THE WAR AT HOME:
EFFECTS OF VIETNAM-ERA MILITARY SERVICE ON POST-WAR HOUSEHOLD STABILITY

Dalton Conley
Jennifer Heerwig

The War at Home: Effects of Vietnam-Era Military Service on Post-War Household Stability
Dalton Conley and Jennifer Heerwig
NBER Working Paper No. 16671
January 2011
JEL No. H56,J12

ABSTRACT

Prior researchers have deployed the Vietnam-era draft lottery as an instrument to estimate causal effects of military service on health and income. This research has shown that effects of veteran status on mortality and earnings that appeared shortly after the war seem to have dissipated by 2000. While these are important outcomes to economists, by focusing on them, researchers may be neglecting an area of life that could be more sensitive to the psychological effects of military service: household and family life. In the present study we use the same IV approach to model the causal impact of Vietnam-era military service on four novel outcomes: residential stability, marital stability, housing tenure and extended family living arrangements. In analysis of the 2000 U.S. Census and the 2005 American Community Survey, we find that veteran status has no effect on housing tenure or residential stability. However, in the ACS sample, being a veteran appears to lower the likelihood of marital disruption, and results for extended family living arrangements appear to change signs across the two samples. Meanwhile, results tend to be strongest for whites.

Dalton Conley
New York University
249 West 29th Street #2E
New York, NY 10001-5230
and NBER
conley@nyu.edu

Jennifer Heerwig
New York University
295 Lafayette Street 4th Floor
New York, NY 100012
ennif@nyu.edu

Introduction

Research into the impact of military service on important health and socio-economic outcomes has yielded evidence to suggest that veterans differ significantly from their non-veteran peers. Though much of the work on veterans has concentrated on generations of male veterans from the World War II and Korean War eras, nearly all veteran studies, regardless of war-time period, have been plagued by the problem of persistent selection bias. Since entry into the military is typically far from random, the men represented in the ranks of the armed forces may not be representative of the male population as a whole, making identification of a treatment effect of military service difficult at best. Specifically, unobserved differences between veterans and non-veterans, which are lumped into the error term, may influence substantive outcomes directly (educational attainment, mortality, marital stability and so on) and may therefore contaminate efforts to estimate a treatment effect of military service or even an intent-to-treat effect of exposure to conscription.

In the present study, however, we exploit a natural experiment to estimate the effects of Vietnam-era military service on long-term family and household outcomes. Between December 1969 and February 1972, the United States Selective Service held four Vietnam draft lotteries. Each of these draft lotteries randomly assigned men in eligible birth cohorts order of induction numbers through a hand drawing of three hundred sixty five birthdates (and 366 for the leap-year lottery for the 1950 birth cohort). The draft lottery provides a unique opportunity to utilize the lottery's random assignment method as a 'natural experiment' using instrumental variable (IV) estimation. Building on previous work by Angrist (1990) and Angrist and Chen (2008) in this vein, we use

data from the 2000 US Decennial Census and the 2005 American Community Survey to produce estimates of the average treatment effect of military service on important family and residential outcomes in the Vietnam-era military service cohort through an instrumental variable estimation. While economists have pursued this same approach to estimate military service effects on earnings (Angrist 1991; Angrist and Chen 2008), disability status (Angrist and Chen 2008), and mortality (Hearst et al. 1986; Angrist and Chen 2008; Conley and Heerwig 2011), they have neglected family and household outcomes such at those we model here. This is an important lacuna since it is reasonable to suspect that family live and household structure may be more sensitive to the psychological effects of military service than the typical outcomes that have been studied thus far. With this in mind we use a 2SLS estimation approach to model the impact of veteran status on marital stability (likelihood of ever having divorced or separated, conditional on marriage); household complexity (extended kin co-residence); housing tenure (owning versus renting); and residential stability (likelihood of having moved in previous five years).

