TY  - JOUR
AU  - Al-Ubaydli,Omar
AU  - Gneezy,Uri
AU  - Lee,Min Sok
AU  - List,John A.
TI  - Toward an understanding of the relative strengths of positive and negative reciprocity
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 16547
PY  - 2010
Y2  - November 2010
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16547
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16547.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Omar Al-Ubaydli
Department of Economics and Mercatus Center
George Mason University
E-Mail: omar@omar.ec

Uri Gneezy
Rady School of Management
University of California - San Diego
Otterson Hall, Room 4S136
9500 Gilman Drive #0553
La Jolla, CA 92093-0553
Tel: (858) 534-4312
Fax: (858) 534-0745
E-Mail: ugneezy@ucsd.edu

min sok. lee
The Kenneth and Anne Griffin Foundation
E-Mail: Min.Lee@griffin-foundation.com

John List
Department of Economics
University of Chicago
1126 East 59th
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 301/405-1288
Fax: 301/314-9091
E-Mail: jlist@uchicago.edu
AB  - A stylized fact is that agents respond more acutely to negative than positive stimuli. Such findings have generated insights on mechanism-design, have been featured prominently in policymaking, and more generally have led to discussions of whether preferences are defined over consumption levels or changes in consumption. This study reconsiders this stylized fact. In doing so, it provides insights into an important domain wherein positive stimuli induce a greater response than negative stimuli: a principal-agent game with reputational considerations and with the agent on the market's short end. This common setting represents an important feature of labor markets with involuntary unemployment.
ER  -