Tractability in Incentive Contracting
---- Acknowledgements -----
For helpful comments, we thank three anonymous referees, the Editor (Stephen Morris), Andy Abel, Frankin Allen, Heski Bar-Isaac, Patrick Cheridito, Peter DeMarzo, Ingolf Dittmann, Florian Ederer, Chris Evans, Itay Goldstein, Gary Gorton, Narayana Kocherlakota, Ernst Maug, Holger Mueller, Christine Parlour, David Pearce, Canice Prendergast, Michael Roberts, Tomasz Sadzik, Yuliy Sannikov, Nick Souleles, Rob Stambaugh, Luke Taylor, Rob Tumarkin, Bilge Yilmaz, and seminar participants at AEA, Five Star, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard-MIT Organizational Economics, Minneapolis Fed, Northwestern, NYU, Princeton, Richmond Fed, Stanford, Toulouse, WFA, Wharton and Wisconsin. We thank Andrei Savotchkine and Qi Liu for excellent research assistance. AE is grateful for the hospitality of the NYU Stern School of Business, where part of this research was carried out. XG thanks the NSF for financial support. This paper was formerly circulated under the title "Tractability and Detail-Neutrality in Incentive Contracting." The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.