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### ESTIMATING HABIT FORMATION IN VOTING

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### **ABSTRACT**

We estimate habit formation in voting—the effect of past on current turnout—by exploiting transitory voting cost shocks. Using county-level data on U.S. presidential elections from 1952-2012, we find that precipitation on current and past election days reduces voter turnout. Our estimates imply that a 1-point decrease in past turnout lowers current turnout by 0.7-0.9 points. Consistent with a dynamic extension of the Downsian framework, current precipitation has stronger effects following previous rainy elections. Further analyses suggest that this habit formation operates by reinforcing the intrinsic satisfaction associated with voting.

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### 1 Introduction

Voter turnout is persistent: a citizen who votes today is more likely to vote in the future (Brody and Sniderman 1977). Although this pattern is widespread, its mechanisms are poorly understood. On the one hand, an individual may repeat her decision to turn out or abstain because her benefits and costs of voting are stable over time. On the other, persistence in turnout may be due to habit formation, in which the mere act of voting today increases the likelihood of future voting, holding constant voters' characteristics. Distinguishing habit formation from turnout persistence in general is critical for the design of policies aimed at boosting political participation. A large degree of habit formation could alter the cost-benefit analysis of voter participation programs such as get-out-thevote campaigns, mandatory voting, paid election days, and improved access to polls. Furthermore, evidence of habit formation as an important source of turnout persistence would inform the relative impacts such programs have on citizens of different ages.<sup>1</sup>

Despite these important consequences, efforts to empirically disentangle habit formation from other channels of persistence have met difficulty, for at least two reasons. First, the task requires a source of variation in turnout that is uncorrelated with other baseline determinants of the voting decision. Second, even if such variation exists, it can identify habit formation only if it has no direct effect on the future determinants of voter turnout. We address this empirical challenge by exploiting unexpected and transitory shocks to voting costs due to precipitation on election day. Following previous studies documenting that rain decreases turnout (Gomez et al. 2007; Hansford and Gomez 2010; Fraga and Hersh 2011), our test for habit formation amounts to asking whether election-day precipitation decreases voter turnout not only in the current election but also during future elections. Because precipitation on election day affects future turnout *only* through its impact on current voting, we are able to isolate the effect of habit formation. Our main estimates imply that a 1 percentage point decrease in past turnout lowers current turnout by 0.7-0.9 percentage points.

To ground the analysis conceptually, we present a theoretical framework for habit formation based on a dynamic extension of the Downsian "calculus of voting" model. In the framework, precipitation is a transitory shock to the cost of voting, propagated through time because the current

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Taking this argument even further, Lodge and Birch (2012) propose to "make electoral participation compulsory for first-time voters only", since "introducing an obligation for new electors to turn out once would ... go a significant way toward breaking the habit of non-voting" and "could have a substantial and lasting impact on turnout."

turnout decision affects the utility of voting in future elections. We use the framework to clarify what is required to identify habit formation, and we discuss why election-day precipitation fits such requirements, not only because it is orthogonal to voters' characteristics, but also because it is unexpected (not leading voters and other agents to adapt their behavior prior to election day) and transitory (affecting current but not future voting costs).

Matching daily weather data with county-level U.S. presidential election returns from 1952 to 2012, we find that both current and lagged election-day precipitation reduce voter turnout. All our models include year fixed effects, county fixed effects, and county-specific trends, allaying concerns about unobserved heterogeneity or confounding trends. We provide a series of robustness and falsification tests in support of our interpretation that the effect of lagged rainfall is due to habit formation. First, turnout shows no relation to precipitation on the day of the next presidential election. Second, turnout shows no relation to precipitation two weeks after both the current and previous election day. These results strengthen our claim that only precipitation that fell precisely on the previous election day matters. Third, the effects of both current and lagged precipitation are stronger in rural areas, where the costs of inclement weather are likely greater.

Because our analysis is conducted at the county level, our estimates may incorporate both the individual effect of habit formation and any additional effects due to social interactions between elections. Indeed, a comparison of our results with existing estimates of (individual) persistence in voting behavior suggests a county-level social multiplier (Glaeser and Scheinkman 2002) as large as 0.4, implying that for every percentage point increase in turnout resulting from individual habit formation, county average turnout rises 1.4 percentage points. We check the plausibility of this social multiplier following the approach of Glaeser et al. (2003): by running ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of current on past turnout at different levels of aggregation. The OLS results imply a social multiplier of the same magnitude, which—identification concerns notwithstanding—lends plausibility to our main results.

We further explore the mechanisms driving habit formation in voting decisions, testing an additional prediction from our theoretical framework: that past shocks to the cost of voting increase the sensitivity of voter turnout to current cost shocks. Indeed, our results show that precipitation has a greater effect on current turnout if the previous election was rainy. Drawing on several additional analyses, we also argue that our main result is unlikely to be driven by persistent changes in voting costs (including automatic de-registration of non-voters), by updates to voters' beliefs about their probability of being pivotal, or by changes in voters' preferences over election outcomes. As a consequence, the results suggest that past voting experiences reinforce the expressive utility citizens gain from the act of voting: that is to say, the consumption benefit of voting.

By documenting habit formation in voting, the paper relates to three strands in the literature. First, a large number of studies document that individuals who voted in the past are more likely to vote in the future, suggesting that this association reflects habit formation (e.g., Brody and Sniderman 1977; Plutzer 2002). However, these studies typically do not attempt to disentangle habit formation from persistence in the costs and benefits of voting.<sup>2</sup> Notable exceptions include Gerber et al. (2003) and Meredith (2009), who exploit plausibly exogenous variation in past voting to identify the persistent effects of shocks to turnout. Gerber et al. carry out a randomized get-out-the-vote intervention, while Meredith implements a regression discontinuity design based on age thresholds for voter eligibility. We discuss these results in the context of our conceptual framework, highlighting that they require additional assumptions—which do not necessarily hold—to be interpreted as evidence of habit formation.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, both treatments may directly affect the determinants of future turnout even if an individual did not vote in the current election. We explain why the assumptions are more natural in the case of a transitory and unexpected shock in the cost of voting, such as precipitation.

Second, the paper speaks to the literature on the formation of political preferences generally, especially research establishing how actions feed back into tastes and beliefs.<sup>4</sup> Also exploiting daily precipitation, Madestam et al. (2013) and Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott (2011) use rainfall on Tax Day and Independence Day to estimate the effect of participating in Tea Party protests and independence day celebrations on political preferences and behavior.<sup>5</sup> Other shocks also have

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ Two papers address this issue using instrumental variables methods that rely on debatable identifying assumptions. Using a panel of voters, Green and Shachar (2000) estimate models where past turnout affects current turnout, including a specification where past turnout is predicted using lagged demographic controls and opinions. Denny and Doyle (2009) estimate similar models using the number of locations a respondent lived while age 16-23 as an instrument for voting in their first eligible election.

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$ Franklin and Hoboldt (2011) show that European voters whose first eligible election is a (low-turnout) European Parliament election are less likely to vote in subsequent national elections, and Atkinson and Fowler (2013) report that the occurrence of saint's day fiestas depress turnout in both current and future Mexican elections. Similarly to Gerber et al. and Meredith, these papers require additional assumptions to justify a habit formation interepretion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Another relevant series of papers tests for habit formation in consumption (Heien and Durham 1991; Dynan 2000).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Other authors have used weather shocks to estimate the effect of race riots on urban development in the U.S. (Collins and Margo 2007) and of political protests on policy changes in France (Huet-Vaughn 2013).

persistent effects; for example, Kaplan and Mukand (2011) show that citizens registered to vote short after the September 11, 2001 are more likely to be registered as Republicans even half a decade after the terrorist attacks. In research that speaks to possible psychological mechanisms underlying our results, Mullainathan and Washington (2009) show that the act of voting for a candidate leads to improved opinions of that candidate, consistent with cognitive dissonance theory. Many of their arguments regarding the choice of candidate can apply to our study of the turnout decision.

Third, and perhaps more importantly, our results add empirical evidence to a recent theoretical literature exploring aggregate turnout when past voting experiences influence future voter participation. Building on an earlier paper by Kanazawa (1998), Bendor et al. (2003) model the behavior of voters who guide their turnout with rules of thumb over past turnout decisions and election outcomes. Their model predicts substantial equilibrium turnout, even in large electorates, thus providing a potential solution to the paradox that citizens vote in large numbers despite having little chance of individually swinging the election. While our framework differs from their model (which does not include a "calculus of voting"), our results corroborate some assumptions in their theory. Given our focus on the development of voting habits, our results lend particular support to Fowler's (2006) extension of their theory to incorporate habitual voters who always turn out. These theories offer a promising direction toward the understanding of mass voter turnout, which social scientists have so far struggled to explain (see Feddersen 2004), even going so far as to call it "the paradox that ate rational choice" (Fiorina 1990). Our documentation of habit formation in voting provides an empirical basis for that theoretical project.

# 2 Motivation: Age Patterns in Voting

To motivate our interest in habit formation, Figure 1 displays U.S. federal election turnout as a function of age using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Voter Supplement, 1980-2010. The figure presents two panels, one including all ages from 18 to 80 and one focusing on the first decade of voter eligibility. Both panels plot age-specific means and local linear regressions with bandwidths of 2 years. Two aspects of the age patterns are suggestive of habit formation.

In Panel A, which spans the lifecycle, turnout increases monotonically in age through the late 60s, at which point it gradually declines, perhaps due to the onset of old-age disability. This pattern is striking because the opportunity cost of time—wages, employment, childrearing—follows a similar age profile. Hence, over most of the lifecycle, turnout increases with age despite a rising cost of voting.<sup>6</sup> The natural implication is that the perceived benefits of voting increase with age more rapidly than does the opportunity cost of time. Although this rising perceived benefit of voting has several potential explanations, habit formation may play an important role.

