TY  - JOUR
AU  - Spiller,Pablo T.
AU  - Gely,Rafael
TI  - Strategic Judicial Decision Making
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 13321
PY  - 2007
Y2  - August 2007
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13321
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13321.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Pablo T. Spiller
University of California
Walter A. Haas School of Business
Faculty Bldg. 593
Berkeley, CA 94720
Tel: 510/642-1502
Fax: 510/642-2826
E-Mail: spiller@haas.berkeley.edu

Rafael Gely
Law School, University of Cincinnati
Clifton Avenue & Calhoun Street
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0040
E-Mail: rafael.gely@uc.edu
AB  - This survey paper starts from the basic, and intuitive, assumption that judges are human and as such, can be modeled in the same fashion we model politicians, activists, managers: driven by well-defined preferences, behaving in a purposive and forward-looking fashion.  We explore, then, the role politics play in judicial decision-making. We provide a brief overview of what is called the "strategic approach," compare it to alternative approaches to understand judicial behavior, and offer some concluding thoughts about the future of positive analyses of judicial decision-making.
ER  -