Previous empirical research on Vietnam veterans has most commonly dealt with differences in income between the service and non-service populations. These studies have emphasized the uniqueness of the Vietnam-era social and political climate in its consequences for veterans. Some have suggested that, in fact, Vietnam service acted as a negative screening device in the labor market as Americans reacted to an incredibly unpopular war and common conceptions about drug-use among soldiers (Angrist, 1991; Ruger, Wilson & Waddoups, 2002; Schwartz, 1986). So, while World War II and Korean War veterans were shown to have slight educational and labor market

advantages vis-à-vis their non-veteran counterparts (Angrist & Krueger, 1994; Settersten, 2006; Schwartz, 1986), Vietnam veterans have lagged behind their non-veteran peers. The size of the effect of Vietnam military service on income has varied considerably among the studies—the differences largely dependent on the method used for identification. Teachman (2004), for instance, concludes that there are significant income losses for Vietnam veterans of 2.6% using a fixed effects framework. Similarly, Angrist (1990) employs an instrumental variable (IV) regression using the draft lottery instrument and finds significant earnings losses for the 1950-1952 birth cohorts for years 1969-1984 among white veterans (although not for nonwhite veterans). A follow-up to Angrist (1990) by Angrist and Chen (2008) shows that, by the time of the Decennial Census, the "adverse consequences of Vietnam-era military service appear to have faded" (25).

While studying the impact of military service on income is important, Conley (2001a) shows that wealth—specifically in the form of housing wealth, which makes up a majority of family equity for the mode of households in the United States—may be a crucial "material mechanism by which socio-economic and racial advantage is transmitted from one generation to the next." (264). For example, Conley (1999) shows that after parental education, parental wealth level during childhood is the best predictor of college enrollment and completion. Conley (2001b) also shows that wealth has an analytically distinct effect on educational outcomes beyond the impact of income alone. Thus, concentrating on income offers us only a partial picture of the possible material disparities generated by military service. To date, there is only one study that tackles the impact of military service on wealth accumulation. Fitzgerald (2006) uses data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate the impact of military service on wealth

accumulation and finds that, for Korea and Vietnam veterans, there is a substantial penalty for each additional year of service on total net worth and on non-housing net worth. Due to data limitations, however, Fitzgerald's study is vulnerable to selection bias and may be overestimating the military service effect.

These are important outcomes of study both in their own right and because of their potential association with socio-economic or health outcomes both for the veterans themselves and their family members (particularly offspring). For example, recent research in urban sociology highlights the possible impact of increased residential mobility at both the individual- and community-level. Klinenberg (2003) documents how the large-scale out-migration of family members left senior African Americans (primarily men) in Chicago's inner-city vulnerable to heat-related mortality during the 1995 heat wave. Sampson (1988; 1991) finds that residential stability significantly increases one's total number of friends / acquaintances, participation in social activities, and subsequently, one's integration into the surrounding community, which may provide support in times of need. Yet, little work has been done on the migration pattern of Vietnam veterans. Cowper and Longino suggest that "veterans as a whole are more mobile and move longer distances than the general population of the same age" (1992, p. 44), but do not provide information on the Vietnam veteran cohort in particular. Given the strong relationship between residential stability and integration into one's community, we might expect increased migration among veterans to negatively influence quality of life through social isolation.

One might also expect that the stresses of military service have a negative impact on the duration and health of intimate relationships. However, Ruger et al. (2002) found

that World War II veterans did not have higher marital dissolutions rates than their non-veteran peers. At the same time, researchers have also shown that the effect of military service on marital dissolution likely varies with period of service. For example, Ruger et al. (*ibid*) showed that, when comparing martial stability for World War II veterans with veterans of the Korean War, the differences were striking. Korean War veterans had "more than twice the dissolution rate of the WWII veterans" (98). The exact reasons for the divergence in dissolution rates between veterans of different conflicts are unclear. The researchers put forth the "social interaction hypothesis"—the idea that "a social milieu" that "a soldier comes home to….may affect the durability of his marriage" (90). If this does indeed turn out to be the explanation for the increased dissolution rates among Korean veterans, we would certainly expect that marital dissolution rates among Vietnam veterans to be high given the social climate to which these soldiers returned and possible ongoing social stigma they may have experienced throughout their lives.

