t K_t$  is the capital borrowed from the households. Combining equations (65) and (66) then yields

$$Y_t = \Gamma(q_t^*) A_t (u_t K_t)^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}, \quad (67)$$

where  $\Gamma(q_t^*) = \left( \int_0^{q_t^*} a_{\min} q^{1-\zeta} dF(q) \right) / \int_0^{q_t^*} dF(q)$  depends on the threshold  $q_t^*$  and the distribution. The above equation then suggests that the measured TFP is

$$TFP_t = \frac{Y_t}{(u_t K_t)^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}} = \Gamma(q_t^*) A_t. \quad (68)$$

Since  $\Gamma'(q_t^*) = a_{\min} f(q_t^*) \int_0^{q_t^*} (q_t^{*1-\zeta} - q^{1-\zeta}) dF(q) / \left( \int_0^{q_t^*} dF(q) \right)^2 > 0$ , the endogenous TFP increases with the threshold  $q_t^*$ . This is intuitive: as the threshold increases, more firms with high productivity enter the credit market, making resource allocation more efficient. Equation (65) implies that  $q_t^*$  increases with  $Y_t$ , and thus we get the following lemma.

**Lemma 4** *TFP is endogenous and increases in  $Y$ , i.e.,  $\frac{\partial \Gamma(q_t^*)}{\partial Y_t} > 0$ .*

We have therefore established that the endogenous TFP is procyclical. Notice that the procyclicality of endogenous TFP holds generally for continuous distributions. Hence without loss of generality, we now assume  $F(q) = q^\eta$  for tractability. In turn, firm-level measured productivity  $\frac{1}{q}$  follows a Pareto distribution with the shape parameter  $\eta$ , which is consistent with the findings of a large literature (see, e.g., Melitz (2003) and references therein). Under the assumption of a power distribution, combining equations (65) and (67) yields the aggregate output

$$Y_t = \left( \frac{\eta}{\eta - \zeta + 1} \right) a_{\min} \Phi^{-\frac{1-\zeta}{\eta}} (A_t u_t^\alpha K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha})^{1 + \frac{1-\zeta}{\eta}}. \quad (69)$$

The intuition is as follows. Here a lending externality emerges because of adverse selection in the credit markets. Suppose that the total lending from financial intermediaries increases.

This creates downward pressure on interest rate  $R_{ft}$ , which increases the cutoff  $q_t^*$  according to the definition in equation (62). Firms with a higher  $q$  have a smaller risk of default. A rise in the cutoff  $q_t^*$  therefore reduces the average default rate. If the rise is big enough, it can in turn stimulate more lending from the financial intermediaries. Since firms with a higher  $q$  are also more productive on average, the increased efficiency in reallocating credit implies that resources are better allocated across firms. Notice that the aggregate output again exhibits increasing returns to scale. Equation (69) reveals that the degree of increasing returns to scale clearly depends on the adverse selection problem and decreases with  $\zeta$  and  $\eta$ . When  $\eta = \infty$ , the firms produce product of homogeneous quality. Hence there is no asymmetric information or adverse selection. If  $\zeta = 1$ , firms are equally productive in the sense that their expected productivity is the same. It therefore matters not how credit is allocated among firms. Given  $\zeta < 1$ , a smaller  $\eta$  implies that firms are more heterogenous, creating a larger asymmetric information problem. Similarly, given  $\eta$ , a smaller  $\zeta$  implies that the productivity of firms deteriorates more quickly with respect to their default risk, making adverse selection more damaging to resource allocation. We formally state this result in the following proposition.

**Proposition 4** *The reduced-form aggregate production in our model exhibits increasing returns to scale if and only if adverse selection exists, i.e.,  $\zeta < 1$  and  $\eta < \infty$ .*

In an important contribution, Basu and Fernald (1997) document increasing returns to scale in aggregate production but not at the micro level. In a recent paper, Liu and Wang (2014) show how credit constraints can generate endogenous variation in TFP, and hence aggregate increasing returns. In their model, the less productive firms are driven out of production. Different from Liu and Wang (2014), firms in our model do not suffer from credit constraints; the more productive firms in our model are driven out of production due to adverse selection.

As in the benchmark model, both the credit spread,  $R_{ft} - 1$ , and the expected default risk,  $1 - E(q|q \leq q_t^*)$ , are countercyclical. These predictions are consistent with the empirical regularities found by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) and many others.

#### 4.1 Indeterminacy

It is straightforward to show that  $W_t = \phi \frac{(1-\alpha)Y_t}{N_t}$  and  $R_t = \phi \frac{\alpha Y_t}{u_t K_t}$ . Here  $\phi = \frac{\eta+1-\zeta}{\eta+1}$  and is constant instead of procyclical. Together with equations (5), (6), (7), (69), and (19), we can determine the seven variables,  $C_t$ ,  $Y_t$ ,  $N_t$ ,  $u_t$ ,  $K_t$ ,  $W_t$  and  $R_t$ . The steady state can be obtained as in the baseline model. We can express the other variables in terms of the steady state  $\phi$ .

Since  $\phi$  is unique, unlike in the baseline model, the steady state here is unique. We assume that  $\Phi$  is large enough so that an interior solution to  $q^*$  is always guaranteed. The following proposition summarizes the conditions for indeterminacy in this extended model.