In fact, one can glean some evidence of habit formation from these age profiles alone. To highlight this evidence, Panel B of Figure 1 zooms in on ages 18-27, separating the scatter plot by previous presidential election eligibility.<sup>7</sup> The scatter plots display clear jumps in turnout from age 19 to age 20 in midterm elections and from age 21 to age 22 in presidential elections, exactly matching the age pattern of eligibility for one previous presidential election. Similar jumps are evident at the age cutoffs for eligibility for two previous presidential elections: 24 in midterm elections and 26 in presidential elections. The four jumps average 2.1 (S.E. = 0.7) percentage points. Since presidential elections tend to involve high turnout, these discontinuous increases in age-specific turnout suggest habit formation: past voting experiences increase the likelihood of future voting. The evidence is similar to that of Meredith (2009), who studies age patterns in voting using more finely-grained age data from California. However, as we discuss below, although it *suggests* habit formation, it requires additional assumptions—which may fail to hold—to be interpreted as the effect of past eligibility for the per se.

# 3 Habit Formation in a Downsian Framework

We consider habit formation in a dynamic extension to the "calculus of voting" framework of Downs (1957), Tullock (1967), and Riker and Ordershook (1968, 1973). Citizen *i* has probability  $P_{it}$  of being the pivotal voter in period *t*'s election: with probability  $P_{it}$ , her preferred candidate wins if and only if she votes. She obtains benefit  $B_{it}$  if her preferred candidate wins the election in period *t*, regardless of whether she voted, and also enjoys direct utility  $D_{it}$  from the act of voting, regardless of the election outcome. The product  $P_{it}B_{it}$  is commonly known as the "instrumental utility" of voting, representing the expected policy payoff from the act of voting. In contrast,  $D_{it}$  is known

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>One possibility is that voters learn how to minimize the costs of voting—faster transportation to the polls, more practical times to vote—as they age. But this argument is difficult to square with the fact that turnout rises with age even in late middle age, when individuals have been eligible to vote for more than two decades.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>All birth cohorts in Figure 1, Panel B, became eligible to vote at age 18 under the 26<sup>th</sup> Amendment of 1971.

as the "expressive utility" of voting, representing intrinsic satisfaction or "warm glow" (Andreoni 1989) from carrying out a civic duty. The citizen incurs cost  $C_{it}$  from voting, also regardless of the election outcome. All four terms are positive, so she votes if and only if:<sup>8</sup>

$$P_{it}B_{it} + D_{it} \ge C_{it} \tag{1}$$

Denote the voting decision as  $V_{it}$ , which equals 1 if the citizen votes, 0 otherwise.

#### 3.1 Identifying Habit Formation

For our purposes, "habit formation" means that the act of voting today, holding constant voters' characteristics, affects voting decisions in the future. Our central contribution is to separate "habit formation" from "persistence" in general, which can be explained by serial correlation in the benefits and costs of voting. For instance, those with constantly high levels of  $B_{it}$  or  $D_{it}$  turn out often, while those with low levels of these variables will rarely vote. A regression of current turnout on its lagged values is thus a poor test of habit formation, since persistent unobserved heterogeneity may explain any serial correlation in voting.

To identify whether  $V_{i,t-1}$  affects  $V_{it}$ , we wish to take advantage of a *transitory* lagged shock  $\xi_{i,t-1}$  to one of the terms of the model. The shock must satisfy:

$$\{P_{it}, B_{it}, D_{it}, C_{it}\} | V_{i,t-1} \bot \xi_{i,t-1}$$
(2)

which states that, conditional on the voting decision in period t - 1, the shock is independent of  $P_{it}$ ,  $B_{it}$ ,  $D_{it}$ , and  $C_{it}$ . Assumption (2) is similar in spirit to the exclusion restriction in a standard instrumental variables setup, implying that  $\xi_{i,t-1}$  affects period t voting only through its effect on period t - 1 voting and not by directly affecting  $P_{it}$ ,  $B_{it}$ ,  $D_{it}$ , or  $C_{it}$ . Under this assumption, an association between  $\xi_{i,t-1}$  and  $V_{it}$  provides reduced-form evidence of habit formation.

Note that even if  $\xi_{it}$  is independent of the baseline benefits and costs of voting before the realization of the shock, it may not satisfy assumption (2). For example, consider a randomized intervention that encouraged citizens to vote in period t - 1. Randomization guarantees that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Technically, the citizen is indifferent between voting and abstaining when expression (1) holds with equality. To simplify the exposition, we assume throughout that the citizen votes in this situation.

intervention is independent of baseline benefits and costs. But depending on its nature, the intervention may directly influence a citizen's sense of civic duty or cost of voting for many periods into the future. In this case,  $\xi_{it}$  affects  $V_{i,t+1}$ , but not necessarily solely through  $V_{it}$ .

Two important contributions to the literature on voting persistence fit this characterization. In the first, Green et al. (2003) report the results of a randomized trial of a get-out-the-vote (direct mail and canvassing) campaign conducted in New Haven, CT, prior to the general election of 1998. They find higher turnout in the treatment group in both the 1998 general election and the 1999 local election, which they interpret as the effect of habit formation. However, in our framework, this interpretation requires the assumption that the campaign had no direct lasting effect on the benefits or costs of voting. Although plausible, this assumption is far from certain. For example, if the campaign raised voters' perceived benefit of voting, and this effect lasted more than a year, then assumption (2) would be violated. A similar logic applies to Meredith (2009), who uses data from California to compare the voting behavior of those whose  $18^{th}$  birthday was just before the 2000 general election to those who turned 18 just after. This approach is similar to ours in Figure 1, Panel B, except that it uses more finely-grained age data on a less generalizable sample. Meredith estimates that those barely eligible to vote in 2000 are more likely to vote in 2004, which he wishes to interpret as evidence that past voter participation affects current voter participation. But this interpretation requires the assumption that experiencing a presidential campaign while eligible to vote has no persistent direct effects on a citizen's tastes and costs. Here again, the assumption is debatable. As Meredith notes, citizens who know they will be eligible to vote may pay more attention to media coverage and campaign messages than those who know they will not be eligible. Because those turning 18 around election day are likely to be high school students, they may also pay more attention to school-based efforts to increase civic engagement. If exposure to these sources of information has persistent effects on the perceived benefits and costs of voting, then assumption (2) is violated.

As an alternative approach to identifying habit formation in voting, we exploit a transitory shock to the cost of voting: election-day precipitation. Four important characteristics of this shock justify our choice. First, as we show below (and as previous research has established), precipitation reduces contemporaneous voter turnout. Second, it is outside of the control of voters, candidates, or any other political agent and is orthogonal to the baseline benefits and costs of voting, before the realization of the shock. Third, it is transient and thus affects contemporaneous voting costs without having a direct effect on future voting costs. Fourth, net of the year fixed effects, county fixed effects, and county-specific trends we include in our econometric model (see Section 5 for details), the remaining variation in precipitation is extremely difficult to predict long in advance. Given this difficulty, voters and candidates are unlikely to modify their behavior leading up to an election in anticipation of a precipitation shock. We emphasize this point in light of our discussion of Meredith's (2009) results: if a shock to voting costs can be predicted well in advance, voters may adapt their consumption of political information in the period leading up to the election, which may lead to a violation of assumption (2).

At the same time, we note a potential exclusion restriction violation in the case of precipitation. The unpleasantness of voting on a rainy day may influence the affective state that voters associate with the act of voting. In this case, the positive act of voting on a rainy day (rather than the negative act of *not* voting on a rainy day) may reduce future voting propensity, so that an effect of lagged precipitation does not imply habit formation. However, this hypothesis requires that voters fail to fully attribute the unpleasantness to bad weather and instead (partially) ascribe it to voting. Given that most voters have experienced many rainy days in the past, such error is likely to be minimal.

#### 3.2 Modeling Habit Formation

Although the mere identification of habit formation is our central contribution, we also propose and test a specific mechanism through which it occurs. Specifically, we hypothesize that habit formation operates primarily through the accumulation of the expressive utility of voting. In a setup similar to Becker and Murphy's addictive goods model (1988), we specify  $D_{it}$  as a stock variable that increases with past acts of voting:

$$D_{it} = D_{i,t-1} + \alpha V_{i,t-1} \tag{3}$$

where  $\alpha > 0$  captures the extent to which past acts of voting increase the utility flow from future acts of voting.<sup>9</sup> A possible psychological micro-foundation for equation (3) is cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957). In our context, this theory implies that a citizen would adapt her tastes regarding the importance of voting to create a consonance between actions and preferences: the act

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>A richer model could also incorporate the effects of past voting on  $P_{it}$ ,  $B_{it}$ , and  $C_{it}$ , leading to other channels through which habit formation may occur. In Section 8, we present evidence supporting our focus on  $D_{it}$ .

of voting would cause her to think that voting is a valuable contribution and an important duty.<sup>10</sup> A citizen enters the electorate with initial value  $D_{i0}$ , drawn from a population distribution; later values of  $D_{it}$  reflect her stock of civic duty or attachment to the democratic process, which is endogenous to past acts of voting. If changes in  $P_{it}$ ,  $B_{it}$ , and  $C_{it}$  from t - 1 to t are unrelated to the voting decision in t - 1, then this accumulation in  $D_{it}$  implies that the act of voting in period t - 1 increases the likelihood of voting in period t.

