@techreport{NBERw13797,
 title = "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods",
 author = "Hanming Fang and Peter Norman",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "13797",
 year = "2008",
 month = "February",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w13797",
 abstract = {This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents' valuations are private information. For a parametric class of problems with binary valuations, we demonstrate that the optimal mechanism involves bundling if a regularity condition, akin to a hazard rate condition, on the distribution of valuations is satisfied. Bundling alleviates the free riding problem in large economies in two ways: first, it may increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one; second, it decreases the extent of use exclusions. If the regularity condition is violated, then the optimal solution replicates the separate provision outcome.},
}