**Proposition 5** *Given the power distribution, i.e.,  $F(q) = q^\eta$  (or equivalently, firm productivity conforms to a Pareto distribution), the steady state is unique. Moreover, the model is indeterminate if and only if*

$$\sigma_{\min} < \sigma < \sigma_{\max} \quad (70)$$

$$\text{where } \sigma \equiv \frac{1-\zeta}{\eta}, \sigma_{\min} \equiv \left( \frac{1}{\frac{1-\alpha}{1+\gamma} + \frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}} \right) - 1 \text{ and } \sigma_{\max} \equiv \frac{1}{\alpha} - 1.$$

To better understand the proposition, we first consider how output responds to a fundamental shock, such as a change in  $A$ , the true TFP. Let us define  $1 + \tilde{\sigma}$  as the multiplier of adverse selection. Holding factor inputs constant, we have

$$1 + \tilde{\sigma} \equiv \frac{d \log Y_t}{d \log A} = (1 + \sigma) \left[ \frac{1 + \theta}{1 + \theta - \alpha(1 + \sigma)} \right] > 1. \quad (71)$$

The above equations show that adverse selection and variable capacity utilization can amplify the impact of a TFP shock on output. Note that the necessary condition  $\sigma > \sigma_{\min}$  can be written as

$$(1 + \tilde{\sigma})(1 - \alpha) - 1 > \gamma. \quad (72)$$

The model is indeterminate if the multiplier effect of adverse selection is sufficiently large. The restriction  $\sigma < \sigma_{\max}$  is typically automatically satisfied. The restriction  $\sigma < \frac{1}{\alpha} - 1$  simply requires that  $\alpha(1 + \sigma) < 1$ , which is the condition needed to rule out explosive growth in the model.

Whether the model is indeterminate or not, equation (71) implies that the response of output to TFP shocks is amplified. In addition, by Proposition 4, the economy is more likely to be indeterminate if  $\eta$  is smaller. Our results are hence in the same spirit as those of Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015), who show that a dispersion in quality will strengthen the amplification effect of adverse selection.

**Empirical Possibility of Indeterminacy** To empirically evaluate the possibility of indeterminacy, we set the same values for  $\rho$ ,  $\theta$ ,  $\delta$ ,  $\alpha$  and  $\gamma$  as in Table 1.<sup>19</sup> We also have new parameters in this extended model,  $(\zeta, \eta)$ . We use two moments to pin them down and set  $\zeta$  and  $\eta$  to match the steady state markup  $\frac{\eta+1-\zeta}{\eta+1} = 0.9$ . Basu and Fernald (1997) estimate

<sup>19</sup>Since  $\Phi$  does not affect the indeterminacy condition, we do not need to specify its value.

aggregate increasing returns to scale in manufacturing to be approximately 1.1. Thus we set  $\sigma = 0.1$ . This leads to  $\zeta = 0.55$  and  $\eta = 4.5$ . We have  $\sigma_{\min} = 0.083$  and  $\sigma_{\max} \equiv 2$ , which meet the indeterminacy conditions. Hence, with these parameters the model exhibits self-fulfilling equilibria.

## 5 Further Robustness Analysis

### 5.1 Monopoly Banking

We have so far assumed that financial intermediaries are fully competitive. As is well known, in a static setting the market structure is important for the existence of multiple equilibria. Here we check the robustness of our results by introducing banks that have monopoly power and do not take the interest rate as given. The expected profits of these banks are then given by (assuming all profits go to the representative household)

$$\max_{R_{ft}} \Pi_t^B = P_t \Phi \left( R_{ft} \int_0^{q_t^*} q dF(q) - \int_0^{q_t^*} dF(q) \right), \quad (73)$$

subject to the cutoff value in equation (62), i.e.,

$$q_t^* = \left( \frac{R_{ft} P_t}{a_{\min}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\zeta}}. \quad (74)$$

The first-order condition on  $R_{ft}$  yields (as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981))

$$\int_0^{q_t^*} q dF(q) + R_{ft} q_t^* f(q_t^*) \frac{dq_t^*}{dR_{ft}} = f(q_t^*) \frac{dq_t^*}{dR_{ft}}, \quad (75)$$

**Lemma 5** *If  $F(q) = q^\eta$  for  $q \in (0, 1)$ , equation (75) can be simplified to*

$$R_{ft} = \frac{\eta + 1}{\eta + 1 - \zeta} \cdot \frac{1}{q_t^*}. \quad (76)$$

All other results are the same as in the previous part, especially the indeterminacy condition. This further highlights the different sources of multiple equilibria in our dynamic model than those in a static model.

### 5.2 Endogenous Production Capacity

Our model has assumed a fixed project size. By construction, when total lending increases, as the riskier borrowers are in their full capacity, the additional lending will be allocated to the more credit-worthy borrowers. If the riskier borrowers could expand their capacity instead

and absorb the additional lending, then the average quality of borrowers may decrease. The lending externality in our previous setting would then disappear. We therefore extend our model to endogenize firm capacity and show that our results are robust to such an extension. We assume a continuum of types of firms as in section 4. Each firm has to pay  $\xi \frac{\Phi_t^{1+\chi}}{1+\chi} dt$  units of capital at time  $t$  in order to produce a maximum flow quantity of  $\Phi_t$  in the time interval from  $t$  to  $t + dt$ . Then firm type  $q_{jt}$  is realized. As before, the firm borrows in order to produce if and only if the probability of success is sufficiently low, namely, if and only if  $q \leq q_t^*$ . (Here  $q_t^*$  is defined as in equation (62).) The instantaneous profit for firm  $j$  is obtained by solving  $\max_{x_{jt} \in \{0, \Phi_t\}} q_{jt} (a_{jt} x_{jt} - R_{ft} P_t x_{jt})$ . The solution is

$$x_{jt} = \begin{cases} \Phi_t & \text{if } q_{jt} < q_t^* = \left( \frac{R_{ft} P_t}{a_{\min}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\zeta}}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad (77)$$