To draw attention to the accumulation framework's implications for our empirical work, we focus on its predictions for voter behavior following cost shocks. These predictions require a slightly more precise setup. To this end, let  $\xi_{it}$  be a cost shock on  $[0, \overline{\xi}]$ , and let  $\tilde{C}_{it}$  be the cost of voting prior to the cost shock, so that  $C_{it} = \tilde{C}_{it} + \xi_{it}$ . Combining terms, let  $\tilde{U}_{it} = P_{it}B_{it} + D_{it} - \tilde{C}_{it}$  be the baseline utility from voting, before the realization of the cost shock. Assume that  $\xi_{it}$  is independent of  $\tilde{U}_{it}$  and that changes in  $P_{it}$ ,  $B_{it}$ , and  $C_{it}$  do not depend on  $V_{is}$  for s < t. Within this setup, we highlight three testable predictions.

The first prediction—which follows directly from our assumption of  $D_{it}$  depending on past turnout—is that current and past cost shocks negatively affect turnout. To see this, note that a citizen votes if and only if  $\tilde{U}_{it} \geq \xi_{it}$ . Some citizens are infra-marginal; those with  $\tilde{U}_{it} < 0$  will never vote in period t or in any period thereafter, while those with  $\tilde{U}_{it} \geq \bar{\xi}$  are sure to vote in period t and for all subsequent periods. We refer to these citizens as *never-voters* and *alwaysvoters*, respectively. But so long as marginal citizens exist—i.e., so long as  $\tilde{U}_{it} \in [0, \bar{\xi})$  for some citizens—then  $\Pr[V_{it} = 1|\xi_{it}, \xi_{i,t-1}]$  decreases in  $\xi_{it}$ . Furthermore, because voting in period t - 1increases  $D_{it}$ ,  $\Pr[V_{it} = 1|\xi_{it}, \xi_{i,t-1}]$  also decreases in  $\xi_{i,t-1}$ . As a result, the framework implies that both current and lagged precipitation decrease voter turnout.

The framework also gives rise to a second prediction, involving the interaction of current and lagged cost shocks: a higher draw of  $\xi_{i,t-1}$  increases the sensitivity of  $\Pr[V_{it} = 1 | \xi_{it}, \xi_{i,t-1}]$  to  $\xi_{it}$ . To establish this result, we focus on citizens who are marginal in period t-1, with  $\tilde{U}_{i,t-1} \in [0, \overline{\xi}]$ . For a citizen of this type, a sufficiently large cost shock  $\xi_{i,t-1}$  keeps her from voting in period t-1, so that in the following period,  $\tilde{U}_{it}$  is smaller than it would have been following a rain-free election. As a result, the minimum cost shock required to keep the citizen from voting in period t is smaller

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$ Mullainathan and Washington (2009) also study the role of cognitive dissonance in voting, but they focus on the choice of candidate, instead of the turnout choice.

than it would have been following a rain-free election. In other words, large shocks prevent marginal individuals from becoming less marginal in the next election. So the framework predicts that larger lagged precipitation shocks make turnout more sensitive to current precipitation shocks.

A third prediction, which matches Figure 1 but is not relevant to our main empirical work below, is that turnout rises with age if the distributions of  $P_{it}$ ,  $B_{it}$ , and  $\tilde{C}_{it}$  are stationary. Citizens who are marginal in period 0—i.e., those with  $\tilde{U}_{i0} \in [0, \bar{\xi})$ —will gradually become always-voters in subsequent periods, while those who are initially infra-marginal will remain infra-marginal in all periods. Hence, the framework provides one explanation for why the young vote less than the old. Even so, it is unlikely to be the sole explanation. In Figure 1, turnout rises with age even across ages that do not differ in exposure to federal elections: for instance, 18 and 19 year-olds. 19 year-olds are more likely to vote than 18 year-olds even though citizens of both ages have been exposed to exactly one federal election. While these youths may differ in exposure to local elections, other factors may also play a role in their different turnout rates.

Throughout this discussion, we have assumed that  $D_{it}$  does not depreciate over time. One can incorporate depreciation by rewriting equation (3) as  $D_{it} = (1 - \delta) D_{i,t-1} + \alpha V_{i,t-1}$ , where  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ is the depreciation rate. This modification does not change the framework's main prediction: that turnout decreases in both current and past cost shocks. But it does complicate the second and third predictions above, regarding the interaction of current and past cost shocks and the age profile of turnout. Both these predictions hold, however, if the depreciation rate  $\delta$  is sufficiently small relative to the habit formation coefficient  $\alpha$ .

### 4 Data

Implementation of our empirical strategy requires consideration of spatial scales when combining weather and voting turnout data. Mid-latitude precipitation systems, as observed over the United States, can have characteristic lengths anywhere between 2 and 1,000 km. Thus, the spatial shapes of precipitation systems do not fit naturally onto political boundaries. This insight yields three particular requirements for our data. First, the turnout data must be at the lowest political unit available, to reduce measurement error in the spatially-averaged precipitation variable. Second, the pixel resolution of the raw precipitation data must be fine enough to guarantee that most political units cover at least one pixel. Finally, because daily precipitation may be spatially correlated, the precipitation data must have the broadest geographical coverage, to guarantee a sufficient number of independent observations for a given day.

For politics data, we use county-level presidential election returns for the years 1952-2012 to generate two variables of interest: voter turnout, which we define as the ratio of votes to eligible voters, and the Republican vote share.<sup>11</sup> For weather, we acquire data with the highest spatial and temporal resolution available for the continental United States. Daily precipitation data for the continental United States for days before, on, and after election day from 1948-2012 come from the NOAA Climate Prediction Center's Unified Gauge-Based Analysis of Precipitation. This source provides pixel-level data at a 0.25 degree by 0.25 degree (or roughly 17 mile by 17 mile) resolution, which we aggregate to the county level using area weights.<sup>12</sup> In addition to data on politics and weather, we also draw on several county demographic and socio-economic covariates from the U.S. Census: racial composition, age structure, median income, and population density.<sup>13</sup>

Table 1 provides means, standard deviations, and several quantiles for the variables in our analysis. Voter turnout averages at 58 percent, with a fairly symmetric distribution ranging from a  $10^{th}$  percentile of 42 to a  $90^{th}$  percentile of 76. The Republican vote share, too, is fairly symmetrically distributed around a mean of 55. In contrast, the precipitation distribution is right-skewed, with a median of 0, a mean of 2.5 millimeters, and a  $90^{th}$  percentile of 7.1 millimeters.<sup>14</sup> Elections are therefore usually free of precipitation, and when precipitation does occur, it is typically minor.

# 5 Empirical Strategy

In our main regression specification, we estimate turnout as a function of current and lagged electionday precipitation, a year fixed effect, a county fixed effect, and a county-specific linear time trend.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>We obtained county-level vote totals for 1948-2000 from James Snyder, which we supplemented for years 2004-2012 using David Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. We obtained estimates of the number of eligible voters from Genzkow et al. (2011) for the years 1952-2004, which we supplemented with our own estimates using similar methods (based on interpolated data from the U.S. Decennial Census) for the years 2008 and 2012. Because the denominator of the turnout rate is estimated with error, estimated turnout rises above 100 in 0.24% of the observations. We include these observations in the reported analyses, but the results are unchanged if we omit them or top-code turnout at 100.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>We validated our constructed weather data against historic weather station data from Weather Underground. Results are similar if we use deviations from long-term norms rather than levels.

 $<sup>^{13}\</sup>mathrm{We}$  obtained these covariates from Haines (2010) and the website http://quickfacts.census.gov/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>The American Meteorological Society (http://glossary.ametsoc.or/wiki/rain) defines rain as "light" when it falls at a rate of 2.5 millimeters per hour or less and "heavy" when it falls at a rate of more than 7.6 millimeters per hour.

For county c in election year t:

$$turnout_{ct} = \beta_0 precip_{ct} + \beta_1 precip_{c,t-1} + \tau_t + \eta_c + \lambda_c t + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

$$\tag{4}$$

Note that t - 1 corresponds to the previous election, four years earlier. To assess the robustness of this specification, we perform three checks. First, we gauge the sensitivity of the coefficients on election-day precipitation to the inclusion of the vector of covariates listed in the bottom panel of Table 1, and to the inclusion of higher-order county-specific trends. Second, we run placebo tests by including measures of precipitation two weeks after election day, as well as precipitation on future election days. Third, we verify the stability of the results to outliers by using subsamples that omit all observations from a single state or a single year.

In all analyses, we cluster standard errors at the state level, thus allowing for arbitrary error covariance across counties in a state over any period of time.<sup>15</sup> A combination of two factors make this wide cluster definition appropriate. First, precipitation is spatially correlated. Second, both the design of the electoral college and the bundling of presidential and state-level elections induce correlated turnout incentives across counties within a state. To document these facts, we regress both turnout and precipitation on a year fixed effect, a county fixed effect, and a county-specific trend, and we map the residuals for an example year, 2004, in Figure 2. Precipitation residuals are clustered over large areas, while turnout residuals tend to cluster within state borders. Maps for other years, displayed in in Appendix Figure 1, show similar patterns.

This reduced-form regression is instructive, but our focus on habit formation leads to interest in identifying an auto-regressive model:

$$turnout_{ct} = \rho turnout_{c,t-1} + \nu_{ct} \tag{5}$$

As we discussed in Section 3.1, OLS regression does not identify this model. However, if we redefine the error term as  $\nu_{ct} \equiv \tau_t + \eta_c + c_i t + \varepsilon_{ct}$  (as in equation (4)), then we can use estimates of  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$  to compute an estimate of the causal parameter  $\rho$ :  $\hat{\rho} = \frac{\hat{\beta}_1}{\hat{\beta}_0}$  converges in probability to  $\rho$ .<sup>16</sup> This

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Our conclusions remain unchanged when we use Conley's (1999) non-parametric estimator for standard errors allowing for arbitrary spatial dependence in a 1500 km radius.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>One concern with this approach is that inter-county migration may bias downward  $\hat{\beta}_1$  and  $\hat{\rho}$ . Molloy et al. (2011) report 5-year cross-county migration rates of almost 20 percent, although over half of these flows are within-state.

ratio can be seen as an instrumental variables (IV) estimator for  $\rho$ , in which lagged precipitation serves as an instrument for lagged turnout. We estimate its variance using the delta method.