In addition to modeling these new outcomes, we will also seek to discover whether these effects vary by race (c.f. Phillips et al. 1992). There are adequate reasons to think that for non-whites any negative effects of draft exposure may be mitigated or even reversed. Angrist (1991), for example, uses the same draft lottery strategy we pursue here and finds that there is no earnings penalty for non-white veterans in contrast to the 15 percent loss in lifetime earnings for white veterans of the Vietnam era. Likewise, with respect to health and mortality, London and Wilmoth (2006) use a nationally representative longitudinal dataset and find that African Americans without military service were more likely to have died than comparable African Americans with no military service over a ten-year period. Further, a military service premium for black men

does not appear to be limited to earnings and mortality outcomes. Sampson and Laub (1996) find that recruits from economically disadvantaged backgrounds (where blacks are overrepresented) benefit from overseas military service on later life indicators of socio-economic status. Lundquist (2008) finds that attitudinal measures of job satisfaction also reflect the perceived benefits of military life for minority groups. Black men and women as well as Latinos and Latinas consistently rank themselves higher on self-reported measures of quality of life and job satisfaction than do white males. However, other research has documented that black veterans are more positively selected vis-à-vis their non-veteran counterparts than are white veterans (Lundquist 2006) raising the possibility that selection may be driving these results (though not Angrist's). Evading this concern, Brown (2006) examines the racial test score gap among the offspring of military personnel and finds that among those who are educated on base in military schools, racial disparities are significantly smaller than in military offspring sent to local civilian schools, lending support to the notion that the mitigation of racial inequalities in the military is not merely a consequence of differential selection into the armed forces. The current study will further our understanding of whether military service has differential—and perhaps inequality reducing—effects on blacks and whites net of selection into the military. (Death rates during the war itself were similar for blacks and whites, mitigating any concerns of differential wartime survival gradients [Rohlfs 2007].)

Taken together, the proposed analyses provide a comprehensive study of the effects—16 to 32 years post-War—of the draft lottery on family and household processes. Understanding the long-term, later-life outcomes that result from military service (and/or exposure to risk of conscription) in a time of war is key to designing

effective public health and social service interventions for this potentially vulnerable

population. Conversely, if the treatment reduces risks for some populations (such as

blacks) then the military deserves to be further investigated as a model for improving the

family conditions of certain civilian groups such as African Americans.

Methods

Since for the 1969 draft lottery it has been demonstrated that the lottery was not

entirely random due to incomplete mixing of the balls that had been pre-sorted by birth

month (Feinberg 1971), we run a 2SLS model in which we control for a vector (**X**) that

includes indicator variables for month (and year) of birth. The first-stage regression (a

linear probability model) of this 2SLS approach is thus:

$$veteranstat^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 draftstatus + \beta_2 \mathbf{X} + \varepsilon_1 \qquad (1)$$

Where veteranstat* is coded "1" for having served in the military and "0" otherwise and

where "draft status" is coded "1" for draft eligible males and "0" for draft ineligible men.

Next, we estimate the following second stage regression (2). Both stages deploy a linear

probability model (as does our "naïve" OLS approach for comparison) even though the

distribution is not normal for most of our outcomes; Heckman and Macurdy (1985) argue

that this is the ideal specification when faced with a set of simultaneous equations where

the instrument, the endogenous regressor, and the dependent measure are dichotomous:

$$y = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 veteranstat^* + \gamma_2 \mathbf{X} + u_1 \qquad (2)$$

where "veteranstat*" contains the predicted values generated by the first-stage regression,

X is our vector of month and year of birth dummies, and y is some outcome of interest. In

this regression, the coefficient on "veteranstat*" will yield the true or pure effect of

veteran status on our outcome, if the assumptions we have detailed earlier hold (along

with other standard assumptions of IV regression such as monotonicity and SUTVA).

Other than month of birth, we do not need to include another vector of control variables, because our assumption is that draft status will be truly random and thus orthogonal to standard socio-demographic variables (at the time of lottery), which we exclude due to concerns of endogeneity. That is, any variation in, say, education or earnings related to our instrument would likely be resulting from the treatment. Thus, we present a reduced form equation that will not shed light on the extent to which these behavioral responses are moderating or mediating our estimate of veteran status. However, they will be interesting in their own right as a summative measure of the effect of exposure to draft risk on the outcomes (as opposed to military service per se).

The 2000 Decennial Census and American Community Survey 2005 enable us to estimate the impact of military service via the draft on a variety of outcomes for the non-institutionalized population. Both datasets include information on a respondent's date of birth and veteran status. Using the birth date information, we will first code all men in our dataset with draft lottery numbers. Next, we will code all men either draft eligible or ineligible based on the highest lottery number called to service for that particular draft year. The 1953 birth cohort provides a counter-factual to detect the impact of other behavioral mechanisms (short of conscription) on our outcomes of interest; these include voluntary enlistment in the face of likely conscription as well as mechanisms to evade conscription such as through medical decertification, flight from the United States, failure to report for induction, conscientious objector status, to name a few.