The expected profit is therefore given by

$$\Phi_t \int_{q_{\min}}^{q_t^*} q (a - R_{ft} P_t) dF(q) = \Phi_t \int_{q_{\min}}^{q_t^*} q (a_{\min} q^{-\zeta} - R_{ft} P_t) dF(q). \quad (78)$$

The optimal  $\Phi_t$  is then determined by solving

$$\max_{\Phi_t} \left\{ -\xi \frac{\Phi_t^{1+\chi}}{1+\chi} + \Phi_t \int_{q_{\min}}^{q_t^*} q (a_{\min} q^{-\zeta} - R_{ft} P_t) dF(q) \right\}. \quad (79)$$

The first-order condition is given by

$$\xi \Phi_t^\chi = \int_{q_{\min}}^{q_t^*} q (a_{\min} q^{-\zeta} - R_{ft} P_t) dF(q). \quad (80)$$

Once  $\Phi_t$  is determined, the rest of the equations are the same as in section 4. The above equation can also be written as

$$\xi \Phi_t^{\chi+1} = \Phi_t \int_{q_{\min}}^{q_t^*} q (a_{\min} q^{-\zeta} - R_{ft} P_t) dF(q).$$

Notice that  $\Phi_t \int_{q_{\min}}^{q_t^*} a_{\min} q^{1-\zeta} dF(q) = Y_t$  by equation (65). Equations (64) and (66) yield  $\Phi_t R_{ft} P_t \int q dF(q) = P_t X_t$ . Under a power distribution we can further show that  $P_t X_t = \frac{\eta+1-\zeta}{\eta+1} Y_t$ . So the equilibrium  $\Phi_t$  can then be determined by

$$\xi \Phi_t^{\chi+1} = \frac{\zeta}{\eta+1} Y_t. \quad (81)$$

Equation (69) becomes  $Y_t = \left(\frac{\eta}{\eta - \tau + 1}\right) a_{\min} \Phi_t^{-\frac{1-\zeta}{\eta}} (A_t u_t^\alpha K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha})^{1+\frac{1-\zeta}{\eta}}$  accordingly. With some algebra, we can obtain the aggregate output

$$Y_t = \left[ \left( \frac{\eta}{\eta - \tau + 1} \right) a_{\min} \right]^{1+\frac{1-\zeta}{\chi+1}} (A_t u_t^\alpha K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha})^{\frac{(\chi+1)(1-\zeta+\eta)}{(1+\chi)\eta+1-\zeta}},$$

which exhibits increasing returns to scale for any  $\chi$ . Dynamic indeterminacy is robust to endogenous production capacity.

## 6 Conclusion

We have shown that in a realistically calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model, adverse selection in credit markets can generate a continuum of equilibria in the form of indeterminacy, either through endogenous markups or endogenous TFP. Adverse selection can therefore potentially explain high output volatility as well as the emergence of probabilistic confidence and credit crises, or boom and bust cycles with jumps in output, consumption and investment in a fully rational expectations context, and in the absence of fundamental shocks. While the standard RBC model with a negative TFP shock cannot fully explain the increase in labor productivity during the Great Recession (see Ohanian (2010)), this feature of the Great Recession is consistent with the prediction of our baseline model in section 2, and is driven by pessimistic beliefs about aggregate output. The pessimistic beliefs reduce aggregate demand and increase markups, leading to a lower real wage and a lower labor supply. Labor productivity, however, rises due to decreasing returns to labor.

To keep our analysis simple, we abstracted from certain important features of credit markets, for example, runs on various financial intermediaries that may amplify the initial adverse selection problem as in the subprime mortgages during the Great Recession. Future research may examine the effects of adverse selection among financial intermediaries.

## Appendix

### A Proofs

**Proof of Lemma 1:** The proof is straightforward. First, from the explicit form of  $Y(\phi)$ , we can easily prove that  $\Psi(\phi) \equiv \left(\frac{1-\phi}{\phi}\right) \cdot Y(\phi)$  strictly increases with  $\phi$  when  $\phi \in (0, \phi^*)$  but strictly decreases with  $\phi$  when  $\phi \in (\phi^*, 1)$ . Second, since  $\Psi(0) < \bar{\Phi} < \Psi^* = \Psi(\phi^*)$ , there exists a unique solution between zero and  $\phi^*$ , denoted by  $\bar{\phi}_L$ , that solves  $\Psi(\phi) = \bar{\Phi}$ . Likewise, there also exists a unique solution between  $\phi^*$  and 1, denoted by  $\bar{\phi}_H$ , that solves  $\Psi(\phi) = \bar{\Phi}$ .