Two aspects of this estimator merit further discussion. First, as with other IV estimators, it requires the monotonicity assumption that turnout weakly decreases in precipitation for all units in our sample. If our unit of observation were the individual, this assumption might not hold. For individuals who enjoy outdoor leisure activities or work in industries like construction or tourism, the time cost of voting may fall on rainy days. Alternatively, individuals who particularly dislike congestion at the polls might vote only in rainy elections, which they anticipate will have low turnout. However, we study counties, not people, and the monotonicity assumption is more likely to hold at the county level. Second, our estimator does not necessarily identify the degree of habit formation at the individual level. In the presence of social interaction effects—for example if people speak to their neighbors about a positive voting experience—the aggregate  $\rho$  for the county may be larger than the individual-level habit formation parameter. We return to this issue when we discuss the magnitudes of our results in Section 7.

Building on the main regression specification, we also estimate two models with interactions. First, guided by the theory, we fit a model with the interaction of current and lagged precipitation:

$$turnout_{ct} = \beta_0 precip_{ct} + \beta_1 precip_{c,t-1} + \gamma precip_{ct} \cdot precip_{c,t-1} + \tau_t + \eta_c + \lambda_c t + \varepsilon_{ct}$$
(6)

The theoretical framework predicts that  $\gamma$  should be negative; lagged precipitation shocks increase the sensitivity of turnout to contemporaneous precipitation shocks. Second, we interact precipitation with county demographic and socio-economic characteristics,  $X_{ct}$ :

$$turnout_{ct} = \beta_0 precip_{ct} + \beta_1 precip_{c,t-1} + X'_{ct}\theta + precip_{ct}X'_{ct}\gamma_0 + precip_{c,t-1}X'_{ct}\gamma_1 + \tau_t + \eta_c + \lambda_c t + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

$$(7)$$

The theory does not have specific predictions for these interactions, but they are instructive for assessing which citizens respond to precipitation and which citizens are habit forming.

Because counties in the same state share weather patterns, we expect little bias from migration. Indeed, when we run our regressions at the state level instead of the county level, our conclusions do not change.

### 6 Results

This section presents our main findings. We first demonstrate that precipitation on election day adversely affects contemporaneous voter turnout. This result is robust to a number of modeling choices and placebo tests. Next, we show that precipitation on election day has a strong persistent effect on turnout in subsequent presidential elections, and we confirm the framework's prediction that contemporaneous and lagged precipitation interact. To conclude the section, we explore how the effects of contemporaneous and lagged precipitation vary across several demographic characteristics.

#### 6.1 Effect of Contemporaneous Precipitation on Turnout

For the equivalent of a "first stage" estimate, Table 2 focuses on the contemporaneous effect of election-day precipitation on voter turnout. In Column (1), we estimate equation (4) with no lags and find a statistically significant coefficient implying that a 1 millimeter increase in precipitation decreases voter turnout by 0.07 percentage points. Column (2) shows that the linear model used in Column (1) is reasonable by estimating a semi-parametric model using dummy variables for increasing bins of precipitation. With just one exception, each successive increase in precipitation is associated with a further decrease in turnout. Relative to the omitted category of 0 millimeters, an intense election-day storm with rainfall totaling more than 20 millimeters causes turnout to fall by 2 percentage points.

As a falsification exercise, we test whether precipitation before and after election day affected election turnout. In Column (3), we include linear terms for the precipitation 7 and 14 days before and after election day. Among these four terms, precipitation 14 days after election day provides the cleanest placebo test, for two reasons. First, precipitation before election day can in theory affect turnout; afterward, it cannot. Second, counties with large areas may experience the same precipitation system within a one week period as precipitation migrates over the county. This lag structure may induce significant estimates for placebo tests close to election day, given the nonlinearity of precipitation systems. Despite this feature of the data, all four placebo coefficients are substantially smaller and less significant than the main effect. Three are statistically insignificant, while precipitation one week after election day is marginally significant at the 8 percent level.<sup>17</sup> Overall,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>As mentioned above, the single significant placebo coefficient may be explained by the different spatial scales of precipitation systems and counties. In unreported analyses, we drop all counties with areas above 1000 sq. km. and

the evidence in Table 1 points to a robust effect of election-day precipitation on contemporaneous turnout. For conciseness (and the reasons we described above), we focus on the 14-days-after placebo check in subsequent analyses.

#### 6.2 Effect of Lagged Precipitation on Turnout

Table 3 shows that the turnout effects of precipitation persist to future elections. Column (1) estimates equation (4), with both contemporaneous and lagged precipitation terms. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, with turnout falling 0.08 and 0.07 percentage points per millimeter of contemporaneous and lagged precipitation, respectively. This finding changes little with the addition of county-level covariates in column (2).<sup>18</sup> In both columns, the implied habit formation parameter  $\rho$  is roughly 0.9, implying that a 1 percentage point rise in period t-1 turnout increases period t turnout by 0.9 percentage points. This estimate of habit formation in voter turnout is substantially larger than existing estimates in the literature, a matter we discuss in Section 7.

The implied habit formation coefficient changes similarly little in columns (3)-(6), which include various combinations of placebos, leads, and lags. As a placebo check, columns (3) and (4) add contemporaneous and lagged precipitation two weeks after election day to columns (1) and (2), respectively. Neither placebo is significantly associated with turnout, and the coefficients on election-day precipitation are little changed. In columns (5) and (6), we add the lead and second lag of election-day precipitation. The lead serves as another falsification exercise: future election-day precipitation does not affect current turnout. Also of interest is the coefficient on twice-lagged precipitation, which is significantly negative, as the theoretical framework would predict. The magnitudes of the coefficients are unsteady, but the implied estimate of  $\rho$ —which we calculate by averaging the ratio of the t coefficient to the t - 1 coefficient and the ratio of the t - 1 coefficient to the t - 2coefficient—falls only slightly, to 0.8.<sup>19</sup> Notes also that column (6) shows small and insignificant coefficients on all leads and lags of precipitation two weeks after election day.

We conduct two further robustness checks for these main results. First, Appendix Table 1

find no significant placebo coefficients for that subsample.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Our estimates are also unaffected by controlling for temperature (using data from Schlenker and Roberts 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Following the discussion in Section 5, both ratios are consistent estimators for  $\rho$ . If turnout were really an autoregressive process of order 1 (AR-1), we could also use a third estimator: the square root of the ratio of the t coefficient to the t-2 coefficient. However, equation (3) implies that voting in period t-2 affects the probability of voting in period t even if an individual does not vote in period t, so the process is not AR-1.

reports estimates from specifications with county-specific trends of different orders. With quadratic or cubic trends, the results are of a similar magnitude and significance level, suggesting that linear trends are sufficiently flexible. The trends are important, however; when we omit them altogether, the results become unstable. Second, Appendix Figure 2 checks that no single state or year is influential. In 49 estimations that leave out a single state (48 continental states plus Washington, DC) and 16 estimations that leave out a single year, the point estimates and significance levels of  $\beta_0$ ,  $\beta_1$ , and  $\rho$  vary little. We conclude that the results are not driven by outliers.

In the last two columns of Table 3, we verify the theoretical framework's prediction that a past precipitation shock increases the sensitivity of turnout to a contemporaneous precipitation shock. In estimates of equation (6) in columns (7) and (8), the coefficient on the interaction of current and lagged precipitation is significantly negative. Again, when column (8) uses precipitation two weeks after election day as a placebo, neither the main effects nor the interaction effect are significant. In magnitude, the interaction effect is 12 percent of the main effect of contemporaneous precipitation. To illustrate, consider the effects of an intense storm with rainfall totaling 1 inch (roughly the  $98^{th}$ percentile of the precipitation distribution). If the previous election was rain-free, then the storm reduces turnout by 1.4 percentage points. If the previous election had a similar storm, then the current storm reduces turnout by 1.6 percentage points.

#### 6.3 Heterogeneity

Who responds to current and lagged precipitation? Our aggregated data do not allow a detailed exploration of this question, but the demographic and socio-economic covariates from the U.S. Census can help shed some light. Table 4 reports estimates of equation (7), which interacts these covariates with contemporaneous and lagged precipitation.<sup>20</sup> For comparison, column (1) repeats the main estimate of equation (4) from Table 3 (column 1).

Table 4's most noteworthy result, shown in column (5), is that the effects of lagged and contemporaneous precipitation are weaker in counties with high population density. The main effects and interactions imply that at the  $10^{th}$  percentile of population density, a millimeter of current or lagged precipitation reduces turnout by 0.13 percentage points, while at the  $90^{th}$  percentile of

 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$ We enter each pair of interactions into a separate regression because the results become noisy and uninformative when we include all of them in the same regression. We believe this problem arises because the interpolation of all the covariates between census years induces correlated measurement errors.

population density, a millimeter of current or lagged precipitation reduces turnout by 0.04 to 0.06 percentage points. This finding matches the conventional wisdom that inclement weather imposes greater costs on rural voters than on their urban counterparts, due to their longer distances from the polls and their access to fewer modes of transportation.

