@techreport{NBERw18764,
 title = "It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans",
 author = "Veronika K. Pool and Clemens Sialm and Irina Stefanescu",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "18764",
 year = "2013",
 month = "February",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w18764",
 abstract = {This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as trustees of 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own funds. Using a hand-collected dataset on retirement investment options, we show that poorly-performing funds are less likely to be removed from and more likely to be added to a 401(k) menu if they are affiliated with the plan trustee. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, the subsequent performance of poorly-performing affiliated funds indicates that these trustee decisions are not information driven and are costly to retirement savers.},
}