**Proof of Lemma 2:** Denote by  $\varphi_1$  and  $\varphi_2$  the eigenvalues of matrix  $J$  so that we have  $\varphi_1 + \varphi_2 = \text{Trace}(J)$  and  $\varphi_1\varphi_2 = \text{Det}(J)$ . Then the model is indeterminate if the trace of  $J$  is negative and the determinant is positive. The trace and the determinant of  $J$  are

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Trace}(J)}{\delta} &= \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi}\right) \lambda_1 - (1+\tau) \lambda_1 + \theta(1+\tau) \lambda_2, \\ \frac{\text{Det}(J)}{\delta^2\theta} &= [(1+\tau) \lambda_1 - 1 + \lambda_2] \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi} - 1\right) - \tau \lambda_2, \end{aligned}$$

respectively, where

$$\lambda_1 = \frac{a(1+\gamma)}{1+\gamma-b(1+\tau)}, \text{ and } \lambda_2 = -\frac{b}{1+\gamma-b(1+\tau)},$$

as defined in equation (36).

Substituting out  $\lambda_1$  and  $\lambda_2$  we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Trace}(J)}{\delta} &= \left[\frac{1}{\gamma+1-(1+\tau)b}\right] \cdot \left[\left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi} - 1 - \tau\right) a(1+\gamma) - \theta(1+\tau)b\right] \\ &= \left[\left(\frac{\theta}{\phi}\right) \left(\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma) + (1+\theta)(1-\alpha)}{1+\theta-(1+\tau)\alpha}\right)\right] \cdot \left[\frac{\frac{(1+\gamma)(1+\theta)}{\alpha(1+\gamma)+(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)} - \phi(1+\tau)}{\gamma+1-(1+\tau)b}\right] \\ &= \left[\left(\frac{\theta}{\phi}\right) \left(\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma) + (1+\theta)(1-\alpha)}{1+\theta-(1+\tau)\alpha}\right)\right] \cdot \left[\frac{\frac{(1+\gamma)(1+\theta)}{\alpha(1+\gamma)+(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)} - 1 + \tau^2}{\gamma+1-(1+\tau)b}\right] \end{aligned}$$

Notice that  $\gamma+1-(1+\tau)b < 0$  is equivalent to

$$\tau > \tau_{\min} \equiv \frac{(1+\gamma)(1+\theta)}{\alpha(1+\gamma) + (1+\theta)(1-\alpha)} - 1.$$

Since  $\tau_{\min} > 0$ ,

$$\frac{(1+\gamma)(1+\theta)}{\alpha(1+\gamma) + (1+\theta)(1-\alpha)} - 1 + \tau^2 > 0.$$



Therefore  $\text{Trace}(J) < 0$  if and only if  $\tau > \tau_{\min}$ . Next we determine the condition under which  $\text{Det}(J) > 0$ . Note that  $\text{Det}(J)$  can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Det}(J)}{\delta^2\theta} &= \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma + 1 - (1 + \tau)b} \right] \cdot \left[ \left( \frac{1 + \theta}{\alpha\phi} - 1 \right) ((1 + \gamma)[a(1 + \tau) - 1] + \tau b) + \tau b \right] \\ &= \frac{1 + \theta}{(1 + \tau)b - (\gamma + 1)} \left\{ (1 + \gamma)(1 - \alpha) - \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta)}{(1 + \theta - \alpha\phi)} + (1 + \gamma)\alpha \right] \tau \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

If  $\tau < \tau_{\min}$ , then we immediately have  $\text{Det}(J) < 0$ . Thus to guarantee  $\text{Det}(J) > 0$ , we must have  $\tau > \tau_{\min}$ , which implies that  $(1 + \tau)b - (\gamma + 1) > 0$ . As a result, given that  $\tau > \tau_{\min}$ ,  $\text{Det}(J) > 0$  if and only if

$$(1 + \gamma)(1 - \alpha) - \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta)}{1 + \theta - \alpha\phi} + (1 + \gamma)\alpha \right] \tau > 0,$$

which can be further simplified to

$$\tau < \frac{(1 + \gamma)(1 - \alpha)}{\frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta)}{1 + \theta - \alpha\phi} + (1 + \gamma)\alpha}.$$

Since  $\phi = 1 - \tau$ , the above inequality can be reformulated as

$$\Delta(\tau) \equiv \alpha^2\tau^2 + \left[ \alpha\theta + \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta)}{(1 + \gamma)} \right] \tau - (1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta - \alpha) < 0.$$

Denote  $\xi \equiv \alpha\theta + \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta)}{(1 + \gamma)}$ . Then  $\det(J) > 0$  if and only if  $\tau > \tau_{\min}$  and

$$\tau < \tau_{\max} \equiv \frac{-\xi + \sqrt{\xi^2 + 4\alpha^2(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta - \alpha)}}{2\alpha^2}.$$

It remains for us to prove that  $\tau_H = 1 - \phi^*$ , where  $\phi^* = \arg \max_{0 \leq \phi \leq 1} \Psi(\phi)$ . The first-order condition of  $\log \Psi(\phi)$  suggests

$$\left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} + \frac{2\alpha - 1}{1 - \alpha} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\phi} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \right) \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 + \theta} \right) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \frac{\alpha\phi}{1 + \theta}} \right) - \frac{1}{1 - \phi} = 0,$$

which is equivalent to

$$\Gamma(\phi) \equiv \alpha^2\phi^2 - \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta)}{1 + \gamma} + \alpha\theta + 2\alpha^2 \right] \phi + \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta)}{1 + \gamma} + (2\alpha - 1)(1 + \theta) \right] = 0.$$