Also interesting in Table 4 is the finding that the interactions with county's over-65 population share are of opposite sign. Although the coefficients on these interactions are not individually significant, the difference between them is significant at the 6 percent level. Because the interaction with contemporaneous precipitation has a positive coefficient and that with lagged precipitation has a negative coefficient, we can infer that counties with more sizable elderly populations are less sensitive to contemporaneous precipitation and more sensitive to lagged precipitation. Recalling our theoretical framework, one interpretation is that the elderly are predominantly always-voters or never-voters, but that the few who are marginal are especially sensitive to precipitation shocks. Consequently, older citizens as a group appear to be especially habit-forming.

## 7 Assessing Magnitudes

This section discusses the magnitude of our results in the context of prevailing studies in the literature. In interpreting the variation across studies, we pay particular attention to the possible role of spillovers due to social interactions.

#### 7.1 Comparison with Previous Research

We estimate a habit formation parameter  $\rho$  between 0.7 and 0.9. By comparison, Gerber et al. (2003) place their persistence parameter at 0.5 in their get-out-the-vote experiment, while Meredith (2009) estimates persistence to be 0.075 using a regression discontinuity design based on voting age restrictions. In Section 3.1, we described why our strategy to identify habit formation differs from previous efforts to capture general persistence in voting, but the biases we discussed there are unlikely to explain why our estimates exceed the others by so much. Here, we propose other possible explanations for the different magnitudes of our estimates.

Meredith's estimate is an order of magnitude smaller than both Gerber et al.'s and ours, but his study design identifies a different estimand that is likely to be small. In both Gerber et al.'s context and our own, always-voters exist, such that the estimation strategies identify the local average treatment effect for marginal voters (the compliers). In contrast, Meredith strategy does not allow for always-voters; individuals just short of their  $18^{th}$  birthdays cannot vote under any circumstance. As a result, Meredith effectively recovers a treatment-on-the-treated persistence parameter that averages the effect of past on present voting for voters who, were they eligible to vote, would be both marginal *and* infra-marginal. The effect is zero for infra-marginal voters, which justifies Meredith's small (though statistically significant) estimate.

The fact that our estimate exceeds that of Gerber et al. presents a greater puzzle. We discuss four possible explanations. First, as discussed in the next subsection, our empirical strategy may pick up interpersonal spillovers due to social interactions following election day; Gerber et al.'s design does not. Second, Gerber et al. ran their get-out-the-vote campaign just before a low-stakes midterm election and collected follow-up data on a local election one year later.<sup>21</sup> The effect of voting in a low-stakes midterm election on voting in a subsequent local election may be smaller than the persistent effects of turnout for presidential elections. Third, the sub-populations induced to vote may differ between the two studies. Gerber et al.'s estimate applies to residents of New Haven whereas our study covers the entire country.<sup>22</sup> Finally, Gerber et al. lost 14 percent of their sample to follow-up. Although attrition was evenly distributed across control and treatment groups, the attriters in the treatment group may have differed in unobservable ways from the attriters in the control group, which would undermine the study design.

#### 7.2 Spillovers and Social Interactions

Individuals may induce others to vote in the future by sharing past voting experiences (Nickerson 2008; Gerber et al. 2008; Bond et al. 2012; DellaVigna et al. 2013). Such social interactions can produce spillovers, implying that our county-level estimate of habit formation captures the combined effects of individual-level habit formation and social interactions.

Formally, let b denote the effect of a unit of precipitation on an individual's probability of turnout, and let r be the individual effect of past on current turnout. These parameters are potentially distinct from the corresponding county-level parameters in Section 3,  $\beta_0$  and  $\rho$ . Our objective

 $<sup>^{21}</sup>$ In the 1998 midterm election, both federal races that involved New Haven (the site of Gerber et al.'s study) were decided by margins of more than 30 points.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Also note that the Gerber et al. experiment is specific to 1998-1999, while we study 1952-2012.

is to understand the mapping between r and  $\rho$ . In the absence of social interactions, these parameters are the same. However, in the presence of (positive) social interactions, part of the effect of past precipitation on turnout operates through social interactions, such that  $\rho$  exceeds r (Case and Katz 1991; Glaeser and Scheinkman 2002). Following Glaeser and Scheinkman's (2002) approach, we define a county-level social interactions parameter  $\theta \in [0, 1)$  as follows: an individual's likelihood of voting increases by  $\theta$  percentage points for every 1 percentage point increase in the average turnout of other residents of her county. We take  $\theta$  to capture social interactions occurring after the current election day and before the next, which allows us to write the effects of current and lagged precipitation as  $\beta_0 = b$  and  $\beta_1 = \frac{br}{1-\theta}$ , respectively, making the county-level habit formation parameter  $\rho = \frac{r}{1-\theta}$ .<sup>23</sup> Hence, the strength of social interactions between election days determines the relationship between the individual- and county-level habit formation parameters.<sup>24</sup>

Unfortunately, little evidence exists on the size of  $\theta$ . Even if we had individual-level data, we could not distinguish r from  $\rho$  using our estimation strategy because precipitation varies at a spatially aggregate level and thus produces estimates that include the effects of social interactions. However, if we take the individual-level persistence parameter from Gerber et al. (2003) as a benchmark for individual habit formation, we can recover a value for  $\theta$ . Although we have already noted that their parameter may not map cleanly onto r, it is nonetheless an average of individual-level persistence parameters for a group of marginal voters, making it a useful benchmark. Combined with our baseline estimate of  $\rho$  at 0.89, their estimate of r at 0.51 implies  $\theta = 0.43$ .

Is this value for  $\theta$  reasonable? As a way to gauge its plausibility, we compare it with the social interactions parameter implied by individual and county-level *associations* of past and current voting, which we estimate in Table 5. In columns (1)-(3), we use self-reported individual turnout from the 1972-1984 CPS to estimate an autoregressive panel model of current on past presidential election turnout, with varying demographic, geographic, and temporal controls. Across various specifications, we find an individual level persistence parameter of approximately 0.5. Combined with our main county-level habit formation estimate of 0.89, this estimate implies  $\theta = 0.44$ . However, autoregressive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>These derivations use the fact that there is a large number of voters in each county (Glaeser and Scheinkman 2002). As a refinement, we could also assume that social interactions have short- and long-run components,  $\theta^S$  and  $\theta^L$ , with the former term capturing interactions during the current election day (hence creating a multiplier for current precipitation). The comparison between county and individual level effects would thus depend on the ratio of these parameters. Since this refinement is not essential ot our dicussion, we omit it to simplify notation.

 $<sup>^{24}</sup>$ Glaeser et al. (2003) study the conditions under which the ratio between aggregate and individual estimates pins down the social multiplier parameter.

estimates of  $\rho$  may be biased for reasons we already noted. In columns (4)-(7) of Table 5, we estimate a similar autoregressive panel model of county-level presidential election turnout, leading to a persistence parameter of roughly 0.8. If the individual and county-level estimates shown in Table 5 are biased by the same *proportion*, then the ratio between the individual and county-level coefficients provides an unbiased estimate of  $\theta$ . Indeed, the coefficients presented in Table 5 imply  $\theta = 0.38$ . Remarkably, all these exercises yield similar estimates for  $\theta$ , around 0.4.

### 8 Alternative Explanations for Habit Formation in Voting

Although our habit formation framework provides a compelling explanation for the dependence of current on past turnout through an accumulation in expressive utility, the Downsian model suggests other possible mechanisms as well. Recall from equation (1) that a citizen i votes if and only if  $P_{it}B_{it} + D_{it} \ge C_{it}$ . We have hypothesized that only  $D_{it}$  depends on past voting experiences. Conceivably, any of the framework's other three terms could also depend on past voting experiences. In this section, we explore this possibility for each additional term of the framework but conclude that our habit formation framework best matches the data. We begin with  $P_{it}$  and then consider  $B_{it}$  and  $C_{it}$  in turn. The section concludes by discussing why partisan politics (a factor outside the Downsian model) is unlikely to play a major role.

#### 8.1 Political Efficacy (P)

In one theory with relevance for our results, past voting experiences shape citizens' sense of external political efficacy (Campbell et al. 1954): the degree to which they believe their actions to affect political outcomes. A citizen with limited understanding of the electoral system may learn over time about her probability of being pivotal. Suppose she takes that probability to be time-invariant, so that  $P_{it}$  represents her latest estimate of the probability, based on her experiences with the electoral system. Under Bayesian updating,  $P_{it}$  increases after voting for the winner or not voting while supporting the loser, and it decreases after voting for the loser or not voting while supporting the winner. Consistent with this this logic, Kanazawa (1998) and Bendor et al. (2003) posit reduced-form behavioral models in which voting for the winner increases future turnout, while voting for the loser decreases future turnout.