Results

For each set of outcomes detailed below, the final analyses included two-stage least squares estimates of military service (i.e. causal estimates of military service using the Vietnam-draft lottery as the instrumental variable) and ordinary least squares estimates (i.e. naïve estimates). We also analyzed each outcome by race category.

Marital Stability: We estimated the effect of military service on the probability of divorce conditional on having been married (a comparison of currently married versus divorced or separated). (We also modeled probability of ever marrying; these results were not significant and are not shown.) We begin by describing our "naive" estimates given by our OLS models and then proceed to discuss the causal estimates derived from the IV regressions. For our first outcome (*everdivorced*), we estimate the effect of military service on the probability of divorce conditional on having been married. This outcome compares those who are currently divorced with the married and separated samples, while those who have never been married or are widowed are excluded. In our OLS models, the effect of veteran status has a strong and significant effect on the probability of divorcing across all race categories. In particular, we find that veteran status increases the probability of divorcing by as much as 3% for the full sample. The same holds true for a slight variant of our first marital stability outcome (*everseparated*), which includes those who have separated in the "divorced" category. The pattern appears in both the Census and ACS samples, although the results for blacks and others in the ACS sample are not significant, likely due to the smaller sample size.

In our instrumental variable models the effect of veteran status disappears in the Census sample. More interestingly, the IV results from the 2005 ACS actually suggest that military service *reduces* the probability of divorce, with the effect concentrated

among white veterans. Again, since these estimates use random assignment through the draft lottery, the effect is closer to a true causal effect of service on marital stability. It should also be noted that, while not significant, the results do also suggest that the direction of the effect is opposite for blacks. In other words, military service appears to increase the probability of divorce for this population.

Residential Stability: We estimated the effect of military service on the probability of having moved at all in the past five years (both local and long-distance moves). Although we had hypothesized that veterans may have significantly different migration patterns than the non-service population, our preliminary analyses indicate that, in fact, veterans are not more mobile than their non-service peers (as indicated by the *move* variable). For both samples, the OLS estimates indicate a significant positive effect for the combined sample. However, this effect once again vanishes in our IV regression models for the 2000 Census. For the 2005 ACS, our results mirror those for marital stability. The effect changes sign and approaches significance for the total sample, with the most pronounced effect being concentrated among whites. For other races, sample sizes likely inhibit detection of an effect of military service on residential stability.

Housing Tenure: A third analysis highlighted the potential effect of military service on the probability of owning the primary residence home versus renting. Since homeownership among the veteran population has been heavily subsidized by government programs such as the VA-Home Loan Program, this outcome has direct implications for the evaluation of existing policies. As such, we compare men who own their homes outright or with a mortgage with those who rent or do not pay rent (*ownshome*). (If we restrict the analysis to heads of households, results do not change.)

For both the Census and the ACS, our OLS models indicate that veteran status *reduces* the probability of owning one's home. These effects are, again, concentrated among white veterans (where our sample sizes are largest). In the IV models, however, the effect of military service diminishes and no longer reaches statistical significance for the race categories combined or separately. Given the vast subsidies to homeownership granted to veterans, it is instructive that our OLS models are negative—suggesting that the service population is still less likely to own a home—while our IV models suggest no causal effect. In either case, it appears that these subsidies have not worked to boost homeownership rates for veterans above the non-service population, although it could be that, without such subsidies, veterans might lag far behind.

Extended Family Living: As another indicator of financial or family instability, we also modeled several novel outcomes that would shed light on the living situations of the Vietnam-era population as it ages. In particular, we modeled the probability of living with a non-spouse relative (including a parent, child, uncle, aunt, and so on). In addition, we also modeled the probability of having an adult child (over the age of twenty-two) in the residence, for Vietnam eligible males who were also heads-of-household (thus the smaller sample size for this analysis given the restriction to heads-of-household).

These models yielded some of the most intriguing findings. For the extended family living outcome (*withfamily*), our OLS results suggest that, for the total sample, veteran status reduces the probability of living with a non-spouse family member. The effect is the same, although smaller, in the IV models. The effect, once again, appears to be concentrated among whites, although the direction of the effect is the same for blacks.

