TY  - JOUR
AU  - Gaynor,Martin
AU  - Laudicella,Mauro
AU  - Propper,Carol
TI  - Can Governments Do It Better? Merger Mania and Hospital Outcomes in the English NHS
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 17608
PY  - 2011
Y2  - November 2011
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17608
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17608.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Martin Gaynor
Heinz College
Carnegie Mellon University
4800 Forbes Avenue, Room 3008
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
Tel: 412/268-7933
Fax: 412/268-5338
E-Mail: mgaynor@cmu.edu

Mauro Laudicella
Imperial College Business School
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom
E-Mail: m.laudicella@imperial.ac.uk

Carol Propper
Imperial College Business School
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom
E-Mail: carol.propper@bristol.ac.uk
AB  - The literature on mergers between private hospitals suggests that such mergers often produce little benefit. Despite this, the UK government has pursued an active policy of hospital merger. These mergers are initiated by a regulator, acting on behalf of the public, and justified on the grounds that merger will improve outcomes. We examine whether this promise is met. We exploit the fact that between 1997 and 2006 in England around half the short term general hospitals were involved in a merger, but that politics means that selection for a merger may be random with respect to future performance. We examine the impact of mergers on a large set of outcomes including financial performance, productivity, waiting times and clinical quality and find little evidence that mergers achieved gains other than a reduction in activity. In addition, mergers reduce the scope for competition between hospitals.
ER  -