Even without further analyses, existing evidence suggests that this theory falls short of explaining our results. First, on a conceptual note, the theory is inconsistent with rational expectations and most forms of forward-looking behavior. Under such assumptions, voters would use all available information about the probability of being pivotal, to which their past voting experiences are not relevant. Second, an explanation based on political efficacy needs to confront the fact that the objective value of  $P_{it}$  is virtually zero. Either very small variations in this probability have large consequences, or voters have unrealistic priors for their pivotalness. Third, although the theory may predict more positive updating than negative updating—by design, more voters support the winner than the loser—narrowly-decided elections should result in little habit formation on average because voters who supported the winner are of roughly the same number as voters who supported the loser. Contrary to this prediction, our estimates of  $\rho$  are large even though most presidential elections during our sample period were decided by margins of less than 10 points.<sup>25</sup>

We can also test this theory's divergent predictions for voting for the winner and voting for the loser. To do so, Table 5 interacts contemporaneous and lagged precipitation with measures of whether a county is politically aligned with the winner or loser of the previous election. To avoid issues of endogeneity, we use a county's Republican vote share two elections ago to ascertain its partisan leaning. We define two new terms for Table 5. A county is "partisan" if its Republican vote share in t - 2 was in the top or bottom 10 percent of the vote share distribution, and a county is "aligned" if it is both "partisan" and politically aligned with the winner in t - 1. A dry day increases the likelihood of voting for the winner in aligned counties and increases the likelihood of voting for the loser in counties that are partisan but not aligned. Therefore, in the following model for turnout in county c at time t:

$$turnout_{ct} = \beta_0 precip_{ct} + \beta_1 precip_{c,t-1} + \theta^p partisan_{c,t-2} + \theta^a aligned_{c,t-1} + \gamma_0^p (partisan_{c,t-2} \times precip_{ct}) + \gamma_1^p (partisan_{c,t-2} \times precip_{c,t-1}) + \gamma_0^a (aligned_{c,t-1} \times precip_{ct}) + \gamma_1^a (aligned_{c,t-1} \times precip_{c,t-1}) + \gamma_0^r (Rwinner_{t-1} \times precip_{ct}) + \gamma_1^r (Rwinner_{t-1} \times precip_{c,t-1}) + \tau_t + \eta_c + \lambda_c t + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

$$(8)$$

 $<sup>^{25}</sup>$ In unreported results, the coefficient on lagged rainfall did not vary with the national margin of victory in the previous election.

we expect non-aligned counties to have less pronounced effects of lagged precipitation than nonpartisan counties ( $\gamma_1^p > 0$ ); aligned counties to have more pronounced effects of lagged precipitation than non-aligned counties ( $\gamma_1^a < 0$ ); and aligned counties to have less-pronounced effects of lagged precipitation than non-partisan counties ( $\gamma_1^a + \gamma_1^p < 0$ ). In equation (8), we also control for whether a Republican won the previous election ( $Rwinner_{t-1}$ ) because  $aligned_{c,t-1}$  is essentially an interaction between  $partisan_{c,t-2}$  and  $Rwinner_{t-1}$ .

Estimates of equation (8), shown in column (1) of Table 5, fail to fully confirm these predictions. Although counties aligned with the winner of the last election exhibit the strongest effects of lagged precipitation (both  $\gamma_1^a$  and  $\gamma_1^a + \gamma_1^p$  are negative), we find no evidence that counties aligned with the loser are different from non-partisan counties ( $\gamma_1^p$  is not significantly different from zero). In other words, widespread voting for the winner raises future county turnout, but widespread voting for the loser does not decrease it. While this finding may speak to the psychology of habit formation, it does not support a model in which citizens learn about their probability of being pivotal.

A potential concern with regression specification (8) is that the inclusion of  $partisan_{c,t-2}$  violates the strict exogeneity assumption required for fixed effects estimation, due to a relationship between turnout and vote shares.<sup>26</sup> To address these concerns, column (3) uses an alternative measure of  $partisan_{c,t-2}$ , based on the Republican vote share predicted by a county's demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Specifically, we run a regression of the Republican vote share on the white population share, the over-65 population share, log median household income, log population density, an indicator for location in the South, and—because of the South's unique politics over the second half of the twentieth century—interactions of the South indicator with all other covariates.<sup>27</sup> Using the predicted values from this regression, we define a county as partisan if its predicted vote share is in the top or bottom 10 percent of the predicted vote share distribution. Because this measure of partisanship is a generated regressor, standard errors are block-bootstrapped at the state level. The magnitudes of the coefficients change somewhat, but the conclusion remains unchanged: aligned counties exhibit a high degree of habit formation, but dis-aligned counties are not significantly different from non-partisan counties.

 $<sup>^{26}</sup>$ After one controls for year fixed effects, county fixed effects, and county-specific trends, the data show no relationship between turnout and vote shares. We return to this issue below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>The results are not substantively different in specifications that omit the interactions of the South indicator with other covariates.

To explore the robustness of the vote-for-the-winner effect, columns (2) and (4) control more flexibly for underlying partisanship. Instead of including the "partisan" term and its interactions, these models distinguish between heavily Republican and heavily Democratic areas. This alternative specification cannot test for average differences between partisan and non-partisan counties, but it can estimate the excess sensitivity of aligned counties relative to dis-aligned counties (equivalent to  $\gamma_1^a$  in equation(8)). The coefficient on the interaction of "aligned" with lagged precipitation remains significantly negative.

Notably, the asymmetry of our findings—aligned counties exhibit a higher degree of habit formation, but dis-aligned counties do not significantly differ from non-partisan counties—lends additional support to the importance of social interactions. Without social interactions, even if habit formation were asymmetric at the individual level—so that voting for the winner raised future voting propensity, but voting for the loser had no effect—county-level estimation would still exhibit symmetry. Specifically, dis-aligned counties contain fewer voters who support the winner than nonpartisan counties, which in turn contain fewer such voters than aligned counties. As a result, one would still expect to find greater habit formation in non-partisan counties than in dis-aligned counties. But the data do not confirm this prediction. One potential explanation is that spillovers from social interactions are especially pronounced in areas with fervent political beliefs following a victorious election. More generally, the county-level asymmetry likely reflects some form of social interactions in voting decisions.

#### 8.2 Instrumental Utility (B)

A separate explanation for our results involves the strength of citizens' political preferences. If the act of voting causes an individual i to care more about political outcomes or to develop more polarized political preferences, then past voting could affect current voting through  $B_{it}$ , the benefit to the individual if her preferred candidate wins. An effect of past voting on  $B_{it}$  is consistent with Mullainathan and Washington's (2009) finding that, due to cognitive dissonance in the choice of candidates, the act of voting causes a citizen to further improve her opinion of her chosen candidate. However, if citizens have objective beliefs about the probability of being pivotal, then any effect on  $B_{it}$  will likely have limited consequences for the voting decision because it will be multiplied by a number approaching zero. Additionally, we can leverage the fact that  $B_{it}$  is multiplied by  $P_{it}$  to test whether accumulation in  $B_{it}$  can explain our results. To this end, we extend our framework to:

$$P_{it}(B_{i,t-1} + \alpha_B V_t) + (D_{i,t-1} + \alpha_D V_t) \ge C_{it}$$

$$\tag{9}$$

where we now allow separate accumulation terms in  $B_{it}$  and  $D_{it}$ , as captured by  $\alpha_B$  and  $\alpha_D$ . While the distinction between  $B_t$  and  $D_t$  is clear in our framework, empirically separating the two mechanisms may be difficult. The act of voting may lead a citizen to change her tastes regarding political participation; the distinction is whether these tastes take the form of instrumental value (caring about the outcome) or expressive value (caring about voting). If  $B_{it}$  accumulates ( $\alpha_B >$ 0), then evidence of habit formation will be stronger when  $P_{it}$  is high. Our test thus introduces interactions between precipitation and state-level voter pivotalness, in the following specification:

$$turnout_{ct} = \beta_0 precip_{ct} + \beta_1 precip_{c,t-1} + \theta pivotal_{ct} + \gamma_0 (pivotal_{ct} \times precip_{ct}) + \gamma_1 (pivotal_{ct} \times precip_{c,t-1}) + \tau_t + \eta_c + \lambda_c t + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

$$(10)$$

The static Downsian framework predicts  $\theta > 0$  and  $\gamma_0 > 0$ : a higher likelihood of being pivotal increases turnout and offsets the negative effects of precipitation on election day. If the act of voting in the previous period increases  $B_{it}$ , we should also observe  $\gamma_1 < 0$ . To construct a measure for  $pivotal_{ct}$ , we use the forecasting model developed by Campbell (1992) and extended in Campell et al. (2006) to obtain an *ex ante* (before precipitation) predicted state-level Democratic vote share for elections from 1952-2004. The predicted Democratic vote share and its forecast uncertainty determine the probability that a randomly drawn voter will hold the tie-breaking vote for a given state in a given election year.<sup>28</sup>

Table 6, which estimates equation (10), shows no evidence of a role for the probability of being pivotal. To ensure sample selection is not affecting our results, column (1) re-estimates our main specification for the sample of election days from 1952-2004 for which we have a measure of state-level pivotalness. The implied  $\rho$  of 0.72 is not statistically distinct from our main sample result presented in Table 3. The rest of the table tests for the role of pivotalness. Column (2) estimates equation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>We use Campbell et al.'s (2006) model to predict the Democratic vote share,  $\hat{d}_{st}$  for state s and election year t. The probability of a randomly drawn voter breaking a state-level tie is  $(1/N_{st})\phi(\hat{d}_{st} - 0.5/\hat{\sigma}_{st})$ , where  $\phi(\cdot)$  is the standard normal density function,  $\hat{\sigma}_{st}$  is the standard deviation of  $\hat{d}_{st}$ , and  $N_{st}$  is the number of registered voters. Our conclusions do not change if we use predicted closeness rather than predicted pivotalness.

(10) using a continuous measure of state-level pivotalness, and none of the estimated parameters of interest are statistically significant.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, the effects of uninteracted current and lagged precipitation, which now capture the effects of habit formation when  $P_{it} = 0$  and can be due solely to accumulations in  $D_{it}$ , remain statistically significant. The implied  $\rho$  from accumulations in  $D_{it}$  alone is 0.65, a number within the uncertainty of our main result in column (1) of Table 3. In column (3), we explore an alternative specification by constructing a indicator for observations with the pivotal probabilities exceeding the sample median. We again find no evidence of accumulation in in  $B_{it}$ . Altogether, Table 6 suggests that habit formation is likely operate through accumulation in the expressive and not instrumental value of voting.

