Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Hysteresis, Implementation, and Enforcement
---- Acknowledgements -----
This paper previously circulated as “Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: The Role of Implementation and Enforcement.” We appreciate the helpful comments of Cindy Alexander, Sudipta Basu, Allan Bester, Utpal Bhattacharya, Luca Enriques, Chris Hansen, Alexander Hellgardt, Zachary Kaplan, Emir Kamenica, Daniel Paravisini, Andrei Shleifer, Jerry Zimmerman, and workshop participants at the 2011 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, 2011 NBER corporate finance program meeting, 2010 PECA conference, Bocconi University, University of Chicago, University of Colorado Boulder, Copenhagen Business School, University of Manchester, University of Michigan, MIT, University of North Carolina, University of Rochester, Stockholm School of Economics, Temple University, University of Texas at Dallas, Tilburg University, Vienna University of Business and Economics, and University of Zurich. We thank several technical partners at PwC’s European offices as well as several CESR members and supervisory authorities for providing institutional information, in particular Mike Birch, Oliver Burkart, Jan Fedders, and Bernd Roese. We thank Philip Jacobs, Laszlo Jakab, Zachary Kaplan, Jeff Lam, Frank Li, Elton Lor, Russell Ruch and Michelle Waymire for their excellent research assistance. Christian Leuz gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Sondheimer Family Charitable Foundation and the Business and Public Policy Faculty Research Fund.