TY  - JOUR
AU  - Brander,James A.
AU  - Spencer,Barbara J.
TI  - Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 1464
PY  - 1984
Y2  - September 1984
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1464
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1464.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
James A. Brander
University of British Columbia
Faculty of Commerce
2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z2  CANADA
Tel: 604/822-8483
Fax: 604/822-8477
E-Mail: brander@sauder.ubc.ca

Barbara J. Spencer
University of British Columbia
Sauder School of Business
2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC  V6T 1Z2
CANADA
Tel: 604/822-8479
Fax: 604/822-8477
E-Mail: barbara.spencer@sauder.ubc.ca
AB  - Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable international markets. In such a world export subsidies can appear as attractive policy tools, from a national point of view, because they improve the relative position of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign firms, enabling it to expand its market share and earn greater profits. In effect, subsidies change the initial conditions of the game that firms play. The terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because, under imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports. International noncooperative equilibriumis characterized by such subsidies on the part of exporting nations, even though they are jointly suboptimal.
ER  -