For others, however, the 2005 ACS results indicate that military service significantly increases the probability of living in an extended family household.

Similar patterns emerge for the adult child (*kidhome*) outcome. This measures something different than extended family residence since it may capture intergenerational effects on SES attainment. Failure to leave the parental home in young adulthood in a culture like that in the U.S. is seen in life course research as an indicator of poor education or labor market outcomes. While the OLS estimates for the 2000 Census suggest that military service may increase the chances of having an adult child in the household, the IV results show the opposite valence, suggesting a significant decrease in this probability. For the Census models, this effect is once again concentrated among whites, although the sign on the veteran status instrument is the same for blacks. In the 2005 ACS, we find further evidence that the effect of military service differs by race— for "others", we find that military service increases the probability of having an adult child in the household quite significantly—by 36 percentage points.

Discussion

Prior researchers have deployed the Vietnam-era draft lottery as an instrument to estimate causal effects of military service on health and income. This research has shown that effects of veteran status on mortality and earnings that appeared shortly after the war seem to have dissipated by 2000. While these are important outcomes to economists, by focusing on them, researchers may be neglecting an area of life that could be more sensitive to the psychological effects of military service: household and family life. In the present study we use the same IV approach to model the causal impact of Vietnam-era military service on four novel outcomes: residential stability, marital stability, housing tenure and extended family living arrangements. In analysis of the 2000 U.S.

Census and the 2005 American Community Survey, we find that veteran status has no effect on housing tenure or residential stability. However, in the ACS sample, being a veteran appears to lower the likelihood of marital disruption. And results for extended family living arrangements appear to change signs across the two samples. Meanwhile, results tend to be strongest for whites.

While we did demonstrate that there appear to be some—if limited—long term effects of Vietnam era military service, these are modest at best, in line with an emerging picture of dissipating effects 25 years plus after the end of combat. The most pronounced effect is the decreased likelihood for white veterans to move, divorce or separate in the 2005 ACS sample (though not in the 2000 Census). This suggests a potentially positive effect of military conscription on family and residential stability for this group that may or may not be mediated by education (or military service directly). Most puzzling is the different results that we obtain for the two samples: Besides residential and marital stability, the effect of extended kin residence is, in fact, opposite (and significantly so) in each sample. In the 2000 Census, the effect is negative for both having an adult child living at home as well as for living with other extended kin. However, in the 2005 ACS, the IV results are positive for adult child living at home; and for "other race" the coefficient is particularly strong (.36) for this outcome as well as for extended family co-residence (.22). These differences across samples may be a result of different points in the business cycle or may be due to random fluctuation or may represent the result of aging populations. Future researchers should examine future ACS samples to determine whether or not effects shown in 2005 are sampling artifacts or emerging trends.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 2000 Census sample, 1950-1952 birth cohorts by race category

	All		White		Black		Other	
	Non-veteran	*Veteran*	*Non-veteran*	*Veteran*	*Non-veteran*	*Veteran*	*Non-veteran*	*Veteran*
Draft Eligible	0.33	0.53	0.32	0.54	0.35	0.48	0.33	0.49
0-8 Years	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.07	0.03
9-12 Years	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.21	0.10	0.14	0.08
H.S. Graduate	0.27	0.33	0.26	0.34	0.33	0.31	0.27	0.29
Some College	0.22	0.30	0.23	0.30	0.20	0.35	0.23	0.33
Associate's	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.11	0.05	0.10	0.07	0.12
Bachelor's	0.20	0.12	0.21	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.13	0.10
College+	0.13	0.06	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.05
Earnings	44154.97	37058.08	46416.62	38257.96	26925.01	28681.93	32164.52	30236.76
withfamily	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.14	0.10	0.10	0.07
moved	0.30	0.35	0.30	0.35	0.35	0.39	0.35	0.40
ownshome	0.83	0.81	0.85	0.83	0.65	0.66	0.72	0.70
N	593725	187345	519160	162565	53450	16740	21115	8045
kidhome	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
N	537695	171365	478095	150425	41795	13880	17810	7065
everdivorced	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.19	0.23	0.25	0.21	0.24
everseparated	0.19	0.22	0.18	0.21	0.32	0.33	0.25	0.28
N	525935	173050	466330	151470	41845	14365	17760	7215