Besides, we can easily verify that,  $\frac{d^2}{d\phi^2} (\log \Psi(\phi)) < 0$  always holds for  $\phi \in (0, 1)$ . Since  $\tau \equiv 1 - \phi$ , we know that  $\Delta(1 - \phi) = \Gamma(\phi)$ . Denote by  $\phi_1$  and  $\phi_2$  the solutions to  $\Gamma(\phi) = 0$ . Note that  $\phi_1 + \phi_2 > 0$ ,  $\phi_1 \cdot \phi_2 > 0$ , and  $\Gamma(0) > 0$ ,  $\Gamma(1) > 0$ . Therefore we know that  $0 < \phi_1 < 1 < \phi_2$ . Consequently we conclude that

$$\phi^* = \phi_1 = 1 - \tau_{\max} \in (0, 1).$$

**Proof of Proposition 1:** By definition,  $\tau_{\max} = 1 - \phi_{\min}$ . Therefore we have  $\phi_{\min} = \phi^*$ . Then by Lemma 2 we know that

1. If  $\phi < \phi_{\min}$ , then  $\text{Trace}(J) < 0$  and  $\text{Det}(J) < 0$ .
2. If  $\phi \in (\phi_{\min}, \phi_{\max})$ , then  $\text{Trace}(J) < 0$  and  $\text{Det}(J) > 0$ .
3. If  $\phi > \phi_{\max}$ , then  $\text{Trace}(J) > 0$  and  $\text{Det}(J) < 0$ .

**Proof of Corollary 1:** First, when adverse selection is severe enough, *i.e.*,  $\bar{\Phi} = \pi\bar{\Phi} \geq \Psi_{\max}$ , the economy collapses. The only equilibrium is the trivial case with  $\phi = 0$ . Given that  $\bar{\Phi} < \Psi_{\max}$ , Lemma 1 implies that there are two solutions, which are denoted by  $(\bar{\phi}_H, \bar{\phi}_L)$ . It is always true that  $\bar{\phi}_L < \phi^* < \bar{\phi}_H$ . Then Lemma 2 immediately suggests that the steady state  $\bar{\phi}_L$  is always a saddle. Since  $\Psi(\phi)$  decreases with  $\phi$  when  $\phi > \phi^*$ , as shown in Proposition 1, indeterminacy emerges if and only if  $\phi \in (\phi^*, \phi_{\max})$ . Therefore the local dynamics around the steady state  $\phi = \bar{\phi}_H$  exhibits indeterminacy if and only if  $\Psi(\phi_{\max}) < \bar{\Phi} < \Psi_{\max}$ .

**Proof of Corollary 2:** Holding  $\bar{\Phi}$  constant,  $\bar{\Phi}$  increases with  $\pi$ , the proportion of dishonest firms. As is proved in Corollary 1, given  $\bar{\Phi} < \Psi_{\max}$ , indeterminacy emerges if and only if  $\bar{\Phi} > \Psi(\phi_{\max})$ . Therefore the likelihood of indeterminacy increases with  $\pi$ .

**Proof of Proposition 2:** As shown in section 2, the dynamical system on  $(C_t, K_t)$  is given by

$$\frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} = \left( \frac{\theta}{1+\theta} \right) \alpha \phi_t \frac{Y_t}{K_t} - \rho, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

$$\dot{K}_t = Y_t - \left( \delta^0 \frac{u_t^{1+\theta}}{1+\theta} \right) K_t - C_t, \quad (\text{A.2})$$

where

$$u_t^{1+\theta} = \frac{\alpha \phi_t Y_t}{\delta^0 K_t}, \quad (\text{A.3})$$

$$Y_t = Y(\phi_t) \equiv \left( \frac{\phi_t}{1-\phi_t} \right) \pi \bar{\Phi}, \quad (\text{A.4})$$

and

$$\delta(u_t) \equiv \delta^0 \frac{u_t^{1+\theta}}{1+\theta},$$

in which  $\delta^0 = \frac{\rho}{\theta} (1+\theta)$  so that  $u = 1$  at the steady state.

First, equation (A.3) implies

$$u_t = \left( \frac{\alpha \phi_t Y_t}{\delta^0 K_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}},$$

and thus we have

$$N_t^{1-\alpha} = \frac{Y_t}{A u_t^\alpha K_t^\alpha} = \frac{Y_t^{1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}} \phi_t^{-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}} K_t^{-\frac{\alpha\theta}{1+\theta}}}{A \left( \frac{\alpha}{\delta^0} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}}}. \quad (\text{A.5})$$

Substituting equation (A.5) into (5) yields

$$\left[ \frac{Y_t^{1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}} \phi_t^{-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}} K_t^{-\frac{\alpha\theta}{1+\theta}}}{A \left( \frac{\alpha}{\delta^0} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}}} \right]^{1+\gamma} = \left[ \left( \frac{1}{C_t} \right) \left( \frac{1-\alpha}{\psi} \right) \phi_t Y_t \right]^{1-\alpha},$$

which can be further simplified to

$$\frac{Y_t^{(1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta})(1+\gamma)} \phi_t^{-\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}} K_t^{-\frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}}}{A^{1+\gamma} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\delta^0} \right)^{\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}}} = C_t^{-(1-\alpha)} \left( \frac{1-\alpha}{\psi} \right)^{(1-\alpha)} \phi_t^{1-\alpha} Y_t^{1-\alpha},$$

or equivalently,

$$C_t^{1-\alpha} = A^{1+\gamma} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\delta^0} \right)^{\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}} \left( \frac{1-\alpha}{\psi} \right)^{(1-\alpha)} \phi_t^{1-\alpha+\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}} Y_t^{1-\alpha-(1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta})(1+\gamma)} K_t^{\frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}}. \quad (\text{A.6})$$

