TY  - JOUR
AU  - Blinder,Alan S.
AU  - Rosen,Harvey S.
TI  - Notches
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 1416
PY  - 1985
Y2  - September 1985
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1416
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1416.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alan S. Blinder
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
Tel: 609/258-3358
Fax: 609/258-5398
E-Mail: blinder@princeton.edu

Harvey S. Rosen
Department of Economics
Fisher Hall
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
Tel: 609/258-4022
Fax: 609/258-6419
E-Mail: HSR@princeton.edu
AB  - Economists have an instinctively negative reaction to any government program that creates a "notch," that is, a discontinuity in a budget constraint. For example, welfare programs like public housing are structured so that a finite lump of benefits is lost all at once when a household's income crosses a certain threshhold. Such notches deserve their bad reputation --they effectively impose a high marginal tax rate over a small income range, which no doubt discourages work and promotes welfare dependency. However,this paper argues that in other contexts, tax and subsidy plans with notches should at least be considered as serious contenders when public policy seeks to encourage or discourage some activity. Using simulations,we show how notch schemes can dominate traditional linear schemes using a standard efficiency criterion.
ER  -