@techreport{NBERw14765,
 title = "Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions",
 author = "Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin and Paul Milgrom",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "14765",
 year = "2009",
 month = "March",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w14765",
 abstract = {We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars.},
}