Substituting equation (A.4) into (A.6) yields

$$C_t = C(\phi_t, K_t) = f_0 \cdot g(\phi_t) \cdot h(K_t), \quad (\text{A.7})$$

where  $f_0 = A^{\frac{1+\gamma}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\delta^0} \right)^{\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)}} \left( \frac{1-\alpha}{\psi} \right)$ ,  $h(K_t) = K_t^{\frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)}}$ , and

$$g(\phi_t) = \left[ \phi_t^{1-\alpha+\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}} Y(\phi_t)^{1-\alpha-(1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta})(1+\gamma)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}.$$

In turn, differentiating both sides of equation (A.7) yields

$$C_t^{1-\alpha} = A^{1+\gamma} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\delta^0} \right)^{\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}} \left( \frac{1-\alpha}{\psi} \right)^{(1-\alpha)} \phi_t^{1-\alpha+\frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}} Y_t^{1-\alpha-(1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta})(1+\gamma)} K_t^{\frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta}},$$

which immediately implies

$$\begin{aligned} (1-\alpha) \frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} &= \left( 1-\alpha + \frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} \right) \frac{\dot{\phi}_t}{\phi_t} + \left( 1-\alpha - \left( 1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta} \right) (1+\gamma) \right) \frac{\dot{Y}_t}{Y_t} + \left( \frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} \right) \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} \\ &= \left( 1-\alpha + \frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} + \left( 1-\alpha - \left( 1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta} \right) (1+\gamma) \right) \frac{Y'(\phi_t) \phi_t}{Y(\phi_t)} \right) \frac{\dot{\phi}_t}{\phi_t} + \left( \frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} \right) \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} \\ &= \left( 1-\alpha + \frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} - \left( \left( 1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta} \right) (1+\gamma) - (1-\alpha) \right) \left( \frac{1}{1-\phi_t} \right) \right) \frac{\dot{\phi}_t}{\phi_t} + \left( \frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} \right) \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} \\ &= \left( 1-\alpha + \frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} \right) \left( \frac{\phi_{\max} - \phi_t}{1-\phi_t} \right) \frac{\dot{\phi}_t}{\phi_t} + \left( \frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} \right) \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.8})$$

Additionally, we have

$$u_t = \left( \frac{\alpha \phi_t Y(\phi_t)}{\delta^0 K_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\theta}} \equiv u(K_t, \phi_t). \quad (\text{A.9})$$

Finally, substituting equation (A.7) and (A.9) into (A.1) and (A.2) yields

$$\begin{aligned} \left( 1 - \alpha + \frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} \right) \left( \frac{\phi_{\max} - \phi_t}{1 - \phi_t} \right) \frac{\dot{\phi}_t}{\phi_t} + \left( \frac{\alpha\theta(1+\gamma)}{1+\theta} \right) \frac{\dot{K}_t}{K_t} &= (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{\alpha\theta}{1+\theta} \phi_t \frac{Y(\phi_t)}{K_t} - \rho \right), \\ \dot{K}_t &= \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha\phi_t}{1+\theta} \right) Y(\phi_t) - C(\phi_t, K_t), \end{aligned}$$

the desired autonomous dynamical system in Proposition 2.

**Proof of Corollary 3:** We can easily verify that  $g(0) = g(1) = 0$ ,  $g''(\phi) < 0$ , and  $g'(\phi_{\max}) = 0$ , where  $\phi_{\max} = 1 - \tau_{\min}$ , and  $\tau_{\min}$  is defined in Lemma 2. Therefore we have  $\phi_{\max} = \arg \max g(\phi)$ . It then follows from equation (43) that  $C_t$  is a hump-shaped function of  $\phi_t$  for a given level of  $K_t$ . Then we immediately obtain the results in Lemma 3.

**Proof of Lemma 3:** Notice that  $\Psi(\phi) = \left( \frac{1-\phi}{\phi} \right) \cdot Y(\phi) \propto (1-\phi)\phi^{\frac{2\alpha-1}{1-\alpha}}$ . When  $\alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ , we know that  $(1-\phi)\phi^{\frac{2\alpha-1}{1-\alpha}}$  is decreasing in  $\phi$ . It is easy to check that  $\lim_{\phi \rightarrow 0} \Psi(\phi) = \infty$  and  $\lim_{\phi \rightarrow 1} \Psi(\phi) = 0$ . Hence equation (58) uniquely pins down the steady state  $\phi$  for any  $\bar{\Phi} > 0$ .

**Proof of Proposition 3:** The dynamical system with reputation is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \psi N_t^\gamma &= \frac{1}{C_t} (1 - \alpha) \phi_t \frac{Y_t}{N_t}, \\ \frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} &= \alpha \phi_t \frac{Y_t}{K_t} - \delta(u_t) - \rho, \\ \alpha \phi_t \frac{Y_t}{u_t K_t} &= \delta^0 u_t^\theta, \\ C_t + \dot{K}_t + C_t^e &= Y_t - \delta(u_t) K_t, \\ Y_t &= A(u_t K_t)^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}, \\ \phi_t &= \frac{Y_t}{\pi \Phi + Y_t}, \\ C_t^e &= (1 - \phi_t) Y_t, \end{aligned}$$

where  $\pi \equiv \frac{\rho e}{\lambda}$ . Denote  $s \equiv 1 - \frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}$ . Then some of the key ratios in the steady state can be obtained as

$$\begin{aligned}
k_y &= \frac{K}{Y} = \frac{\alpha\phi\theta}{\rho(1+\theta)}, \\
c_y &= \frac{C}{Y} = s\phi = \left(1 - \frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}\right)\phi, \\
N &= \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)\phi}{c_y} \cdot \frac{1}{\psi}\right]^{\frac{1}{1+\gamma}} = \left[\left(\frac{1-\alpha}{1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{\psi}\right]^{\frac{1}{1+\gamma}}, \\
Y &= A^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (k_y)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} N = A^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\alpha\phi\theta}{\rho(1+\theta)}\right]^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \left[\left(\frac{1-\alpha}{1-\frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{\psi}\right]^{\frac{1}{1+\gamma}}. \quad (\text{A.10})
\end{aligned}$$