#### 8.3 Voting Costs (C)

The final term of the Downsian framework,  $C_{it}$ , may also play a role: past experience with voting may lower the future cost of voting. This mechanism has two potential sources, one personal and one institutional. As an example of personal costs, voters must occasionally incur informational "fixed costs:" learning the location of the polling station and the best way to get there. They may also be uncertain of how much time the act of voting takes; if they are risk averse, they will become more likely to vote once they learn the true opportunity cost of voting. While this hypothesis is plausible, it is unlikely to be the only mechanism driving our results. First, if informational fixed costs matter, one would expect the lagged effect of rainfall to be smaller in counties with older populations (whose voters have more experience going to the polls), which is not the case in our data. Second, individuals who cast a vote for the winner are more likely to form habits, which is difficult to reconcile with a model in which voting lowers informational costs. In other words, if habit formation were mediated entirely by voting costs, then reduction of future voting costs would have to be particularly salient in partisan counties, only when the preferred candidate wins. We can think of little reason why learning about location, for example, would interact with *ex post* election results in such a manner.

On the institutional side, state and county election offices have at various points implemented laws that purge inactive voters from the registration rolls. These laws varied substantially (both

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>The point estimates and standard errors for both the interacted and uninteracted pivotal coefficients are large because the probability of being pivotal is typically on the order of  $10^{-4}$  percent.

across and within states) with regard to the frequency of the purges and the number of elections a voter must miss to be purged (Mitchell and Wlezien 1995). After the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), automatic purges of non-voters has ceased in all states. Nonetheless, while they were in effect, these laws could produce "habit formation," as we have defined it. Non-voters in several consecutive elections would lose their registration, raising the cost of future voting and making them less likely to vote again. However, these laws are unlikely to explain our results. First, the purging of inactive voters from the voter rolls has no obvious connection to the vote-for-the-winner effects reported in Table 5, as there is no reason purging would vary by county partial with timing that matches the identity of the election winner. Second, to further test the importance of these laws in our results, we re-estimated our main specification using only the states and elections with no automatic purging of non-voters. Specifically, for every presidential election year, we used The Book of the States<sup>30</sup> to code whether, in a given year, a state made registration "subject to cancellation for failure to vote at certain specified intervals." Restricting the estimation of 4 to counties in states that had no automatic purging of non-voters at election t yields results very similar to those from our main specification (Column 1, Table 3).<sup>31</sup> This result is consistent with previous findings that the turnout effects of purging non-voters are negligible (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Mitchell and Wlezien 1995).<sup>32</sup>

Note that we have only discussed costs incurred immediately prior to the act of voting. Longerterm costs, like voter registration or learning about party platforms, precede the realization of the precipitation shock. Given the difficulty of predicting deviations from trend long in advance, they are also not amenable to adjustment in anticipation of the precipitation shock.

### 8.4 What Role for Politics?

Until now, the discussion has treated the voter as an isolated individual, rather than as a participant in an interactive political process. But actions by political elites may play a role, especially in light of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Available at http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-archive-1935-2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>Volumes of *The Book of the States* from before 1960 do not report on automatic purging, so these estimates use only the 1960-2012 elections. 48% of observations in this period are from state-elections without automatic purging (20,799 observations). After 1993, the NVRA has abolished automatic purging of voters, and hence all observations from the 1996 election and afterward enter the estimation. In this subsample, the effect of current precipitation on turnout is -0.069 (S.E. = 0.032), while the effect of lagged precipitation is -0.069 (S.E. = 0.039), implying a  $\rho$  of 1.01 (S.E. = 0.33).

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$ Mitchel and Wlezien (1995) argue that efforts to repeal purge laws "serve to keep people on the rolls who are not very likely to vote."

existing evidence that rain-induced decreases in turnout have a partial bias, benefitting Republicans (Gomez, Hansford, and Krause 2007; Hansford and Gomez 2010). If precipitation shocks affect election outcomes, and if incumbents are especially empowered to manipulate voter turnout, then the persistent effects of precipitation shocks may have a political explanation.

Several pieces of evidence suggest that such political explanations are not the primary mechanism. First, in unreported results, the effect of lagged precipitation did not vary with the party of the incumbent or with an indicator for whether the incumbent was running for re-election. Second, regional variation in the effects of precipitation, reported in Table 6, is at odds with theories in which lagged precipitation matters because it changes the party in power. Precipitation decreases turnout in both the South and the Non-South, but it has divergent effects on the Republican vote share: decreasing it in the South, increasing it elsewhere. Our main findings are not due to precipitation advantaging a party that has outsized sway over voter turnout.

# 9 Conclusion

Social scientists have repeatedly documented that voting behavior is persistent, but they have struggled to isolate the mechanism driving this empirical regularity. This paper identifies the effects of habit formation, in which the act of voting today directly affects future turnout, as a causal channel for explaining turnout persistence. We use transitory and unexpected voting cost shocks due to election-day precipitation to estimate these effects, finding that a 1 percentage point decrease in current turnout reduces future turnout by 0.7-0.9 percentage points. Additional analyses motivated by a dynamic Downsian framework suggest that this effect is unlikely to be driven by persistent changes in voting costs, by the updating of voter beliefs over the probability of being pivotal, or by changes in voters' perceived benefits from election outcomes. The weight of our evidence suggests that habit formation occurs through an accumulation in the expressive value citizens gain from voting.

45 years have passed since Riker and Ordeshook (1968) introduced the  $D_{it}$  term to the Downsian model as a solution to the paradox of voter turnout. Although many have accepted the idea that voters get consumption value from the act of voting, the precise form of this consumption value and the way it develops have remained elusive. We hope our finding of habit formation in voting furthers interest in the underlying psychological and social determinants of the intrinsic value voters place on the act of voting, as well as in the design of policies encouraging voter participation. As Feddersen (2004) suggests, our evidence of habit formation should also help inform political economy models of strategic voter mobilization and suppression.

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
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
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Note: Scatter plots are age-specific rates, while curves are local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 2 years.




Figure 2: Precipitation and Turnout Residuals, 2004

Note: Residuals from regressions of precipitation (mm) and turnout on year and county fixed effects and county trends. See Appendix Figure 1 for more years.

				Percentiles					
	Mean	Std. Dev.	$10^{\mathrm{th}}$	$25^{ m th}$	$50^{\mathrm{th}}$	$75^{ m th}$	$90^{\mathrm{th}}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
Politics									
Voter turnout	58.4	13.6	41.8	49.4	58.3	67.4	75.8		
Republican vote share	55.3	14.2	36.6	46.3	56.1	65.2	72.9		
Weather									
Precipitation on election day (mm)	2.5	6.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	7.1		
Demographics									
% white	87.8	15.8	64.2	82.3	95.0	98.6	99.7		
% over 65	13.2	4.4	7.8	10.1	12.8	15.9	19.0		
Log median household income $(2012 \$	10.6	0.3	10.2	10.4	10.6	10.8	11.0		
Log population density (people/sq. mile)	3.6	1.6	1.5	2.8	3.6	4.5	5.6		

 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Note: The sample includes 49,524 county-year observations, based on presidential elections from 1952-2012 in 3,108 counties.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Linear model	Bin model	Placebo
Precip. 2 wks before election day, t			0.029
			[0.022]
Precip. 1 wk before election day, t			-0.025
			[0.023]
Precip. on election day, t	-0.069		-0.065
	$[0.024]^{***}$		$[0.023]^{***}$
Precip. 1 wk after election day, t			-0.039
			$[0.022]^*$
Precip. 2 wks after election day, t			-0.034
			[0.036]
(4,8] mm precip. on election day, t		-0.654	
		$[0.332]^*$	
(8,12] mm precip. on election day, t		-0.436	
		[0.466]	
(12,16] mm precip. on election day, t		-1.508	
		$[0.512]^{***}$	
(16,20] mm precip. on election day, t		-1.817	
		$[0.667]^{***}$	
(20,95] mm precip. on election day, t		-2.003	
		$[0.862]^{**}$	
Number of county-years	49,524	$49,\!524$	49,524
Number of counties	3108	3108	3108
Election years	1952-2012	1952-2012	1952-2012

Table 2: Effect	of	Contemporaneous	Precipitation	on	Turnout	

Note: Dependent variable is voter turnout (0-100). Brackets contain standard errors clustered at the state level. All regressions include year and county fixed effects and county trends. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Precip. on election day, t+1					-0.028	-0.027		
					[0.027]	[0.035]		
Precip. on election day, t	-0.078	-0.070	-0.077	-0.068	-0.113	-0.110	-0.058	-0.056
	$[0.026]^{***}$	[0.025]***	[0.025]***	$[0.024]^{***}$	$[0.040]^{***}$	[0.037]***	[0.027]**	[0.026]**
Precip. on election day, t-1	-0.070	-0.065	-0.068	-0.063	-0.116	-0.112	-0.058	-0.055
	$[0.025]^{***}$	$[0.024]^{**}$	$[0.023]^{***}$	$[0.022]^{***}$	$[0.045]^{**}$	$[0.041]^{***}$	$[0.024]^{**}$	$[0.023]^{**}$
Precip. on election day, t-2					-0.061	-0.057		
					$[0.025]^{**}$	[0.023]**		
$(Precip., t)^*(Precip., t-1)$							-0.007	-0.007
							$[0.002]^{***}$	$[0.002]^{***}$
Precip. 2 wks. after election day, $t+1$						-0.021		
r recip. 2 wks. after election day, t+1						[0.026]		
Precip. 2 wks. after election day, t			-0.029	-0.025		-0.008		-0.032
r recip. 2 wks. after election day, t			[0.038]	[0.032]		[0.039]		[0.021]
Precip. 2 wks. after election day, t-1			-0.018	-0.018		-0.008		-0.021
Frecip. 2 wks. after election day, t-1				[0.039]				[0.030]
Duccin 2 rules often election does to			[0.044]	[0.039]		[0.048] - $0.036$		[0.030]
Precip. 2 wks. after election day, t-2								
(Drasing 2 miles often t)						[0.034]		0.007
(Precip. 2 wks. after, t)								
*(Precip. 2 wks. after, t-1)								[0.005]
Implied $\rho$	0.89	0.93	0.88	0.92	0.78	0.77		
	$[0.28]^{***}$	$[0.31]^{***}$	$[0.28]^{**}$	$[0.32]^{***}$	$[0.14]^{***}$	$[0.14]^{***}$		
Number of county-years	49,524	49,524	49,524	49,524	43,300	43,300	49,524	49.524
Number of counties	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$
Election years	1952-2012	1952-2012	1952-2012	1952-2012	1956-2008	1956-2008	1952-2012	1952-2012
County covariates?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No