Note: All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with Census confidentiality guidelines. Proportions are calculated with rounded sample sizes.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for 2005 ACS sample, 1950-1952 birth cohorts by race category

	All		White		Black		Other	
	Non-veteran	*Veteran*	*Non-veteran*	*Veteran*	*Non-veteran*	*Veteran*	*Non-veteran*	*Veteran*
Draft Eligible	0.33	0.54	0.33	0.55	0.34	0.50	0.32	0.51
0-8 Years	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.02
9-12 Years	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.17	0.06	0.11	0.06
H.S. Graduate	0.26	0.33	0.26	0.34	0.35	0.32	0.28	0.31
Some College	0.21	0.29	0.21	0.28	0.20	0.32	0.22	0.29
Associate's	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.12	0.06	0.12	0.08	0.15
Bachelor's	0.21	0.13	0.22	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.16	0.11
College+	0.15	0.07	0.16	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.07
Earnings	49562.2	39260.7	51661.91	40637.28	28573.03	26335.77	35358.26	31628.05
withfamily	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.11	0.07	0.07	0.05
moved	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.10
ownshome	0.87	0.86	0.89	0.87	0.69	0.69	0.79	0.77
N	61060	18720	54960	16655	4250	1350	1850	710
kidhome	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.14
N	56590	17555	51455	15725	3515	1190	1615	640
everdivorced	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.17	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.25
everseparated	0.18	0.20	0.17	0.19	0.31	0.32	0.25	0.28
N	54410	17315	49460	15500	3350	1175	1600	645

Note: All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with Census confidentiality guidelines. Proportions are calculated with rounded sample sizes.

Table 3: Military service effect estimates on extended family living, home ownership, marital stability and residential stability using 2000 Census data for 1950-1952 birth cohorts only by race

	All		White		Black		Other	
Outcome	*OLS*	*IV*	*OLS*	*IV*	*OLS*	*IV*	*OLS*	*IV*
kidhome	0.010***	-0.010*	0.012***	-0.009*	-0.007*	-0.044	0.002	0.043
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.031)	(0.005)	(0.036)
withfamily	-0.010***	-0.006*	-0.007***	-0.007*	-0.038***	-0.030	-0.026***	0.024
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.029)	(0.004)	(0.030)
ownshome	-0.026***	-0.002	-0.028***	0.000	-0.036***	-0.001	-0.018***	0.010
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.040)	(0.006)	(0.048)
moved	0.051***	0.011	0.051***	0.011	0.045***	0.010	0.054***	-0.008
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.051)
everdivorced	0.027***	0.003	0.027***	0.003	0.022***	-0.044	0.027***	0.064
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.038)	(0.006)	(0.045)
everseparated	0.030***	0.004	0.030***	0.003	0.017***	-0.034	0.029***	0.067
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.048)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 ; Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include controls for state of birth and birth cohort.

Table 4: Military service effect estimates on extended family living, home ownership, marital stability and residential stability using 2005 ACS data for 1950-1952 birth cohorts only by race

Outcome	*All*		*White*		*Black*		*Other*	
	OLS	*IV*	*OLS*	*IV*	*OLS*	*IV*	*OLS*	*IV*
kidhome	-0.003	0.028*	-0.002	0.015	-0.017	0.060	0.015	0.357***
	0.003	0.016	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.083)	(0.016)	(0.116)
withfamily	-0.009***	0.010	-0.006***	0.001	-0.040***	0.059	-0.024**	0.220***
	0.002	0.009	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.074)	(0.011)	(0.077)
ownshome	-0.020***	-0.010	-0.020***	0.000	-0.004	-0.158	-0.018	-0.090
	0.003	0.017	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.113)	(0.018)	(0.119)
moved	0.015***	0.005	0.016***	-0.003*	-0.008	0.051	0.010	-0.009
	0.002	0.012	(0.002)	(0.015)	0.009	0.073	0.013	0.082
everdivorced	0.015***	-0.033*	0.016***	-0.044**	0.007	0.165	0.001	-0.008
	0.003	0.018	(0.003)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.107)	(0.019)	(0.117)
everseparated	0.018***	-0.044**	0.018***	-0.052***	0.009	0.096	0.012	-0.010
	0.003	0.019	(0.003)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.117)	(0.020)	(0.122)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include controls for state of birth and birth cohort.

