@techreport{NBERw15540,
 title = "Bayesian Persuasion",
 author = "Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "15540",
 year = "2009",
 month = "November",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w15540",
 abstract = {When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a persuasion mechanism that strictly benefits Sender. We characterize the optimal mechanism. Finally, we analyze several examples that illustrate the applicability of our results.},
}