Table 3: Effect of Contemporaneous and Lagged Precipitation on Turnout

Note: Dep. var. is voter turnout (0-100). Brackets contain SEs clustered at the state level. All regressions include year fixed & county FE and county trends. County covariates: white pop. share, over-65 pop. share, log median income, log pop. density. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Precip. on election day, t	-0.078	-0.195	-0.115	-1.374	-0.152
	$[0.026]^{***}$	[0.119]	$[0.053]^{**}$	$[0.685]^{***}$	$[0.041]^{***}$
Precip. on election day, t-1	-0.070	-0.195	-0.041	-0.618	-0.159
	$[0.025]^{***}$	[0.124]	[0.037]	[0.493]	$[0.044]^{***}$
$(\% \text{ white})^*(\text{Precip.}, t)$		0.0015			
		[0.0013]			
$(\% \text{ white})^*(\text{Precip., t-1})$		0.0015			
		[0.0013]			
$(\% \text{ over } 65)^*(\text{Precip., t})$			0.0034		
			[0.0026]		
$(\% \text{ over } 65)^*(\text{Precip., t-1})$			-0.0024		
			[0.0018]		
$(Log median income)^*(Precip., t)$				0.123	
				$[0.064]^*$	
(Log median income)*(Precip., t-1)				0.052	
				[0.046]	
(Log pop. density)*(Precip., t)					0.017
					[0.006]***
(Log pop. density)*(Precip., t-1)					0.021
					$[0.007]^{***}$
Number of county-years	49,524	49,524	49,524	49,524	49,524
Number of counties	3,108	3,108	3,108	3,108	$3,\!108$

Table 4: Heterogeneity in the Effects of Contemporaneous and Lagged Precipitation

Note: Dependent variable is voter turnout (0-100). Sample includes presidential elections from 1952-2012. Brackets contain standard errors clustered at the state level. All regressions include year and county fixed effects, county trends, and the main effects of any demographic variables included in the interaction terms. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

	Individ	Individuals (CPS $1972-1984$ )			Counties			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
Turnout in last election	0.48	0.51	0.46	0.83	0.82	0.78	0.69	
	$[0.01]^{***}$	$[0.01]^{***}$	$[0.01]^{***}$	$[0.01]^{***}$	$[0.02]^{***}$	$[0.03]^{***}$	$[0.04]^{***}$	
Number of observations	$315,\!970$	$315,\!970$	315,970	49,524	49,524	49,524	49,524	
Election years	1972-1984	1972-1984	1972-1984	1952-2012	1952-2012	1952-2012	1952-2012	
Covariates?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
State-group/state FE?	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	
County FE?	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	

Table 5: Persistence in Voter Turnout, Individuals versus Counties

Note: Dependent variable is voter turnout (0-100). \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

*Individual analysis:* Brackets contain SEs clustered at the state-group level. The analysis uses 23 state-groups instead of 50 states because the 1976 CPS does not contain state identifiers. In the subsample from other years, results were identical in estimations with clustering or fixed effects at the state, rather than state-group, level. Covariates include education level, age, age squared, gender, and race.

*County analysis:* Brackets contain SEs clustered at the state level. Covariates include white pop. share, over-65 pop. share, log median income, and log pop. density.

	Actual pa	rtisanship	Predicted p	oartisanship
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Precip. on election day, t	-0.071	-0.064	-0.055	-0.058
	$[0.023]^{***}$	$[0.023]^{***}$	$[0.027]^{**}$	$[0.027]^{**}$
Precip. on election day, t-1	-0.044	-0.045	-0.037	-0.041
	[0.028]	[0.029]	[0.026]	[0.028]
(Aligned, t-1) $\times$ (Precip., t)	0.002	0.085	0.173	0.180
	[0.058]	[0.083]	[0.141]	[0.196]
(Aligned, t-1) $\times$ (Precip., t-1)	-0.123	-0.131	-0.180	-0.180
	$[0.064]^*$	$[0.062]^{**}$	$[0.069]^{***}$	$[0.080]^{**}$
$(Partisan, t-2) \times (Precip., t)$	0.036		-0.202	
	[0.036]		$[0.068]^{***}$	
$(Partisan, t-2) \times (Precip., t-1)$	0.021		0.029	
	[0.037]		[0.063]	
(Heavily Dem., t-2) $\times$ (Precip., t)		-0.104		-0.194
		$[0.047]^{**}$		$[0.069]^{***}$
(Heavily Dem., t-2) $\times$ (Precip., t-1)		0.005		0.020
		[0.040]		[0.078]
(Heavily Rep., t-2) $\times$ (Precip., t)		-0.070		-0.217
		[0.063]		[0.171]
(Heavily Rep., t-2) $\times$ (Precip., t-1)		0.057		0.081
		[0.035]		[0.074]
(Rep. winner, t-1) $\times$ (Precip., t)	-0.011	-0.004	0.029	0.029
	[0.038]	[0.035]	[0.038]	[0.040]
(Rep. winner, t-1) $\times$ (Precip., t-1)	-0.057	-0.055	-0.068	-0.062
	[0.052]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.054]
Aligned, t-1	2.84	2.50	2.55	2.35
	$[0.95]^{***}$	$[1.05]^{**}$	$[1.33]^*$	[1.42]
Partisan, t-2	-1.42		0.024	
	$[0.37]^{***}$		[0.75]	
Heavily Dem., t-2		-1.53		-0.36
		$[0.53]^{***}$		[0.89]
Heavily Rep., t-2		-0.64		0.40
		[0.66]		[0.90]
Sum of coefs. on (Aligned, $t-1$ )×(Precip, $t-1$ )	-0.102	-	-0.151	
and (Partisan, t-2) $\times$ (Precip., t-1)	$[0.043]^{**}$		$[0.071]^{**}$	
		10.000		10.000
Number of county-years	46,329	46,329	46,329	46,329
Number of counties	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$


Table 6: Role of County Partisanship and Alignment with the Winner

Note: Dep. var. is voter turnout (0-100). Sample includes presidential elections from 1956-2012. Brackets contain standard errors clustered at the state level: asymptotic in cols. (1)-(2), block bootstrapped in cols. (3)-(4). All regressions include year and county FE and county trends. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

	Full sample		Non-	South	South		
	Turnout	Rep. share	are Turnout	Rep. share	Turnout	Rep. share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Precip. on election day, t	-0.078	-0.022	-0.084	0.078	-0.040	-0.077	
	$[0.026]^{***}$	[0.027]	$[0.039]^{***}$	$[0.028]^{***}$	[0.030]	$[0.034]^{**}$	
Precip. on election day, t-1	-0.070	-0.041	-0.039	0.014	-0.066	-0.047	
	$[0.025]^{***}$	[0.034]	$[0.011]^{***}$	[0.023]	$[0.026]^{**}$	[0.034]	
Number of county-years	49,524	49,441	26,918	$26,\!917$	22,606	22,524	
Number of counties	3108	3108	1685	1685	1423	1423	


Table 7: Precipitation, Turnout, and Vote Shares, Regional Comparison

Note: Dependent variable is voter turnout (0-100). Brackets contain standard errors clustered at the state level. All regressions include year and county fixed effects and county trends. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01




Appendix Figure 1: Precipitation and Turnout Residuals, Selected Years

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Note: Residuals from regressions of precipitation (mm) and turnout on year and county fixed effects, and county-specific trends.



Appendix Figure 2: Leave-One-Out Checks

Note: Each estimate is based on a sample that omits the state or year on the x-axis. Dots are coefficients; bars are 95% CIs. Light gray horizontal lines represent full-sample estimates.

Appendix Table 1. Higher-Order County-Specific Hends							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Precip. on election day, t	-0.011	-0.078	-0.062	-0.063			
	[0.030]	$[0.026]^{***}$	$[0.023]^{***}$	$[0.023]^{***}$			
Precip. on election day, t-1	0.016	-0.070	-0.057	-0.057			
	[0.021]	$[0.025]^{***}$	$[0.021]^{***}$	$[0.021]^{***}$			
Implied $\rho$	-1.43	0.89	0.92	0.91			
	[4.81]	$[0.28]^{***}$	$[0.32]^{***}$	$[0.32]^{***}$			
Number of county-years	49,524	49,524	49,524	49,524			
Number of counties	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$	$3,\!108$			
Trend order	0	1	2	3			

Appendix Table 1: Higher-Order County-Specific Trends

Note: Brackets contain standard errors clustered at the state level. All regressions include year fixed effects and county fixed effects. The sample includes all presidential elections from 1952 to 2012. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01