TY  - JOUR
AU  - Berman,Eli
AU  - Shapiro,Jacob N.
AU  - Felter,Joseph H.
TI  - Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14606
PY  - 2008
Y2  - December 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14606
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14606.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Eli Berman
Department of Economics, 508
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA  92093
Tel: 858/534-2858
Fax: 858/534-7040
E-Mail: elib@ucsd.edu

Jacob N. Shapiro
Woodrow Wilson School of Public Policy
and International Affairs
Princeton University
Robertson Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
Tel: 608-258-2256
Fax: 609-258-0482
E-Mail: jns@princeton.edu

Joseph Felter
Hoover Institution
434 Galvez Mall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
E-Mail: felter@hoover.stanford.edu
AB  - We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory‘s predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the "surge" began in 2007.
ER  -