We can use equation (58) to solve for the steady state  $\phi$  and use equation (A.10) to obtain the steady state  $Y$ . Consumption and capital can then be computed from  $C = c_y Y$  and  $K = k_y Y$ , respectively. The log-linearization of the system of equilibrium equations is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= \hat{\phi}_t + \hat{y}_t - (1+\gamma)\hat{n}_t - \hat{c}_t, \\
\dot{\hat{c}}_t &= \rho(\hat{\phi}_t + \hat{y}_t - \hat{k}_t), \\
\hat{y}_t &= \alpha(\hat{u}_t + \hat{k}_t) + (1-\alpha)\hat{n}_t, \\
\hat{u}_t &= \frac{1}{1+\theta}(\hat{\phi}_t + \hat{y}_t - \hat{k}_t), \\
\dot{\hat{k}}_t &= \left(\frac{s\phi}{k_y}\right)(\hat{\phi}_t + \hat{y}_t - \hat{k}_t) - \left(\frac{c_y}{k_y}\right)(\hat{c}_t - \hat{k}_t), \\
\hat{\phi}_t &= (1-\phi)\hat{y}_t \equiv \tau\hat{y}_t.
\end{aligned}$$

As in the baseline model, we can substitute out  $\hat{u}_t$  and  $\hat{\phi}_t$  to obtain a reduced form of output in terms of capital and labor as follows:

$$\hat{y}_t = \frac{\alpha\theta\hat{k}_t + (1+\theta)(1-\alpha)\hat{n}_t}{1+\theta - (1+\tau)\alpha} \equiv a\hat{k}_t + b\hat{n}_t,$$

where  $a \equiv \frac{\alpha\theta}{1+\theta-(1+\tau)\alpha}$  and  $b \equiv \frac{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)}{1+\theta-(1+\tau)\alpha}$ . We assume  $\tau < \frac{1+\theta}{\alpha} - 1$ , which is a reasonable restriction under standard calibrations, so that  $a > 0$  and  $b > 0$ . Finally  $\hat{n}_t$  can be expressed as a function of  $\hat{y}_t$  and  $\hat{c}_t$ , and thus we have

$$\hat{y}_t = \frac{a(1+\gamma)}{1+\gamma - b(1+\tau)}\hat{k}_t - \frac{b}{1+\gamma - b(1+\tau)}\hat{c}_t \equiv \lambda_1\hat{k}_t + \lambda_2\hat{c}_t,$$

where  $\lambda_1 \equiv \frac{\alpha(1+\gamma)}{1+\gamma-b(1+\tau)}$  and  $\lambda_2 \equiv -\frac{b}{1+\gamma-b(1+\tau)}$ . Consequently the local dynamics is characterized by the following differential equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{bmatrix} \dot{\hat{k}}_t \\ \dot{\hat{c}}_t \end{bmatrix} &= \delta \begin{bmatrix} \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi}\right) s\phi(1+\tau)\lambda_1 & \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi}\right) [s\phi(1+\tau)\lambda_2 - (1-s\phi)] \\ \theta[(1+\tau)\lambda_1 - 1] & \theta(1+\tau)\lambda_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_t \\ \hat{c}_t \end{bmatrix}, \\ &\equiv J \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_t \\ \hat{c}_t \end{bmatrix}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $s \equiv 1 - \frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}$ ,  $c_y = s\phi$ , and  $\delta = \rho/\theta$ . The local dynamics around the steady state is determined by the roots of  $J$ . Notice that the trace and the determinant of  $J$  are

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Trace}(J)}{\delta} &= \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha}\right) s(1+\tau)\lambda_1 + \theta(1+\tau)\lambda_2 < 0, \\ \frac{\text{Det}(J)}{\delta^2\theta\left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi}\right)} &= s\phi(1+\tau)\lambda_2 + (1-s\phi)(1+\tau)\lambda_1 - (1-s\phi) > 0. \end{aligned}$$

Similar to the analysis of the indeterminacy for our baseline model, here  $\text{Trace}(J) < 0$  if and only if  $\tau > \tau_{\min} \equiv \frac{(1+\theta)(1+\gamma)}{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)+\alpha(1+\gamma)} - 1$ . Given that  $\tau > \tau_{\min}$ , some algebraic manipulation shows that  $\text{Det}(J) > 0$  if and only if  $\tau < \frac{1+\theta}{\alpha} - 1$ , and

$$A_1\tau^2 - A_2\tau - A_3 < 0,$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} A_1 &\equiv s(1+\theta)(2+\alpha+\alpha\gamma) > 0 \\ A_2 &\equiv (1+\theta)(1+\alpha\gamma) - s[(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)(1-\gamma) + (1+\gamma)\alpha] \\ A_3 &\equiv (1+\theta)(1-\alpha)[s + (1-s)\gamma] > 0. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore  $A_1\tau^2 - A_2\tau - A_3 < 0$  if and only if  $\tau < \tau_H$ , where  $\tau_H$  is the positive solution to  $A_1\tau^2 - A_2\tau - A_3 = 0$ .

