TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hall,Robert E.
AU  - Krueger,Alan B.
TI  - Evidence on the Determinants of the Choice between Wage Posting and Wage Bargaining
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 16033
PY  - 2010
Y2  - May 2010
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16033
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16033.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Robert E. Hall
Hoover Institution
Stanford University
Stanford, CA  94305-6010
Tel: 650/723-2215
E-Mail: rehall@gmail.com

Alan B. Krueger
Industrial Relations Section
Firestone Library
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544
Tel: 609/258-4046
Fax: 609/258-2907
E-Mail: akrueger@princeton.edu
M2  - featured in NBER digest on 2010-09-01
AB  - Some workers bargain with prospective employers before accepting a job. Others face a posted wage as a take-it-or-leave-it opportunity. Theories of wage formation point to substantial differences in labor-market equilibrium between bargained and posted wages. We surveyed a representative sample of U.S. workers to inquire about the wage determination process at the time they were hired into their current or most recent jobs. A third of the respondents reported bargaining over pay before accepting their current jobs. About a third of workers had precise information about pay when they first met with their employers, a sign of wage posting. About 40 percent of workers could have remained on their earlier jobs at the time they accepted their current jobs, indicating a more favorable bargaining position than is held by unemployed job-seekers. Our analysis of the distribution of wages shows that wage dispersion is higher among workers who bargained for their wages. Wages are higher among bargainers than non-bargainers, after adjusting for the differing compositions of the groups. Our results on wages give substantial support to the job-ladder model--workers who had the option to remain at their earlier jobs when they took their current jobs can earn higher wages than those without that option.
ER  -