Work Cited

Angrist, J. (1990). "Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social Security Administrative Records." American Economic Review 80(3): 313-36.

Angrist, J. (1991). "The Draft Lottery and Voluntary Enlistment in the Vietnam Era." Journal of the American Statistical Association 86(415): 584-95.

Angrist, J. (1998). "Estimating the Labor Market Impact of Voluntary Military Service Using Social Security Data on Military Applicants." Econometrica 66(2): 249-88.

Angrist, J. and S. Chen. (2008). "Long-Term Consequences of Vietnam-Era Conscription: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings." NBER Working Paper #13411.

Angrist, J. and A. B. Krueger (1994). "Why Do World War II Veterans Earn More than Nonveterans?" Journal of Labor Economics 12(1): 74-97.

Brown, Charles (2006). "Relatively Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces: Impacts on Children of Military Families." Unpublished manuscript. University of Michigan, Department of Economics.

Conley, D. (1999). Being Black, Living in the Red. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Conley, D. (2001a). "A Room With a View or a Room of One's Own? Housing and Social Stratification." Sociological Forum 16(2): 263-280.

Conley, D. (2001b). "Capital for College: Parental Assets and Postsecondary Schooling." Sociology of Education 74(Jan): 59-72.

Conley, D. and J. Heerwig. In Press. The Long-Term Effects of Military Conscription on Mortality: Estimates from the Vietnam-era Draft Lottery. *Demography*.

Cowper, D. and C. Longino (1992). "Veteran Interstate Migration and VA Health Service Use." The Gerontologist 32(1): 44-50.

Feinberg, S.E. (1971), "Randomization and Social Affairs: The 1970 Draft Lottery", Science, 171, 255-261.

Fitzgerald, K. (2006). "The Effect of Military Service on Wealth Accumulation." Research on Aging 28(1): 56-83.

Grimard, F. and D. Parent. (2007). "Education and smoking: Were Vietnam War draft avoiders also more likely to avoid smoking?" Journal of Health Economics 26(5):896-926.

Hearst, N., T. Newman, et al. (1986). "A Randomized Natural Experiment." New England Journal of Medicine. (314): 620-4.

Heckman, J.J. and T.E. Macurdy. 1985. A simultaneous equations linear probability model. *The Canadian Journal of Economics*. 85:28-37.

Klinenberg, Eric. (2002). Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

London, A. and J. Wilmoth (2006). "Military Service and (Dis)Continuity in the Life Course." Research on Aging 28(1): 135-59.

Lundquist, Jennifer Hickes. (2006). "When race makes no difference: Marriage and the military." Social Forces. 83:731-757.

Lundquist, Jennifer Hickes. (2008). "Ethnic and Gender Satisfaction in the Military: The Effect of a Meritocratic Institution." *Forthcoming*.

Phillips, R., P. Andrisani, et al. (1992). "The Economic Returns to Military Service: Race-Ethnic Differences." Social Science Quarterly 73(2): 340-59.

Rohlfs, C. (2007). "Does Combat Exposure Make You a More Violent or Criminal Person? Evidence from the Pre-Lottery Vietnam Draft," Working Paper. Maxwell School. Syracuse University.

Ruger, W., S. Wilson, et al. (2002). "Warfare and Welfare: Military Service, Combat, and Marital Dissolution." Armed Forces & Society 29(1): 85-107.

Sampson, R. (1988). "Local Friendship Ties and Community Attachment in Mass Society: A Multilevel Systemic Model." American Sociological Review 53(5): 766-779.

Sampson, R. (1991). "Linking the Micro- and Macrolevel Dimensions of Community Social Organization." Social Forces 70(1): 43-64.

Sampson, R. and J. Laub (1996). "Socioeconomic Achievement in the Life Course of Disadvantaged Men: Military Service as a Turning Point, Circa 1940-1965." American Sociological Review 61(3): 347-67.

Schwartz, S. (1986). "The Relative Earnings of Vietnam and Korean-Era Veterans." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 39(4): 564-72.

Settersten, R. (2006). "When Nations Call: How Wartime Military Service Matters for the Life Course and Aging." Research on Aging 28(1): 12-36.

Teachman, J. (2004). "Military Service during the Vietnam Era: Were There Consequences for Subsequent Civilian Earnings?" Social Forces 83(2): 709-30.