**Proof of Corollary 4:** Combining Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 immediately yields the desired result.

**Proof of Lemma 4:** First, using the implicit function theorem, equation (67) suggests that  $\frac{\partial q^*}{\partial Y} > 0$ . Second, since  $TFP = \Gamma(q^*)A$ , it is obvious that  $\frac{\partial TFP}{\partial q^*} > 0$ . Then using the chain rule gives  $\frac{\partial TFP}{\partial Y} = \left(\frac{\partial TFP}{\partial q^*}\right) \left(\frac{\partial q^*}{\partial Y}\right) > 0$ .

**Proof of Proposition 4:** We immediately reach the proposition by observing equation (69).

**Proof of Proposition 5:** First, given the power distribution, *i.e.*,  $F(q) = q^\eta$ , we can analytically obtain the dynamical system, and then easily verify the uniqueness of the steady state. It remains for us to pin down the indeterminacy region. To establish the conditions for indeterminacy, we first log-linearize the equilibrium equations. Substituting out  $\hat{u}_t$  from the log-linearized equation (24), we obtain

$$\hat{y}_t = a\hat{k}_t + b\hat{n}_t,$$

where  $a = \frac{\theta\alpha(1+\sigma)}{1+\theta-\alpha(1+\sigma)}$  and  $b = \frac{(1+\theta)(1-\alpha)(1+\sigma)}{1+\theta-\alpha(1+\sigma)}$ . Finally, expressing  $\hat{n}_t$  from the log-linearized equation (22), we obtain

$$\hat{y}_t = \lambda_1\hat{k}_t + \lambda_2\hat{c}_t,$$

where  $\lambda_1 \equiv \frac{a(1+\gamma)}{1+\gamma-b}$  and  $\lambda_2 \equiv -\frac{a}{1+\gamma-b}$ . We hence obtain a two-dimensional system of differential equations

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{bmatrix} \dot{\hat{k}}_t \\ \dot{\hat{c}}_t \end{bmatrix} &= \delta \begin{bmatrix} \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi} - 1\right)\lambda_1 & \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi}\right)(\lambda_2 - 1) + 1 - \lambda_2 \\ \theta(\lambda_1 - 1) & \theta\lambda_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_t \\ \hat{c}_t \end{bmatrix} \\ &\equiv J \begin{bmatrix} \hat{k}_t \\ \hat{c}_t \end{bmatrix}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $\delta = \rho/\theta$ . The local dynamics around the steady state is determined by the roots of  $J$ . The trace and the determinant of  $J$  are

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Trace}(J)}{\delta} &= \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi} - 1\right)\lambda_1 + \theta\lambda_2 = \frac{\left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi} - 1\right)(1+\gamma)a - \theta b}{1+\gamma-b}, \\ \frac{\det(J)}{\delta^2\theta} &= \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi} - 1\right)(\lambda_1 - 1 + \lambda_2) = \left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi} - 1\right) \left[ \frac{(1+\gamma)(a-1)}{1+\gamma-b} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Indeterminacy arises if  $\text{Trace}(J) < 0$  and  $\det(J) > 0$ . Under the assumption  $a < 1$ , or  $\alpha(1+\sigma) < 1$ ,  $\det(J) > 0$  is equivalent to  $1+\gamma-b > 0$ , or  $\sigma > \sigma_{\min} \equiv \left(\frac{1}{\frac{1-\alpha}{1+\gamma} + \frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}}\right) - 1$ . Then  $\text{Trace}(J) < 0$  requires  $\left(\frac{1+\theta}{\alpha\phi} - 1\right)(1+\gamma)a > \theta b$ . Rearranging terms yields the requirement,  $\frac{(1+\sigma)\eta}{1+\eta} < \frac{1}{\frac{1-\alpha}{1+\gamma} + \frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}}$ . Recall that  $\sigma = \frac{1-\zeta}{\eta}$ , and thus  $\frac{(1+\sigma)\eta}{1+\eta} = \frac{1+\eta-\zeta}{1+\eta} < 1 < \frac{1}{\frac{1-\alpha}{1+\gamma} + \frac{\alpha}{1+\theta}}$ . Therefore the above requirement is automatically satisfied.

**Proof of Lemma 5:** Equation (75) can be rewritten as

$$\frac{\int_0^{q_t^*} q dF(q) R_{ft}}{f(q_t^*)} \frac{R_{ft}}{q_t^*} = - (R_{ft}q_t^* - 1) \frac{d \log(q_t^*)}{d \log(R_{ft})}. \quad (\text{A.11})$$

If  $F(q) = q^\eta$  for  $q \in (0, 1)$ , then  $f(q) = \eta q^{\eta-1}$ , and thus

$$\int_0^{q^*} q dF(q) = \int_0^{q^*} \eta q^\eta dq = \frac{\eta}{\eta+1} (q^*)^{\eta+1}. \quad (\text{A.12})$$

Therefore equation (A.11) can be simplified to

$$\frac{R_{ft}q_t^*}{\eta+1} = \frac{R_{ft}q_t^* - 1}{\zeta}, \quad (\text{A.13})$$

which yields the desired equation (76).



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